! 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



THE 

NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



BY 

LOTHROP STODDARD, A.M., Ph.D. (Harv.) 

AUTHOR OF *' THE RISING TIDE OF COLOR," 
" THE STAKES OF THE WAR," 
"PRESENT DAT EUROPE: ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND," 
" THE FRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO," ETC. 



WITH MAP 



NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
■18*1 




Copyright, 1921, bt 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

Published September, 1921 
Reprinted October, December, 1921 



■d-M 



PRINTED AT 
THE SCKBNEK PRESS 
KEW YORK, TJ. S. A. 



PREFACE 



The entire world of Islam is to-day in profound fer- 
ment. From Morocco to China and from Turkestan 
to the Congo, the 250,000,000 followers of the Prophet 
Mohammed are stirring to new ideas, new impulses, new- 
aspirations. A gigantic transformation is taking place 
whose results must affect all mankind. 

This transformation was greatly stimulated by the 
late war. But it began long before. More than a hun- 
dred years ago the seeds were sown, and ever since then 
it has been evolving; at first slowly and obscurely; later 
more rapidly and perceptibly; until to-day, under the 
stimulus of Armageddon, it has burst into sudden and 
startling bloom. 

The story of that strange and dramatic evolution I 
have endeavored to tell in the following pages. Con- 
sidering in turn its various aspects — religious, cultural, 
political, economic, social — I have tried to portray their 
genesis and development, to analyze their character, and 
to appraise their potency. While making due allowance 
for local differentiations, the intimate correlation and 
underlying unity of the various movements have ever 
been kept in view. 

Although the book deals primarily with the Moslem 
world, it necessarily includes the non-MosJem Hindu 



vi 



PREFACE 



elements of India. The field covered is thus virtually 
the entire Near and Middle East. The Far East has 
not been directly considered, but parallel developments 
there have been noted and should always be kept in 
mind. 

Lothrop Stoddard. 

Brooeline, Mass., 
May 8, 1921. 



CONTENTS 

PASS 

Introduction: The Decline and Fall of the Old 

Islamic World 3 

THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

CHAPTBB 

I. The Mohammedan Revival 25 

II. Pan-Islamism 45 

III. The Influence of the West 90 

IV. Political Change 131 

V. Nationalism 157 

VI. Nationalism in India 239 

VII. Economic Change 268 

VIII. Social Change 296 

IX. Social Unrest and Bolshevism ...... 323 

Conclusion . 355 

Index 357 



MAP 

The World of Islam . . . , . , , . . at end of volume 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



INTRODUCTION 

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD 
ISLAMIC WORLD 

The rise of Islam is perhaps the most amazing event in 
human history. Springing from a land and a people alike 
previously negligible, Islam spread within a century over 
half the earth, shattering great empires, overthrowing 
long-established religions, remoulding the souls of races, 
and building up a whole new world — the world of Islam. 

The closer we examine this development the more 
extraordinary does it appear. The other great religions 
won their way slowly, by painful struggle, and finally 
triumphed with the aid of powerful monarchs converted 
to the new faith. Christianity had its Constantine, 
Buddhism its Asoka, and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each 
lending to his chosen cult the mighty force of secular 
authority. Not so Islam. Arising in a desert land 
sparsely inhabited by a nomad race previously undis- 
tinguished in human annals, Islam sallied forth on its 
great adventure with the slenderest human backing and 
against the heaviest material odds. Yet Islam triumphed 
with seemingly miraculous ease, and a couple of genera- 
tions saw the Fiery Crescent borne victorious from the 
Pyrenees to the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central 
Asia to the deserts of Central Africa. 

3 



4 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



This amazing success was due to a number of con- 
tributing factors, chief among them being the character 
of the Arab race, the nature of Mohammed's teaching, 
and the general state of the contemporary Eastern world. 
Undistinguished though the Arabs had hitherto been, 
they were a people of remarkable potentialities, which 
were at that moment patently seeking self-realization. 
For several generations before Mohammed, Arabia had 
been astir with exuberant vitality. The Arabs had out- 
grown their ancestral paganism and were instinctively 
yearning for better things. Athwart this seething fer- 
ment of mind and spirit Islam rang like a trumpet-call. 
Mohammed, an Arab of the Arabs, was the very incarna- 
tion of the soul of his race. Preaching a simple, austere 
monotheism, free from priestcraft or elaborate doctrinal 
trappings, he tapped the well-springs of religious zeal 
always present in the Semitic heart. Forgetting the 
chronic rivalries and blood-feuds which had consumed 
their energies in internecine strife, and welded into a glow- 
ing unity by the fire of their new-found faith, the Arabs 
poured forth from their deserts to conquer the earth for 
Allah, the One True God. 

Thus Islam, like the resistless breath of the sirocco, 
the desert wind, swept out of Arabia and encountered — 
a spiritual vacuum. Those neighboring Byzantine and 
Persian Empires, so imposing to the, casual eye, were 
mere dried husks, devoid of real vitality. Their religions 
were a mockery and a sham. Persia's ancestral cult of 
Zoroaster had degenerated into "Magism" — a pompous 
priestcraft, tyrannical and persecuting, hated and secretly 
despised. As for Eastern Christianity, bedizened with 
the gewgaws of paganism and bedevilled by the mad- 



INTRODUCTION 



5 



dening theological speculations of the decadent Greek 
mind, it had become a repellent caricature of the teachings 
of Christ. Both Magism and Byzantine Christendom 
were riven by great heresies which engendered savage 
persecutions and furious hates. Furthermore, both the 
Byzantine and Persian Empires were harsh despotisms 
which crushed their subjects to the dust and killed out 
all love of country or loyalty to the state. Lastly, the 
two empires had just fought a terrible war from which 
they had emerged mutually bled white and utterly ex- 
hausted. 

Such was the world compelled to face the lava-flood of 
Islam. The result was inevitable. Once the disciplined 
strength of the East Roman legions and the Persian 
cuirassiers had broken before the fiery onslaught of the 
fanatic sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no 
patriotic resistance. The down-trodden populations pas- 
sively accepted new masters, while the numerous heretics 
actually welcomed the overthrow of persecuting core- 
ligionists whom they hated far worse than their alien 
conquerors. In a short time most of the subject peoples 
accepted the new faith, so refreshingly simple compared 
with their own degenerate cults. The Arabs, in their 
turn, knew how to consolidate their rule. They were no 
bloodthirsty savages, bent solely on loot and destruction. 
On the contrary, they were an innately gifted race, eager 
to learn and appreciative of the cultural gifts which older 
civilizations had to bestow. Intemiarrying freely and 
professing a common belief, conquerors and conquered 
rapidly fused, and from this fusion arose a new civilization 
— the Saracenic civilization, in which the ancient cultures 
of Greece, Rome, and Persia were revitalized by Arab 



6 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



vigor and synthesized by the Arab genius and the Islamic 
spirit. For the first three centuries of its existence 
(circ. 650-1000 A. D.) the realm of Islam was the most 
civilized and progressive portion of the world. Studded 
with splendid cities, gracious mosques, and quiet universi- 
ties where the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved 
and appreciated, the Moslem East offered a striking con- 
trast to the Christian West, then sunk in the night of the 
Dark Ages. 

However, by the tenth century the Saracenic civili- 
zation began to display unmistakable symptoms of decline. 
This decline was at first gradual. Down to the terrible 
disasters of the thirteenth century it still displayed vigor 
and remained ahead of the Christian West. Still, by the 
year 1000 A. D. its golden age was over. For this there 
were several reasons. In the first place, that inveterate 
spirit of faction which has always been the bane of the 
Arab race soon reappeared once more. Rival clans strove 
for the headship of Islam, and their quarrels degenerated 
into bloody civil wars. In this fratricidal strife the fervor 
of the first days cooled, and saintly men like Abu Bekr 
and Omar, Islam's first standard-bearers, gave place to 
worldly minded leaders who regarded their position of 
" Khalifa" 1 as a means to despotic power and self- 
glorification. The seat of government was moved to 
Damascus in Syria, and afterward to Bagdad in Meso- 
potamia. The reason for this was obvious. In Mecca 
despotism was impossible. The fierce, free-born Arabs 
of the desert would tolerate no master, and their innate 
democracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had 
explicitly declared that all Believers were brothers. The 

1 /. e., "Successor." Anglicized into the word "Caliph." 



INTRODUCTION 



7 



Meccan caliphate was a theocratic democracy. Abu 
Bekr and Omar were elected by the people, and held 
themselves responsible to public opinion, subject to the 
divine law as revealed by Mohammed in the Koran. 

But in Damascus, and still more in Bagdad, things were 
different. There the pure-blooded Arabs were only a 
handful among swarms of Syrian and Persian converts 
and "Neo-Arab" mixed-bloods. These people were filled " 
with traditions of despotism and were quite ready to 
yield the caliphs obsequious obedience. The caliphs, in 
their turn, leaned more and more upon these complaisant 
subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers, officials, and 
ultimately soldiers. Shocked and angered, the proud 
Arabs gradually returned to the desert, while the govern- 
ment fell into the well-worn ruts of traditional Oriental 
despotism. When the caliphate was moved to Bagdad 
after the founding of the Abbaside dynasty (750 A. D.), 
Persian influence became preponderant. The famous 
Caliph Haroun-al-Rashid, the hero of the Arabian 
Nights, was a typical Persian monarch, a true successor 
of Xerxes and Chosroes, and as different from Abu Bekr 
or Omar as it is possible to conceive. And, in Bagdad, 
as elsewhere, despotic power was fatal to its possessors. 
Under its blight the " successors" of Mohammed became 
capricious tyrants or degenerate harem puppets, whose 
nerveless hands were wholly incapable of guiding the great 
Moslem Empire. 

The empire, in fact, gradually went to pieces. Shaken 
by the civil wars, bereft of strong leaders, and deprived 
of the invigorating amalgam of the unspoiled desert 
Arabs, political unity could not endure. Everywhere 
there occurred revivals of suppressed racial or particu- 



8 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



larist tendencies. The very rapidity of Islam's expansion 
turned against it, now that the well-springs of that 
expansion were dried up. Islam had made millions of 
converts, of many sects and races, but it had digested 
them very imperfectly. Mohammed had really converted 
the Arabs, because he merely voiced ideas which were 
obscurely germinating in Arab rninds and appealed to 
impulses innate in the Arab blood. When, however, 
Islam was accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinc- 
tively interpreted the Prophet's message according to their, 
particular racial tendencies and cultural backgrounds, 
the result being that primitive Islam was distorted or 
perverted. The most extreme example of this was in 
Persia, where the austere monotheism of Mohammed was 
transmuted into the elaborate mystical cult known as 
Shiism, which presently cut the Persians off from full 
communion with the orthodox Moslem world. The same 
transmutive tendency appears, in lesser degree, in the 
saint-worship of the North African Berbers and in the 
pantheism of the Hindu Moslems — both developments 
which Mohammed would have unquestionably exe- 
crated. 

These doctrinal fissures in Islam were paralleled by the 
disruption of political unity. The first formal split oc- 
curred after the accession of the Abbasides. A member 
of the deposed Ommeyyad family fled to Spain, where he 
set up a rival caliphate at Cordova, recognized as lawful 
not only by the Spanish Moslems but by the Berbers of 
North Africa. Later on another caliphate was set up in 
Egypt — the Fatimite caliphate, resting its title on descent 
from Mohammed's daughter Fatima. As for the Abba- 
side caliphs of Bagdad, they gradually declined in power, 



INTRODUCTION 



9 



until they became mere puppets in the hands of a new 
racial element, the Turks. 

Before describing that shift of power from Neo-Arab 
to Turkish hands which was so momentous for the history 
of the Islamic world, let us first consider the decline in 
cultural and intellectual vigor that set in concurrently 
with the disruption of political and religious unity during 
the later stages of the Neo-Arab period. 

The Arabs of Mohammed's day were a fresh, unspoiled 
people in the full flush of pristine vigor, eager for adven- 
ture and inspired by a high ideal. They had their full 
share of Semitic fanaticism; but, though fanatical, they 
were not bigoted; that is to say, they possessed, not closed, 
but open minds. They held firmly to the tenets of their 
religion, but this religion was extremely simple. The 
core of Mohammed's teaching was theism plus certaiu 
practices. A strict belief in the unity of God; an equally 
strict belief in the divine mission 1 of Mohammed as set 
forth in the Koran, and certain clearly defined duties — 
prayer, ablutions, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage — 
these, and these alone, constituted the Islam of the Arab 
conquerors of the Eastern world. 

So simple a theology could not seriously fetter the 
Arab mind, alert, curious, eager to learn, and ready to 
adjust itself to conditions ampler and more complex than 
those prevailing in the parched environment of the desert. 
Now, not only did the Arabs relish the material advan- 

1 To be carefully distinguished from divinity, Mohammed not only 
did not make any pretensions to divinity, but specifically disclaimed any 
such attributes. He regarded himself as the last of a series of divinely 
inspired prophets, beginning with Adam and extending through Moses 
and Jesus to himself, the mouthpiece of God's last and most perfect revela- 
tion. 



10 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tages and luxuries of the more developed societies which 
they had conquered; they also appreciated the art, litera- 
ture, science, and ideas of the older civilizations. The 
effect of these novel stimuli was the remarkable cultural 
and intellectual flowering which is the glory of Saracenic 
civilization. For a time thought was relatively free and 
produced a wealth of original ideas and daring specula- 
tions. These were the work not only of Arabs but also 
of subject Christians, Jews, and Persians, many of them 
being heretics previously depressed under the iron bands 
of persecuting Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism. 

Gradually, however, this enlightened era passed away. 
Reactionary forces appeared and gained in strength. 
The liberals, who are usually known under the general 
title of "Motazelites," not only clung to the doctrinal 
simplicity of primitive Islam, but also contended that the 
test of all things should be reason. On the other hand, 
the conservative schools of thought asserted that the test 
should be precedent and authority. These men, many of 
them converted Christians imbued with the traditions of 
Byzantine orthodox}', undertook an immense work of 
Koranic exegesis, combined with an equally elaborate 
codification and interpretation of the reputed sayings or 
"traditions" of Mohammed, as handed down by his 
immediate disciples and followers. As the result of these 
labors, there gradually arose a Moslem theology and 
scholastic philosophy as rigid, elaborate, and dogmatic 
as that of the mediaeval Christian West. 

Naturally, the struggle between the fundamentally 
opposed tendencies of traditionalism and rationalism was 
long and bitter. Yet the ultimate outcome was almost 
a foregone conclusion. Eveiything conspired to favor 



INTRODUCTION 



11 



the triumph of dogma over reason. The whole historic 
tradition of the East (a tradition largely induced by racial 
and climatic factors 1 ) was toward absolutism. This 
tradition had been interrupted by the inrush of the wild 
libertarianism of the desert. But the older tendency 
presently reasserted itself, stimulated as it was by the 
political transformation of the caliphate from theocratic 
democracy to despotism. 

This triumph of absolutism in the field of government 
in fact assured its eventual triumph in all other fields as 
well. For ; in the long run, despotism can no more tolerate 
liberty of thought than it can liberty of action. Some of 
the Damascus caliphs, to be sure, toyed with Motazelism, 
the Ommeyyads being mainly secular-minded men to 
whom freethinking was intellectually attractive. But 
presently the caliphs became aware of liberalism's political 
implications. The Motazelites did not confine themselves 
to the realm of pure philosophic speculation. They also 
trespassed on more dangerous ground. Motazelite voices 
were heard recalling the democratic days of the Meccan 
caliphate, when the Commander of the Faithful, instead 
of being an hereditary monarch, was elected by the peo- 
ple and responsible to public opinion. Some bold spirits 
even entered into relations with the fierce fanatic sects of 

1 The influence of environment and heredity on human evolution in 
general and on the history of the East in particular, though of great im- 
portance, cannot be treated in a summary such as this. The influence of 
climatic and other environmental factors has been ably treated by Pro- 
fessor Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as The Pulse of 
Asia (Boston, 1907); Civilization and Climate (Yale Univ. Press, 1915), 
and World-Power and Evolution (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). See also chap. 
Ill in Arminius Vambery — Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. Eine 
culturgeschichtliche Studie (Leipzig, 1875). For a summary of racial in- 
fluences in Eastern history, see Madison Grant — The Passing of the Great 
Race (N. Y., 1916). 



12 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



inner Arabia, like the Kharijites, who, upholding the 
old desert freedom, refused to recognize the caliphate 
and proclaimed theories of advanced republicanism. 

The upshot was that the caliphs turned more and more 
toward the conservative theologians as against the liberals, 
just as they favored the monarchist Neo-Arabs in prefer- 
ence to the intractable pure-blooded Arabs of the desert. 
Under the Abbasides the government came out frankly 
for religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic ortho- 
doxy were established, Motazelites were persecuted and 
put to death, and by the twelfth century A. D. the last 
vestiges of Saracenic liberalism were extirpated. The 
canons of Moslem thought were fixed. All creative 
activity ceased. The very memory of the great Motaze- 
lite doctors faded away. The Moslem mind was closed, 
not to be reopened until our own day. 

By the beginning of the eleventh century the decline of 
Saracenic civilization had become so pronounced that 
change was clearly in the air. Having lost their early 
vigor, the Neo-Arabs were to see their political power pass 
into other hands. These political heirs of the Neo-Arabs 
were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of 
that congeries of nomadic tribes which, from time imme- 
morial, have roamed over the limitless steppes of Eastern 
and Central Asia, and which are known collectively under 
the titles of "Uralo-Altaic" or " Turanian" peoples. 
The Arabs had been in contact with the Turkish nomads 
ever since the Islamic conquest of Persia, when the 
Moslem generals found the Turks beating restlessly against 
Persia's northeastern frontiers. In the caliphate's palmy 
days the Turks were not feared. In fact, they were pres- 
ently found to be very useful. A dull-witted folk with 



INTRODUCTION 



13 



few ideas, the Turks could do two things superlatively 
well — obey orders and fight like devils. In other words, 
they made ideal mercenary soldiers. The caliphs were de- 
lighted, and enlisted ever-larger numbers of them for their 
armies and their body-guards. 

This was all very well while the caliphate was strong, 
but when it grew weak the situation altered. Rising 
everywhere to positions of authority, the Turkish mer- 
cenaries began to act like masters. Opening the eastern 
frontiers, they let in fresh swarms of their countrymen, 
who now came, not as individuals, but in tribes or 
" hordes" under their hereditary chiefs, wandering about 
at their own sweet will, settling where they pleased, and 
despoiling or evicting the local inhabitants. 

The Turks soon renounced their ancestral paganism for 
Islam, but Islam made little change in their natures. 
In judging these Turkish newcomers we must not con- 
sider them the same as the present-day Ottoman Turks 
of Constantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanli 
are so saturated with European and Near Eastern blood, 
and have been so leavened by Western and Saracenic ideas, 
that they are a very different people from their remote 
immigrant ancestors. Yet, even as it is, the modern 
Osmanli display enough of those unlovely Turanian 
traits which characterize the unmodified Turks of Central 
Asia, often called " Turkomans/' to distinguish them from 
their Ottoman kinsfolk to the west. 

Now, what was the primitive Turkish nature? First 
and foremost, it was that of the professional soldier. 
Discipline was the Turk's watchword. No originality 
of thought, and but little curiosity. Few ideas ever 
penetrated the Turk's slow mind, and the few that did 



14 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



penetrate were received as military orders, to be obeyed 
without question and adhered to without reflection. 
Such was the being who took over the leadership of Islam 
from the Saracen's failing grasp. 

No greater misfortune could have occurred both for 
Islam and for the world at large. For Islam it meant the 
rule of dull-witted bigots under which enlightened progress 
was impossible. Of course Islam did gain a great acces- 
sion of warlike strength, but this new power was so 
wantonly misused as to bring down disastrous repercus- 
sions upon Islam itself. The first notable exploits of the 
immigrant Turkish hordes were their conquest of Asia 
Minor and their capture of Jerusalem, both events taking 
place toward the close of the eleventh century. 1 Up 
to this time Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian 
world. The original Arab flood of the seventh century, 
after overrunning Syria, had been stopped by the barrier 
of the Taurus Mountains; the Byzantine Empire had 
pulled itself together; and thenceforth, despite border 
bickerings, the Byzantine-Saracen frontier had remained 
substantially unaltered. Now, however, the Turks broke 
the Byzantine barrier, overran Asia Minor, and threatened 
even Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christendom. 
As for Jerusalem, it had, of course, been in Moslem hands 
since the Arab conquest of 637 A. D., but the caliph Omar 
had carefully respected the Christian "Holy Places," and 
his successors had neither persecuted the local Christians 
nor maltreated the numerous pilgrims who flocked peren- 
nially to Jerusalem from every part of the Christian world. 

1 The Turkish overrunning of Asia Minor took place after the destruc- 
tion of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert, 1071 A. D. 
The Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076. 



INTRODUCTION 



15 



But the Turks changed all this. Avid for loot, and filled 
with bigoted hatred of the "Misbelievers," they sacked 
the holy places, persecuted the Christians, and rendered 
pilgrimage impossible. 

The effect of these twin disasters upon Christendom, 
occurring as they did almost simultaneously, was tremen- 
dous. The Christian West, then at the height of its 
religious fervor, quivered with mingled fear and wrath. 
Myriads of zealots, like Peter the Hermit, roused all 
Europe to frenzy. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the 
Christian West poured upon the Moslem East vast hosts 
of warriors in those extraordinary expeditions, the Cru- 
sades. 

The Turkish conquest of Islam and its counterblast, 
the Crusades, were an immense misfortune for the world. 
They permanently worsened the relations between East 
and West. In the year 1000 A. D. Christian-Moslem 
relations were fairly good, and showed every prospect of 
becoming better. The hatreds engendered by Islam's 
first irruption were dying away. The frontiers of Islam 
and Christendom had become apparently fixed, and 
neither side showed much desire to encroach upon the 
other. The only serious debatable ground was Spain, 
where Moslem and Christian were continually at hand- 
grips; but, after all, Spain was mutually regarded as a 
frontier episode. Between Islam and Christendom, as a 
whole, intercourse was becoming steadily more friendly 
and more frequent. This friendly intercourse, if con- 
tinued, might ultimately have produced momentous 
results for human progress. The Moslem world was at 
that time still well ahead of western Europe in knowledge 
and culture, but Saracenic civilization was ossifying, 



16 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



whereas the Christian West, despite its ignorance, rude- 
ness, and barbarism, was bursting with lusty life and 
patently aspiring to better things. Had the nascent 
amity of East and West in the eleventh century continued 
to develop, both would have greatly profited. In the 
West the influence of Saracenic culture, containing, as it 
did, the ancient learning of Greece and Rome, might have 
awakened our Renaissance much earlier, while in the 
East the influence of the mediaeval West, with its abound- 
ing vigor, might have saved Moslem civilization from the 
creeping paralysis which was overtaking it. 

But it was not to be. In Islam the refined, easy-going 
Saracen gave place to the bigoted, brutal Turk. Islam 
became once more aggressive — not, as in its early days, 
for an ideal, but for sheer blood-lust, plunder, and destruc- 
tion. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the 
only possible civilization and the most brutal and hope- 
less barbarism. Furthermore, this war was destined to 
last for centuries. The Crusades were merely Western 
counter-attacks against a Turkish assault on Christendom 
which continued for six hundred years and was definitely 
broken only under the walls of Vienna in 1683. Naturally, 
from these centuries of unrelenting strife furious hatreds 
and fanaticisms were engendered which still envenom 
the relations of Islam and Christendom. The atrocities 
of Mustapha Kemal's Turkish " Nationalists" and the 
atrocities of the Greek troops in Asia Minor, of which we 
read in our morning papers, are in no small degree a 
" carrying on" of the mutual atrocities of Turks and 
Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago. 

With the details of those old wars between Turks and 
Christians this book has no direct concern. The wars 



INTRODUCTION 



17 



themselves should simply be noted as a chronic barrier 
between East and West. As for the Moslem East, with 
its declining Saracenic civilization bowed beneath the 
brutal Turkish yoke, it was presently exposed to even 
more terrible misfortunes. These misfortunes were also of 
Turanian origin. Toward the close of the twelfth century 
the eastern branches of the Turanian race were welded 
into a temporary unity by the genius of a mighty chieftain 
named Jenghiz Khan. Taking the sinister title of "The 
Inflexible Emperor/' this arch-savage started out to loot 
the world. He first overran northern China, which he 
hideously ravaged, then turned his devastating course 
toward the west. Such was the rise of the terrible 
" Mongols," whose name still stinks in the nostrils of 
civilized mankind. Carrying with them skilled Chinese 
engineers using gunpowder for the reduction of fortified 
cities, Jenghiz Khan and his mounted hosts proved every- 
where irresistible. The Mongols were the most appalling 
barbarians whom the world has ever seen. Their object 
was not conquest for settlement, not even loot, but in 
great part a sheer satanic lust for blood and destruction. 
They revelled in butchering whole populations, destroying 
cities, laying waste countrysides — and then passing on to 
fresh fields. 

Jenghiz Khan died after a few years of his westward 
progress, but his successors continued his work with 
unabated zeal. Both Christendom and Islam were 
smitten by the Mongol scourge. All eastern Europe was 
ravaged and rebarbarized, the Russians showing ugly 
traces of the Mongol imprint to this day. But the woes 
of Christendom were as nothing to the woes of Islam. 
The Mongols never penetrated beyond Poland, and west- 



18 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ern Europe, the seat of Western civilization, was left 
unscathed. Not so Islam. Pouring down from the north- 
east, the Mongol hosts whirled like a cyclone over the 
Moslem world from India to Egypt, pillaging, murdering, 
and destroying. The nascent civilization of mediaeval 
Persia, just struggling into the light beneath the incubus 
of Turkish harryings, was stamped flat under the Mongol 
hoofs, and the Mongols then proceeded to deal with the 
Moslem culture-centre — Bagdad. Bagdad had declined 
considerably from the gorgeous days of Haroun-al- 
Rashid, with its legendary million souls. However, it 
was still a great city, the seat of the caliphate and the 
unquestioned centre of Saracenic civilization. The Mon- 
gols stormed it (1258 A. D.), butchered its entire popula- 
tion, and literally wiped Bagdad off the face of the earth. 
And even this was not the worst. Bagdad was the capital 
of Mesopotamia. This "Land between the Rivers" had, 
in the very dawn of history, been reclaimed from swamp 
and desert by the patient labors of half -forgotten peoples 
who, with infinite toil, built up a marvellous system of 
irrigation that made Mesopotamia the perennial garden 
and granary of the world. Ages had passed and Mesopo- 
tamia had known many masters, but all these conquer- 
ors had respected, even cherished, the irrigation works 
which were the source of all prosperity. These works 
the Mongols wantonly, methodically destroyed. The 
oldest civilization in the world, the cradle of human cul- 
ture, was hopelessly ruined ; at least eight thousand years 
of continuous human effort went for naught, and Mesopo- 
tamia became the noisome land it still remains to-day, 
parched during the droughts of low water, soaked to 
fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods, ten- 



INTRODUCTION 



19 



anted only by a few mongrel fellahs inhabiting wretched 
mud villages, and cowed by nomad Bedouin browsing 
their flocks on the sites of ancient fields. 

The destruction of Bagdad was a fatal blow to Saracenic 
civilization, especially in the east. And even before that 
dreadful disaster it had received a terrible blow in the 
west. Traversing North Africa in its early days, Islam 
had taken firm root in Spain, and had so flourished there 
that Spanish Moslem culture was fully abreast of that in 
the Moslem East. The capital of Spanish Islam was 
Cordova, the seat of the Western caliphate, a mighty 
city, perhaps more wonderful than Bagdad itself. For 
centuries Spanish Islam lived secure, confining the Chris- 
tians to the mountainous regions of the north. As 
Saracen vigor declined, however, the Christians pressed 
the Moslems southward. In 1213 Spanish Islam was 
hopelessly broken at the tremendous battle of Las Navas 
de Tolosa. Thenceforth, for the victorious Christians 
it was a case of picking up the pieces. Cordova itself 
soon fell, and with it the glory of Spanish Islam, for the 
fanatical Christian Spaniards extirpated Saracenic civili- 
zation as effectually as the pagan Mongols were at that 
time doing. To be sure, a remnant of the Spanish Mos- 
lems held their ground at Granada, in the extreme south, 
until the year Columbus discovered America, but this was 
merely an episode. The Saracen civilization of the West 
was virtually destroyed. 

Meanwhile the Moslem East continued to bleed under 
the Mongol scourge. Wave after wave of Mongol raiders 
passed over the land, the last notable invasion being that 
headed by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlane, 
early in the fifteenth century. By this time the western 



20 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Mongols had accepted Islam, but that made little differ- 
ence in their conduct. To show that Tamerlane was a 
true scion of his ancestor Jenghiz Khan, it may be re- 
marked that his foible was pyramids of human skulls, his 
prize effort being one of 70,000 erected after the storming 
of the Persian city of Ispahan. After the cessation of 
the Mongol incursions, the ravaged and depopulated 
Moslem East fell under the sway of the Ottoman Turks. 

The Ottoman Turks, or "Osmanli," were originally 
merely one of the many Turkish hordes which entered 
Asia Minor after the downfall of Byzantine rule. They 
owed their greatness mainly to a long line of able sultans, 
who gradually absorbed the neighboring Turkish tribes 
and used this consolidated strength for ambitious con- 
quests both to east and west. In 1453 the Osmanli 
extinguished the old Byzantine Empire by taking Con- 
stantinople, and within a century thereafter they had 
conquered the Moslem East from Persia to Morocco, had 
subjugated the whole Balkan peninsula, and had ad- 
vanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna. Unlike 
their Mongol cousins, the Ottoman Turks built up a 
durable empire. It was a barbarous sort of empire, for 
the Turks understood very little about culture. The only 
things they could appreciate were military improvements. 
These, however, they thoroughly appreciated and kept 
fully abreast of the times. In their palmy days the 
Turks had the best artillery and the steadiest infantry in 
the world, and were the terror of Europe. 

Meantime Europe was awakening to true progress and 
higher civilization. While the Moslem East was sinking 
under Mongol harryings and Turkish militarism, the 
Christian West was thrilling to the Renaissance and the 



INTRODUCTION 



21 



discoveries of America and the water route to India. 
The effect of these discoveries simply cannot be over- 
estimated. When Columbus and Vasco da Gama made 
their memorable voyages at the end of the fifteenth 
century, Western civilization was pent up closely within 
the restricted bounds of west-central Europe, and was 
waging a defensive and none-too-hopeful struggle with the 
forces of Turanian barbarism. Russia lay under the heel 
of the Mongol Tartars, while the Turks, then in the full 
flush of their martial vigor, were marching triumphantly 
up from the southeast and threatening Europe's very 
heart. So strong were these Turanian barbarians, with 
Asia, North Africa, and eastern Europe in their grasp, that 
Western civilization was hard put to it to hold its own. 
Western civilization was, in fact, fighting with its back to 
the wall — the wall of a boundless ocean. We can hardly 
conceive how our mediaeval forefathers viewed the ocean. 
To them it was a numbing, constricting presence; the 
abode of darkness and horror. No wonder mediaeval 
Europe was static, since it faced on ruthless, aggressive 
Asia, and backed on nowhere. Then, in the twinkling of 
an eye, the sea-wall became a highway, and dead-end 
Europe became mistress of the ocean — and thereby 
mistress of the world. 

The greatest strategic shift of fortune in all human 
history had taken place. Instead of fronting hopelessly 
on the fiercest of Asiatics, against whom victory by direct 
attack seemed impossible, the Europeans could now flank 
them at will. Furthermore, the balance of resources 
shifted in Europe's favor. Whole new worlds were un- 
masked whence Europe could draw limitless wealth to 
quicken its home life and initiate a progress that would 



22 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreaded Asiatic 
assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant 
Moslem East compared with those of the Americas and 
the Indies? So Western civilization, quickened, ener- 
gized, progressed with giant strides, shook off its mediaeval 
fetters, grasped the talisman of science, and strode into 
the light of modern times. 

Yet all this left Islam unmoved. Wrapping itself in 
the tatters of Saracenic civilization, the Moslem East 
continued to fall behind. Even its military power 
presently vanished, for the Turk sank into lethargy and 
ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time the West, 
busied with internal conflicts, hesitated to attack the 
East, so great was the prestige of the Ottoman name. 
But the crushing defeat of the Turks in their rash attack 
upon Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the Ottoman 
Empire was far gone in decrepitude. Thenceforth, the 
empire was harried mercilessly by Western assaults and 
was saved from collapse only by the mutual jealousies of 
Western Powers, quarrelling over the Turkish spoils. 

However, not until the nineteenth century did the 
Moslem world, as a whole, feel the weight of Western 
attack. Throughout the eighteenth century the West 
assailed the ends of the Moslem battle-line in eastern 
Europe and the Indies, but the bulk of Islam, from 
Morocco to Central Asia, remained almost immune. The 
Moslem world failed to profit by this respite. Plunged 
in lethargy, contemptuous of the European "Misbe- 
lievers," and accepting defeats as the inscrutable will of 
Allah, Islam continued to live its old life, neither knowing 
nor caring to know anything about Western ideas or 
Western progress. 



INTRODUCTION 



23 



Such was the decrepit Moslem world which faced 
nineteenth-century Europe, energized by the Industrial 
Revolution, armed as never before by modern science and 
invention which had unlocked nature's secrets and placed 
hitherto-undreamed-of weapons in its aggressive hands. 
The result was a foregone conclusion. One by one, the 
decrepit Moslem states fell before the Western attack, and 
the whole Islamic world was rapidly partitioned among 
the European Powers. England took India and Egypt, 
Russia crossed the Caucasus and mastered Central Asia, 
France conquered North Africa, while other European 
nations grasped minor portions of the Moslem heritage. 
The Great War witnessed the final stage in this process of 
subjugation. By the terms of the treaties which marked 
its close, Turkey was extinguished and not a single 
Mohammedan state retained genuine independence. The 
subjection of the Moslem world was complete — on paper. 

On paper ! For, in its very hour of apparent triumph, 
Western domination was challenged as never before. 
During those hundred years of Western conquest a mighty 
internal change had been coming over the Moslem world. 
The swelling tide of Western aggression had at last moved 
the " immovable " East. At last Islam became conscious 
of its decrepitude, and with that consciousness a vast 
ferment, obscure yet profound, began to leaven the 
250,000,000 followers of the Prophet from Morocco to 
China and from Turkestan to the Congo. The first 
spark was fittingly struck in the Arabian desert, the 
cradle of Islam. Here, at the opening of the nineteenth 
century, arose the Wahabi movement for the reform of 
Islam, which presently kindled the far-flung " Moham- 
medan Revival/' which in its turn begat the movement 



24 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



known as "Pan-Islamism." Furthermore, athwart these 
essentially internal movements there came pouring a 
flood of external stimuli from the West — ideas such as 
parliamentary government, nationalism, scientific educa- 
tion, industrialism, and even ultramodern concepts like 
feminism, socialism, Bolshevism. Stirred by the inter- 
action of all these novel forces and spurred by the cease- 
less pressure of European aggression, the Moslem world 
roused more and more to life and action. The Great War 
was a shock of terrific potency, and to-day Islam is seeth- 
ing with mighty forces fashioning a new Moslem world. 
What are those forces moulding the Islam of the future ? 
To their analysis and appraisal the body of this book is 
devoted. 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

"Das Alte sturzt, es andert sich die Zeit, 
Und neues Leben bliiht aus den Rumen." 

Schiller: Wilhelm Tell. 

CHAPTER I 
THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 

By the eighteenth century the Moslem world had sunk 
to the lowest depth of its decrepitude. Nowhere were 
there any signs of healthy vigor; everywhere were stag- 
nation and decay. Manners and morals were alike 
execrable. The last vestiges of Saracenic culture had 
vanished in a barbarous luxury of the few and an equally 
barbarous degradation of the multitude. Learning was 
virtually dead, the few universities which survived fallen 
into dreary decay and languishing in poverty and neglect. 
Government had become despotism tempered by anarchy 
and assassination. Here and there a major despot like 
the Sultan of Turkey or the Indian " Great Mogul" 
maintained some semblance of state authority, albeit 
provincial pashas were forever striving to erect inde- 
pendent governments based, like their masters', on 
tyranny and extortion. The pashas, in turn, strove 
ceaselessly against unruly local chiefs and swarms of 
brigands who infested the countryside. Beneath this 
sinister hierarchy groaned the people, robbed, bullied, 
and ground into the dust. Peasant and townsman had 
alike lost all incentive to labor or initiative, and both 
agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowest level com- 
patible with bare survival. 
As for religion, it was as decadent as everything else. 

25 



26 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



The austere monotheism of Mohammed had become over- 
laid with a rank growth of superstition and puerile 
mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented and ruin- 
ous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which, decked 
out in amulets, charms, and rosaries, listened to squalid 
fakirs or ecstatic dervishes, and went on pHgrimages 
to the tombs of "holy men/' worshipped as saints 
and " intercessors" with that Allah who had become too 
remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted 
souls. As for the moral precepts of the Koran, they were 
ignored or defied. Wine-drinking and opium-eating were 
well-nigh universal, prostitution was rampant, and the 
most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed. 
Even the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, were sink-holes 
of iniquity, while the "Hajj," or pilgrimage ordained by 
the Prophet, had become a scandal through its abuses. In 
fine: the life had apparently gone out of Islam, leaving 
naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degrading 
superstition behind. Could Mohammed have returned 
to earth, he would unquestionably have anathematized 
his followers as apostates and idolaters. 

Yet, in this darkest hour, a voice came crying out of the 
vast Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam, calling the 
faithful back to the true path. This puritan reformer, 
the famous Abd-el-Wahab, kindled a fire which presently 
spread to the remotest corners of the Moslem world, 
purging Islam of its sloth and reviving the fervor of olden 
days. The great Mohammedan Revival had begun. 

Mahommed ibn Abd-el-Wahab was born about the year 
1700 A. D. in the heart of the Arabian desert, the region 
known as the Nejd. The Nejd was the one clean spot 
in the decadent Moslem world. We have already seen 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 27 



how, with the transformation of the caliphate from a 
theocratic democracy to an Oriental despotism, the free- 
spirited Arabs had returned scornfully to their deserts. 
Here they had maintained their wild freedom. Neither 
caliph nor sultan dared venture far into those vast 
solitudes of burning sand and choking thirst, where the 
rash invader was lured to sudden death in a whirl of 
stabbing spears. The Arabs recognized no master, wan- 
dering at will with their flocks and camels, or settled here 
and there in green oases hidden in the desert's heart. 
And in the desert they retained their primitive political 
and religious virtues. The nomad Bedouin lived under 
the sway of patriarchal " sheiks"; the settled dwellers 
in the oases usually acknowledged the authority of some 
leading family. But these rulers possessed the slenderest 
authority, narrowly circumscribed by well-established 
custom and a jealous public opinion which they trans- 
gressed at their peril. The Turks, to be sure, had managed 
to acquire a precarious authority over the holy cities and 
the Red Sea littoral, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was 
free. And, in religion, as in politics, the desert Arabs kept 
the faith of their fathers. Scornfully rejecting the corrup- 
tions of decadent Islam, they held fast to the simple theol- 
ogy of primitive Islam, so congenial to their Arab natures. 

Into this atmosphere of an older and better age, Abd- 
el-Wahab was born. Displaying from the first a studious 
and religious bent, he soon acquired a reputation for 
learning and sanctity. Making the Meccan pilgrimage 
while still a young man, he studied at Medina and trav- 
elled as far as Persia, returning ultimately to the Nejd. 
He returned burning with holy wrath at what he had seen 
and determined to preach a puritan reformation. For 



28 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



years he wandered up and down Arabia ; and at last he 
converted Mahommed, head of the great clan of Saud, 
the most powerful chieftain in all the Nejd. This gave 
Abd-el-Wahab both moral prestige and material strength, 
and he made the most of his opportunities. Gradually 
the desert Arabs were welded into a politico-religious 
unity like that effected by the Prophet. Abd-el-Wahab 
was, in truth, a faithful counterpart of the first caliphs, 
Abu Bekr and Omar. When he died in 1787 his disciple, 
Saud, proved a worthy successor. The new Wahabi 
state was a close counterpart of the Meccan caliphate. 
Though possessing great military power, Saud always 
considered himself responsible to public opinion and never 
encroached upon the legitimate freedom of his subjects. 
Government, though stern, was able and just. The 
Wahabi judges were competent and honest. Robbery 
became almost unknown, so well was the public peace 
maintained. Education was sedulously fostered. Every 
oasis had its school, while teachers were sent to the 
Bedouin tribes. 

Having consolidated the Nejd, Saud was now ready to 
undertake the greater task of subduing and purifying 
the Moslem world. His first objective was of course the 
holy cities. This objective was attained in the opening 
years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand 
against the rush of the Wahabi hosts burning with fanatic 
hatred against the Turks, who were loathed both as 
apostate Moslems and as usurpers of that supremacy in 
Islam which all Arabs believed should rest in Arab hands. 
When Saud died in 1814 he was preparing to invade 
Syria. It looked for a moment as though the Wahabis 
were to sweep the East and puritanize all Islam at a blow. 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 29 

But it was not to be. Unable to stem the Wahabi 
flood, the Sultan of Turkey called on his powerful vassal, 
the famous Mehemet Ali. This able Albanian adventurer 
had by that time made himself master of Egypt. Frankly 
recognizing the superiority of the West, he had called in 
numerous European officers who rapidly fashioned a 
formidable army, composed largely of hard-fighting 
Albanian highlanders, and disciplined and equipped after 
European models. Mehemet Ali gladly answered the 
Sultan's summons, and it soon became clear that even 
Wahabi fanaticism was no match for European muskets 
and artillery handled by seasoned veterans. In a short 
time the holy cities were recaptured and the Wahabis 
were driven back into the desert. The nascent Wahabi 
empire had vanished like a mirage. Wahabism's political 
role was ended. 1 

However, Wahabism's spiritual role had only just 
begun. The Nejd remained a focus of puritan zeal 
whence the new spirit radiated in all directions. Even 
in the holy cities Wahabism continued to set the religious 
tone, and the numberless "Hajjis," or pilgrims, who came 
annually from every part of the Moslem world returned to 
their homes zealous reformers. Soon the Wahabi leaven 
began to produce profound disturbances in the most dis- 
tant quarters. For example, in northern India a Wahabi 
fanatic, Seyid Ahmed, 2 so roused the Punjabi Moham- 

^n the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, V Islam au dix~ 
neuvieme Steele (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, Essays on Eastern Ques- 
tions (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, Muslim Theology (London, 
1903); J. L. Burekhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys (2 vols., 
London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le D6isme des Wahhabis," Journal 
Asiatique, IV, vol. II, pp. 168 ei seq. 

2 Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslem 
liberal of the mid-nineteenth century. 



30 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

medans that he actually built up a theocratic state, and 
only his chance death prevented a possible Wahabi 
conquest of northern India. This state was shattered by 
the Sikhs, about 1830, but when the English conquered 
the country they had infinite trouble with the smouldering 
embers of Wahabi feeling, which, in fact, lived on, con- 
tributed to the Indian mutiny, and permanently fanati- 
cized Afghanistan and the wild tribes of the Indian 
Northwest Frontier. 1 It was during these years that 
the famous Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi came from 
his Algerian home to Mecca and there imbibed those 
Wahabi principles which led to the founding of the great 
Pan-Islamic fraternity that bears his name. Even the 
Babbist movement in Persia, far removed though it 
was doctrinally from Wahabi teaching, was indubitably 
a secondary reflex of the Wahabi urge. 2 In fact, within a 
generation, the strictly Wahabi movement had broadened 
into the larger development known as the Mohammedan 
Revival, and this in turn was developing numerous 
phases, chief among them being the movement usually 
termed Pan-Islamism. That movement, particularly on 
its political side, I shall treat in the next chapter. At 
present let us examine the other aspects of the Moham- 
medan Revival, with special reference to its religious and 
cultural phases. 

The Wahabi movement was a strictly puritan reforma- 
tion. Its aim was the reform of abuses, the abolition of 

1 For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North Indian Mos- 
lems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W. W. 
Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London, 1872).. 

2 For the Babbist movement, see Clement Huart, La Religion de Bab 
(Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, Trois Ans en Perse (Paris, 1S67). 
A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan revival 
is found in Le Chatelier, op. cit. 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 31 



superstitious practices, and a return to primitive Islam. 
All later accretions — the writings and interpretations of 
the mediaeval theologians, ceremonial or mystical inno- 
vations, saint worship, in fact every sort of change, were 
condemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed 
was preached in all its uncompromising simplicity, and 
the Koran, literally interpreted, was taken as the sole 
guide for human action. This doctrinal simplification 
was accompanied by a most rigid code of morals. The 
prayers, fastings, and other practices enjoined by Mo- 
hammed were scrupulously observed. The most austere 
manner of living was enforced. Silken clothing, rich 
food, wine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and all other indul- 
gences were sternly proscribed. Even religious architec- 
ture was practically tabooed, the Wahabis pulling down 
the Prophet's tomb at Medma and demolishing the 
minarets of mosques as godless innovations. The Waha- 
bis were thus, despite their moral earnestness, excessively 
narrow-minded, and it was very fortunate for Islam that 
they soon lost their political power and were compelled 
thenceforth to confine their efforts to moral teaching. 

Many critics of Islam point to the Wahabi movement 
as a proof that Islam is essentially retrograde and innately 
incapable of evolutionary development. These criticisms, 
however, appear to be unwarranted. The initial stage 
of every religious reformation is an uncritical return to 
the primitive cult. To the religious reformer the only 
way of salvation is a denial of all subsequent innovations, 
regardless of their character. Our own Protestant Ref- 
ormation began in just this way, and Humanists like 
Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by Protestantism's 
puritanical narrowness, could see no good in the move- 



32 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ment, declaring that it menaced all true culture andmerely 
replaced an infallible Pope by an infallible Bible. 

As a matter of fact, the puritan beginnings of the 
Mohammedan Revival presently broadened along more 
constructive lines, some of these becoming tinged with 
undoubted liberalism. The Moslem reformers of the 
early nineteenth century had not dug veiy deeply into 
their religious past before they discovered — Motazelism. 
We have already reviewed the great struggle which had 
raged between reason and dogma in Islam's early days, 
in which dogma had triumphed so completely that the 
very memory of Motazelism had faded away. Now, 
however, those memories were revived, and the liberal- 
minded reformers were delighted to find such striking 
confirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the 
Motazelite doctors and in the sacred texts themselves. 
The principle that reason and not blind prescription was 
to be the test opened the door to the possibility of all 
those reforms which they had most at heart. For 
example, the reformers found that in the traditional 
writings Mohammed was reported to have said: "I am 
no more than a man ; when I order you anything respecting 
religion, receive it; when I order you about the affairs of 
the world, then I am nothing more than man/' And, 
again, as though foreseeing the day when sweeping changes 
would be necessary: "Ye are in an age in which, if ye 
abandon one-tenth of that which is ordered, ye will be 
ruined. After this, a time will come when he who shall 
observe one-tenth of what is now ordered will be re- 
deemed." 1 

Before discussing the ideas and efforts of the modern 

1 Mishkat-el-Masabih, I, 46, 51. 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 33 



Moslem reformers, it might be well to examine the asser- 
tions made by numerous Western critics, that Islam is 
by its very nature incapable of reform and progressive 
adaptation to the expansion of human knowledge. Such 
is the contention not only of Christian polemicists, 1 but 
also of rationalists like Renan and European adminis- 
trators of Moslem populations like Lord Cromer. Lord 
Cromer, in fact, pithily summarizes this critical attitude 
in his statement: " Islam cannot be reformed; that is to 
say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something 
else." 2 

Now these criticisms, coming as they do from close 
students of Islam often possessing intimate personal 
acquaintance with Moslems, deserve respectful considera- 
tion. And yet an historical survey of religions, and 
especially a survey of the thoughts and accomplishments 
of Moslem reformers during the past century, seem to 
refute these pessimistic charges. 

In the first place, it should be remembered that Islam 
to-day stands just about where Christendom stood in 
the fifteenth century, at the beginning of the Reformation. 
There is the same supremacy of dogma over reason, the 
same blind adherence to prescription and authority, the 
same suspicion and hostility to freedom of thought or 
scientific knowledge. There is no doubt that a study 
of the Mohammedan sacred texts, particularly of the 

1 The best recent examples of this polemical literature are the writings 
of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well-known missionary to the Arabs; espe- 
cially his Arabia, the Cradle of Islam (Edinburgh, 1900), and The Reproach 
of Islam (London, 1915). Also see volume entitled The Mohammedan 
World of To-day, being a collection of the papers read at the Protestant 
Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906. 

2 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, p. 229 (London, 1908). For Renan's 
attitude, see his L'Islamisme et la Science (Paris, 1883). 



34 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



"sheriat" or canon law, together with a glance over 
Moslem history for the last thousand years, reveal an 
attitude on the whole quite incompatible with modern 
progress and civilization. But was not precisely the 
same thing true of Christendom at the beginning of the 
fifteenth century? Compare the sheriat with the Chris- 
tian canon law. The spirit is the same. Take, for 
example, the sheriat's prohibition on the lending of money 
at interest; a prohibition which, if obeyed, renders im- 
possible anything like business or industry in the modern 
sense. This is the example oftenest cited to prove Islam's 
innate incompatibility with modern civilization. But 
the Christian canon law equally forbade interest, and 
enforced that prohibition so strictly, that for centuries 
the Jews had a monopoly of business in Europe, while the 
first Christians who dared to lend money (the Lombards) 
were regarded almost as heretics, were universally hated, 
and were frequently persecuted. Again, take the matter 
of Moslem hostility to freedom of thought and scientific 
investigation. Can Islam show anything more revolting 
than that scene in Christian history when, less than 
three hundred years ago, 1 the great Galileo was haled 
before the Papal Inquisition and forced, under threat of 
torture, to recant the damnable heresy that the earth 
went round the sun ? 

As a matter of fact, Mohammed reverenced knowledge. 
His own words are eloquent testimony to that. Here 
are some of his sayings: 

"Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of 
China." 

"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave." 

1 In the year 1633. 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 35 



"One word of knowledge is of more value than the 
reciting of a hundred prayers." 

"The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of 
martyrs." 

"One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a 
Moslem brother, outweighs the prayers of a whole year." 

"Wise men are the successors of the Prophet." 

"God has created nothing better than reason." 

" In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms, 
made pilgrimage, and all other good works; nevertheless, 
he shall be rewarded only in the measure that he has used 
his common sense." 

These citations (and there are others of the same 
tenor) prove that the modern Moslem reformers have 
good scriptural backing for their liberal attitude. Of 
course I do not imply that the reform movement in 
Islam, just because it is liberal and progressive, is thereby 
ipso facto assured of success. History reveals too many 
melancholy instances to the contrary. Indeed, we have 
already seen how, in Islam itself, the promising liberal 
movement of its early days passed utterly away. What 
history does show, however, is that when the times fa- 
vor progress, religions are adapted to that progress by 
being reformed and liberalized. No human society once 
fairly on the march was ever turned back by a creed. 
Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists, the 
doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, undermined, 
flanked, or swept aside. Now there is no possibility that 
the Moslem world will henceforth lack progressive in- 
fluences. It is in close contact with Western civilization 
and is being increasingly permeated with Western ideas. 
Islam cannot break away and isolate itself if it would. 



36 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Everything therefore portends its profound modification. 
Of course critics like Lord Cromer contend that this 
modified Islam will be Islam no longer. But why not ? If 
the people continue to call themselves Mohammedans and 
continue to draw spiritual sustenance from the message 
of Mohammed^ why should they be denied the name? 
Modern Christianity is certainly vastly different from 
mediaeval Christianity, while among the various Christian 
churches there exist the widest doctrinal variations. 
Yet all who consider themselves Christians are considered 
Christians by all except bigots out of step with the times. 

Let us now scrutinize the Moslem reformers, judging 
them, not by texts and chronicles, but by their words and 
deeds; since, as one of their number, an Algerian, very 
pertinently remarks, "men should be judged, not by the 
letter of their sacred books, but by what they actually 
do." 1 

Modern Moslem liberalism, as we have seen, received 
its first encouragement from the discovery of the old 
Motazelite literature of nearly a thousand years before. 
To be sure, Islam had never been quite destitute of liberal 
minds. Even in its darkest days a few voices had been 
raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example, 
in the sixteenth century the celebrated El-Gharani had 
written: "It is not at all impossible that God may hold 
in reserve for men of the future perceptions that have not 
been vouchsafed to the men of the past. Divine munifi- 
cence never ceases to pour benefits and enlightenment 
into the hearts of wise men of every age." 2 These isolated 
voices from Islam's Dark Time helped to encourage the 

1 Ismael Hamet, Les Musulmans frangais du Nord de V&frique (Paris, 
1906). 

2 Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work Ulslamisme (Paris, 1877). 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 37 



modern reformers, and by the middle of the nineteenth 
century every Moslem land had its group of forward- 
looking men. At first their numbers were, of course, in- 
significant, and of course they drew down upon them- 
selves the anathemas of the fanatic Mollahs 1 and the 
hatred of the ignorant multitude. The first country 
where the reformers made their influence definitely felt 
was in India. Here a group headed by the famous Sir 
Syed Ahmed Khan started an important liberal move- 
ment, founding associations, publishing books and news- 
papers, and establishing the well-known college of Ali- 
garh. Sir Syed Ahmed is a good type of the early liberal 
reformers. Conservative in temperament and perfectly 
orthodox in his theology, he yet denounced the current 
decadence of Islam with truly Wahabi fervor. He also 
was frankly appreciative of Western ideas and eager to 
assimilate the many good things which the West had to 
offer. As he wrote in 1867: "We must study European 
scientific works, even though they are not written by 
Moslems and though we may find in them things con- 
trary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate 
the Arabs of olden days, who did not fear to shake their 
faith by studying Pythagoras." 2 

1 The Mollahs are the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactly cor- 
respond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anything 
like a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordained 
priestly class or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, Brahmanism, 
and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conduct religious 
services. As time passed, however, a class of men developed who were 
learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately became practically 
priests, though theoretically they should be regarded as theological lawyers. 
There also developed religious orders of dervishes, etc.; but primitive 
Islam knew nothing of them. 

2 From the article by Leon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, Histoire 
Generate, vol. XII, p. 498. This article gives an excellent general survey 
of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in the nineteenth 
century. 



38 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



This nucleus of Indian Moslem liberals rapidly grew in 
strength, producing able leaders like Moulvie Cheragh 
Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whose scholarly works in faultless 
English are known throughout the world. 1 These men 
called themselves "Neo-Motazelites" and boldly advo- 
cated reforms such as a thorough overhauling of the 
sheriat and a general modernization of Islam. Their 
view-point is well set forth by another of their leading 
figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. "Nothing was more distant 
from the Prophet's thought/' he writes, "than to fetter 
the mind or to lay down fixed, immutable, unchanging 
laws for his followers. The Quran is a book of guidance 
to the faithful, and not an obstacle in the path of their 
social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress." He la- 
ments Islam's present backwardness, for he continues: 
"Modern Islam, with its hierarchy of priesthood, gross 
fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and superstitious prac- 
tices is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam of the Prophet 
Mohammed." He concludes with the following liberal 
confession of faith: "Is Islam hostile to progress? I will 
emphatically answer this question in the negative. Islam, 
stripped of its theology, is a perfectly simple religion. 
Its cardinal principle is belief in one God and belief in 
Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion, 
superfluity." 2 

Meanwhile, the liberals were making themselves felt 
in other parts of the Moslem world. In Turkey liberals 
actually headed the government during much of the 
generation between the Crimean War and the despotism 

1 Especially his best-known book, The Spirit of Islam (London, 1891). 

2 S. Khuda Bukhsh, Essays : Indian and Islamic, pp. 20, 24- 284 (London, 
1912). 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 39 



of Abdul Hamid, 1 and Turkish liberal ministers like 
Reshid Pasha and Midhat Pasha made earnest though un- 
availing efforts to liberalize and modernize the Ottoman 
Empire. Even the dreadful Hamidian tyranny could not 
kill Turkish liberalism. It went underground or into exile, 
and in 1908 put through the revolution which deposed the 
tyrant and brought the " Young Turks" to power. In 
Egypt liberalism took firm root, represented by men like 
Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University 
and respected friend of Lord Cromer. Even outlying 
fragments of Islam like the Russian Tartars awoke to the 
new spirit and produced liberal-minded, forward-looking 
men. 2 

The liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of 
course form the part of evolutionary progress in Islam, 
They are in the best sense of the word conservatives, 
receptive to healthy change, yet maintaining their heredi- 
tary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith in 
Islam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue 
to draw their spiritual sustenance. 

There are, however, other groups in the Moslem world 
who have so far succumbed to Western influences that 
they have more or less lost touch with both their spiritual 
and cultural pasts. In all the more civilized portions of 
the Moslem world, especially in countries long under 
European control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there 
are many Moslems, Western-educated and Western cul- 
ture-veneered, who have drifted into an attitude vary- 
ing from easy-going religious indifference to avowed ag- 

^1856 to 1878. 

2 For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see Armicius 
Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands (London, 1906). 



40 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



nosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has 
entirety departed. The Algerian Ismael Hamet well de- 
scribes the attitude of this class of his fellow countrymen 
when he writes: " European scepticism is not without 
influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have 
kept some attachment for the external forms of their 
religion, usually ignore the unhealthy excesses of the 
religious sentiment. They do not give up their religion, 
but they no longer dream of converting all those who do 
not practise it; they want to hand it on to their children, 
but they do not worry about other men's salvation. This 
is not unbelief ; it is not even free thought ; but it is luke- 
warmness." 1 

Beyond these tepid latitudinarians are still other 
groups of a very different character. Here we find com- 
bined the most contradictory sentiments: young men 
whose brains are seething with radical Western ideas — 
atheism, socialism, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet, 
curiously enough, these fanatic radicals tend to join 
hands with the fanatic reactionaries of Islam in a common 
hatred of the West. Considering themselves the born 
leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant masses, the radi- 
cals hunger for political power and rage against that 
Western domination which vetoes their ambitious pre- 
tensions. Hence, they are mostly extreme " National- 
ists," while they are also deep in Pan-Islamic reactionary 
schemes. Indeed, we often witness the strange spectacle 
of atheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a 
truly dervish zeal. Mr. Bukhsh well describes this type 
when he writes: "I know a gentleman, a Mohammedan 

1 Ismael Hamet, Les Musulmans frangais du Nord de VAfrique, p. 268 
(Paris, 1906). 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 41 



by profession, who owes his success in life to his faith. 
Though, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of 
Islam and occasionally stands up in public as the cham- 
pion and spokesman of his coreligionists; yet, to my utter 
horror, I found that he held opinions about his religion 
and its founder which even Voltaire would have rejected 
with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating con- 
tempt." 1 

Later on we shall examine more fully the activities of 
these gentry in the chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism 
and Nationalism. What I desire to emphasize here is 
their pernicious influence on the prospects of a genuine 
Mohammedan reformation as visualized by the true re- 
formers whom I have described. Their malevolent de- 
sire to stir up the fanatic passions of the ignorant masses 
and their equally malevolent hatred of everything West- 
ern except military improvements are revealed by out- 
bursts like the following from the pen of a prominent 
"Young Turk." "Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in 
open hostility to all your world of progress. Learn, ye 
European observers, that a Christian, whatever his posi- 
tion, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our 
eyes a being devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning 
is simple and definitive. We say: the man whose judg- 
ment is so perverted as to deny the evidence of the One 
God and to fabricate gods of different kinds, cannot be 
other than the most ignoble expression of human stu- 
pidity. To speak to him would be a humiliation to our 
reason and an offense to the grandeur of the Master of 
the Universe. The worshipper of false gods is a monster 
of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; to 

1 S. Khuda Bukhsh, op. cit., p. 241. 



42 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



combat him ; convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest 
task of the Faithful. These are the eternal commands 
of our One God. For us there are in this world only 
Believers and Misbelievers; love, charity, fraternity to 
Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers. 
Among Misbelievers, the most odious and criminal are 
those who, while recognizing God, create Him of earthly 
parents, give Him a son, a mother; so monstrous an aber- 
ration surpasses, in our eyes, all bounds of iniquity; the 
presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of our 
existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of 
our faith; their contact a pollution for our bodies; any 
relation with them a torture for our souls. 

"While detesting you, we have been studying your po- 
litical institutions and your military organizations. Be- 
sides the new arms which Providence procures for us by 
your own means, you yourselves have rekindled the inex- 
tinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young 
Turks, our Babis, our new fraternities, all are sects in 
their varied forms, are inspired by the same thought, the 
same purpose. Toward what end? Christian civiliza- 
tion? Never!" 1 

Such harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among 
the Moslem masses. Although the liberal reformers are 
a growing power in Islam, it must not be forgotten that 
they are as yet only a minority, an elite, below whom He 
the ignorant masses, still suffering from the blight of age- 
long obscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own 
world, which they regard as the highest ideal of human 

1 Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, Mecheroutietie, of August, 
1912. Quoted from : A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musvlmcm, Conetaatine, 
Algeria, 1913. 



THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 43 



existence, and fanatically hating everything outside as 
wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even when compelled 
to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it 
none the less. They rebel blindly against the spirit of 
change which is forcing them out of their old ruts, and 
their anger is still further heightened by that ubiquitous 
Western domination which is pressing upon them from 
all sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the 
Pan-Islamic and Nationalist leaders who mould the multi- 
tude to their own sinister ends. 

Islam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of 
liberal reform and chauvinistic reaction. The liberals 
are not only the hope of an evolutionary reformation, 
they are also favored by the trend of the times, since the 
Moslem world is being continually permeated by Western 
progress and must continue to be thus permeated unless 
Western civilization itself collapses in ruin. Yet, though 
the ultimate triumph of the liberals appears probable, 
what delays, what setbacks, what fresh barriers of war- 
fare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionaries 
bring about ! Neither the reform of Islam nor the rela- 
tions between East and West are free from perils whose 
ominous possibilities we shall later discuss. 

Meanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that through- 
out the Moslem world a numerous and powerful minority, 
composed not merely of Westernized persons but also of 
orthodox conservatives, are aware of Islam's decadence 
and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformation 
along liberal, progressive lines is at once a practical 
necessity and a sacred duty. Exactly how this reforma- 
tion shall be legally effected has not yet been determined, 
nor is a detailed discussion of technical machinery neces- 



44 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



sary for our consideration. 1 History teaches us that 
where the will to reform is vitally present, reformation 
will somehow or other be accomplished. 

One thing is certain : the reforming spirit, in its various 
manifestations, has already produced profound changes 
throughout Islam. The Moslem world of to-day is vastly 
different from the Moslem world of a century ago. The 
Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindled 
a purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not 
been without moral compensations. The spread of lib- 
eral principles and Western progress goes on apace. If 
there is much to fear for the future, there is also much 
to hope. 

1 For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, The Future of 
Islam (London, 1882); A. Le chatelier, L' I slam au dix-neuvieme Steele 
(Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, Ulslamisme (Paris, 1877); H. N. Brailsford, 
"Modernism in Islam," The Fortnightly Review, September, 1908; Sir 
Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed," The Nineteenth Century 
and After, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique," Revue 
Politique Internationale, July, 1916; XX, "L'Islam apres la Guerre," 
Revue de Paris, 15 January,' 1916. 



CHAPTER IX 
PAN-ISLAMISM 

Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival 
is highly complex. Starting with the simple, puritan 
protest of Wahabism, it has developed many phases, 
widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In 
the previous chapter we examined the phase looking 
toward an evolutionary reformation of Islam and a 
genuine assimilation of the progressive spirit as well as 
the external forms of Western civilization. At the same 
time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only 
a minority, an elite; while the Moslem masses, still 
plunged in ignorance and imperfectly awakened from 
their age-long torpor, are influenced by other leaders of 
a very different character — men inclined to militant 
rather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than re- 
ceptive to the West. These militant forces are, in their 
turn, complex. They may be grouped roughly under 
the general concepts known as "Pan-Islamism" and 
"Nationalism." It is to a consideration of the first of 
these two concepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter 
is devoted. 

Pan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling 
of solidarity between all "True Believers/' is as old as 
the Prophet, when Mohammed and his few followers 
were bound together by the tie of faith against their 
pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To 

45 



46 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Mohammed the principle of fraternal solidarity among 
Moslems was of transcendent importance, and he suc- 
ceeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslem hearts 
that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. 
The bond between Moslem and Moslem is to-day much 
stronger than that between Christian and Christian. 
Of course Moslems fight bitterly among themselves, but 
these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of family 
quarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel 
aggression. Islam's profound sense of solidarity prob- 
ably explains in large part its extraordinary hold upon 
its followers. No other religion has such a grip on its 
votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christi- 
anity and Brahmanism, 1 and has driven Magism from 
the face of the earth; 2 yet there has been no single in- 
stance where a people, once become Moslem, has ever 
abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been, 
like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy. 

Islam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of 
its fundamental institutions: the "Hajj," or pilgrimage 
to Mecca, and the caliphate. Contrary to the general 
opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather than the cali- 
phate which has exerted the more consistently unifying 
influence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme 
act of faith, and every year fully 100,000 pilgrims arrive, 
drawn from every quarter of the Moslem world. There, 
before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of all races, 

1 Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism 's home- 
land, but has also converted virtually the entire populations of the great 
islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerly ascendant. 

2 The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are the 
sole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded by 
Zoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in the 
seventh century A. D. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



47 



tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstacy of 
common devotion, returning to their homes bearing the 
proud title of "Hajj is," or Pilgrims — a title which insures 
them the reverent homage of their fellow Moslems for all 
the rest of their days. The political implications of the 
Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennial Pan- 
Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are 
discussed by delegates from every part of the Moham- 
medan world, and where plans are elaborated for Islam's 
defense and propagation. Here nearly all the militant 
leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, 
Mahommed ben Sennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el Afghani, 
and many more) felt the imperious summons to then- 
task. 1 

As for the caliphate, it has played a great historic 
role, especially in its early days, and we have already 
studied its varying fortunes. Reduced to a mere shadow 
after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it was revived 
by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and were 
recognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world. 2 
However, these sultan-caliphs of Stambul 3 never suc- 
ceeded in winning the religious homage accorded their 
predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes, espe- 

1 Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans have 
managed to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written their impressions. 
Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's Mekka (2 vols., The Hague, 1888) and Het 
Mekkaansche Feest (Leiden, 1889) are the most recent good works. Also 
see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of value from the pen of a 
Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, With the Pilgrims to Mecca; 
The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A. D. 1902), with an Introduction by 
Arminius Vambery (London, 1905). 

2 The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite or 
orthodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to their own 
Shereefian sultans. 

3 The Turkish name for Constantinople. 



48 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



cially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anach- 
ronism to which they could never be truly reconciled. 
Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure, made an ambitious 
attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness, but 
such success as he attained was due more to the general 
tide of Pan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency 
of the caliphal name. The real leaders of modern Pan- 
Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merely qualified 
allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. 
This was not realized in Europe, which came to fear 
Abdul Hamid as a sort of Mohammedan pope. Even 
to-day most Western observers seem to think that Pan- 
Islamism centers in the caliphate, and we see European 
publicists hopefully discussing whether the caliphate's 
retention by the discredited Turkish sultans, its trans- 
ference to the Shereef of Mecca, or its total suppression, 
will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This, however, is a 
distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal institution 
is still undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd 
leaders of the modern Pan-Islamic movement have long 
been working on a much broader basis. They realize 
that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day lies not 
in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and 
the great Pan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, 
of which I shall presently speak. 1 

Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. 
Its first stage was of course the Wahabi movement. 
The Wahabi state founded by Abd-el-Wahab in the 

1 On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, The Caliphate : Its Rise, Decline, and 
Fall (Edinbur^i, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, The Caliph's Last Heritage 
(London, 1915); XX, "L'Islam apres la Guerre," Revue de Paris, 15 
January, 1916; "The Indian Khilafat Delegation," Foreign Affairs, July, 
1920 (Special Supplement). 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



49 



Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of the 
Meccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely 
disciple, Saud, loosed his fanatic hosts upon the holy 
cities, he dreamed that this was but the first step in a 
puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslem 
world. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nev- 
ertheless, soon produced profound political disturbances 
in distant regions like northern India and Afghanistan, 
as I have already narrated. They were, however, all 
integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentially 
protests against the political decadence of Moslem states 
and the moral decadence of Moslem rulers. These out- 
breaks were not inspired by any special fear or hatred 
of the West, since Europe was not yet seriously assail- 
ing Islam except in outlying regions like European Tur- 
key or the Indies, and the impending peril was conse- 
quently not appreciated. 

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the 
situation had radically altered. The French conquest of 
Algeria, the Russian acquisition of Transcaucasia, and 
the English mastery of virtually all India, convinced 
thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadly 
peril of falling under Western domination. It was at this 
time that Pan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti- 
Western character which it has ever since retained. 
At first resistance to Western encroachment was spo- 
radic and uncoordinated. Here and there heroic fig- 
ures like Abd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the 
Caucasus fought brilliantly against the European in- 
vaders. But, though these paladins of the faith were 
accorded wide-spread sympathy from Moslems, they re- 
ceived no tangible assistance and, unaided, fell. 



50 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew 
in intensity, and the seventies saw the Moslem world 
swept from end to end by a wave of militant fanaticism. 
In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of 1871, 
while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men" 
preaching holy wars, the greatest of these being the 
Mahdist insurrection in the Egyptian Sudan, which 
maintained itself against England's best efforts down 
to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of 
the century. In Afghanistan there was an intense ex- 
acerbation of fanaticism awakening sympathetic echoes 
among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave the 
British much trouble. In Central Asia there was a sim- 
ilar access of fanaticism, centring in the powerful Nake- 
chabendiya fraternity, spreading eastward into Chinese 
territory and culminating in the great revolts of the 
Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and 
Yunnan. In the Dutch East Indies there was a whole 
series of revolts, the most serious of these being the At- 
chin War, which dragged on interminably, not being 
quite stamped out even to-day. 

The salient characteristic of this period of militant 
unrest is its lack of co-ordination. These risings were all 
spontaneous outbursts of local populations; animated, to 
be sure, by the same spirit of fear and hatred, and in- 
flamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evi- 
dence of a central authority laying settled plans and 
moving in accordance with a definite programme. The 
risings were inspired largely by the mystical doctrine 
known as "Mahdism." Mahdism was unknown to prim- 
itive Islam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But 
in the " traditions, " or reputed sayings of Mohammed, 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



51 



there occurs the statement that the Prophet predicted 
the coming of one bearing the title of "El Mahdi" 1 
who would fill the earth with equity and justice. From 
this arose the wide-spread mystical hope in the appear- 
ance of a divinely inspired personage who would effect 
the universal triumph of Islam, purge the world of infi- 
dels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems. 
This doctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history. 
At various times fanatic leaders have arisen claiming to 
be El Mahdi, "The Master of the Hour," and have won 
the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just as cer- 
tain "Messiahs" have similarly excited the Jews. It 
was thus natural that, in their growing apprehension 
and impotent rage at Western aggression, the Moslem 
masses should turn to the messianic hope of Mahdism. 
Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothing 
constructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire; 
flaring up fiercely here and there, then dying down, leav- 
ing the disillusioned masses more discouraged and apa- 
thetic than before. 

Now all this was recognized by the wiser supporters 
of the Pan-Islamic idea. The impotence of the wildest 
outbursts of local fanaticism against the methodical 
might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that long 
preparation and complete co-ordination of effort were 
necessary if Islam was to have any chance of throwing 
off the European yoke. Such men also realized that 
they must study Western methods and adopt much of 
the Western technic of power. Above all, they felt that 
the political liberation of Islam from Western domination 
must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration, 

1 Literally, "he who is guided aright." 



52 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



thereby engendering the moral forces necessary both for 
the war of liberation and for the fruitful reconstruction 
which should follow thereafter. At this point the ideals 
of Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both 
recognize Islam's present decadence; both desire its 
spiritual regeneration. It is on the nature of that regen- 
eration that the two parties are opposed. The liberals 
believe that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas. 
The Pan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that prim- 
itive Islam contains all that is necessary for regenera- 
tion, and contend that only Western methods and ma- 
terial achievements should be adopted by the Moslem 
world. 

The beginnings of self-conscious, systematic Pan- 
Islamism date from about the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The movement crystallizes about two foci: 
the new-type religious fraternities like the Sennussiya, 
and the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by 
Djemal-ed-Din. Let us first consider the fraternities. 

Religious fraternities have existed in Islam for cen- 
turies. They all possess the same general type of or- 
ganization, being divided into lodges ("Zawias") headed 
by Masters known as "Mokaddem," who exercise a 
more or less extensive authority over the "Khouan" or 
Brethren. Until the foundation of the new-type organ- 
izations like the Sennussi, however, the fraternities ex- 
erted little practical influence upon mundane affairs. 
Their interests were almost wholly religious, of a mysti- 
cal, devotional nature, often characterized by great aus- 
terities or by fanatical excesses like those practised by 
the whirling and howling dervishes. Such political in- 
fluence as they did exert was casual and local. Any- 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



53 



thing like joint action was impossible, owing to their 
mutual rivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraterni- 
ties still exist in great numbers, but they are without 
political importance except as they have been leavened 
by the new-type fraternities. 

The new-type organizations date from about the middle 
of the nineteenth century ; the most important in every 
way being the Sennussiya. Its founder, Seyid Ma- 
hommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem, 
Algeria, about the year 1800. As his title "Seyid" 
indicates, he was a descendant of the Prophet, and was 
thus born to a position of honor and importance. 1 He 
early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety, 
studying theology at the Moorish University of Fez 
and afterward travelling widely over North Africa 
preaching a reform of the prevailing religious abuses. He 
then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there his re- 
formist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi 
teachers. It was at that time that he appears to have 
definitely formulated his plan of a great puritan order, 
and in 1843 he returned to North Africa, settling in 
Tripoli, where he built his first Zawia, known as the 
"Zawia Baida," or White Monastery, in the mountains 
near Derna. So impressive was his personality and so 
great his organizing ability that converts flocked to him 
from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soon 
alarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations 
became so strained that Seyid Mahommed presently 
moved his headquarters to the oasis of Jarabub, far to 
the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in 1859, 

l " Seyid" means "Lord." This title is borne only by descendants of 
the Prophet, 



54 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



his organization had spread over the greater part of 
North Africa. 

Seyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninter- 
ruptedly by his son, usually known as Sennussi-el-Mahdi. 
The manner in which this son gained his succession typ- 
ifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two 
sons, El-Mahdi being the younger. While they were 
still mere lads, their father determined to put them to a 
test, to discover which of them had the stronger faith. 
In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons climb 
a tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his 
Prophet to leap to the ground. The younger lad leaped 
at once and reached the ground unharmed; the elder boy 
refused to spring. To El-Mahdi, "who feared not to 
commit himself to the will of God," passed the right to 
rule. Throughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justi- 
fied his father's choice, displaying wisdom and piety of a 
high order, and further extending the power of the fra- 
ternity. During the latter part of his reign he removed 
his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, still farther into the 
Lybian desert, where he died in 1902, and was succeeded 
by his nephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the 
order, who also appears to possess marked ability. 

With nearly eighty years of successful activity behind 
it, the Sennussi Order is to-day one of the vital factors in 
Islam. It counts its adherents in every quarter of the 
Moslem world. In Arabia its followers are very numer- 
ous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life of the 
holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however, 
still remains the focus of Sennussism. The whole of 
northern Africa, from Morocco to Somaliland, is dotted 
with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutely dependent upon 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



55 



the Grand Lodge ; headed by The Master, El Sennussi. 
The Sennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of 
the Lybian Sahara. Only one European eye 1 has ever 
seen tins mysterious spot. Surrounded by absolute des- 
ert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes of 
approach known only to experienced Sennussi guides, 
every one of whom would suffer a thousand deaths 
rather than betray him, El Sennussi, The Master, sits 
serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North 
Africa. 

The influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound. 
The local Zawias are more than mere " lodges." Besides 
the Mokaddem, or Master, there is also a "Wekfl," or civil 
governor, and these officers have discretionary authority 
not merely over the Zawia members but also over the 
community at large — at least, so great is the awe inspired 
by the Sennussiya throughout North Africa, that a word 
from Wekil or Mokaddem is always listened to and 
obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonial 
authorities, British, French, or Italian, as the case may 
be, there exists an occult government with which the 
colonial authorities are careful not to come into con- 
flict. 

On their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid 
a downright breach with the European Powers. Their 
long-headed, cautious policy is truly astonishing. For 
more than half a century the order has been a great force, 
yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many 
of the fanatic risings which have occurred in various 
parts of Africa, local Sennussi have undoubtedly taken 
part, and the same was true during the Italian campaign 

1 The explorer Dr. Nachtigal. 



56 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



in Tripoli and in the late war; but the order itself has 
never officially entered the lists. 

In fact, this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and 
haughty aloofness is maintained not only toward Chris- 
tians but also toward the other powers that be in 
Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolute 
freedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have 
never been cordial. Even the wily Abdul Hamid, at 
the height of his prestige as the champion of Pan-Islam- 
ism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldly 
platonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el- 
Mahdi's favorite remarks was said to have been: " Turks 
and Christians: I will break both of them with one and 
the same stroke." Equally characteristic was his attitude 
toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the "Mahdist" 
uprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with victory, 
Mahommed Ahmed sent emissaries to El Sennussi, ask- 
ing his aid. El Sennussi refused, remarking haughtily: 
"What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? Am 
I not myself Mahdi if I choose?" 

These Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi 
are idle. Far from it. On the contrary, they are cease- 
lessly at work with the spiritual arms of teaching, disci- 
pline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme is the 
welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole 
Moslem world into the revived "Imamat" of Islam's 
early days; into a great theocracy, embracing all True 
Believers — in other words, Pan-Islamism. But they be- 
lieve that the political liberation of Islam from Christian 
domination must be preceded by a profound spiritual 
regeneration. Toward this end they strive ceaselessly 
to improve the manners and morals of the populations 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



57 



under their influence, while they also strive to improve 
material conditions by encouraging the better cultivation 
of oases, digging new wells, building rest-houses along the 
caravan routes, and promoting trade. The slaughter and 
rapine practised by the Sudanese Mahdists disgusted the 
Sennussi and drew from their chief words of scathing 
condemnation. 

All this explains the order's unprecedented self-re- 
straint. This is the reason why, year after year and 
decade after decade, the Sennussi advance slowly, calmly, 
coldly; gathering great latent power, but avoiding the 
temptation to expend it one instant before the proper 
time. Meanwhile they are covering North Africa with 
their lodges and schools, disciplining the people to the 
voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils; and, to the south- 
ward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith 
of Islam. 1 

1 On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya in particular, 
see W. S. Blunt, The Future of Islam (London, 1882) ; O. Depont and X. 
Coppolani, Les Confreries religieuses musulmanes (Paris, 1897) ; H. Duvey- 
rier, La Confrerie musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben Ali es Senoussi (Paris, 
1884) ; A. Le Chatelier, Les Confreries musulmanes du Hedjaz (Paris, 1887) ; 
L. Petit, Confreries musulmanes (Paris, 1899) ; L. Rinn, Marabouts et Khouan 
(Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman (Constantine, 
Algeria, 1913); Simian, Les Confreries islamiques en Algerie (Algiers, 1910); 
Achmed Abdullah (himself a Sennussi), "The Sennussiyehs," The Forum, 
May, 1914; A. R. Colquhoun, "Pan-Islam," North American Review, 
June, 1906; T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," 
Nineteenth Century, March, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, "The Moslem 
Menace," Nineteenth Century and After, September, 1907; . . . "La 
Puissance de 1' Islam: Ses Confreries Religieuses," Le Correspondent, 25 
November and 10 December, 1909. The above judgments, particularly 
regarding the Sennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others 
minimizing its importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that of 
Commandant Binger, " Le Peril de Tlslam," Bulletin du Comite de VAfrique 
franqaise, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems with El Sen- 
nussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, "Chez les Senoussia et les Touareg," 
V Expansion Coloniale franqaise, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman, Voyage au 
Pays des Senoussia d tr avers la Tripolitaine- (translated from the Arabic), 
Paris, 1903. 



58 



THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Nothing better shows modern Islam's quickened vital- 
ity than the revival of missionary fervor during the past 
hundred years. Of course Islam has always displayed 
strong proselytising power. Its missionary successes in 
its early days were extraordinary; and even in its period 
of decline it never wholly lost its propagating vigor. 
Throughout the Middle Ages Islam continued to gain 
ground in India and China; the Turks planted it firmly 
in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and six- 
teenth centuries Moslem missionaries won notable tri- 
umphs in such distant regions as West Africa, the Dutch 
Indies, and the Philippines. Nevertheless, taking the 
Moslem world as a whole, religious zeal undoubtedly 
declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenth 
century. 

The first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however, 
blew the smouldering embers of proselytism into a new 
flame, and everywhere except in Europe Islam began once 
more advancing portentously along all its far-flung 
frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some extent, a born 
missionary and instinctively propagates his faith among 
his non-Moslem neighbors, so the work was carried on 
not only by priestly specialists but also by multitudes of 
travellers, traders, and humble migratory workers. 1 Of 
course numerous zealots consecrated their fives to the 
task. This was particularly true of the religious fra- 
ternities. The Sennussi have especially distinguished 
themselves by their apostolic fervor, and from those 
natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara, thousands 

1 On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, Verbreitung des 
I slams (Berlin, 1897) ; M. Townsend, Asia and Europe, pp. 46-49, 60-61, 81 ; 
A. Le Cbatelier, V Islam au dix-neiwieme Steele (Paris, 1888); various 
papers in The Mohammedan World To-day (London, 1906). 



PAN-ISLAMISM 59 

of " Marabouts " have gone forth with flashing eyes and 
swelling breasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured 
with a zeal like that of the Christian mendicant friars of 
the Middle Ages. Islam's missionary triumphs among 
the negroes of West and Central Africa during the past 
century have been extraordinary. Every candid Euro- 
pean observer tells the same story. As an Englishman 
very justly remarked some twenty years ago: "Moham- 
medanism is making marvellous progress in the interior 
of Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it 
the Christian propaganda is a myth." 1 And a French 
Protestant missionary remarks in similar vein: "We see 
Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down but never 
stopped, toward the heart of Africa. Despite all obsta- 
cles encountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears 
nothing. Even Christianity, its most serious rival, Islam 
regards without hate, so sure is it of victory. While 
Christians dream of the conquest of Africa, the Moham- 
medans do it." 2 

The way in which Islam is marching southward is dra- 
matically shown by a recent incident. A few years ago 
the British authorities suddenly discovered that Moham- 
medanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigation 
brought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar 
Arabs. They began their propaganda about 1900. Ten 
years later almost every village in southern Nyassaland 
had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Although 

1 T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War," Nineteenth 
Century, March, 1900. 

2 D. A. Forget, Vlslam et le Christianisme dans VAfrique centrale, p. 65 
(Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslem missionary activity 
in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, VIslamisme et le Christianisme en Afrigue 
(Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race 
(London, 1887); Forget, op. cit 



60 



THE 



NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



the movement was frankly anti-European ; the British 
authorities did not dare to check it for fear of reper- 
cussions elsewhere. Many European observers fear that 
it is only a question of time when Islam will cross the 
Zambezi and enter South Africa. 

And these gains are not made solely against paganism. 
They are being won at the expense of African Christianity 
as well. In West Africa the European missions lose many 
of their converts to Islam, while across the continent the 
ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost against 
Islam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem 
tide. Xot by warlike incursions ; but by peaceful pene- 
tration, the Abyssinians are being Islamized. " Tribes 
which, fifty or sixty years ago, counted hardly a Moham- 
medan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according 
to the precepts of Islam." 1 

Islam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most note- 
worthy missionary victories, but they by no means tell 
the whole story, as a few instances drawn from other 
quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previous 
chapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the 
Russian Tartars. That, however, was only one phase of 
the Mohammedan Revival in that region, another phase 
being a marked resurgence of proselyting zeal. These 
Tartars had long been under Russian rule, and the Ortho- 
dox Church had made persistent efforts to convert them; 
in some instances with apparent success. But when the 
Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartars early in the 
nineteenth century, they immediately began laboring 

1 A. Guerinot, "L'Islam et l'Abyssinie," Revue du Monde musxdman, 1918. 
Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K. Cederquist, 
"Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia," The Moslem World, April, 1912. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



61 



with their Christianized brethren, and in a short time 
most of these reverted to Islam despite the best efforts of 
the Orthodox Church and the punitive measures of the 
Russian governmental authorities. Tartar missionaries 
also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes 
to the northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their 
Russian masters. 1 

In China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed 
an extraordinary development of Moslem energy. Islam 
had reached China in very early times, brought in by 
Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers. 
Despite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women, 
their descendants still differ perceptibly from the general 
Chinese population, and regard themselves as a separate 
and superior people. The Chinese Mohammedans are 
mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnan 
and the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially 
Chinese Moslems, another centre of Mohammedan popu- 
lation is found in the Chinese dependency of Eastern or 
Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocks and 
conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century. 
Until comparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems 
were well treated, but gradually their proud-spirited 
attitude alarmed the Chinese Government, which with- 
drew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in the 
nineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan 
Revival reached China, as it did every other part of the 
Moslem world, and the Chinese Mohammedans, inflamed 
by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revolts culmi- 
nating in the great rebellions which took place about the 

l S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," The Moslem World, January, 

ten. 



62 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



year 1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan. 
As usual, these fanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fight- 
ing power. The Turkestan rebels found an able leader, 
one Yakub Beg, and for some years both Turkestan and 
Yunnan were virtually independent. To many European 
observers at that time it looked as though the rebels 
might join hands, erect a permanent Mohammedan state 
in Western China, and even overrun the whole empire. 
The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem 
world, the Sultan of Turkey honoring him with the high 
title of Commander of the Faithful. After years of bitter 
fighting, accompanied by frightful massacres, the Chinese 
Government subdued the rebels. The Chinese Moslems, 
greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their 
former strength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and 
today they number fully 10,000,000. Thus, Chinese 
Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factor to be reckoned with 
in the future. 1 

The above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's 
activities during the past century. In India, for example, 
Islam has continued to gain ground rapidly, while in the 
Dutch Indies it is the same story. 2 European domination 
actually favors rather than retards the spread of Islam, 
for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the 
railroad, the post-office, and the printing-press, useful 
adjuncts to Islamic propaganda. 

Let us now consider the second originating centre of 

1 Broomhall, Islam in China (London, 1910); Nigarende\ "Notes sur les 
Musulmans Chinois," Revue du Monde musulman, January, 1907; paper on 
Islam in China in The Mohammedan World To-day (London, 1906). 

2 See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in The Mohammedan World 
To-day (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch East 
Indies (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



63 



modern Pan-Islamism — the movement especially asso- 
ciated with the personality of Djemal-ed-Din. 

Seyid Djemal-ed-Din el- Afghani was born early in the 
nineteenth century at Asadabad, near Hamadan, in 
Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he was of Afghan rather 
than Iranian descent, while his title "Seyid," meaning 
descendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood. 
Endowed with a keen intelligence, great personal magnet- 
ism, and abounding vigor, Djemal-ed-Din had a stormy 
and checkered career. He was a great traveller, know- 
ing intimately not only most of the Moslem world but 
western Europe as well. From these travels, supple- 
mented by wide reading, he gained a notable fund of 
information which he employed effectively in his mani- 
fold activities. A born propagandist, Djemal-ed-Din at- 
tracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islam 
his strong personality started an intellectual ferment. 
Unlike El Sennussi, he concerned himself very little with 
theology, devoting himself to politics. Djemal-ed-Din 
was the first Mohammedan who fully grasped the im- 
pending peril of Western domination, and he devoted 
his life to warning the Islamic world of the danger and 
attempting to elaborate measures of defense. By Euro- 
pean colonial authorities he was soon singled out as a 
dangerous agitator. The English, in particular, feared 
and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India, 
he went to Egypt about 1880, and had a hand in the 
anti-European movement of Arabi Pasha. When the 
English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelled 
Djemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching 
Constantinople. Here he found a generous patron in 
Abdul-Hamid, then evolving his Pan-Islamic policy. 



64 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, and 
promptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propa- 
ganda bureau. In fact, it is probable that the success 
of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policy was largely due to 
Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at an 
advanced age, active to the last. 

Djemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as 
follows: 

"The Christian world, despite its internal differences 
of race and nationality, is, as against the East and espe- 
cially as against Islam, united for the destruction of all 
Mohammedan states. 

"The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical 
spirit of Peter the Hermit. At heart, Christendom still 
regards Islam with fanatical hatred and contempt. This 
is shown in many ways, as in international law, before 
which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of 
Christian nations. 

" Christian governments excuse the attacks and humil- 
iations inflicted upon Moslem states by citing the latter's 
backward and barbarous condition; yet these same gov- 
ernments stifle by a thousand means, even by war, every 
attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands. 

"Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, 
not merely to some of them, and the result of this spirit 
is a tacit, persistent effort for Islam's destruction. 

"Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured 
and calumniated by Christendom. 'The Europeans call 
in the Orient "fanaticism" what at home they call 
"nationalism" and "patriotism." And what in the 
West they call "self-respect," "pride," "national honor," 
in the East thev call "chauvinism." What in the West 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



65 



they esteem as national sentiment, in the East they con- 
sider xenophobia/ 1 

"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world 
must unite in a great defensive alliance, to preserve itself 
from destruction; and, to do this, it must acquire the 
technic of Western progress and learn the secrets of Eu- 
ropean power." 

Such, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din, 
propagated with eloquence and authority for many years. 
Given the state of mingled fear and hatred of Western 
encroachment that was steadily spreading throughout the 
Moslem world, it is easy to see how great DjemaFs in- 
fluence must have been. And of course Djemal was 
not alone in his preaching. Other influential Moslems 
were agitating along much the same lines as early as the 
middle of the nineteenth century. One of these pioneers 
was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to 
remark: "What we want is rather an increase of fanati- 
cism than a diminution of it." 2 Arminius Vambery, the 
eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar, states that shortly 
after the Crimean War he was present at a militant 
Pan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far 
parts of the Moslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace. 3 

Such were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul 
Hamid built his ambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul 
Hamid is one of the strangest personalities of modern 

1 Quoted from article by "X, " "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," 
Revue du Monde musulman, March, 1913. This authoritative article is, 
so the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan — "un 
homme d'etat musulman." For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see 
A. Servier, Le Nationalisms musulman, pp. 10-13. 

2 Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, Essays on Eastern Questions, p. Ill 
(London, 1872). 

3 A. Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands, p. 351 (London, 1906). 



66 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



times. A man of unusual intelligence, his mind was 
yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge 
of insanity. Nursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he 
tried to carry them out by dark and tortuous methods 
which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian, were some- 
times absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he 
strove to keep the smallest decisions dependent on his 
arbitrary will, albeit he was frequently guided by clever 
sycophants who knew how to play upon his supersti- 
tions and his prejudices. 

Abdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very 
difficult circumstances. The country was on the verge 
of a disastrous Russian war, while the government was 
in the hands of statesmen who were endeavoring to trans- 
form Turkey into a modern state and who had introduced 
all sorts of Western political innovations, including a par- 
liament. Abdul Hamid, however, soon changed all this. 
Taking advantage of the confusion which marked the 
close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and 
made himself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors 
had ever been. Secure in his autocratic power, Abdul 
Hamid now began to evolve his own peculiar policy, 
which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamic trend. 1 
Unlike his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid deter- 
mined to use his position as caliph for far-reaching po- 
litical ends. Emphasizing his spiritual headship of the 
Mohammedan world rather than his political headship 
of the Turkish state, he endeavored to win the active 
support of all Moslems and, by that support, to intimi- 

1 Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned by the 
French publicist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warnings were 
published in his prophetic book UAvenir de la Turquie — Le Panislamisme 
(Paris, 1883). 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



67 



date European Powers who might be formulating aggres- 
sive measures against the Ottoman Empire. Before long 
Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic 
propaganda organization, working mainly by secretive, 
tortuous methods. Constantinople became the Mecca of 
all the fanatics and anti-Western agitators like Djemal- 
ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forth 
swarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant 
parts of Islam the Caliph's message of hope and im- 
pending deliverance from the menace of infidel rule. 

Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda went on unin- 
terruptedly for nearly thirty years. Precisely what this 
propaganda accomplished is very difficult to estimate. 
In the first place, it was cut short, and to some extent 
reversed, by the Young-Turk revolution of 1908 which 
drove Abdul Hamid from the throne. It certainly was 
never put to the test of a war between Turkey and a first- 
class European Power. This is what renders any theo- 
retical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did suc- 
ceed in gaining the respectful acknowledgment of his 
spiritual authority by most Moslem princes and notables, 
and he certainly won the pious veneration of the Moslem 
masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard 
the mighty Caliph in Stambul as, in very truth, the 
Defender of the Faith, and to consider his empire as the 
bulwark of Islam. On the other hand, it is a far cry 
from pious enthusiasm to practical performance. Fur- 
thermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning 
over powerful Pan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who 
suspected his motives and questioned his judgment; 
while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked him for his 
despotic, reactionary, inefficient rule. It is thus a very 



68 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



debatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever 
called upon the Moslem world for armed assistance in a 
"holy war/' he would have been generally supported. 

Yet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general 
spread of Pan-Islamic sentiment throughout the Moslem 
world. In this larger sense he succeeded; albeit not so 
much from his position as caliph as because he incarnated 
the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may 
conclude that Abdul Hamid' s Pan-Islamic propaganda 
did produce profound and lasting effects which will have 
to be seriously reckoned with. 

The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated 
the situation. It was soon followed by the Persian 
revolution and by kindred symptoms in other parts of 
the East. These events brought into sudden prominence 
new forces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and 
even social unrest, which had long been obscurely germi- 
nating in Islam but which had been previously denied 
expression. We shall later consider these new forces in 
detail. The point to be here noted is their complicating 
effect on the Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was, 
in fact ; cross-cut and deflected from its previous course, 
and a period of confusion and mental uncertainty super- 
vened. 

This interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism 
had recovered its poise and was moving forward once 
more. The reason was renewed pressure from the West. 
In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's African 
dependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Chris- 
tian Balkan states attacked Turkey in the Balkan War, 
which sheared away Turkey's European provinces to 
the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



69 



and discredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years 
Russia and England strangled the Persian revolution, 
while France, as a result of the Agadir crisis, closed her 
grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years, the 
Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults 
not only unprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes, 
quite without provocation. 

The effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of 
mingled despair and rage swept the Moslem world from 
end to end. And, of course, the Pan-Islamic implication 
was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam's agi- 
tators had been preaching for fifty years — the Crusade 
of the West for Islam's destruction. What could be 
better confirmation of the warnings of Djemal-ed-Din? 

The results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks 
and Arabs had been on the worst of terms, both races 
clasped hands in a sudden access of Pan-Islamic fervor, 
and the Italian invaders were met with a fanatical fury 
that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western 
observers with grave disquietude. "Why has Italy 
found 1 defenseless' Tripoli such a hornet's nest?" queried 
Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister of foreign 
affairs. "It is because she has to do, not merely with 
Turkey, but with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball 
rolling — so much the worse for her — and for us all." 1 
The Anglo-Russian manhandling of Persia likewise roused 
much wrathful comment throughout Islam, 2 while the 

1 Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Crise m6diterraneenne et 1' Islam," Revue 
Hebdomadaire, April 13, 1912. 

2 See "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," Revue du Monde 
musulman, June, 1914; B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics." 
Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, May 4, 1910; W. M. Shuster, 
The Strangling of Persia (New York, 1912). 



70 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



impending extinction of Moroccan independence at 
French hands was discussed with mournful indignation. 

But with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of 
Islam knew no bounds. From China to the Congo, 
pious Moslems watched with bated breath the swaying 
battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news of 
Turkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish 
rose hoarse and high. A prominent Indian Mohammedan 
well expressed the feelings of his coreligionists every- 
where when he wrote: "The King of Greece orders a 
new Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls 
to Christian fanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already 
speaks of the planting of the Cross on the dome of 
Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrow they 
will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar. 
Brothers! Be ye of one mind, that it is the duty of 
every True Believer to hasten beneath the Khalifa's 
banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety of the 
faith." 1 And another Indian Moslem leader thus ad- 
jured the British authorities: "I appeal to the present 
government to change its anti-Turkish attitude before 
the fury of millions of Moslem fellow subjects is kindled 
to a blaze and brings disaster." 2 

Most significant of all were the appeals made at this 
time by Moslems to non-Mohammedan Asiatics for sym- 
pathy and solidarity against the hated West. This was a 
development as unprecedented as it was startling. Mo- 
hammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testa- 
ments, and regarding himself as the successor of the 

1 Quoted from A. Vambery, "Die tiirkische Katastrophe imd die Islam- 
welt," Deutsche Revue, July, 1913. 

2 Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, "Recent Turkish Events and Moslem 
India," Asiatic Review, October, 1913. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



71 



divinely inspired prophets Moses and Jesus, had en- 
joined upon his followers relative respect for Christians 
and Jews (" Peoples of the Book") in contrast with 
other non-Moslems, whom he stigmatized as " Idola- 
ters." These injunctions of the Prophet had always 
been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of 
Moslems for Christians, however bitter, had been as 
nothing compared with their loathing and contempt for 
"Idolaters" like the Brahmanist Hindus or the Bud- 
dhists and Confucianists of the Far East. 

The first symptom of a change in attitude appeared 
during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. So great had 
Islam's fear and hatred of the Christian West then be- 
come, that the triumph of an Asiatic people over Euro- 
peans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems, 
even though the victors were "Idolaters." It was quite 
in keeping with Pan-Islamism's strong missionary bent 
that many pious Moslems should have dreamed of 
bringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to 
get in touch with Japan were made. Propagandist 
papers were founded, missionaries were selected, and the 
Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamic dele- 
gation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conver- 
sion of Japan was widely discussed. Said an Egyptian 
journal in the year 1906: "England, with her sixty mil- 
lion Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion. With a 
Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change 
entirely." 1 And, at the other end of the Moslem world, 
a Chinese Mohammedan sheikh wrote: "If Japan thinks 
of becoming some day a very great power and making 

1 Quoted by F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'lslam," Revue du Monde musul- 
man, November, 1906. 



72 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Asia the dominator of the other continents; it will be 
only by adopting the blessed religion of Islam." 1 

Of course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts 
that while Japan received Islam's emissaries with smil- 
ing courtesy, she had not the faintest intention of turn- 
ing Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first step had been 
taken toward friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia, 
and the Balkan War drove Moslems much further in this 
direction. The change in Moslem sentiment can be 
gauged by the numerous appeals made by the Indian 
Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen 
from the following sample entitled significantly "The 
Message of the East." "Spirit of the East," reads this 
noteworthy document, "arise and repel the swelling flood 
of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid us 
with your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your 
power, the birthright and heritage of the Hindu ! Let the 
Spirit Powers hidden in the Himalayan mountain-peaks 
arise. Let prayers to the god of battles float upward; 
prayers that right may triumph over might; and call to 
your myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!" 2 

To any one who realizes the traditional Moslem atti- 
tude toward "Idolaters," such words are simply amaz- 
ing. They betoken a veritable revolution in outlook. 
And such sentiments were not confined to Indian Mos- 
lems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems 
as well. Said a Mohammedan newspaper of Chinese 
Turkestan, advocating a fraternal union of all Chinese 
against Western aggression: "Europe has grown too 
presumptuous. It will deprive us of our liberty; it will 
destroy us altogether if we do not bestir ourselves 

1 Farjanel, supra. 2 Quoted by Vamb£ry, supra. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



73 



promptly and prepare for a powerful resistance." 1 Dur- 
ing the troublous first stages of the Chinese revolution, 
the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulky aloofness, 
co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucian 
fellow patriots that Doctor Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican 
leader, announced gratefully: "The Chinese will never 
forget the assistance which their Moslem fellow country- 
men have rendered in the interest of order and liberty/' 2 
The Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply 
stirred against European aggression, keenly conscious of 
its own solidarity, and frankly reaching out for Asiatic 
allies in the projected struggle against European domina- 
tion. 

Under these circumstances it may at first sight appear 
strange that no general Islamic explosion occurred when 
Turkey entered the lists at the close of 1914 and the 
Sultan-Caliph issued a formal summons to the Holy War. 
Of course this summons was not the flat failure which 
Allied reports led the West to believe at the time. As 
a matter of fact, there was trouble in practically every 
Mohammedan land under Allied control. To name only 
a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumult 
smothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements, 
Tripoli burst into a flame of insurrection that drove the 
Italians headlong to the coast, Persia was prevented from 
joining Turkey only by prompt Russo-British interven- 
tion, while the Indian northwest frontier was the scene 
of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a 
million Anglo-Indian troops. The British Government 

1 Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," Nineteenth 
Century and After, April, 1912. 

2 Ibid. 



74 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



has officially admitted that during 1915 the Allies' Asiatic 
and African possessions stood within a hand's breadth 
of a cataclysmic insurrection. 

That insurrection would certainly have taken place if 
Islam's leaders had everywhere spoken the fateful word. 
But the word was not spoken. Instead, influential 
Moslems outside of Turkey generally condemned the 
latter's action and did all in their power to calm the 
passions of the fanatic multitude. 

The attitude of these leaders does credit to their dis- 
cernment. They recognized that this was neither the 
time nor the occasion for a decisive struggle with the 
West. They were not yet materially prepared, and they 
had not perfected their understandings either among 
themselves or with their prospective non-Moslem allies. 
Above all, the moral urge was lacking. They knew that 
athwart the Khalifa's writ was stencilled "Made in 
Germany." They knew that the "Young-Turk" clique 
which had engineered the coup was made up of Euro- 
peanized renegades, many of them not even nominal 
Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had 
no intention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the 
fire, nor did they wish to further Prussian schemes of 
world-dominion which for themselves would have meant 
a mere change of masters. Far better to let the West 
fight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal 
fully its future intentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide 
its time, grow in strength, and await the morrowi 

The Versailles peace conference was just such a revela- 
tion of European intentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders 
had been waiting for in order to perfect their pro- 
grammes and enlist the moral solidarity of their fol- 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



75 



lowers. At Versailles the European Powers showed un- 
equivocally that they had no intention of relaxing their 
hold upon the Near and Middle East. By a number of 
secret treaties negotiated during the war ; the Ottoman 
Empire had been virtually partitioned between the vic- 
torious Allies, and these secret treaties formed the basis 
of the Versailles settlement. Furthermore; Egypt had 
been declared a British protectorate at the very begin- 
ning of the war, while the Versailles conference had 
scarcely adjourned before England announced an "agree- 
ment" with Persia which made that country another 
British protectorate in fact if not in name. The upshot 
was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle East 
were subjected to European political domination as never 
before. 

But there was another side to the shield. During the 
war years the Allied statesmen had officially proclaimed 
times without number that the war was being fought to 
establish a new world-order based on such principles as 
the rights of small nations and the liberty of all peoples. 
These pronouncements had been treasured and memor- 
ized throughout the East. When, therefore, the East 
saw a peace settlement based, not upon these high profes- 
sions, but upon the imperialistic secret treaties, it was 
fired with a moral indignation and sense of outraged jus- 
tice never known before. A tide of impassioned determi- 
nation began rising which has already set the entire East 
in tumultuous ferment, and which seems merely the pre- 
monitory ground-swell of a greater storm. So ominous 
were the portents that even before the Versailles confer- 
ence had adjourned many European students of Eastern 
affairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the 



76 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

judgment of Leone Caetani ; Duke of Sermoneta ; an Ital- 
ian authority on Mohammedan questions. Speaking in 
the spring of 1919 on the war's effect on the East, he 
said: "The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Oriental 
civilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental 
world, from China to the Mediterranean, is in ferment. 
Everywhere the hidden fire of anti-European hatred is 
burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discon- 
tent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, 
Arabia, and Lybia are all different manifestations of the 
same deep sentiment, and have as their object the re- 
bellion of the Oriental world against European civiliza- 
tion/' 1 

Those words are a prophetic forecast of what has since 
occurred in the Moslem world. Because recent events 
are perhaps even more involved with the nationalistic 
aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are with the 
strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their 
detailed discussion till the chapter on Nationalism. We 
should, however, remember that Moslem nationalism 
and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internal differences, 
tend to unite against the external pressure of European 
domination and equally desire Islam's liberation from 
European political control. Remembering these facts, 
let us survey the present condition of the Pan-Islamic 
movement. 

Pan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by 
Western pressure, especially by the late war and the re- 
cent peace settlements. However, Pan-Islamism must 
not be considered as merely a defensive political reaction 
against external aggression. It springs primarily from 

1 Special cable to the New York Times, dated Rome, May 28, 1919. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



77 



that deep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to 
Moslem by bonds much stronger than those which unite 
the members of the Christian world. These bonds are 
not merely religious, in the technical sense; they are so- 
cial and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world, 
despite wide differences in local customs and regulations, 
the basic laws of family and social conduct are every- 
where the same. " The truth is that Islam is more than 
a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civiliza- 
tion with a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own; 
in its long struggle against the rival civilization of Chris- 
tendom it has become an organic unit conscious of it- 
self." 1 

To this Islamic civilization all Moslems are deeply 
attached. In this larger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal. 
Even the most Hberal-minded Moslems, however much 
they may welcome Western ideas, and however strongly 
they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of 
the political Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in 
Islam's essential solidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem 
liberal, The Aga Khan, remarks: "There is a right and 
legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and be- 
lieving Mohammedan belongs — that is, the theory of the 
spiritual brotherhood and unity of the children of the 
Prophet. The real spiritual and cultural unity of Islam 
must ever grow, for to the follower of the Prophet it is 
the foundation of the life and the soul." 2 

If such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly 
conversant with Western culture and receptive to West- 

1 Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," Nineteenth Century and After, 
July, 1919. 

2 H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition, p. 158 (London, 1918). 



78 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



em progress; what must be the feelings of the Moslem 
masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical? Besides 
perfectly understandable fear and hatred due to Western 
aggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great 
deal of genuine fanaticism caused, not by European po- 
litical domination, but by religious bigotry and blind 
hatred of Western civilization. 1 But this fanaticism has, 
of course, been greatly inflamed by the political events of 
the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and po- 
litical hatred of the West have coalesced in a state of 
mind decidedly ominous for the peace of the world. We 
should not delude ourselves into minimizing the danger- 
ous possibilities of the present situation. Just because 
the fake "Holy War" proclaimed by the Young-Turks 
at German instigation in 1914 did not come off is no rea- 
son for believing that a real holy war is impossible. As 
a German staff-officer in Turkish service during the late 
struggle very candidly says: a The Holy War was an 
absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War." 2 
I have already explained how most Moslems saw 
through the trick and refused to budge. 

However, the long series of European aggressions, 
culminating in the recent peace settlements which sub- 
jected virtually the entire Moslem world to European 
domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslem hearts 
a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrous con- 
sequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have 
long been heaping high. More than twenty years ago 
Arminius Vambery, who knew the Moslem world as few 

1 This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 

2 Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief of 
general staff, in the Berliner Tageblatt, January 24, 1920. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



79 



Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of the 
perils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies. 
"As time passes," he wrote in 1898, "the danger of a 
general war becomes ever greater. We should not forget 
that time has considerably augmented the adversary's 
force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment of 
solidarity which is becoming livelier of late years among 
the peoples of Islam, and which in our age of rapid com- 
munication is no longer a negligible quantity, as it was 
even ten or twenty years ago. 

"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of 
our nineteenth century Crusaders to the importance of 
the Moslem press, whose ramifications extend all over 
Asia and Africa, and whose exhortations sink more pro- 
foundly than they do with us into the souls of their read- 
ers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt, 
and Algeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin 
to exert a profound influence. Everything that Europe 
thinks, decides, and executes against Islam spreads 
through those countries with the rapidity of lightning. 
Caravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the 
equator, where the tidings are commented upon in very 
singular fashion. Certain sparks struck at our meetings 
and banquets kindle, little by little, menacing flames. 
Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close 
our eyes to the dangers lurking beneath an apparent 
passivity. What the Terdjuman of Crimea says between 
the lines is repeated by the Constantinople Ikdam, and 
is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by The 
Moslem Chronicle. 

"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is 
composed of tenuous and dispersed strands. But West- 



80 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



era aggression might easily unite those strands into a 
solid whole, bringing about a general war." 1 

In the decades which have elapsed since Vambery 
wrote those lines the situation has become much more 
tense. Moslem resentment at European dominance has 
increased, has been reinforced by nationalistic aspirations 
almost unknown during the last century, and possesses 
methods of highly efficient propaganda. For example, 
the Pan -Islamic press, to which Vambery refers, has 
developed in truly extraordinary fashion. In 1900 there 
were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200 propa- 
gandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 
there were well over 1,000. 2 Moslems fully appreciate 
the post-office, the railroad, and other modern methods 
of rapidly interchanging ideas. "Every Moslem country 
is in communication with ever} 7 other Moslem country: 
directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travel- 
lers, traders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means 
of Mohammedan newspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets, 
and periodicals. I have met with Cairo newspapers in 
Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinople news- 
papers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in 
Mohammerah, Kerbela, and Port Said." 3 As for the 
professional Pan-Islamic propagandists, more particu- 
larly those of the religious fraternities, they swarm ev- 
erywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people. "Travel- 
ling under a thousand disguises — as merchants, preachers, 
students, doctors, workmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks, 

1 A. Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, pp. 71, 
72 (Paris, 1898). 

2 A Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 182. 

3 B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics," Proceedings of 
the Central Asian Society, May, 1910. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



81 



pretended fools or rhapsodists, these emissaries are every- 
where well received by the Faithful and are efficaciously 
protected against the suspicious investigations of the 
European colonial authorities." 1 

Furthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a 
wide-spread conviction, held by liberals and chauvinists 
alike (albeit for very different reasons), that Islam is 
entering on a period of Renaissance and renewed glory. 
Says Sir Theodore Morison: "No Mohammedan believes 
that Islamic civilization is dead or incapable of further 
development. They recognize that it has fallen on evil 
days; that it has suffered from an excessive veneration 
of the past, from prejudice and bigotry and narrow 
scholasticism not unlike that which obscured European 
thought in the Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam 
too is about to have its Renaissance, that it is receiving 
from Western learning a stimulus which will quicken it 
into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this new 
life are everywhere manifest." 2 

Sir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem 
liberals. How Pan-Islamists with anti-Western senti- 
ments feel is well set forth by an Egyptian, Yahya Sid- 
dyk, in his well-known book, The Awakening of the Is- 
lamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira. 3 
The book is doubly interesting because the author has a 
thorough Western education, holding a law degree from 
the French university of Toulouse, and is a judge on 
the Egyptian bench. Although writing nearly a decade 
before the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the 

1 L. Rinn, Marabouts et Khouan, p. vi. 

2 Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," op. ext. 

3 Yahya Siddyk, Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au quatorzieme Steele 
de VHegire (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic. 



82 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



imminence of the European War. "Behold," he writes, 
"these Great Powers ruining themselves in terrifying 
armaments; measuring each other's strength with defiant 
glances; menacing each other; contracting alliances 
which continually break and which presage those terrible 
shocks which overturn the world and cover it with ruins, 
fire, and blood! The future is God's, and nothing is 
lasting save His Will." 

Yahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate. 
"Does this mean," he asks, "that Europe, our 'enlight- 
ened guide/ has already reached the summit of its evo- 
lution ? Has it already exhausted its vital force by two 
or three centuries of hyperexertion ? In other words: is 
it already stricken with senility, and will it see itself soon 
obliged to yield its civilizing role to other peoples less de- 
generate, less neurasthenic; that is to say, younger, more 
robust, more healthy, than itself? In my opinion, the 
present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colo- 
nial expansion means, not strength, but weakness. De- 
spite the aureole of so much grandeur ; power, and glory, 
Europe is to-day more divided and more fragile than ever, 
and ill conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and its anguish. 
Its destiny is inexorably working out ! . . . 

"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both 
much good and much evil: good, in the material and 
intellectual sense; evil, from the moral and political point 
of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by a 
brilliant civilization, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell 
into a malaise; but they are not stricken, they are not 
dead ! These peoples, conquered by the force of cannon, 
have not in the least lost their unity, even under the 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



83 



oppressive regimes to which the Europeans have long 
subjected them. . . . 

"I have said that the European contact has been 
salutary to us from both the material and intellectual 
point of view. What reforming Moslem princes wished to 
impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-day real- 
ized a hundredfold. So great has been our progress in 
the last twenty-five years in science, letters, and art that 
we may well hope to be in all these things the equals of 
Europe in less than half a century. . . . 

" A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of 
the Hegira, and this happy century will mark our Renais- 
sance and our great future! A new breath animates 
the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems are 
penetrated with the necessity of work and instruction! 
We all wish to travel, do business, tempt fortune, brave 
dangers. There is in the East, among the Mohamme- 
dans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknown 
twenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public 
opinion throughout the East." 

The author concludes: "Let us hold firm, each for all, 
and let us hope, hope, hope ! We are fairly launched on 
the path of progress : let us profit by it ! It is Europe's 
very tyranny which has wrought our transformation ! 
It is our continued contact with Europe that favors our 
evolution and inevitably hastens our revival ! It is 
simply history repeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling 
itself despite all opposition and all resistance. . . . 
Europe's tutelage over Asiatics is becoming more and 
more nominal — the gates of Asia are closing against the 
European! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution 



84 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



without parallel in the world's annals. A new age is at 
hand!" 

If this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the 
opening years of the century, it is clear that their views 
must have been confirmed and intensified by the Great 
War. 1 The material power of the West was thereby 
greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by 
the character of the peace settlement and by the atten- 
dant disputes which broke out among the victors. The 
mutual rivalries and jealousies of England, France, Italy, 
and their satellites in the East have given Moslems much 
food for hopeful thought, and have caused correspond- 
ing disquietude in European minds. A French publicist 
recently admonished his fellow Europeans that "Islam 
does not recognize our colonial frontiers," and added 
warningly, "the great movement of Islamic union inaugu- 
rated by Djemal-ed-Din el- Afghani is going on." 2 

The menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious 
agitation which has been going on for the last three years 
among India's 70,000,000 Moslems against the dismem- 
berment of the Ottoman Empire. This agitation is not 
confined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and 
Sir Theodore Morison does not overstate the case when 
he says: "It is time the British public realized the gravity 
of what is happening in the East. The Mohammedan 
world is ablaze with anger from end to end at the partition 
of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far 
remote as Kabul and Cairo are symptoms only of this 

1 For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiatic and 
African peoples, see my book The Rising Tide of Color against White 
World-Supremacy (New York and London, 1920). 

2 L. Massignon, "L'Islam et la Politique des Allies," Revue des Sciences 
polUiques. June, 1920. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



85 



wide-spread resentment. I have been in close touch with 
Mohammedans of India for close upon thirty years and I 
think it is my duty to warn the British public of the pas- 
sionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed 
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. The diplomats 
at Versailles apparently thought that outside the Turkish 
homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. This is a 
disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mo- 
hammedan now in London to realize the white heat 
to which their anger is rising. In India itself the whole 
of the Mohammedan community from Peshawar to Ar- 
cot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women 
inside the Zenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who 
usually take no interest in public affairs are leaving their 
shops and counting-houses to organize remonstrances and 
petitions; even the mediaeval theologians of Deoband 
and the Nadwatul-Ulama, whose detachment from the 
modern world is proverbial; are coming from their clois- 
ters to protest against the destruction of Islam." 1 

Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that 
the Moslem liberals are being driven into the camp of 
political Pan-Islamism. Receptive though the liberals 
are to Western ideas, and averse though they are to Pan- 
Isiamism's chauvinistic; reactionary tendencies; Europe's 
intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a tem- 
porary alliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist 
groups; even though the liberals know that anything 
like a holy war would dig a gulf between East and West, 
stop the influx of Western stimuli, favor reactionary 
fanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a mod- 
ernist reformation of Islam. 

1 Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," op. cit. 



86 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Perhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper 
in Islam that the last few years have witnessed the rapid 
spread of two new puritan, fanatic movements — the Ikh- 
wan and the Salafiya. The Ikhwan movement began 
obscurely about ten years ago in inner Arabia — the Nejd. 
It is a direct outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it dif- 
fers in no essential respect. So rapid has been Ikhwan- 
ism 's progress that it to-day absolutely dominates the 
entire Nejd, and it is headed by desert Arabia's most 
powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud 
who headed the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago. 
The fanaticism of the Ikhwans is said to be extraordi- 
nary, while their programme is the old Wahabi dream of 
a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world. 1 As for 
the Salafi movement, it started in India even more ob- 
scurely than Ikhwanism did in Arabia, but during the 
past few years it has spread widely through Islam. Like 
Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical in spirit, its 
adherents being found especially among dervish organi- 
zations. 2 Such phenomena, taken with everything else, 
do not augur well for the peace of the East. 

So much for Pan-Islamism 's religious and political 
sides. Now let us glance at its commercial and industrial 
aspects — at what may be called economic Pan-Islamism. 

Economic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the 
permeation of Western ideas. Half a century ago the 
Moslem world was economically still in the Middle Ages. 
The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such 

1 For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, "The Situation in 
Arabia," Atlantic Monthly, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, "The Politico- 
Religious Situation in Arabia," The Moslem World, July, 1919. 

2 For the Salafi movement, see " Wahhabisme — Son Avenir sociale et le 
Mouvement salafi," Revue du Monde musulman, 1919. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



87 



as the prohibition of interest rendered economic life in 
the modern sense impossible. What little trade and in- 
dustry did exist was largely in the hands of native Chris- 
tians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic life of 
the East was being disorganized by the aggressive com- 
petition of the West. Europe's political conquest of the 
Moslem world was, in fact, paralleled by an economic 
conquest even more complete. Everywhere percolated 
the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made 
goods, while close behind came European capital, tempt- 
ingly offering itself in return for loans and concessions 
which, once granted, paved the way for European po- 
litical domination. 

Yet in economics as in politics the very completeness 
of Europe's triumph provoked resistance. Angered and 
alarmed by Western exploitation, Islam frankly recognized 
its economic inferiority and sought to escape from its 
subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began casting about 
for a modus Vivendi with modern life that would put 
Islam economically abreast of the times. Western 
methods were studied and copied. The prohibitions of 
the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored. 

The upshot has been a marked evolution toward 
Western economic standards. This evolution is of course 
still in its early stages, and is most noticeable in lands 
most exposed to Western influences like India, Egypt, 
and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the 
trend is the same. The details of this economic trans- 
formation will be discussed in the chapter devoted to 
economic change. What we are here concerned with is 
its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong. 
Nowhere does Islam's innate solidarity come out better 



88 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



than in the economic field. The religious, cultural, and 
customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslem enable 
Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part 
of the Islamic world, while Western methods of transit 
and communication enable Mohammedans to travel and 
keep in touch as they never could before. New types of 
Moslems — wholesale merchants, steamship owners, busi- 
ness men, bankers, even factory industrialists and brokers 
— are rapidly evolving; types which would have been 
simply unthinkable a century, or even half a century, ago. 

And these new men understand each other perfectly. 
Bound together both by the ties of Islamic fraternity 
and by the pressure of Western competition, they co- 
ordinate their efforts much more easily than politicals 
have succeeded in doing. Here liberals, Pan-Islamists, 
and Nationalists can meet on common ground. Here is 
no question of political conspiracies, revolts, or holy 
wars, challenging the armed might of Europe and risking 
bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary, 
here is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for 
economic ends by business methods which the West 
cannot declare unlawful and dare not repress. 

What, then, is the specific programme of economic 
Pan-Islamism? It is easily stated: the wealth of Islam 
for Moslems. The profits of trade and industry for Mos- 
lem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of West- 
ern capital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking 
of Europe's grip on Islam's natural resources by the ter- 
mination of concessions in lands, mines, forests, railways, 
custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamic lands is 
to-day drained away to foreign shores. 

Such are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism. 



PAN-ISLAMISM 



89 



They are wholly modern concepts, the outgrowth of those 
Western ideas whose influence upon the Moslem world I 
shall now discuss. 1 

1 On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. Le Chatelier, 
"Le Reveil de l'lslam — Sa Situation economique," Revue Economique 
Internationale, July, 1910; also his article "Politique musulmane," Revue 
du Monde musulman, September, 1910; M. Pickthall, "La Morale isla- 
mique," Revue Politique internationale, July, 1916; S. Khuda Bukhsh, 
Essays: Indian and Islamic (London, 1912). 



CHAPTER III 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 

The influence of the West is the great dynamic in the 
modern transformation of the East. The ubiquitous im- 
pact of Westernism is modifying not merely the Islamic 
world but all non-Moslem Asia and Africa/ and in subse- 
quent pages we shall examine the effects of Western 
influence upon the non-Moslem elements of India. Of 
course Western influence does not entirely account for 
Islam's recent evolution. We have already seen that, for 
the last hundred years, Islam itself has been engendering 
forces which, however quickened by external Western 
stimuli, are essentially internal in their nature, arising 
spontaneously and working toward distinctive, original 
goals. It is not a mere copying of the West that is to- 
day going on in the Moslem world, but an attempt at 
a new synthesis — an assimilation of Western methods 
to Eastern ends. We must always remember that the 
Asiatic stocks which constitute the bulk of Islam's fol- 
lowers are not primitive savages like the African negroes 
or the Australoids, but are mainly peoples with genu- 
ine civilizations built up by their own efforts from the 
remote past. In view of their historic achievements, 
therefore, it seems safe to conclude that in the great fer- 
ment now stirring the Moslem world we behold a real 
Renaissance, whose genuineness is best attested by the 

1 For the larger aspects, see my book The Rising Tide of Color against 
White World-Supremacy (New York and London, 1920). 

90 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 91 



fact that there have been similar movements in former 
times. 

The modern influence of the West on the East is quite 
unprecedented in both intensity and scope. The far 
more local, partial influence of Greece and Rome cannot 
be compared to it. Another point to be noted is that this 
modern influence of the West upon the East is a very 
recent thing. The full impact of Westernism upon the 
Orient as a whole dates only from about the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Since then ; however, the process 
has been going on by leaps and bounds. Roads and rail- 
ways, posts and telegraphs, books and papers, methods 
and ideas, have penetrated, or are in process of penetrat- 
ing, every nook and cranny of the East. Steamships sail 
the remotest seas. Commerce drives forth and scatters 
the multitudinous products of Western industry among 
the remotest peoples. Nations which only half a century 
ago lived the life of thirty centuries ago, to-day read 
newspapers and go to business in electric tram-cars. 
Both the habits and thoughts of Orientals are being 
revolutionized. To a discussion of the influence of the 
West upon the Moslem world the remainder of this book 
will be devoted. The chief elements will be separately 
analyzed in subsequent chapters, the present chapter 
being a general survey of an introductory character. 

The permeation of Westernism is naturally most ad- 
vanced in those parts of Islam which have been longest 
under Western political control. The penetration of the 
British "Raj " into the remotest Indian jungles, for exam- 
ple, is an extraordinary phenomenon. By the coinage, 
the post-office, the railroads, the administration of justice, 
the encouragement of education, the relief of famine, and 



92 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



a thousand other ways, the great organization has pene- 
trated all India. But even in regions where European 
control is still nominal, the permeation of Westernism has 
gone on apace. The customs and habits of the people 
have been distinctly modified. Western material im- 
provements and comforts like the kerosene-oil lamp and 
the sewmg-machine are to-day part and parcel of the 
daily life of the people. New economic wants have been 
created; standards of living have been raised; canons of 
taste have been altered. 1 

In the intellectual and spiritual fields, likewise, the 
leaven of Westernism is clearly apparent. We have 
already seen how profoundly Moslem liberal reformers 
have been influenced by Western ideas and the spirit of 
Western progress. Of course in these fields Westernism 
has progressed more slowly and has awakened much 
stronger opposition than it has on the material plane. 
Material innovations, especially mechanical improve- 
ments, comforts, and luxuries, make their way much 
faster than novel customs or ideas, which usually shock 
established beliefs or ancestral prejudices. Tobacco was 
taken up with extraordinary rapidity by every race and 
clime, and the kerosene-lamp has in half a century pene- 
trated the recesses of Central Asia and of China; whereas 
customs like Western dress and ideas like Western educa- 
tion encounter many setbacks and are often adopted 
with such modifications that their original spirit is dena- 

1 On these points, see Arminius Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern 
Lands (London, 1906); also his La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant 
Quarante Ans (Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper, The Modernizing of the Orient 
(New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic (Lon- 
don, 1912); A. J. Brown, ''Economic Changes in Asia," The Century, 
March, 1904. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 93 



tured or perverted. The superior strength and skill of 
the West are to-day generally admitted throughout the 
East, but in many quarters the first receptivity to West- 
ern progress and zeal for Western ideas have cooled or 
have actually given place to a reactionary hatred of the 
very spirit of Western civilization. 1 

Western influences are most apparent in the upper and 
middle classes, especially in the Western-educated intelli- 
gentsia which to-day exists in every Eastern land. These 
elites of course vary greatly in numbers and influence, 
but they all possess a more or less definite grasp of West- 
ern ideas. In their reactions to Westernism they are 
sharply differentiated. Some, while retaining the funda- 
mentals of their ancestral philosophy of fife, attempt a 
genuine assimilation of Western ideals and envisage a 
higher synthesis of the spirits of East and West. Others 
break with their traditional pasts, steep themselves in 
Westernism, and become more or less genuinely West- 
ernized. Still others conceal behind their Western ve- 
neer disillusionment and detestation. 2 

Of course it is in externals that Westernization is 
most pronounced. The Indian or Turkish "intellectual," 
holding Western university degrees and speaking fluently 
several European languages, and the wealthy prince or 
pasha, with his motor-cars, his racing-stables, and his 

1 For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see Vambery, 
op. cit.; Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London, 1910); J. N. Far- 
quhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, 1915); Rev. J. 
Morrison, New Ideas in India : A Study of Social, Political, and Religious 
Developments (Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 
especially vol. II, pp. 228-243 (London, 1908). 

2 For the Westernized Elites, see L. Bertrand, Le Mirage Orientale 
(Paris, 1910); Cromer, op. cit.; A. Mltin, Ulnde d'aujourd'hui : Ultude 
Sociale (Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, " Politique musulmane," Revue du 
Monde musulman, September, 1910. 



94 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



annual "cure" at European watering-places, appear very 
Occidental to the casual eye. Such men wear European 
clothes, eat European food ; and live in houses partly or 
wholly furnished in European style. Behind this facade 
exists every possible variation of inner life, from earnest 
enthusiasm for Western ideals to inveterate reaction. 

These varied attitudes toward Westernism are not 
parked off by groups or localities, they coexist among the 
individuals of every class and every land in the East. 
The entire Orient is, in fact, undergoing a prodigious 
transformation, far more sudden and intense than any- 
thing the West has ever known. Our civilization is 
mainly self -evolved; a natural growth developing by 
normal, logical, and relatively gradual stages. The East, 
on the contrary, is undergoing a concentrated process of 
adaptation which, with us, was spread over centuries, and 
the result is not so much evolution as revolution — polit- 
ical, economic, social, idealistic, religious, and much more 
besides. The upshot is confusion, uncertainty, grotesque 
anachronism, and glaring contradiction. Single genera- 
tions are sundered by unbridgable mental and spiritual 
gulfs. Fathers do not understand sons; sons despise 
their fathers. Everywhere the old and the new struggle 
fiercely, often within the brain or spirit of the same indi- 
vidual. The infinite complexity of this struggle as it 
appears in India is well summarized by Sir Valentine 
Chirol when he speaks of the many "currents and cross- 
currents of the confused movement which is stirring the 
stagnant waters of Indian life — the steady impact of 
alien ideas on an ancient and obsolescent civilization; 
the more or less imperfect assimilation of those ideas by 
the few; the dread and resentment of them by those 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 95 



whose traditional ascendancy they threaten; the disin- 
tegration of old beliefs, and then again their aggressive 
revival; the careless diffusion of an artificial system of 
education, based none too firmly on mere intellectualism, 
and bereft of all moral or religious sanction; the applica- 
tion of Western theories of administration and of juris- 
prudence to a social formation stratified on lines of 
singular rigidity; the play of modern economic forces 
upon primitive conditions of industry and trade; the 
constant and unconscious but inevitable friction between 
subject races and their alien rulers; the reverberation of 
distant wars and distant racial conflicts; the exaltation 
of an Oriental people in the Far East." 1 These lines, 
though written about India, apply with fair exactitude to 
every other portion of the Near and Middle East to-day. 
As a French writer remarks with special reference to the 
Levant: "The truth is that the Orient is in transforma- 
tion, and the Mohammedan mentality as well — though 
not perhaps exactly as we might wish. It is undergoing 
a period of crisis, wherein the past struggles everywhere 
against the present; where ancient customs, impaired by 
modern innovations, present a hybrid and disconcerting 
spectacle." 2 

To this is largely due the unlovely traits displayed by 
most of the so-called "Westernized" Orientals; the 
"stucco civilization " 3 of the Indian Babu, and the boule- 
vardier "culture" of the Turkish "Effendi" — syphilized 

1 Chirol, op. tit., pp. 321-322. 

2 Bertrand, op. tit., p. 39. See also Bukhsh, op. cit. ; Farquhar, op. cit.; 
Morrison, op. tit. ; R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Economics 
(London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Econo- 
mic Journal, December, 1910. 

8 W. S. Lilly, India and Its Problems, p. 243 (London, 1902). 



96 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



rather than civilized. Any profound transformation 
must engender many worthless by-products, and the 
contemporary Westernization of the Orient has its dark 
as well as its bright side. The very process of reform, 
however necessary and inevitable, lends fresh virulence 
to old ills and imports new evils previously unknown, 
xls Lord Cromer says: "It is doubtful whether the price 
which is being paid for introducing European civilization 
into these backward Eastern societies is always recog- 
nized as fully as it should be. The material benefits 
derived from European civilization are unquestionably 
great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public and 
private morality the future is altogether uncertain." 1 

The good and the evil of Westernization are alike 
mostly clearly evident among the ranks of the educated 
elites. Some of these men show the happiest effects of 
the Western spirit, but an even larger number fall into 
the gulf between old and new, and there miserably 
perish. Lord Cromer characterized many of the "Eu- 
ropeanized" Egyptians as "at the same time de- 
Moslemized Moslems and invertebrate Europeans"; 2 
while another British writer thus pessimistically de- 
scribes the superficial Europeanism prevalent in India: 
"Beautiful Mogul palaces furnished with cracked furni- 
ture from Tottenham Court Road. That is what we 
have done to the Indian mind. We have not only made 
it despise its own culture and throw it out; we have 
asked it to fill up the vacant spaces with furniture which 
will not stand the climate. The mental Eurasianism of 
India is appalling. Such minds are nomad. They be- 
long to no civilization, no country, and no history. 

1 Cromer, op. cit., vol. II, p. 231. 2 Ibid., p. 228. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 97 



They create a craving that cannot be satisfied, and 
ideals that are unreal. They falsify life. They deprive 
men of the nourishment of their cultural past, and the 
substitutes they supply are unsubstantial. . . . We 
sought to give the Eastern mind a Western content and 
environment; we have succeeded too well in establish- 
ing intellectual and moral anarchy in both." 1 

These patent evils of Westernization are a prime cause 
of that implacable hatred of everything Western which 
animates so many Orientals, including some well ac- 
quainted with the West. Such persons are precious 
auxiliaries to the ignorant reactionaries and to the rebels 
against Western political domination. 

The political predominance of the West over the East 
is, indeed, the outstanding factor in the whole question 
of Western influence upon the Orient. We have already 
surveyed Europe's conquest of the Near and Middle 
East during the past century, and we have seen how 
helpless the backward, decrepit Moslem world was in 
face of the twofold tide of political and economic subju- 
gation. In fact, the economic phase was perhaps the 
more important factor in the rapidity and completeness 
of Europe's success. To be sure, some Eastern lands 
were subjugated at a stroke by naked military force, as 
in the French expedition to Algiers, the Russian conquest 
of Central Asia, and the Italian descent upon Tripoli. 
Much oftener, however, subjection began by the essen- 

1 J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India, pp. 171-172 (London, 
1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, Cromer, 
Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish 
Peasantry of Anatolia," Quarterly Review, January, 1918; H. M. Hynd- 
man, The Awakening of Asia (New York, 1919); T. Rothstein, Egypt's 
Ruin (London, 1910); Captain P. Azan, Recherche oVune Solution de la 
Question indigene en Algerie (Paris, 1903). 



98 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tially economic process known as "pacific penetration" — 
the acquirement of a financial grip upon a hitherto inde- 
pendent Oriental country by Western capital in the form 
of loans and concessions, until the assumption of Western 
political control became little more than a formal regis- 
tration of what already existed in fact. Such is the 
story of the subjection of Egypt, Morocco, and Persia, 
while England's Indian Empire started in a purely trad- 
ing venture — the East India Company. The tremendous 
potency of " pacific penetration" is often not fully appre- 
ciated. Take the significance of one item alone — rail- 
way concessions. Says that keen student of Weltpolitik, 
Doctor Dillon; "Railways are the iron tentacles of 
latter-day expanding Powers. They are stretched out 
caressingly at first. But once the iron has, so to say, en- 
tered the soul of the weaker nation, the tentacles swell 
to the dimensions of brawny arms, and the embrace 
tightens to a crushing grip." 1 

On the question of the abstract Tightness or wrongness 
of this subjection of the East by the West, I do not pro- 
pose to enter. It has been exhaustively discussed, pro 
and con, and every reader of these pages is undoubtedly 
familiar with the stock arguments on both sides. The 
one thing certain is that this process of subjugation was, 
broadly speaking, inevitable. Given two worlds at such 
different levels as East and West at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century — the West overflowing with vitality 
and striding at the forefront of human progress, the East 
sunk in lethargy and decrepitude — and it was a fore- 
gone conclusion that the former would encroach upon 
the latter. 

*E. J. Dillon, "Persia," Contemporary Review, June, 1910. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 99 



What does concern us in our present discussion is the 
effect of European political control upon the general proc- 
ess of Westernization in Eastern lands. And there can 
be no doubt that such Westernization was thereby great- 
ly furthered. Once in control of an Oriental country, 
the European rulers were bound to favor its Westerniza- 
tion for a variety of reasons. Mere self-interest impelled 
them to make the country peaceful and prosperous, in 
order to extract profit for themselves and reconcile the 
inhabitants to their rule. This meant the replacement 
of inefficient and sanguinary native despotisms inhibiting 
progress and engendering anarchy by stable colonial gov- 
ernments, maintaining order, encouraging industry, and 
introducing improvements like the railway, the post, 
sanitation, and much more besides. In addition to these 
material innovations, practically all the Western govern- 
ments endeavored to better the social, intellectual, and 
spiritual condition of the peoples that had come under 
their control. The European Powers who built up colo- 
nial empires during the nineteenth century were actuated 
by a spirit far more enlightened than that of former 
times, when the early colonial empires of Spain, Portugal, 
Holland, and the English East India Company had been 
run on the brutal and short-sighted doctrine of sheer 
exploitation. In the nineteenth century all Western rule 
in the Orient was more or less impregnated with the ideal 
of "The White Man's Burden." The great empire- 
builders of the nineteenth century, actuated as they were 
not merely by self-interest and patriotic ambition but, 
also by a profound sense of obligation to improve the 
populations which they had brought under their coun- 
try's sway, felt themselves bearers of Western enlighten- 



100 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ment and labored to diffuse all the benefits of Western 
civilization. They honestly believed that the extension 
of Western political control was the best and quickest, 
perhaps the only, means of modernizing the backward 
portions of the world. 

That standpoint is ably presented by a British "lib- 
eral imperialist," Professor Ramsay Muir, who writes: 
"It is an undeniable fact that the imperialism of the 
European peoples has been the means whereby European 
civilization has been in some degree extended to the 
whole world, so that to-day the whole world has become 
a single economic unit, and all its members are parts of 
a single political system. And this achievement brings 
us in sight of the creation of a world-order such as the 
wildest dreamers of the past could never have antici- 
pated. Without the imperialism of the European peo- 
ples North and South America, Australia, South Africa, 
must have remained wildernesses, peopled by scattered 
bands of savages. Without it India and other lands of 
ancient civilization must have remained, for all we can 
see, externally subject to that endless succession of wars 
and arbitrary despotisms which have formed the sub- 
stance of their history through untold centuries, and 
under which neither rational and equal law nor political 
liberty, as we conceive them, were practicable concep- 
tions. Without it the backward peoples of the earth 
must have continued to stagnate under the dominance of 
an unchanging primitive customary regime, which has 
been their state throughout recorded time. If to-day 
the most fruitful political ideas of the West — the ideas of 
nationality and self-government — which are purely prod-, 
ucts of Western civilization, are beginning to produce a 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 101 



healthy fermentation in many parts of the non-European 
world, that result is due to European imperialism." 1 

The ethics of modern imperialism have nowhere been 
better formulated than in an essay by Lord Cromer. 
"An imperial policy," he writes, "must, of course, be 
carried out with reasonable prudence, and the principles 
of government which guide our relations with whatso- 
ever races are brought under our control must be politi- 
cally and economically sound and morally defensible. 
This is, in fact, the keystone of the imperial arch. The 
main justification of imperialism is to be found in the use 
which is made of imperial power. If we make good use 
of our power, we may face the future without fear that 
we shall be overtaken by the Nemesis which attended 
Roman misrule. If the reverse is the case, the British 
Empire will deserve to fall, and of a surety it will ulti- 
mately fall." 2 

Such are the basic sanctions of Western imperialism 
as evolved during the nineteenth century. Whether or 
not it is destined to endure, there can be no question 
that this prodigious extension of European political con- 
trol greatly favored the spread of Western influences of 
every kind. It is, of course, arguable that the East 
would have voluntarily adopted Western methods and 
ideas even if no sort of Western pressure had been ap- 
plied. But they would have been adopted much more 
slowly, and this vital element of time renders such argu- 
ments mere academic speculation. For the vital, ex- 
panding nineteenth-century West to have deliberately 

1 Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World," The New 
Europe, June 28, 1917. 

2 The Earl of Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, p. 5 (London, 1913). 



102 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



restrained itself while the backward East blunderingly 
experimented with Westernism, accepting and rejecting, 
buying goods and refusing to pay for them, negotiating 
loans and then squandering and repudiating them, invit- 
ing in Europeans and then expelling or massacring them, 
would have been against all history and human nature. 

As a matter of fact, Western pressure was applied, as 
it was bound to be applied; and this constant, ubiqui- 
tous, unrelenting pressure, broke down the barriers of 
Oriental conservatism and inertia as nothing else could 
have done, forced the East out of its old ruts, and com- 
pelled it to take stock of things as they are in a world of 
hard facts instead of reminiscent dreams. In subse- 
quent chapters we shall examine the manifold results of 
this process which has so profoundly transformed the 
Orient during the past hundred years. Here we will con- 
tinue our general survey by examining the more recent 
aspects of Western control over the East and the reac- 
tions of the East thereto. 

In my opinion, the chief fallacy involved in criticisms 
of Western control over Eastern lands arises from 
failure to discriminate between nineteenth-century and 
twentieth- century imperialism. Nineteenth- century im- 
perialism was certainly inevitable, and was apparently 
beneficial in the main. Twentieth-century imperialism 
cannot be so favorably judged. By the year 1900 the 
Oriental peoples were no longer mere fanatical obscur- 
antists neither knowing nor caring to know anything 
outside the closed circle of their ossified, decadent civili- 
zations. The East had been going to school, and wanted 
to begin to apply what it had been taught by the West. 
It should have been obvious that these peoples, whose 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 103 



past history proved them capable of achievement and 
who were now showing an apparently genuine desire for 
new progress, needed to be treated differently from what 
they had been. In other words, a more liberal attitude 
on the part of the West had become advisable. 

But no such change was made. On the contrary, in 
the West itself, the liberal idealism which had prevailed 
during most of the nineteenth century was giving way to 
that spirit of fierce political and economic rivalry which 
culminated in the Great War. 1 Never had Europe been 
so avid for colonies, for "spheres of influence," for con- 
cessions and preferential markets; in fine, so "imperial- 
istic," in the unfavorable sense of the term. The result 
was that with the beginning of the twentieth century 
Western pressure on the East, instead of being relaxed, 
was redoubled; and the awakening Orient, far from being 
met with sympathetic consideration, was treated more 
ruthlessly than it had been for two hundred years. The 
way in which Eastern countries like Turkey and Persia, 
striving to reform themselves and protect their indepen- 
dence, were treated by Europe's new Realpolitik would 
have scandalized the liberal imperialists of a generation 
before. It certainly scandalized present-day liberals, as 
witness these scathing lines written in 1912 by the well- 
known British publicist Sidney Low: 

"The conduct of the Most Christian Powers during 
the past few years has borne a striking resemblance to 
that of robber-bands descending upon an unarmed and 
helpless population of peasants. So far from respecting 
the rights of other nations, they have exhibited the most 

1 For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see my Rising 
Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy, especially chaps. VI and VII. 



104 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



complete and cynical disregard for them. They have, 
in fact, asserted the claim of the strong to prey upon the 
weak, and the utter impotence of all ethical considera- 
tions in the face of armed force, with a crude nakedness 
which few Eastern military conquerors could well have 
surpassed. 

"The great cosmic event in the history of the last 
quarter of a century has been the awakening of Asia 
after centuries of somnolence. The East has suddenly 
sprung to life, and endeavored to throw itself vigorously 
into the full current of Western progress. Japan started 
the enterprise; and, fortunately for herself, she entered 
upon it before the new Western policy had fully devel- 
oped itself, and while certain archaic ideals about the 
rights of peoples and the sanctity of treaties still pre- 
vailed. When the new era was inaugurated by the great 
Japanese statesmen of the nineteenth century, Europe 
did not feel called upon to interfere. We regarded the 
Japanese renaissance with interest and admiration, and 
left the people of Nippon to work out the difficulties of 
their own salvation, unobstructed. If that revolution 
had taken place thirty years later, there would probably 
have been a different story to tell; and New Japan, in 
the throes of her travail, would have found the armed 
Great Powers at her bedside, each stretching forth a 
mailed fist to grab something worth taking. Other 
Eastern countries which have endeavored to follow the 
example of Japan during the present centuiy have had 
worse luck. During the past ten years a wave of sheer 
materialism and absolute contempt for international 
morality has swept across the Foreign Offices of Europe, 
and has reacted disastrously upon the various Eastern 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 105 



nations in their desperate struggles to reform a constitu- 
tional system. They have been attempting to carry out 
the suggestions made to them for generations by benevo- 
lent advisers in Christendom. 

"Now, when they take these counsels to heart, and 
endeavor, with halting steps, and in the face of immense 
obstacles, to pursue the path of reform, one might sup- 
pose that their efforts would be regarded with sympa- 
thetic attention by the Governments of the West; and 
that, even if these offered no direct aid, they would at 
least allow a fair trial.' ' But, on the contrary, "one 
Great Power after another has used the opportunity pre- 
sented by the internal difficulties of the Eastern coun- 
tries to set out upon a career of annexation." 1 

We have already seen how rapid was this career of 
annexation, extinguishing the independence of the last 
remaining Mohammedan states at the close of the Great 
War. We have also seen how it exacerbated Moslem 
fear and hatred of the West. And the West was already 
feared and hated for many reasons. In the preceding 
chapter we traced the growth of the Pan-Islamic move- 
ment, and in subsequent chapters we shall trace the 
development of Oriental nationalism. These politico- 
religious movements, however, by no means exhaust the 
list of Oriental reactions to Westernism. There are 
others, economic, social, racial in character. In view of 
the complex nature of the Orient's reaction against 
Westernism, let us briefly analyze the problem in its 
various constituent elements. 

Anti-Western feeling has been waning in some quarters 

1 Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers," Fortnightly Review, 
March, 1912. 



106 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



and waxing in others during the past hundred years. 
By temperamental reactionaries and fanatics things 
Western have, of course, always been abhorred. But, 
leaving aside this intransigeant minority, the attitude of 
other categories of Orientals has varied greatly accord- 
ing to times and circumstances. By liberal-mi n ded per- 
sons Western influences were at first hailed with cor- 
diality and even with enthusiasm. In the opening 
chapter we saw how the liberal reformers welcomed the 
Western concept of progress and made it one of the bases 
of their projected religious reformation. And the liber- 
als displayed the same attitude in secular matters. The 
liberal statesmen who governed Turkey during the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century made earnest efforts 
to reform the Ottoman state, and it was the same in 
other parts of the Moslem world. An interesting exam- 
ple is the attempt made by General Kheir-ed-Din to 
modernize Tunis. This man, a Circassian by birth, had 
won the confidence of his master, the Bey, who made 
him vizier. In 1860 he toured Europe and returned 
greatly impressed with its civilization. Convinced of 
Europe's infinite superiority, he desired passionately to 
transplant Western ideas and methods to Tunis. This 
he believed quite feasible, and the result would, so he 
thought, be Tunis's rapid regeneration. Kheir-ed-Din 
was not in the least a hater of the West. He merely 
recognized clearly the Moslem world's peril of speedy 
subjection to the West if it did not set its house rapidly 
in order, and he therefore desired, in a perfectly legiti- 
mate feeling of patriotism, to press his country along the 
road of progress, that it might be able to stand alone 
and preserve its independence. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 107 



So greatly was the Bey impressed by Kheir-ed-Din 's 
report that he gave him a free hand in his reforming en- 
deavors. For a short time Kheir-ed-Din displayed great 
activity, though he encountered stubborn opposition 
from reactionary officials. His work was cut short by 
his untimely death, and Tunis, still unmodernized, fell 
twenty years later under the power of France. Kheir- 
ed-Din, however, worked for posterity. In order to 
rouse his compatriots to the realities of their situation 
he published a remarkable book, The Surest Means of 
Knowing the State of Nations. This book has profoundly 
influenced both liberals and nationalists throughout the 
Near East, especially in North Africa, where it has be- 
come the bible of Tunisian and Algerian nationalism. 
In his book Kheir-ed-Din shows his coreligionists the 
necessity of breaking with their attitude of blind admira- 
tion for the past and proud indifference to everything 
else, and of studying what is going on in the outer world. 
Europe's present prosperity is due, he asserts, not to 
natural advantages or to religion, but "to progress in 
the arts and sciences, which facilitate the circulation of 
wealth and exploit the treasures of the earth by an 
enlightened protection constantly given to agriculture, 
industry, and commerce: all natural consequences of 
justice and liberty — two things which, for Europeans, 
have become second nature." In past ages the Moslem 
world was great and progressive, because it was then 
liberal and open to progress. It declined through big- 
otry and obscurantism. But it can revive by reviving 
the spirit of its early days. 

I have stressed the example of the Tunisian Kheir-ed- 
Din rather than the better-known Turkish instances 



108 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

because it illustrates the general receptivity of mid- 
nineteenth-century Moslem liberals to Western ideas 
and their freedom from anti-Western feeling. 1 As time 
passed, however, many of these erstwhile liberals, disil- 
lusioned with the West for various reasons, notably 
European aggression, became the bitterest enemies of 
the West, hating the very spirit of Western civilization. 2 
This anti-Western feeling has, of course, been greatly 
exacerbated since the beginning of the present century. 
As an influential Mohammedan wrote just before the 
Great War: "The events of these last ten years and the 
disasters which have stricken the Mohammedan world 
have awakened in its bosom a sentiment of mutual cor- 
diality and devotion hitherto unknown, and a unanimous 
hatred against all its oppressors has been the ferment 
which to-day stirs the hearts of all Moslems." 3 The 
bitter rancor seething in many Moslem hearts shows in 
outbursts like the following, from the pen of a popular 
Turkish writer at the close of the Balkan Wars: "We 
have been defeated, we have been shown hostility by 
the outside world, because we have become too delib- 
erative, too cultured, too refined in our conceptions of 
right and wrong, of humanity and civilization. The 
example of the Bulgarian army has taught us that every 

1 On this point see also A. Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands 
(London, 1906); W. S. Blunt, The Future of Islam (London, 1882); also the 
two articles by Leon Cahun on intellectual and social developments in 
the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in Lavisse et Rambaud, 
Histoire Generate, vol. XI, chap. XV; vol. XII, chap. XIV. 

2 See A. Vambery, Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, chap. VI 
(Leipzig, 1875). 

3 "La Situation politique de la Perse," Revue du Monde musulman, 
June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this anonymous 
writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official — "un homme d'Stat 
musulman." 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 109 



soldier facing the enemy must return to the days of bar- 
barism, must have a thirst of blood, must be merciless 
in slaughtering children and women, old and weak, must 
disregard others 7 property, life, and honor. Let us 
spread blood, suffering, wrong, and mourning. Thus 
only may we become the favorites of the civilized world 
like King Ferdinand's army." 1 

The .Great War itself was hailed by multitudes of 
Moslems as a well-merited Nemesis on Western arro- 
gance and greed. Here is how a leading Turkish news- 
paper characterized the European Powers: "They would 
not look at the evils in their own countries or elsewhere, 
but interfered at the slightest incident in our borders; 
every day they would gnaw at some part of our rights 
and our sovereignty; they would perform vivisection on 
our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces of it. And 
we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of rebellion in our 
hearts and with clinched but powerless fists, silent and 
depressed, would murmur as the fire burned within: 
'Oh, that they might fall out with one another! Oh, 
that they might eat one another up ! ■ And lo ! to-day 
they are eating each other up, just as the Turk wished 
they would." 2 

Such anti-Western sentiments are not confined to 
journalists or politicians; they are shared by all classes, 
from princes to peasants. Each class has its special rea- 

1 Ahmed Emin, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its 
Press, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914). 

2 The Constantinople Tanine. Quoted from The Literary Digest, Octo- 
ber 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the Euro- 
pean Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common 
to non-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling through- 
out the world, see my Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy, 
pp. 13-16 ? 



110 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



sons for hating European political control. The native 
princes, even when maintained upon their thrones and 
confirmed in their dignities and emoluments, bitterly 
resent their state of vassalage and their loss of limitless, 
despotic power. "Do you know, I can hardly buy a pen 
or a sword for myself without asking the Resident for per- 
mission?" remarked an Indian rajah bitterly. His atti- 
tude was precisely that of Khedive Tewfik Pasha, who, 
in the early days of the British occupation of Egypt, 
while watching a review of British troops, said to one of 
his ministers: "Do you suppose I like this ? I tell you, I 
never see an English sentinel in my streets without long- 
ing to jump out of my carriage and strangle him with 
my own hands." 1 The upper classes feel much the same 
as their sovereigns. They regret their former monopoly 
of privilege and office. This is especially true of the 
Western-educated intelligentsia, who believe that they 
should hold all government posts and resent bitterly the 
reservation of high-salaried directive positions for Euro- 
peans. Of course many intelligent liberals realize so 
fully the educative effect of European control that they 
acquiesce in a temporary loss of independence in order 
to complete their modernization and ultimately be able 
to stand alone without fear of reaction or anarchy. How- 
ever, these liberals are only a small minority, hated by 
their upper-class fellows as time-servers and renegades, 
and sundered by an immense gulf from the ignorant 
masses. 

At first sight we might think that the masses would, 
on the whole, be favorably disposed toward European 

1 Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper, The Modern- 
izing of the Orient, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914). 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 111 



political control. Despite certain economic disadvan- 
tages that Westernization has imposed, the masses have 
unquestionably gained most by European rule. For- 
merly exploited ruthlessly by both princes and upper 
classes, the peasants and town workers are to-day as- 
sured peace, order, justice, and security for their land- 
holdings and the fruits of their toil. Now it would be a 
mistake to think that the masses are insensible to all 
this. The fact is, they do recognize the benefits of 
European rule. Nevertheless, the new rulers, while tol- 
erated and even respected, are never beloved. Further- 
more, as the generation which knew the old regime dies 
off, its evils are forgotten, and the younger generation, 
taking present benefits for granted, murmurs at the flaws 
in the existing order, and lends a readier ear to native 
agitators extolling the glories of independence and ideal- 
izing the "good old times." 

The truth of the matter is that, despite all its short- 
comings, the average Oriental hankers after the old way 
of life. Even when he recognizes the good points of the 
new, he nevertheless yearns irrationally for the old. "A 
Moslem ruler though he oppress me and not a kafir 1 
though he work me weal" is a Moslem proverb of long 
standing. Every colonial administration, no matter 
how enlightened, runs counter to this ineradicable aver- 
sion of Moslems for Christian rule. A Russian admin- 
istrator in Central Asia voices the sentiments of European 
officials generally when he states: "Pious Moslems cannot 
accommodate themselves to the government of Giaours" 2 

Furthermore, it must be remembered that most Ori- 

1 An " Unbeliever "—in other words, a Christian. 

2 Quoted by A. Woeikof, Le Turkestan russe (Paris, 1914). 



112 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



entals either do not recognize much benefit in European 
rule, or, even though they do recognize considerable 
benefits, consider these more than offset by many points 
which, in their eyes, are maddening annoyances or bur- 
dens. The very things which we most pride ourselves 
on having given to the Orient — peace, order, justice, 
security — are not valued by the Oriental anywhere near 
as highly as we might expect. Of course he likes these 
things, but he would prefer to get less of them if what he 
did get was given by native rulers, sharing his preju- 
dices and point of view. Take the single factor of jus- 
tice. As an English writer remarks: "The Asiatic is not 
delighted with justice per se; indeed, the Asiatic really 
cares but little about it if he can get sympathy in the 
sense in which he understands that misunderstood word. 
. . . This is the real reason why every Asiatic in his 
heart of hearts prefers the rule of his own nationality, 
bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of aliens. For 
when he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt 
with by people who understand his frailties, and who, 
though they may savagely punish him, are at least in 
sympathy with the motives which prompt his delin- 
quencies.'' 1 

Take again the matter of order. The average Oriental 
not only does not appreciate, but detests, our well-regu- 
lated, systematic manner of life. Accustomed as he has 
been for centuries to a slipshod, easy-going existence, 
in which, if there was much injustice, there was also much 
favoritism, he instinctively hates things like sanitary 
measures and police regulations. Accustomed to a wide 
" personal liberty" in the anarchic sense, he is not will- 

1 B. L. Putnam Weale, The Conflict of Color, p. 193 (London, 1910). 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 113 



ing to limit this liberty for the common weal. He wants 
his own way, even though it involves possible dangers 
to himself — dangers which may always be averted by 
bribery, favoritism, or violence. Said an American who 
had listened to a Filipino's glowing words on indepen- 
dence: "What could you do, if you were independent, 
that you cannot do now?" "I could build my house 
there in the middle of the street, if I wanted to." "But 
suppose your neighbor objected and interfered?" "I 
would 'get' him." "But suppose he 'got' you?" A 
shrug of the shoulders was the only answer. 1 

The fact is that the majority of Orientals, despite the 
considerable penetration of Western ideas and methods 
that has been going on for the last century, still love 
their old ruts and hate to be budged out of them. They 
realize that Western rule furthers more than anything 
else the Westernization of their social system, their tra- 
ditional manner of life, and they therefore tend to react 
fanatically against it. Every innovation imposed by 
the colonial authorities is apt to rouse the most pur- 
blind resistance. For example, compulsory vaccination 
was bitterly opposed for years by the natives of Algeria. 
The French officials pointed out that smallpox, hitherto 
rampant, was being rapidly extirpated. The natives re- 
plied that, in their opinion, it was merely a crafty scheme 
for sterilizing them sexually and thus make room for 
French colonists. The officials thereupon pointed to the 
census figures, which showed that the natives were in- 
creasing at an unprecedented rate. The natives merely 
shrugged their shoulders and continued to inveigh against 
the innovation. 

1 Quoted from H. H. Powers, The Great Peace, p. 82 (New York, 1918). 



114 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



This whole matter has been well summarized by a 
French writer with a wide knowledge of Mohammedan 
lands. Says Louis Bertrand: 

"In reality, all these peoples, indisposed as they are by 
their traditions, customs, and climates to live according 
to our social ideal, hate to endure the constraint of our 
police, of our administration — in a word, of any sort of 
regulated government, no matter how just and honest. 
Delivered from the most anarchic and vexatious of tyr- 
annies, they remain in spirit more or less like our vaga- 
bonds, always hoping to escape from the gendarmes. In 
vain do we point out to the Arabs of North Africa that, 
thanks to the protection of France, they are no longer 
pillaged by Turkish despots nor massacred and tortured 
by rival tribes. They see only one thing: the necessity 
of paying taxes for matters that they do not understand. 
We shall never realize the rage, the fury, aroused in our 
Algerian towns by the simple health department ordi- 
nance requiring the emptying of a garbage-can at a fixed 
hour. At Cairo and elsewhere I have observed the same 
rebellious feelings among the donkey-boys and cab- 
drivers subjected to the regulations of the English police- 
man. 

"But it is not merely our municipal and administra- 
tive regulations which they find insupportable; it is all 
our habits, taken en bloc — in a word, the order which 
regulates our civilized life. For instance: on the railway- 
line from Jaffa to Jerusalem the train stops at a station 
beside which stands the tomb of a holy man. The 
schedule calls for a stop of a minute at most. But no 
sooner had we arrived than what was my stupefaction to 
see all the Mohammedans on the train get off, spread 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 115 



their prayer-rugs, and tranquilly begin their devotions. 
The station-master blew his whistle, the conductor yelled 
at them that he was going to leave them behind; nobody 
budged. A squad of railway employees had to be mo- 
bilized, who, with blows and curses, finally bundled these 
pious persons back into the train again. The business 
lasted a good quarter of an hour, and was not easy. 
The more vigorous of the worshippers put up an ener- 
getic resistance. 

"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at ran- 
dom. What is certain is that these peoples do not yet 
understand what we mean by exactitude, and that the 
concept of a well-regulated existence has not yet pene- 
trated their heads." 1 

What has just been written of course applies primarily 
to the ignorant masses. But this attitude of mind is 
more or less common to all classes of Oriental peoples. 
The habits of centuries are not easily transformed. In 
fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were 
able to enjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty 
of the unmodified East, and that, therefore, though they 
may be better able to understand the value of Western- 
ization, they have in one sense the most to lose. 2 

In fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the "good 
old times" had charms which they mournfully regret. 
For the prince, the pasha, the courtier, existence was 
truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, the prince 
might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival 
monarch; the pasha strangled at his master's order; 

1 L. Bertrand, Le Mirage oriental, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910). 

2 On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend 
entitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics," in his book Asia and Europe, 
pp. 120-128. 



116 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



the courtier tortured through a superior's whim. But, 
meanwhile, it was "life," rich and full. "Each of these 
men had his own character and his own renown among 
his countrymen, and each enjoyed a position such as is 
now unattainable in Europe, in which he was released 
from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad or good, 
and was fed every day and all day with the special flat- 
tery of Asia — that willing submissiveness to mere voli- 
tion which is so like adoration, and which is to its recipi- 
ents the most intoxicating of delights. Each, too, had 
his court of followers, and every courtier shared in the 
power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his 
lord. The power was that of life and death ; the luxury 
included possession of every woman he desired; the adula- 
tion was, as I have said, almost religious worship." 1 

But, it may be asked, what about the poor man, ex- 
ploited by this hierarchy of capricious despots? What 
had he to gain from all this? Well, in most cases, he 
got nothing at all; but he might gain a great deal. Life 
in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery. Any one, how- 
ever humble, who chanced to please a great man, might 
rise to fame and fortune at a bound. And this is just 
what pleases the Eastern temperament; for in the East, 
"luck" and caprice are more prized than the "security" 
cherished in the West. In the Orient the favorite stories 
are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts of fortune 
— beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and 
all in a single night. To the majority of Orientals it is 
still the uncertainties of life, and the capricious favor of 
the powerful, which make it most worth living; not the 
sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labor. All 

1 Townsend, op. cit., p. 104. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 117 



these things made the life of the Orient infinitely inter- 
esting to all. And it is precisely this gambler's interest 
which Westernization has more or less destroyed. As an 
English writer very justly remarks a propos of modern 
Egypt: "Our rule may be perfect, but the East finds it 
dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it was 
gay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. 'Ah ! yes/ said 
an Egyptian to a champion of English rule, 'but in the 
old days a beggar might sit at the gate, and if he were 
found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, he might be 
a great man on the morrow/ There is a natural and in- 
evitable regret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when 
favor took the place of justice, and life had great heights 
and depths — for the Egypt of Joseph, Haroun-al-Rashid, 
and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat of broad- 
cloth over the radiant garment." 1 

Saddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so 
much that they hold dear, it is not strange that many 
Eastern conservatives glorify the past as a sort of Golden 
Age, infinitely superior to anything the West can pro- 
duce, and in this they are joined by many quondam 
liberals, disillusioned with Westernism and flying into 
the arms of reaction. The result is a spirit of hatred 
against everything Western, which sometimes assumes 
the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand: 
"During a lecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker 
contended that France owed Islam (1) its civilization and 
sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3) all that was best 
in the character and mentality of its population, seeing 
that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789, 

1 H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey," Contemporary Review, 
October, 1906. 



118 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



all the reformers who labored for its enfranchisement — 
Albigensians, Vaudois ; Calvinists, and Camisards — were 
probably descendants of the Saracens. It was nothing 
less than the total annexation of France to Morocco." 
Meanwhile, "it has become the fashion for fervent 
(Egyptian) nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in 
the gardens of the Alcazar of Seville or in the patios of 
the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendors of 
W 7 estern Islam." 1 

Even more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu 
wing of this Golden Age school. These Hindu enthu- 
siasts far outdo the wildest flights of their Moslem fel- 
lows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the 
nursery and home of all true religion, philosophy, cul- 
ture, civilization, science, invention, and everything else; 
and they aver that when India's present regrettable 
eclipse is past (an eclipse of course caused entirely by 
English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory for 
the salvation of the whole world. Employing to the full 
the old adage that there is nothing new under the sun, 
they have "discovered" in the Vedas and other Hindu 
sacred texts "irrefutable" evidence that the ancient 
Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including 
such up-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes 
and the League of Nations. 2 

All this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the 
long run, prove futile. The East, like the West, has its 

1 Bertrand, pp. 209, 210. 

2 For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer, India and the 
Future (London, 1918); Young and Ferrers, India in Conflict (London, 
1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra, Hinduism: 
The World-Ideal (London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy, The Dance of Siva 
(New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the Next War," 
Journal of Race Development, April, 1916. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 119 



peculiar virtues; but the East also has its special faults, 
and it is the faults which, for the last thousand years, 
have been gaining on the virtues, resulting in backward- 
ness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is 
being penetrated — and quickened — by the West. The 
outcome will never be complete Westernization in the 
sense of a mere wholesale copying and absolute transfor- 
mation; the East will always remain fundamentally it- 
self. But it will be a new self, the result of a true as- 
similation of Western ideas. The reactionaries can only 
delay this process, and thereby prolong the Orient's 
inferiority and weakness. 

Nevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unin- 
telligent, is intelligible. Westernization hurts too many 
cherished prejudices and vested interests not to arouse 
chronic resistance. This resistance would occur even if 
Western influences were all good and Westerners all 
angels of light. But of course Westernization has its 
dark side, while our Western culture-bearers are ani- 
mated not merely by altruism, but also by far less worthy 
motives. This strengthens the hand of the Oriental 
reactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanc- 
tions. In addition to the extremely painful nature of 
any transformative process, especially in economic and 
social matters, there are many incidental factors of an 
extremely irritating nature. 

To begin with, the mere presence of the European, 
with his patent superiority of power and progress, is a 
constant annoyance and humiliation. This physical 
presence of the European is probably as necessary to 
the Orient's regeneration as it is inevitable in view of 
the Orient's present inferiority. But, however benefi- 



120 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



cial ; it is none the less a source of profound irritation. 
These Europeans disturb everything, modify customs, 
raise living standards, erect separate "quarters" in the 
cities, where they form "extraterritorial" colonies ex- 
empt from native law and customary regulation. An 
English town rises in the heart of Cairo, a "Little Paris" 
eats into Arabesque Algiers, while European Pera flaunts 
itself opposite Turkish Stambul. 

As for India, it is dotted with British "enclaves." 
"The great Presidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Ma- 
dras, are European cities planted on Indian soil. All the 
prominent buildings are European, though in some of 
the more recent ones an endeavor has been made to 
adopt what is known as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of 
architecture. For the rest, the streets are called by 
English names, generally the names of bygone viceroys 
and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land 
and quelled the mutiny — heroes whose effigies meet you 
at every turn. The shops are English shops, where 
English or Eurasian assistants traffic in English goods. 
English carriages and motors bowl along the macad- 
amized or tarred roads of Old England. On every hand 
there is evidence of the instinctive effort to reproduce, 
as nearly as the climate will permit, English conditions 
of life. . . . Almost the whole life of the people of 
India is relegated to the back streets, not to say the 
slums — frankly called in Madras, the Black Town. There 
are a few points — clubs and gymkhanas specially estab- 
lished to that end — where English men, and even women, 
meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier 
classes, on a basis of social equality. But few indeed are 
the points of contact between the Asian town and the 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 121 



European city which has been superimposed upon it. 
The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps 
the curiosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the 
bazaars; but the European community as a whole cares 
no more for the swarming brown multitudes around it 
than the dwellers on an island care for the fishes in the 
circumambient sea." 1 And what is true of the great 
towns holds good for scores of provincial centres, "sta- 
tions," and cantonments. The scale may be smaller, 
but the type is the same. 

The European in the Orient is thus everywhere pro- 
foundly an alien, living apart from the native life. And 
the European is not merely an aloof alien; he is a ruling 
alien as well. Always his attitude is that of the superior, 
the master. This attitude is not due to brutality or 
snobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situa- 
tion. Of course many Europeans have bad manners, 
but that does not change the basic reality of the case. 
And this reality is that, whatever the future may bring, 
the European first established himself in the Orient be- 
cause the West was then infinitely ahead of the East; 
and he is still there to-day because, despite all recent 
changes, the East is still behind the West. Therefore the 
European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long as 
he stays there must continue to rule — justly, temper- 
ately, with politic regard for Eastern progress and liberal 
devolution of power as the East becomes ripe for its lib- 
eral exercise — but, nevertheless, rule. Wherever the Oc- 
cidental has established his political control, there are 
but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in his 
governing, the Occidental must rule according to his own 

1 Archer, pp. 11, 12, 



122 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



lights; despite all concessions to local feeling, he must, 
in the last analysis, act as a Western, not as an Eastern, 
ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of all true colonial 
government when he says: "In governing Oriental races 
the first thought must be what is good for them, but not 
necessarily what they think is good for them." 1 

Now all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that even the most en- 
lightened Oriental can hardly regard it as other than 
a bitter though salutary medicine, while most Orientals 
feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very vir- 
tues of the European are prime causes of his unpopu- 
larity. For, as Meredith Townsend well says: "The 
European is, in Asia, the man who will insist on his 
neighbor doing business just after dinner, and being exact 
when he is half-asleep, and being 1 prompt ? just when he 
wants to enjoy, — and he rules in Asia and is loved in 
Asia accordingly." 2 

Furthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked 
not merely as a ruler and a disturber, but also as a man 
of widely different race. This matter of race is very 
complicated, 3 but it cuts deep and is of fundamental 
importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Mid- 
dle East with which our present discussion is concerned 
belong to what is known as the "brown" category of 
the human species. Of course, in strict anthropology, 
the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set 
off a sharply differentiated group of "brown" types as a 
"brown race," as we can set off the "white" types of 

1 Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, p. 25. 

2 Townsend, Asia and Europe, p. 128. 

3 1 have dealt with it at length in my Rising Tide of Color against White 
World-Supremacy. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 123 



Europe as a "white race" or the "yellow" Mongoloid 
types of the Far East as a "yellow race." This is be- 
cause the Near and Middle East have been racially a 
vast melting-pot, or series of melting-pots, wherein con- 
quest and migration have continually poured new hetero- 
geneous elements, producing the most diverse ethnic 
amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and 
Middle Eastern peoples are largely white, like the Per- 
sians and Ottoman Turks; others, like the southern 
Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black; while 
still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peo- 
ples, have much yellow blood. Again, as there is no 
brown racial type-norm, as there are white and yellow 
type-norms, so there is no generalized brown culture 
like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great 
brown spiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat 
of brown population, Islam is professed by only one-fifth 
of the inhabitants. Lastly, while the spiritual fron- 
tiers of the Moslem world coincide mainly with the eth- 
nic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps at 
several points, including some pure whites in eastern Eu- 
rope, many true yellows in the Far East, and multitudes 
of negroes in Africa. 

Nevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the 
terms "brown race" and "brown world" do connote 
genuine realities which science and politics alike recog- 
nize to be essentially true. There certainly is a funda- 
mental comity between the brown peoples. This comity 
is subtle and intangible in character; yet it exists, and 
under certain circumstances it is capable of momentous 
manifestations. Its salient feature is the instinctive 
recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that 



124 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



they are fellow "Asiatics," however bitter may be their 
internecine feuds. This instinctive "Asiatic" feeling has 
been noted by historians for more than two thousand 
years, and it is true to-day as in the past. 

The great racial divisions of mankind are the most 
fundamental, the most permanent, the most ineradica- 
ble things in human experience. They are not mere 
diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion, 
stature, and hair-formation are merely the outward, 
visible symbols of correlative mental and spiritual dif- 
ferences which reveal themselves in sharply contrasted 
temperaments and view-points, and which translate 
themselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent 
group-life. 

Now it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage 
which runs between "East" and "West." Broadly 
speaking, the Near and Middle East is the "brown 
world," and this differentiates it from the "white world" 
of the West in a way which never can be really obliter- 
ated. Indeed, to attempt to obliterate the difference by 
racial fusion would be the maddest of follies. East and 
West can mutually quicken each other by a mutual 
exchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each 
other by transfusions of blood. To unite physically 
would be the greatest of disasters. East and West have 
both given much to the world in the past, and promise 
to give more in the future. But whatever of true value 
they are to give can be given only on condition that 
they remain essentially themselves. Ethnic fusion would 
destroy both their race-souls and would result in a dreaiy 
mongrelization from which would issue nothing but de- 
generation and decay. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 125 



Both East and West instinctively recognize the truth 
of this, and show it by their common contempt for the 
" Eurasian" — the mongrel offspring of unions between 
the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: "The 
chasm between the brown man and the white is un- 
fathomable,* has existed in all ages, and exists still ev- 
erywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, no 
brown man marries a white wife, without an inner sense 
of having been false to some unintelligible but irresisti- 
ble command." 1 

The above summary of the political, economic, social, 
and racial differences between East and West gives us a 
fair idea of the numerous cross-currents which complicate 
the relations of the two worlds and which hinder West- 
ernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly going 
on, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far- 
reaching is its scope. But the factors just considered will 
indicate the possibilities of reaction and will roughly assign 
the limits to which Westernization may ultimately extend. 

One thing is certain: Western political control in the 
Orient, however prolonged and however imposing in 
appearance, must ever rest on essentially fragile founda- 
tions. The Western rulers will always remain an alien 
caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never 
loved and never regarded as anything but foreigners. 
Furthermore, Western rule must necessarily become more 
precarious with the increasing enlightenment of the sub- 
ject peoples, so that the acquiescence of one generation 
may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It 
is indeed an unstable equiHbrium, hard to maintain and 
easily upset. 

1 Townsend, p. 97. 



126 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



The latent instability of European political control 
over the Near and Middle East was dramatically shown 
by the moral effect of the Russo-Japanese War. Down 
to that time the Orient had been so helpless in face of 
European aggression that most Orientals had come to 
regard Western supremacy with fatalistic resignation. 
But the defeat of a first-class European Power by an 
Asiatic people instantly broke the spell, and all Asia and 
Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication which we can 
scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionary thus describes 
the effect of the Japanese victories on northern India, 
where he was stationed at the time: "A stir of excite- 
ment passed over the north of India. Even the remote 
villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat 
in their circles and passed round the huqqa at night. 
One of the older men said to me, 'There has been nothing 
like it since the mutiny.' A Turkish consul of long ex- 
perience in Western Asia told me that in the interior you 
could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tin- 
gling' with the news. Asia was moved from end to 
end, and the sleep of the centuries was finally broken. 
It was a time when it was 'good to be alive/ for a new 
chapter was being written in the book of the world's 
history." 1 

Of course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this 
new spirit, whose roots lay in the previous epoch of sub- 
tle changes that had been going on. The Russo-Japa- 

1 Rev. C. F. Andrews, The Renaissance in India, p. 4 (London, 1911). 
For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese War upon 
Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest," The 
Forum, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'lslam," Revue du Monde 
musidman, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by the Russo- 
Japanese War," American Revieiu of Reviews, February, 1905; A. Vam- 
bery, "Japan and the Mahometan World," Nineteenth Century and After, 
April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk, op. cit., p. 42. 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 127 



nese War was thus rather the occasion than the cause of 
the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over 
Asia and Africa in the year 1904. But it did dramatize 
and clarify ideas that had been genriinating half -uncon- 
sciously in millions of Oriental minds, and was thus the 
sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for a 
revivified Orient. 

Furthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced 
the Orient's attitude toward the series of fresh European 
aggressions which then began. It is a curious fact that 
just when the Far East had successfully resisted Euro- 
pean encroachment, the Near and Middle East should 
have been subjected to European aggressions of unpar- 
alleled severity. We have already noted the furious 
protests and the unwonted moral solidarity of the Mos- 
lem world at these manifestations of Western Realpolitik. 
It would be interesting to know exactly how much of 
this defiant temper was due to the heartening example 
of Japan. Certainly our ultraimperialists of the West 
were playing a dangerous game during the decade be- 
tween 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vamb£ry remarked 
after the Italian raid on Tripoli: "The more the power 
and authority of the West gains ground in the Old World, 
the stronger becomes the bond of unity and mutual 
interest between the separate factions of Asiatics, and 
the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it 
wise or expedient by useless provocation and unnecessary 
attacks to increase the feeling of animosity, to hurry on 
the struggle between the two worlds, and to nip in the 
bud the work of modern culture which is now going on 
in Asia?" 1 

1 A. Vambery, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists," 
Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1912. 



128 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



The Great War of course immensely aggravated an 
already critical situation. The Orient suddenly saw the 
European peoples, who, in racial matters, had hitherto 
maintained something like solidarity, locked in an inter- 
necine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw 
those same peoples put one another furiously to the ban 
as irreconcilable foes; it saw white race-unity cleft by 
moral and political gulfs which white men themselves 
continuously iterated would never be filled. The one 
redeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the 
liberal programme which the Allied statesmen inscribed 
upon their banners. But when the war was over and 
the Allies had won, it promptly leaked out that at the 
very time when the Allied leaders were making their 
liberal speeches they had been negotiating a series of 
secret treaties partitioning the Near East between them 
in a spirit of the most cynical imperialism; and in the 
peace conferences that closed the war it was these secret 
treaties, not the liberal speeches, which determined the 
Oriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the 
total subjugation of the Near and Middle East to Euro- 
pean political control. 

The wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over the 
East was not confined to furious remonstrance like the 
protests of pre-war days. There was a note of immedi- 
ate resistance and rebellion not audible before. This re- 
bellious temper has translated itself into warlike action 
which has already forced the European Powers to abate 
some of their extreme pretensions and which will un- 
doubtedly make them abate others in the near future. 
The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed in 
later chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great 



THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 129 



War has shattered European prestige in the East and 
has opened the eyes of Orientals to the weaknesses of 
the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic course 
of education. For one thing, millions of Orientals and 
negroes were taken from the remotest jungles of Asia 
and Africa to serve as soldiers and laborers in the White 
Man's War. Though the bulk of these auxiliaries were 
used in colonial operations; more than a milhon of them 
were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white 
men, raped white women, tasted white luxuries, learned 
white weaknesses — and went home to tell their people 
the whole story. 1 Asia and Africa to-day know Europe 
as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that 
they will make use of their knowledge. The most seri- 
ous factor in the situation is that the Orient realizes 
that the famous Versailles "Peace" which purports to 
have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather an uncon- 
structive, unstatesmanlike futility that left old sores un- 
healed and even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies 
debilitated and uncured, while Asia and Africa see in 
this a standing incitement to rash dreams and violent 
action. 

Such is the situation to-day : an East, torn by the con- 
flict between new and old, facing a West riven with dis- 
sension and sick from its mad follies. Probably never 
before have the relations between the two worlds con- 
tained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possi- 
bilities. The point to be here noted is that this strange 

1 For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon, Le 
Declin de V Europe (Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman, The Awakening of 
Asia (New York, 1919) ; E. D. Morel, The Black Man's Burden (New York, 
1920); F. B. Fisher, India's Silent Revolution (New York, 1919); also, my 
Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy. 



130 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



new East which now faces us is mainly the result of 
Western influences permeating it in unprecedented fash- 
ion for the past hundred years. To the chief elements 
in that permeation let us now turn. 



CHAPTER IV 



POLITICAL CHANGE 

The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political 
tradition. From earliest times the typical form of gov- 
ernment in the East has been despotism — the arbitrary 
rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are slaves, 
holding their goods, their honors, their very lives, at his 
will and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon 
Oriental despotism has been religion. Some critics may 
add "custom but it amounts to the same thing, for in 
the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. 
The mantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the 
priests forming a privileged caste. But, with these 
exceptions, Oriental despotism has usually known no 
bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected religion 
and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as 
he chose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh 
exhausting all Egypt to gratify his whim for a colossal 
pyramid tomb, and throughout history Oriental life has 
been cursed by this fatal political simplicity. 

Now manifold human experience has conclusively 
proved that despotism is a bad form of government in 
the long run. Of course there is the legendary "benevo- 
lent despot" — the "father of his people," surrounded by 
wise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke 
of the pen. That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But 
in real life the "benevolent despot" rarely happens and 

131 



132 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



still more rarely succeeds himself. The "father of his 
people' ' usually has a pompous son and a vicious grand- 
son, who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy 
trinity — David, Solomon, Rehoboam — has reappeared 
with depressing regularity throughout history. 

Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his 
limitations. The trouble with all despots, good or bad, 
is that their rule is entirely personal. Eveiything, in 
the last analysis, depends on the despot's personal will. 
Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot him- 
self may discard his benevolence overnight, and the 
fate of an empire may be jeopardized by the monarch's 
infatuation for a woman or by an upset in his digestion. 

We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despot- 
ism," in its simon-pure, Oriental sense; not even under 
the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can hardly conceive 
what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot 
we usually think of the "enlightened autocrats" of 
eighteenth-century Europe, such as Frederick the Great. 
But these monarchs were not "despots" as Orientals 
understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He was 
regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. 
Those proud Prussian officers, starched bureaucrats, 
stiff-necked burghers, and stubborn peasants each had 
his sense of personal dignity and legal status. The un- 
questioning obedience which they gave Frederick was 
given not merely because he was their king, but also be- 
cause they knew that he was the hardest-working man 
in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to the state. If 
Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved, 
capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have 
soon showed him that there were limits to his power. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



133 



In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East " there 
lies upon the eyes and foreheads of all men a law which 
is not found in the European decalogue; and this law runs: 
'Thou shalt honor and worship the man whom God 
shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, 
thou shalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee 
thou shalt still love him, for thou art his slave and his 
chattel.'" 1 The Eastern monarch may immure himself 
in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the shoul- 
ders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth 
limitless power; the life of every subject is in his hands. 
Yet, any evening, at the pout of a dancing-girl, the 
monarch may send from his harem to the vizier's palace 
a negro "mute," armed with the bowstring. And when 
that black mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of 
office, and with neither question nor remonstrance, will 
bare his neck to be strangled. That is real despotism — 
the despotism that the East has known. 

Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is 
surely obvious that under such a tradition neither ordered 
government nor consistent progress is possible. Eastern 
history is, in fact, largely a record of sudden flowerings 
and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cuts 
his way to power in a period of confusion and decay. 
He must be strong and able, or he would not win over 
other men of similar nature struggling for the coveted 
prize. His energy and ability soon work wonders. He 
knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. 
His vigor and resolution supply the driving-power re- 
quired to compel his subordinates to act with reasonable 
efficiency, especially since incompetence or dishonesty 

l T. Morison, Imperial Rule in India, p. 43 (London, 1S99). 



134 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



are punished with the terrible severity of the Persian 
king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skin 
into the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap 
sat to administer justice. 

While the master lives, things may go well. But the 
master dies, and is succeeded by his son. This son, even 
assuming that he has inherited much of his father's 
ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raised 
in the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and de- 
signing women, neither his pride nor his passions have 
been effectively restrained, and he grows up a pompous 
tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a 
man will not be apt to look after things as his father 
did. And as soon as the master's eye shifts, things begin 
to go to pieces. How can it be otherwise? His father 
built up no governmental machine, functioning almost 
automatically, as in the West. His officers worked from 
fear or personal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of 
duty or impersonal esprit de corps. Under the grandson, 
matters get even worse, power slips from his incompetent 
hands and is parcelled out among many local despots, of 
whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that 
the decadent state is not overrun by some foreign con- 
queror. In either eventuality, the old cycle — David, Sol- 
omon, Rehoboam — is finished, and a new cycle begins — 
with the same destined end. 

That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. 
It has, however, been modified or temporarily inter- 
rupted by the impact of more liberal political influences, 
exerted sometimes from special Eastern regions and 
sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been 
given over to unrelieved despotism. Here and there 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



135 



have been peoples (mostly mountain or pastoral peoples) 
who abhorred despotism. Such a people have always 
been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs ; 
fired by Islam, established a mighty caliphate which, 
in its early days, was a theocratic democracy. Of 
course we have also seen how the older tradition of 
despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem 
world, how the democratic caliphate turned into a des- 
potic sultanate, and how the liberty-loving Arabs re- 
tired sullenly to their deserts. Political liberalism, like 
religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten. 
Almost — not quite; for memories of the Meccan cali- 
phate, like memories of Motazelism, remained in the 
back of men's minds, ready to come forth again with 
better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with 
every Arab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it 
kept free. And then, there was Islam. No court theo- 
logian could entirely explain away the fact that Mo- 
hammed had said things like "All Believers are broth- 
ers" and "All Moslems are free." No court chroni- 
cler could entirely expunge from Moslem annals the 
story of Islam's early days, known as the Wakti-Seadet, 
or "Age of Blessedness." Even in the darkest times 
Moslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly 
interested to £ead that the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after 
his election by the people, said : " Oh nation ! you have 
chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your 
caliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If 
otherwise, admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. 
Truth alone is desirable, and lies are despicable. . . . 
As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me only so long 
as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see 



136 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



that I deviate but in the minutest details from this 
law, you need obey me no more." 1 

In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely ob- 
literate the fact that primitive Islam was the supreme 
expression of a freedom-loving folk whose religion must 
necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Even the 
sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states, 
" fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to 
absolutism." 2 Vambery well summarizes this matter 
when he writes : " It is not Islam and its doctrines which 
have devastated the western portion of Asia and brought 
about the present sad state of things; but it is the 
tyranny of the Moslem Princes, who have wilfully per- 
verted the doctrines of the Prophet, and sought and 
found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their despotic 
rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of 
doubt in matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting 
and crashing all liberal principles, they have prevented 
the dawn of a Moslem Renaissance." 3 

In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despot- 
ism reached its evil maximum in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, and how the Mohammedan Revival was not merely 
a puritan reformation of religion but was also in part 
a political protest against the vicious and contempti- 
ble tyrants who misruled the Moslem world. This in- 
ternal movement of political liberalism was soon cross- 
cut by another political current coming in from the 
West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Mos- 

1 Quoted from Arminius Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands, 
pp. 305-306 (London, 1906). 

2 A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," Proceedings of the American 
Political Science Association, vol. VII, p. 67 (1910). 

3 Vambery, op. cit., p. 307. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



137 



lem East with Europe's prosperity and vigor, think- 
ing Moslems were beginning to recognize their short- 
comings, and they could not avoid the conclusion that 
their woes were in large part due to their wretched gov- 
ernments. Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes 
came to realize that there must be some adoption of 
Western political methods if their countries were to be 
saved from destruction. The most notable examples 
of this new type of Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mah- 
mud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of Egypt, both of 
whom came to power about the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century. 

Of course none of these reforming princes had the 
slightest idea of granting their subjects constitutional 
liberties or of transforming themselves into limited 
monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but ab- 
solute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" 
of Europe and less in the sense of the purely Oriental 
despot. What they wanted were true organs of govern- 
ment — army, civil service, judiciary, etc. — which would 
function efficiently and semi-automatically as govern- 
mental machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses 
of individuals who had to be continuously prodded and 
punished by the sovereign in order to get anything 
done. 

Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely col- 
leagues persisted in their new policies, but the outcome 
of these "reforms from above" was, on the whole, dis- 
appointing. The monarchs might build barracks and 
bureaux on European models and fill them with soldiers 
and bureaucrats in European clothes, but they did not 
get European results. Most of these "Western-type" 



138 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



officials knew almost nothing about the West and were 
therefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. 
In fact, they had small heart for the business. Devoid 
of any sort of enthusiasm for ideas and institutions which 
they did not comprehend, they applied themselves to 
the work of reform with secret ill will and repugnance, 
moved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's 
command. As time passed, the military branches did 
gain some modern efficiency, but the civil services made 
little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic 
vices but few or none of the virtues. 

Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to 
appear: men demanding Western innovations like con- 
stitutions, parliaments, and other phenomena of modern 
political life. Their numbers were constantly recruited 
from the widening circles of men acquainted with West- 
ern ideas through the books, pamphlets, and news- 
papers which were being increasingly published, and 
through the education given by schools on the Western 
model which were springing up. The third quarter of 
the nineteenth century saw the formation of genuine 
political parties in Turkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups 
actually wrung from a weak sultan the grant of a parlia- 
ment. 

These early successes of Moslem political liberalism 
were, however, followed by a period of reaction. The 
Moslem princes had become increasingly alarmed at 
the growth of liberal agitation among their subjects and 
were determined to maintain their despotic authority. 
The new Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly 
suppressed his parliament, savagely persecuted the lib- 
erals, and restored the most uncompromising despotism. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



139 



In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal move- 
ment with equal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift 
rule of Khedive Ismail ended all native political life 
by provoking European intervention and the imposition 
of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution 
of 1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation 
in those Moslem countries which still retained their 
independence. Nevertheless, the agitation was there, 
working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriots 
fled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct 
their liberal propaganda, and from havens of refuge like 
Switzerland these " Young-Turks, " "Young-Persians," 
and others issued manifestoes and published revolution- 
ary literature which was smuggled into their homelands 
and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren. 1 

As the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily 
in strength. A young Turkish poet wrote at this time: 
"All that we admire in European culture as the fruit of 
science and art is simply the outcome of liberty. Every- 
thing derives its light from the bright star of liberty. 
Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; 
without liberty there is no happiness; and without hap- 
piness, existence, true life, eternal life, is impossible. 
Everlasting praise and glory to the shining light of free- 
dom ! " 2 By the close of the nineteenth century keen- 
sighted European observers noted the working of the 
liberal ferment under the surface calm of absolutist re- 

*A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenth 
century is found in Vamb6ry, " Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im mosli- 
mischen Asien," Deutsche Rundschau, October, 1893; a shorter summary 
of Vambery's views is found in his Western Culture in Eastern Lands, 
especially chap. V. Also, see articles by L6on Cahun, previously noted, 
in Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generate, vols. XI and XII. 

2 Vambery, supra, p. 332. 



140 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



pression. Thus, Arminius Vambery, revisiting Con- 
stantinople in 1896 ; was astounded by the liberal evolu- 
tion that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey- 
forty years before. Although Constantinople was sub- 
jected to the severest phase of Hamidian despotism, 
Vambery wrote: "The old attachment of Turkey for 
the absolute regime is done for. We hear much in 
Europe of the 1 Young-Turk 9 Party; we hear even of a 
constitutional movement, political emigres, revolutionary 
pamphlets. But what we do not realize is the ferment 
which exists in the different social classes, and which 
gives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and 
is no longer clay in the hands of his despotic potter. 
In Turkey, therefore, it is not a question of a Young- 
Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman belongs 
to this party." 1 

In this connection we should note the stirrings of un- 
rest that were now rapidly developing in the Eastern 
lands subject to European political control. By the 
close of the nineteenth century only four considerable 
Moslem states — Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghan- 
istan — retained anything like independence from Euro- 
pean domination. Since Afghanistan and Morocco were 
so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as civi- 
lized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that 
genuine liberal movements against native despotism 
could arise. But in European-ruled countries like In- 
dia, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural level of the in- 
habitants was high enough to engender liberal political 
aspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule 

1 Vambery, La Turquie d' auj our d' hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, p. 22 
(Paris, 1898). 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



141 



which may be felt by savages as well as by civilized 
peoples. 

These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated 
by the movements against native despotism in Turkey 
and Persia. Nevertheless, the two sets of phenomena 
must be sharply distinguished from each other. The 
Turkish and Persian agitations were essentially move- 
ments of liberal reform. The Indian, Egyptian, Al- 
gerian, and kindred agitations were essentially move- 
ments for independence, with no settled programme as to 
how that independence should be used after it had been 
attained. These latter movements are, in fact, "na- 
tionalist" rather than liberal in character, and it is in 
the chapters devoted to nationalism that they will be 
discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are 
really coalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men hold- 
ing very diverse political ideas, embracing as these 
"nationalist" coalitions do not merely genuine liberals 
but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark reac- 
tionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberated 
countries the yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course 
all the nationalist groups use the familiar slogans "free- 
dom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, what many of them 
mean is merely freedom and liberty from foreign tute- 
lage — in other words, independence. We must always 
remember that patriotism has no essential connection 
with liberalism. The Spanish peasants, who shouted 
"liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies, greeted 
their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm 
and welcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries 
of "Long live chains!" 

The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted 



142 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

Turkey and Persia since the beginning of the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century came dramatically to an end 
in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into revo- 
lution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, 
the Persians rising against their infamous ruler Mu- 
hammad Ali Shah, " perhaps the most perverted, cow- 
ardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the 
throne of Persia in many generations." 1 These revolu- 
tions released the pent-up liberal forces which had been 
slowly gathering strength under the repression of the 
previous generation, and the upshot was that Turkey 
and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, par- 
liaments, and all the other political machinery of the 
West. 

How the new regimes would have worked m normal 
times it is profitless to speculate, because, as a matter 
of fact, the times were abnormal to the highest degree. 
Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had 
made their revolutions just when the world was enter- 
ing that profound malaise which culminated in the 
Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia were allowed 
time to attempt the difficult process of political trans- 
formation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every 
blunder and, in the inevitable weakness of transition, 
pounced upon them to their undoing. The Great War 
merely completed a process of Western aggression and 
intervention which had begun some years before. 

This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders 
largely academic any discussion of the much-debated 
question whether or not the peoples of the Near and 
Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is, 

1 W. Morgan Sinister, The Strangling of Persia, p. xxi (New York, 1912). 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



143 



of establishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional 
political life. Opinions on this point are at absolute 
variance. Personally, I have not been able to make up 
my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself with 
stating the various arguments without attempting to 
draw any general conclusion. Before stating these con- 
trasted view-points, however, I would draw attention to 
the distinction which should be made between the Mo- 
hammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus 
of India. Moslems everywhere possess the democratic 
political example of Arabia as well as a religion which, 
as regards its own followers at least, contains many 
liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this. 
Their political tradition has been practically that of un- 
relieved Oriental despotism, the only exceptions being 
a few primitive self-governing communities in very early 
times, which never exerted any wide-spread influence and 
quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the Hindu 
religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever 
afflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an in- 
finity of rigid castes between which no real intercourse 
is possible; each caste regarding all those of lesser rank 
as unclean, polluting creatures, scarcely to be distin- 
guished from animals. It is obvious that with such 
handicaps the establishment of true self-government 
will be apt to be more difficult for Hindus than for Mo- 
hammedans, and the reader should keep this point in 
mind in the discussion which follows. 

Considering first the attitude of those who do not 
believe the peoples of the Near and Middle East capable 
of real self-government in the Western sense either now 
or in the immediate future, we find this thesis both ably 



144 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cro- 
mer believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was 
far too strong to be overcome, at least in our time. 
"From the dawn of history/' he asserts, "Eastern poli- 
tics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. Do not 
let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple 
idea of despotic rule will readily give way to the far 
more complex conception of ordered liberty. The trans- 
formation, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be 
the work, not of generations, but of centuries. . . . 
Our primary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a sys- 
tem which, under the specious cloak of free institutions, 
will enable a small minority of natives to misgovern 
their countrymen, but to establish one which will enable 
the mass of the population to be governed according to 
the code of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyp- 
tian parliament, supposing such a thing to be possible, 
would not improbably legislate for the protection of the 
slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance 
can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had 
their own way, would not re-establish suttee. Good 
government has the merit of presenting a more or less 
attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain anything 
approaching to the British ideal of self-government, 
they will have to undergo very numerous transmigra- 
tions of political thought." And Lord Cromer concludes 
pessimistically: "It will probably never be possible to 
make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear." 1 
In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor 
Dillon, writing after the Turkish and Persian revolu- 
tions, had little hope in their success, and ridiculed the 

1 Cromer, Political and Literary Essays, pp. 25-28. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



145 



current "faith in the sacramental virtue of constitutional 
government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet 
manufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons 
of men, can do away with the foundations of national 
character. Flashy phrases and elegant declamations 
may persuade people that they have been transmuted; 
but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts 
point to utter incapacity for self-government." Refer- 
ring to the Persian revolution, Doctor Dillon continues: 
"At bottom, only names of persons and things have been 
altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy 
goes on forever. . . . Financial support of the new 
government is impossible. For foreign capitalists will 
not give money to be squandered by filibusters and 
irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, 
appear on the surface and disappear at once." 1 

A high French colonial official thus characterizes the 
Algerians and other Moslem populations of French 
North Africa: "Our natives need to be governed. They 
are big children, incapable of going alone. We should 
guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and 
crush intriguers and agents of sedition. At the same 
time, we should protect them, direct them paternally, 
and especially obtain influence over them by the con- 
stant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no 
vain humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of 
France and of the natives themselves." 2 

Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have 
been disappointed with the way Orientals have used 

X E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self -Government," Contemporary 
Review, April, 1910. 

2 E. Mercier, La Question indigene, p. 220 (Paris, 1901). 



146 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



experimental first steps in self-government like Advisory- 
Councils granted by the European rulers; have used 
them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power, 
instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. 
As Lord Kitchener said in his 1913 report on the state 
of Egypt: " Representative bodies can only be safely 
developed when it is shown that they are capable of per- 
forming adequately their present functions, and that 
there is good hope that they could undertake still more 
important and arduous responsibilities. If representa- 
tive government, in its simplest form, is found to be un- 
workable, there is little prospect of its becoming more 
useful when its scope is extended. No government 
would ,be insane enough to consider that, because an 
Advisory Council had proved itself unable to carry out 
its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, 
it should therefore be given a larger measure of power 
and control." 1 

These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the 
native upper classes and Western-educated elites, how- 
ever successful they may be in inflaming the ignorant 
masses, who are often quite contented with the material 
benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is 
well brought out by a leading American missionary in 
India, with a lifetime of experience in that country, 
who wrote some years ago: "The common people of 
India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their 
government than they ever were before. It is the classes, 
rather, who reveal the real spirit of discontent. . . . 
If the common people were let alone by the agitators, 
there would not be a more loyal people on earth than 

1 "Egypt," No. 1 (1914), p. 6. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



147 



the people of India. But the educated classes are cer- 
tainly possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will 
no longer remain satisfied with inferior places of responsi- 
bility and lower posts of emolument. . . . These peo- 
ple have little or no s} r mpathy with the kind of govern- 
ment which is gradually being extended to them. Ulti- 
mately they do not ask for representative institutions, 
which will give them a share in the government of their 
own land. What they really seek is absolute control. 
The Brahmin (only five per cent of the community) 
believes that he has been divinely appointed to rule the 
country and would withhold the franchise from all 
others. The Sudra — the Bourgeois of India — would no 
more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pa- 
riahs of the land than he would give it to his dog. It is 
the British power that has introduced, and now main- 
tains, the equality of rights and privileges for all the 
people of the land." 1 

The apprehension that India, if liberated from British 
control, might be exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin 
oligarchy is shared not only by Western observers but 
also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known collec- 
tively as the " Depressed Classes." These people op- 
pose the Indian nationalist agitation for fear of losing 
their present protection under the British "Raj." They 
believe that India still needs generations of education 
and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much 
less independence, and they have organized into a pow- 
erful association, the "Namasudra," which is loyalist 
and anti-nationalist in character. 

l Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," Journal of Race 
Development, July, 1910. 



148 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its 
leader. Doctor Nair. " Democracy as a catchword/' he 
says, "has already reached India and is widely used. 
But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, 
and will find it hard to secure a footing in a country 
where caste is strongly intrenched. ... I do not want 
to lay the charge of oppressing the lower castes at the 
door of any particular caste. All the higher castes take 
a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the 
non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin op- 
presses all the castes below him. . . . We want a real 
democracy and not an oligarchy, however camouflaged 
by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oli- 
garchy is established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. 
We further say that we should prefer a delayed democ- 
racy to an immediate oligarchy, having more trust in a 
sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympa- 
thetic oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have 
been oppressing us in the past and will do so again but 
for the British Government. Our attitude is based, not 
on 1 faith' alone, but on the instinct of self-preserva- 
tion." 1 

Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that 
India is not ripe for self-government, and that the re- 
laxing of British authority now, or in the immediate 
future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The 
Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for 
the reasons expressed by one of their representative 
men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who remarks: " Rightly or 
wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern Indian 
politics, and I have always held that we should devote 

1 Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy," Edinburgh Review, 
October, 1918, 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



149 



more attention to social problems and intellectual ad- 
vancement and less to politics; which, in our present 
condition, is an unmixed evil. I am firmly persuaded 
that we would consult our interest better by leaving 
politics severely alone. ... It is not a handful of men 
armed with the learning and culture of the West, but it 
is the masses that must feel, understand, and take an 
intelligent interest in their own affairs. The infinitesi- 
mal educated minority do not constitute the population 
of India. It is the masses, therefore, that must be 
trained, educated, brought to the level of unassailable 
uprightness and devotion to their country. This goal 
is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we attain 
it, our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile 
and illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely 
cast off the swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or 
have risen above the illusions of power and the ambi- 
tions of fortune. We have yet to learn austerity of 
principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope 
to raise the standard of private and public morality so 
long as we continue to subordinate the interest of our 
community and country to our own." 1 

Such pronouncements as these from considerable por- 
tions of the native population give pause even to those 
liberal English students of Indian affairs who are con- 
vinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home 
rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When 
Indian Nationalists ask for freedom, they mean au- 
tonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner. Our 
answer as given in the reforms is: 2 'Yes, autonomy you 

1 Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912). 

2 /. e., the increase of self-government granted India by Britain as a 
result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. 



150 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



shall have, but on one condition — that you have democ- 
racy as well. We will give up the control as soon as 
there is an Indian people which can control its native 
rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian oli- 
garchy/ This is the root of the disagreement between 
those who say that India might have self-government 
immediately and those who say that India can only be- 
come capable of self-government with time. For the 
former, by ' self-government/ mean autonomy, and it 
is perfectly true that India might be made autonomous 
immediately. If the foreign control were withdrawn 
to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group 
of governments would, no doubt, after a period of con- 
fusion, come into being in India. But it would not be 
democratic government; it would be the despotic rule 
of the stronger or more cunning." 1 

The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of 
those critics, both Western and Oriental, who main- 
tain that the peoples of the Near and Middle East are 
incapable of self-government in our sense, at least to- 
day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine 
the views of those who hold a more optimistic attitude. 
Some observers stress strongly Islam's liberal tendencies 
as a foundation on which to erect political structures in 
the modern sense. Vambery says: " Islam is still the 
most democratic religion in the world, a religion favoring 
both liberty and equality. If there ever was a consti- 
tutional government, it was that of the first Caliphs." 2 
A close English student of the Near East declares : " Tri- 

*E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India," The New Europe, January 29, 
1920. 

2 Vambery, La Turqy.it d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, p. 58. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



151 



bal Arabia has the only true form of democratic govern- 
ment, and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure 
that it continues democratic — as many a would-be 
despot knows to his cost." 1 Regarding the Young- 
Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks: 
" Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary in- 
stitutions as might at first sight appear. There lay hid- 
den some precedent; much preparation, and a strong 
desire, for parliamentary government. Both the re- 
ligious and the secular institutions of Turkey involve 
precedents for a parliament. Mohammed himself con- 
ferred with the wisest of his companions. The Ulema 2 
have taken counsel together up to the present time. 
The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic 
and opposed in essence to absolutism. The habit of 
regarding it as fundamental law enables even the most 
ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a Consti- 
tution." He points out that the early sultans had their 
" Divan," or assemblage of high officials, meeting regu- 
larly to give the sultan information and advice, while 
more recently there have been a Council of State and a 
Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments 
of 1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and fol- 
lowed by Hamidian absolutism, they were legal prece- 
dents, never forgotten. From all this Professor Lybyer 
concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore be 
regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an en- 
largement and improvement of familiar institutions." 3 
Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, 

1 G. W. Bury, Pan-Islam, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919). 

2 The assembly of religious notables. 

3 A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament," Proceedings of the American 
Political Science Association, vol. VII, pp. 66-67 (1910). 



152 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



whom the Persian Revolutionary Government called in 
to organize the country's finances, and who was ousted 
in less than a year by Russo-British pressure, expresses 
an optimistic regard for the political capacities of the 
Persian people. 

"I believe," he says, "that there has never been in 
the history of the world an instance where a people 
changed suddenly from an absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional or representative form of government 
and at once succeeded in displaying a high standard of 
political wisdom and knowledge of legislative procedure. 
Such a thing is inconceivable and not to be expected 
by any reasonable person. The members of the first 
Medjlis 1 were compelled to fight for their very existence 
from the day that the Parliament was constituted. . . . 
They had no time for serious legislative work, and but 
little hope that any measures which they might enact 
would be put into effect. 

"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose 
members I knew personally, was doubtless incompetent 
if it were to be judged by the standards of the British 
Parliament or the American Congress. It would be 
strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried govern- 
ment in a land filled with the decay of ages should, from 
the outset, be able to conduct its business as well as 
governments with generations and even centuries of 
experience behind them. We should make allowance 
for lack of technical knowledge; for the important ques- 
tion, of course, is that the Medjlis in the main repre- 
sented the new and just ideals and aspirations of the 
Persian people. Its members were men of more than 

1 The name of the Persian Parliament. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



153 



average education; some displayed remarkable talent, 
character, and courage. . . . They responded enthusi- 
astically to any patriotic suggestion which was put 
before them. They themselves lacked any great knowl- 
edge of governmental finances, but they realized the 
situation and were both willing and anxious to put their 
full confidence in any foreign advisers who showed them- 
selves capable of resisting political intrigues and bribery 
and working for the welfare of the Persian people. 

"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent 
when it has the support of an entire people, when it 
recognizes its own limitations, and when its members 
are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation's 
dignity and sovereign rights. . . . 

"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult 
to generalize. The great mass of the population is com- 
posed of peasants and tribesmen, all densely ignorant. 
On the other hand, many thousands have been educated 
abroad, or have travelled after completing their educa- 
tion at home. They, or at least certain elements among 
them which had had the support of the masses, proved 
their capacity to assimilate western civilization and 
ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the 
face of untold obstacles. Opportunities were equalized 
to such a degree that any man of ability could occupy 
the highest official posts. As a race they showed dur- 
ing the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for 
education. Hundreds of schools were established dur- 
ing the Constitutional regime. A remarkable free press 
sprang up overnight, and fearless writers came forward 
to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within 
their country or without. The Persians were anxious 



154 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



to adopt wholesale the political, ethical, and business 
codes of the most modern and progressive nations. 
They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest 
which pervades India, which produced the ' Young- 
Turk' movement, and which has more recently mani- 
fested itself in the estabhshment of the Chinese Re- 
public." 1 

Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that 
you cannot hustle the East. This includes a warning 
and a reflection. Western men and Western ideals can 
hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that they 
are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to 
themselves. As a matter of fact, the moral appeal and 
the appeal of race-pride and patriotism, are as strong in 
the East as in the West, though it does not he so near 
the surface; and naturally the Oriental displays no great 
desire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only 
to the Westerner." 2 

Indeed, many Western liberals believe that European 
rule, however benevolent and efficient, will never pre- 
pare the Eastern peoples for true self-government; and 
that the only way they will learn is by trying it out 
themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the 
well-known British publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking 
of India, Mr. Curtis says that education and kindred 
benefits conferred by British rule will not, of themselves, 
"avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsible 
government. On the contrary, education will prove a 
danger and positive mischief, unless accompanied by 
a definite instalment of political responsibility. It is 

1 Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, pp. 240-246. 
*IHd., p. 333. 



POLITICAL CHANGE 



155 



in the workshops of actual experience alone that elec- 
torates will acquire the art of self-government, however 
highly educated they may be. 

"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite pow- 
ers on electorates. The officers of Government 1 must 
give every possible help and advice to the new authori- 
ties, for which those authorities may ask. They must 
act as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if 
the new authorities are to learn the art of responsible 
government, they must be free from control from above. 
Not otherwise will they learn to feel themselves respon- 
sible to the electorate below. Nor will the electorates 
themselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings 
rests in their own hands. Suffering there will be, and it 
is only by suffering, self-inflicted and perhaps long en- 
dured, that a people will learn the faculty of self-help, 
and genuine electorates be brought into being. . . . 

"I am proud to think that England has conferred 
immeasurable good on India by creating order and show- 
ing Indians what orderly government means. But, this 
having been done, I do not believe the system can now 
be continued as it is, without positive damage to the 
character of the people. The burden of trusteeship 
must be transferred, piece by piece, from the shoulders 
of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort able to 
bear it. Their strength and numbers must be devel- 
oped. But that can be done by the exercise of actual 
responsibility steadily increased as they can bear it. It 
cannot be done by any system of school-teaching, though 
such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process. 

"The goal now set by the recent announcement of 

1 /. e., the British Government of India, 



156 THE 



NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



the Secretary of State 1 will only be reached through 
trouble. Yet troublous as the times before us may be, 
we have at last reached that stage of our work in India 
which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The 
task is one worthy of this epoch in our history, if only 
because it calls for the effacement of oiarselves." 2 

Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process 
which is to-day actually going on, not only in India but 
in other parts of the East as well. The Great War has 
so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirations and has 
so weakened European power and prestige that a wide- 
spread relaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is tak- 
ing place. This process may make for good or for ill, 
but it is apparently inevitable; and a generation (perhaps 
a decade) hence may see most of the Near and Middle 
East autonomous or even independent. Whether the 
liberated peoples will misuse their opportunities and 
fall into despotism or anarchy, or whether they succeed 
in estabHshing orderly, progressive, constitutional gov- 
ernments, remains to be seen. We have examined the 
factors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the 
only way in which to-day it can scientifically be left — on 
a note of interrogation. 

1 /. e., the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted. 
3 Lionel Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government, 
pp. 159-160 (London, 1918). 



CHAPTER V 
NATIONALISM 

The spirit of nationality is one of the great dynamics 
of modern times. In Europe, where it first attained 
self-conscious maturity, it radically altered the face of 
things during the nineteenth century, so that that cen- 
tury is often called the Age of Nationalities. But na- 
tionalism is not merely a European phenomenon. It 
has spread to the remotest corners of the earth, and is 
apparently still destined to effect momentous trans- 
formations. 

Given a phenomenon of so vital a character, the ques- 
tion at once arises: What is nationalism? Curiously 
enough, this question has been endlessly debated. Many 
theories have been advanced, seeking variously to iden- 
tify nationalism with language, culture, race, politics, 
geography, economics, or religion. Now these, and even 
other, matters may be factors predisposing or contribut- 
ing to the formation of national consciousness. But, in 
the last analysis, nationalism is something over and above 
all its constituent elements, which it works into a new 
and higher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite 
or mysterious about nationalism, despite all the argu- 
ments that have raged concerning its exact meaning. 
As a matter of fact, nationalism is a state of mind. Na- 
tionalism is a belief held by a fairly large number of 
individuals, that they constitute a " Nationality"; it 

157 



158 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



is a sense of belonging together as a " Nation." This 
"Nation," as visualized in the minds of its believers, is 
a people or community associated together and organized 
under one government, and dwelling together in a dis- 
tinct territory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, 
we have what is known as a body-politic or "State." 
But we must not forget that this "State" is the material 
manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existed 
for generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangi- 
ble attributes like state sovereignty or physical fron- 
tiers. Conversely, we must remember that a state need 
not be a nation. Witness the defunct Hapsburg Empire 
of Austria-Hungary — an assemblage of discordant na- 
tionalities which flew to pieces under the shock of war. 

The late war was a liberal education regarding nation- 
alistic phenomena, especially as applied to Europe, and 
most of the fallacies regarding nationality were vividly 
disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland — a country 
whose very existence flagrantly violates "tests" like 
language, culture, religion, or geography, and where 
nevertheless a lively sense of nationality emerged tri- 
umphant from the ordeal of Armageddon. 

So familiar are these matters to the general public 
that only one point need here be stressed: the difference 
between nationality and race. Unfortunately the two 
terms have been used very loosely, if not interchange- 
ably, and are still much confused in current thinking. 
As a matter of fact, they connote utterly different things. 
Nationality is a psychological concept or state of mind. 
Race is a physiological fact, which may be accurately 
determined by scientific tests such as skull-measurement, 
hair-formation, and color of eyes and skin. In other 



NATIONALISM 



159 



words, race is what people anthropologically really are; 
nationality is what people politically think they are. 

Right here we encounter a most curious paradox. 
There can be no question that, as between race and 
nationality, race is the more fundamental, and, in the 
long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity 
is obviously dependent upon his heredity, and no matter 
how stimulating may be his environment, the potential 
limits of his reaction to that environment are fixed at 
his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains that men pay 
scant attention to race, while nationalism stirs them to 
their veiy souls. The main reason for this seems to be 
because it is only about half a century since even savants 
realized the true nature and importance of race. Even 
after an idea is scientifically established, it takes a long 
time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, and 
only after it has been thus accepted will it form the 
basis of practical conduct. Meanwhile the far older 
idea of nationality has permeated the popular conscious- 
ness, and has thereby been able to produce tangible 
effects. In fine, our political life is still dominated by 
nationalism rather than race, and practical politics are 
thus conditioned, not by what men really are, but by 
what they think they are. 

The late war is a striking case in point. That war 
is very generally regarded as having been one of "race." 
The idea certainly lent to the struggle much of its bit- 
terness and uncompromising fury. And yet, from the 
genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind. 
Ethnologists have proved conclusively that, apart from 
certain palaeolithic survivals and a few historically re- 
cent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited by only three 



160 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed "Nordic" race, (2) 
the medium-complexioned. round-headed "Alpine" race, 
(3) the brunet, long-headed "Mediterranean" race. 
These races are so dispersed and intermingled that 
every European nation is built of at least two of these 
stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, the European War was not a race- 
war at all, but a domestic struggle between closely knit 
blood-relatives. 

Now all this was known to most well-educated Euro- 
peans long before 1914. And yet it did not make the 
slightest difference. The reason is that, in spite of 
everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe 
that they fit into an entirely different race-category. 
They think they belong to the "Teutonic" race, the 
"Latin" race, the "Slav" race, or the "Anglo-Saxon" 
race. The fact that these so-called "races" simply do 
not exist but are really historical differentiations, based 
on language and culture, which cut sublimely across 
genuine race-lines — all that is quite beside the point. 
Your European may apprehend this intellectually, but 
so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have 
no appreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of 
hearts he will still believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an 
Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. For his blood-race he will not 
stir; for his thought-race he will die. For the glory of 
the dolichocephalic "Nordic" or the brachycephalic 
"Alpine" he will not prick his finger or wager a groat; 
for the triumph of the "Teuton" or the "Slav" he will 
give his last farthing and shed his heart's blood. In 
other words: Not what men really are, but what they 
think they are. 



NATIONALISM 



161 



At first it may seem strange that in contemporary 
Europe thought-race should be all-powerful while blood- 
race is impotent. Yet there are very good reasons. 
Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been 
nationalism, but also nationalism has seized upon the 
nascent racial concept and has perverted it to its own 
ends. Until quite recent times "Nationality" was a 
distinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate iden- 
tity of culture, language, and historic past. It was the 
logical product of a relatively narrow European outlook. 
Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlook which had 
contented itself with the regional, feudal, and dialectic 
loyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the 
nineteenth century saw a still further widening of the 
European outlook to a continental or even to a world 
horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceased 
to satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended 
to embrace all those of kindred speech, culture, and his- 
toric tradition, however distant such persons might be. 
Obviously a new temiinology was required. The key- 
work was presently discovered — "Race." Hence we get 
that whole series of pseudo "race" phrases — "Pan- 
Germanism," "Pan-Slavism," "Pan-Angleism," "Pan- 
Latinism," and the rest. Of course these are not racial 
at all. They merely signify nationalism brought up to 
date. But the European peoples, with all the fervor of 
the nationalist faith that is in them, believe and pro- 
claim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical poli- 
tics is concerned, they are racial and will so continue 
while the nationalist dynamic endures. 

This new development of nationalism (the "racial" 
stage, as we may call it) was at first confined to the older 



162 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



centres of European civilization, but with the spread of 
Western ideas it presently appeared in the most unex- 
pected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for exam- 
ple, quickly engendered those fanatical propagandas, 
" Pan-Hellenism/ 9 "Pan-Serbism," etc., which turned 
that unhappy region first into a bear-garden and latterly 
into a witches' sabbath. 

Meanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century, the first phase of nationalism had patently 
passed into Asia. The "Young-Turk" and "Young- 
Egyptian" movements, and the "Nationalist" stirrings 
in regions so far remote from each other as Algeria, 
Persia, and India, were unmistakable signs that Asia 
was gripped by the initial throes of nationalist self- 
consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years 
of the twentieth century, numerous symptoms pro- 
claimed the fact that in Asia, as in the Balkans, the 
second or "racial" stage of nationalism had begun. 
These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung 
"Pan-" movements: "Pan-Turanism," "Pan-Arabism," 
and (most amazing of apparent paradoxes) "Pan-Islamic 
Nationalism." 

I 

Let us now trace the genesis and growth of national- 
ism in the Near and Middle East, devoting the present 
chapter to nationalist developments in the Moslem world 
with the exception of India. India requires special 
treatment, because there nationalist activity has been 
mainly the work of the non-Moslem Hindu element. 
Indian nationalism has followed a course differing dis- 



NATIONALISM 



163 



tinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore be con- 
sidered in the following chapter. 

Before it received the Western impact of the nine- 
teenth century, the Islamic world was virtually devoid 
of self-conscious nationalism. There were, to be sure, 
strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intense 
dynastic sentiment like the Turks' devotion to their 
"Padishas," the Ottoman sultans. There was also 
marked pride of race such as the Arabs' conviction that 
they were the "Chosen People.' ' Here, obviously, were 
potential nationalist elements. But these elements were 
as yet dispersed and uncoordinated. They were not 
yet fused into the new synthesis of self-conscious na- 
tionalism. The only Moslem people which could be 
said to possess anything like true nationalist feeling were 
the Persians, with their traditional devotion to their 
plateau-land of "Iran." The various peoples of the 
Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary, in- 
choate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary 
spirit; capable of development, perhaps, but as yet 
scarcely perceptible even to outsiders and certainly un- 
perceived by themselves. 

Furthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hos- 
tile to nationalism. Islam's insistence upon the brother- 
hood of all True Believers, and the Islamic political ideal 
of the "Imamat," or universal theocratic democracy, 
naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign, 
mutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent 
nationalities of Renaissance Europe conflicted with the 
mediaeval ideals of universal papacy and "Holy Roman 
Empire." 

Given such an unfavorable environment, it is not 



164 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



strange to see Moslem nationalist tendencies germinat- 
ing obscurely and confusedly throughout the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half 
of the century is there any clear conception of "Na- 
tionalism" in the Western sense. There are distinct 
nationalist tendencies in the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din 
el-Afghani (who is philosophically the connecting link 
between Pan-Islamism and Moslem nationalism), while 
the Turkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century 
were patently influenced by nationalism as they were 
by other Western ideas. It was, in fact, in Turkey 
that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared. 
Working upon the Turks' traditional devotion to their 
dynasty and pride in themselves as a ruling race lord- 
ing it over many subject peoples both Christian and 
Moslem, the Turkish nationalist movement made rapid 
progress. 

Precisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in 
Turkey began with a revival of historic memories and a 
purification of the language. Half a century ago the 
Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins 
or their history. The martial deeds of their ancestors 
and the stirring annals of their empire were remem- 
bered only in a vague, legendary fashion, the study of 
the national history being completely neglected. Re- 
ligious discussions and details of the life of Mohammed 
or the early days of Islam interested men more than the 
spread of Ottoman power in three continents. The 
nationalist pioneers taught their fellow countrymen their 
historic glories and awakened both pride of past and 
confidence in the future. 

Similarly with the Turkish language; the early na- 



NATIONALISM 



165 



tionalists found it virtually cleft in twain. On the one 
hand was "official" Turkish — a clumsy hotchpotch, 
overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and cryptic expres- 
sions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraor- 
dinary jargon, couched in a bombastic style, was vir- 
tually unintelligible to the masses. The masses, on the 
other hand, spoke "popular" Turkish — a primitive, 
limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised 
as uncouth and boorish by "educated" persons. The 
nationalists changed all this. Appreciating the simple, 
direct strength of the Turkish tongue, nationalist en- 
thusiasts trained in European principles of grammar and 
philology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language 
in the Western sense. So well did they succeed that in 
less than a generation they produced a simplified, flexi- 
ble Turkish which was used effectively by both journal- 
ists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes, 
and became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and 
the canon of style. 1 

Of course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism 
was Western political pressure. The more men came to 
love their country and aspire to its future, the more 
European assaults on Turkish territorial integrity spurred 
them to defend their threatened independence. The 
nationalist ideal was "Ottomanism" — the welding of a 
real "nation" in which all citizens, whatever their origin 
or creed, should be "Ottomans," speaking the Turkish 
language and inspired by Ottoman patriotism. This, 

1 For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see Vam- 
bery, La Turquie d' aujourd' hui et d'avant Quarante Ans; and his Western 
Culture in Eastern Lands. Also the articles by Leon Cahun in Lavisse 
et Rambaud, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, VEffort Ottoman (Paris, 
1907). 



166 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior) 
nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire, 
to say nothing of the new Arab nationalism which was 
taking shape at just this same time. Turkish national- 
ism was also frowned on by Sultan Abdul Hamid. Ab- 
dul Hamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist 
movements, both as limitations to his personal absolut- 
ism and as conflicting with that universal Pan-Islamic 
ideal on w^hich he based his policy. Accordingly, even 
those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete 
loyalty were suspect, while those with liberal tendencies 
were persecuted and driven into exile. 

The revolution of 1908, however, brought nationalism 
to power. Whatever their differences on other matters, 
the Young-Turks were all ardent nationalists. In fact, 
the very ardor of their nationalism was a prime cause 
of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of 
fanatics the Young-Turks tried to " Ottomanize " the 
whole empire at once. This enraged all the other na- 
tionalities, alienated them from the revolution, and gave 
the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attack 
disorganized Turkey in 1912. 

The truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism 
was evolving in a direction which could only mean 
heightened antagonism between the Turkish element on 
the one side and the non-Turkish elements, Christian 
or Moslem, on the other. Turkish nationalism had, in 
fact, now reached the second or "racial" stage. Pass- 
ing the bounds of the limited, mainly territorial idea 
connoted by the term "Ottomanism," it had embraced 
the far-flung and essentially racial concepts known as 
' ' Pan-Turkism ' ' and ' ' Pan-Turanism . ' ' These wider de- 



NATIONALISM 



167 



velopments we shall consider later on in this chapter. 
Before so doing let us examine the beginnings of na- 
tionalism's "first stage" in other portions of the Moslem 
world. 

Shortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a 
nationalistic awakening, kindred symptoms began to 
appear among the Arabs. As in all self-conscious na- 
tionalist movements, it was largely a protest against 
some other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest 
was naturally directed against their Turkish rulers. We 
have already seen how Desert Arabia (the Nejd) had 
always maintained its freedom, and we have also seen 
how those Arab lands like Syria, Mesopotamia, and the 
Hedjaz which fell under Turkish control nevertheless 
continued to feel an ineradicable repugnance at seeing 
themselves, Islam's "Chosen People," beneath the yoke 
of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstart barba- 
rians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination 
the two races never got on well together, their racial 
temperaments being too incompatible for really cordial 
relations. The profound temperamental incompatibility 
of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a French 
writer. Says Victor Berard: "Such are the two lan- 
guages and such the two peoples: in the latitude of Rome 
and in the latitude of Algiers, the Turk of Adrianople, 
like the Turk of Adalia, remains a man of the north 
and of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab re- 
mains a man of the south and of the extreme south. 
To the Arab's suppleness, mobility, imagination, artistic 
feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchic individu- 
alism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense of 
discipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turk- 



168 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ish master has always felt disdain for the ' artistic 
canaille/ whose pose, gesticulations, and indiscipline, 
shock him profoundly. On their side, the Arabs see in 
the Turk only a blockhead; in his placidity and taci- 
turnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for 
law only slavishness ; and in his love of material well- 
being only gross bestiality. Especially do the Arabs 
jeer at the Turk's artistic incapacity: after having gone 
to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs, and Greeks, 
the Turk remains, in Arab eyes, just a big booby of bar- 
rack and barnyard." 1 

Add to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks 
as perverters of the Islamic faith, and we need not be 
surprised to find that Turkey's Arab subjects have ever 
displayed symptoms of rebellious unrest. We have seen 
how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed 
against Turkish control of the holy cities, and despite 
the Wahabi defeat, Arab discontent lived on. About 
1820 the German explorer Burckhardt wrote of Arabia: 
"When Turkish power in the Hedjaz declines, the Arabs 
will avenge themselves for their subjection." 2 And 
some twenty years later the Shereef of Mecca remarked 
to a French traveller: "We, the direct descendants of 
the Prophet, have to bow our heads before miserable 
Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to 
power by the most shameful courses." 3 Throughout 
the nineteenth century every Turkish defeat in Europe 
was followed by a seditious outburst in its Arab prov- 
inces. 

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these 



1 Berard, Le Sultan, VI slam et les Puissances, p. 16 (Paris, 1907). 
1 Cited by Berard, p. 19. 8 Ibid., p. 20. 



NATIONALISM 



169 



seditious stirrings remained sporadic, uncoordinated out- 
bursts of religious, regional, or tribal feeling, with no 
genuinely " Nationalistic " programme of action or ideal. 
But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation ap- 
peared. Its birthplace was Syria. That was what 
might have been expected, since Syria was the part of 
Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Western influ- 
ences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, 
did not amount to much. Directed by a small group of 
noisy agitators devoid of real ability, the Turkish Gov- 
ernment suppressed it without much difficulty. 

The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew 
the scattered embers into a fresh flame. For several 
years Turkey's Arab provinces were in full ferment. 
The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turk- 
ish yoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit 
confederation headed by a religious potentate, probably 
the Shereef of Mecca. This was obviously an adaptation 
of Western nationalism to the traditional Arab ideal of 
a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan 
caliphate and the Wahabi government of the Nejd. 

This second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise 
of short duration. Turkey was now ruled by Sultan 
Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic policy 
looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects. 
Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, 
favors were heaped upon Arab chiefs and notables, while 
efforts were made to promote the contentment of the 
empire's Arab populations. At the same time the con- 
struction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz 
gave the Turkish Government a stronger grip over its 
Arab provinces than ever before, and conversely ren- 



170 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



dered successful Arab revolts a far more remote possi- 
bility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propa- 
ganda was specially directed toward awakening a sense 
of Moslem solidarity between Arabs and Turks as against 
the Christian West. These efforts achieved a measure 
of success. Certainly, every European aggression in the 
Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to 
forget, or at least adjourn, their domestic quarrels in 
face of the common foe. 

Despite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts, 
a considerable section of his Arab subjects remained 
unreconciled, and toward the close of the nineteenth 
century a fresh stirring of Arab nationalist discontent 
made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the 
Turkish authorities, the Arab nation alist agitators, 
mostly Syrians, went into exile. Gathering in near-by 
Egypt (now of course under British governance) and in 
western Europe, these exiles organized a revolutionary 
propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the 
year 1895, when the " Arabian National Committee" 
was created at Paris. For a decade their propaganda 
went on obscurely, but evidently with effect, for in 1905 
the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into 
armed insurrection. This insurrection, despite the best 
efforts of the Turkish Government, was never wholly 
suppressed, but dragged on year after year, chaining 
Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing mate- 
rially to her Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12. 

The Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's atten- 
tion upon "The Arab Question," and the nationalist 
exiles made the most of their opportunity by redoubling 
their propaganda, not only at home but in the West as 



NATIONALISM 



171 



well. Europe was fully informed of " Young Arabia's" 
wrongs and aspirations, notably by an extremely clever 
book by one of the nationalist leaders, entitled The 
Awakening of the Arab Nation, 1 which made a distinct 
sensation. The aims of the Arab nation alists are clearly 
set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National 
Committee ; addressed to the Great Powers and pub- 
lished early in 1906. Says this manifesto: "A great 
pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey. 
The Arabs, whom the Turks tyrannized over only by 
keeping them divided on insignificant questions of ritual 
and religion, have become conscious of their national, 
historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detach 
themselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order 
to form themselves into an independent State. This 
new Arab Empire will extend to its natural frontiers, 
from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to the 
Isthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea 
of Oman. It will be governed by the constitutional 
and liberal monarchy of an Arabian Sultan. The present 
Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territory of 
Medina, will form an independent empire whose sover- 
eign will be at the same time the religious Khalif of all 
the Mohammedans. Thus, one great difficulty, the 
separation of the civil and the religious powers in Islam, 
will have been solved for the greater good of all." 

To their fellow Arabs the committee issued the fol- 
lowing proclamation : " Dear Compatriots ! All of us 
know how vile and despicable the glorious and illustrious 
title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of 
all foreigners, especially Turks. All of us see to what 

1 Le Reveil de la Nation arabe, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905). 



172 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



depths of misery and ignorance we have fallen under the 
tyranny of these barbarians sprung from Central Asia. 
Our land ; the richest and finest on earth, is to-day an 
arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the 
world in a hundred years; we spread everywhere sci- 
ences, arts, and letters; for centuries we led world-civ- 
ilization. But, since the spawn of Ertogrul 1 usurped 
the caliphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to 
exploit us to such a degree that we have become the 
poorest people on eprth." The proclamation then goes 
on to declare Arabia's independence. 2 

Of course "Young Arabia" did not then attain its 
independence. The revolt was kept localized and Tur- 
key maintained its hold over most of its Arab dominions. 
Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During the 
remainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces 
were in a sort of unstable equilibrium, torn between the 
forces of nationalist sedition on the one hand and Pan- 
Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other. 

The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new 
shift in the situation. The Arab provinces, like the 
other parts of the empire, rejoiced in the downfall of 
despotism and hoped great things for the future. In 
the Turkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well 
represented, and their deputies asked for a measure of 
federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks, bent upon 
"Ottomanization," curtly refused. The result was pro- 
found disillusionment in the Arab provinces and a re- 
vival of separatist agitation. It is interesting to note 

1 The semi-legendar}' founder of the Ottoman Empire. 

2 The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently 
found in E. Jung, Les Puissances decant la Revolte arabe : La Crise mondiale 
de Demain, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906). 



NATIONALISM 



173 



that the new independence agitation had a much more 
ambitious programme than that of a few years before. 
The Arab nationalists of Turkey were by this time defi- 
nitely linking up with the nationalists of Egypt and 
French North Africa — Arabic-speaking lands where the 
populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arab 
nationalism was beginning to speak aloud what it had 
previously whispered — the programme of a great "Pan- 
Arab" empire stretching right across North Africa and 
southern Asia from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans. 
Thus, Arab nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, was 
evolving into the "second," or racial, stage. 

Deferring discussion of this broader development, let 
us follow a trifle further the course of the more restricted 
Arab nationalism within the Turkish Empire. Despite 
the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by the European 
aggressions of 1911-12, nationalist feeling was contin- 
ually aroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the 
Young-Turk government, and the independence agita- 
tion was presently in full swing once more. In 1913 
an Arabian nationalist congress convened in Paris and 
revolutionary propaganda was inaugurated on an in- 
creased scale. When the Great War broke out next 
year, Turkey's Arab provinces were seething with sedi- 
tious unrest. 1 The Turkish authorities took stern mea- 
sures against possible trouble, imprisoning and executing 
all prominent nationalists upon whom they could lay 
their hands, while the proclamation of the "Holy War" 
rallied a certain portion of Arab public opinion to the 

1 A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is that of 
the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde 
arabe," Revue du Monde muaulman, December, 1913. Also see G. W. 
Bury, Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen (London, 1915). 



174 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Egypt 
was a possibilit}' . But as the war dragged on the forces 
of discontent once more raised their heads. In 1916 
the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gave the signal for 
the downfall of Turkish rule. This revolt, liberally 
backed by England, gained the active or passive sup- 
port of the Arab elements throughout the Turkish Em- 
pire. Inspired by Allied promises of national indepen- 
dence of a most alluring character, the Arabs fought 
strenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor 
in the debacle of Ottoman military power in the autumn 
of 1918. 1 

Before discussing the momentous events which have 
occurred in the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman 
Empire since 1918, let us consider nationalist develop- 
ments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lying to 
the westward. Of these developments the most im- 
portant is that of Egypt. The mass of the Egyptian 
people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time, of the old "Ni- 
lotic" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, the 
Egyptian "fellaheen" have submitted passively to a 
long series of conquerors, albeit this passivity has been 
occasionally broken by outbursts of volcanic fury pres- 
ently dying away into passivity once more. Above the 
Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper class 
descended chiefly from Egypt's more recent Asiatic con- 
querors — Arabs, Kinds, Circassians, Albanians, and 

1 For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Independance 
arabe et la Revolte actuelle," La Revue, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine, 
•'Arabs versus Turks," American Review of Reviews, November, 1916; 
A. Musil, Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien (Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury, 
Pan-Islam (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The Politico-Religious Situation 
in Arabia," The Moslem World, July, 1919; L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The 
Soul of the Arabian Revolution," Asia, April, May, June, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



175 



Turks. In addition to this upper class, which until 
the English occupation monopolized all political power, 
there are large European " colonies" with " extraterri- 
torial' ' rights, while a further complication is added by 
the persistence of a considerable native Christian ele- 
ment, the " Copts," who refused to turn Mohammedan 
at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one- 
tenth of the total population. 

With such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures, 
and with so prolonged a tradition of foreign domination, 
Egypt might seem a most unlikely milieu for the growth 
of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt has been 
more exposed to Western influences than any other part 
of the Near East. Bonaparte's invasion at the close 
of the eighteenth century profoundly affected Egyptian 
life, and though the French were soon expelled, European 
influences continued to permeate the valley of the Nile. 
Mehemet AH, the able Albanian adventurer who made 
himself master of Egypt after the downfall of French 
rule, realized the superiority of European methods and 
; fostered a process of Europeanization which, however 
superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western 
ideas. Mehemet Ali's policy was continued by his suc- 
cessors. That magnificent spendthrift Khedive Ismail, 
whose reckless contraction of European loans was the 
primary cause of European intervention, prided himself 
on his "Europeanism" and surrounded himself with 
Europeans. 

Indeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism 
took the form of a protest against the noxious, parasiti- 
cal "Europeanism" of Khedive Ismail and his courtiers. 
Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed 



176 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



at the way Ismail was mortgaging Egypt's independence 
by huge European loans and sucking its life-blood by 
merciless taxation. Inspired consciously or uncon- 
sciously by the Western concepts of "nation" and "pa- 
triotism/' these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive 
course and to safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their 
efforts were directed not merely against the motley 
crew of European adventurers and concessionaires who 
were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances, but 
also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian 
pashas, and the Armenian and Syrian usurers, who were 
the instruments of Ismail's will. The nascent move- 
ment was thus basically a "patriotic" protest against 
all those, both foreigners and native-born, who were 
endangering the country. This showed clearly in the 
motto adopted by the agitators — the hitherto unheard- 
of slogan: "Egypt for the Egyptians!" 

Into this incipient ferment there was presently in- 
jected the dynamic personality of Djemal-ed-Din. No- 
where else did this extraordinary man exert so profound 
and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not too much 
to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptian 
nationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators 
like Arabi Pasha but also conservative reformers like 
Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realized Egypt's weak- 
ness and were content to labor patiently by evolutionary 
methods for distant goals. 

For the moment the apostles of violent action had 
the stage. In 1882 a revolutionary agitation broke out 
headed by Arabi Pasha, an army officer, who, signifi- 
cantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first man of 
Nilotic stock to sway Egypt's destinies in modern times. 



NATIONALISM 



177 



Raising their slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians/' the 
revolutionists sought to drive all "foreigners," both 
Europeans and Asiatics, from the country. Their at- 
tempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massa- 
cre of Europeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once 
precipitated European intervention. An English army 
crushed the revolutionists at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, 
and after this one battle, disorganized, bankrupt Egypt 
submitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring, 
Lord Cromer. The khedivial dynasty was, to be sure, 
retained, and the native forms of government respected, 
but all real power centred in the hands of the British 
"Financial Adviser," the representative of Britain's 
imperial will. 

For twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and 
the record of this able proconsul will place him forever 
in the front rank of the world's great administrators. 
His strong hand drew Egypt from hopeless bankruptcy 
into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, how- 
ever, did not kill Egyptian nationalism. Scattered to 
the winds before the British bayonet charges, the seeds 
of unrest slowly germinated beneath the fertile Nilotic 
soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the numbing 
shock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationalist sentiment grew steadily 
as the years wore on, and by the closing decade of the 
nineteenth century it had become distinctly perceptible 
to keen-sighted European observers. Passing through 
Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorer Schwein- 
furth was struck with the psychological change which 
had occurred since his earlier visits to the valley of the 
Nile. "A true national self -consciousness is slowly be- 
ginning to awaken," he wrote. "The Egyptians are 



178 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



still very far from being a true Nationality, but the be- 
ginning has been made." 1 

With the opening years of the twentieth century what 
had previously been visible only to discerning eyes burst 
into sudden and startling bloom. This resurgent Egyp- 
tian nationalism had, to be sure, its moderate wing, 
represented by conservative-minded men like Moham- 
med Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University and respected 
friend of Lord Cromer, who sought to teach his fellow 
countrymen that the surest road to freedom was along 
the path of enlightenment and progress. In the main, 
however, the movement was an impatient and violent 
protest against British rule and an intransigeant demand 
for immediate independence. Perhaps the most signifi- 
cant point was that virtually all Egyptians were na- 
tionalists at heart, conservatives as well as radicals de- 
clining to consider Egypt as a permanent part of the 
British Empire. The nationalists had a sound legal 
basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British 
rule rested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. Eng- 
land had intervened in Egypt as a self-constituted "Man- 
datory" of European financial interests. Its action had 
roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in 
France, and to allay this opposition the British Gov- 
ernment had repeatedly announced that its occupation 
of Egypt was of a temporary nature. In fact, Egyptian 
discontent was deliberately fanned by France right down 
to the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale in 1904. This 
French sympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital 
importance in the development of the nationalist move- 

1 Georg Schweinfurth, Die Wiedergeburt Agyptens im Ldchte eines aufge- 
kldrten Islam (Berlin, 1895). 



NATIONALISM 



179 



ment. In Egypt , France's cultural prestige was pre- 
dominant. In Egyptian eyes a European education 
was synonymous with a French education, so the rising 
generation inevitably sat under French teachers, either 
in Egypt or in France, and these French preceptors, 
being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunity 
for instilling dislike of England and aversion to British 
rule. 

The radical nationalists were headed by a young man 
named Mustapha Kamel. He was a very prince of 
agitators; ardent, magnetic, enthusiastic, and possessed 
of a fiery eloquence which fairly swept away both his 
hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist, 
he edited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals, 
and as fast as one organ was suppressed by the British 
authorities he started another. His uncompromising 
nationalism may be gauged from the following examples 
from his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase 
"The Egyptians for Egypt; Egypt for the Egyptians," 
he wrote as early as 1896: " Egyptian civilization cannot 
endure in the future unless it is founded by the people 
itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the 
pupil, in fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man 
has sacred, intangible rights ; that he is not created to be 
a tool, but to lead an intelligent and worthy life; that 
love of country is the most beautiful sentiment which 
can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without indepen- 
dence is a nation without existence ! It is by patriotism 
that , backward peoples come quickly to civilization, to 
greatness, , and to power. It is patriotism that forms 
the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations, 
and it is patriotism that gives life to every living being. " 



180 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



The English; of course, were bitterly denounced. 
Here is a typical editorial from his organ El Lewa: 
"We are the despoiled. The English are the despoilers. 
We demand a sacred right. The English are the usurp- 
ers of that right. This is why we are sure of success 
sooner or later. When one is in the right, it is only a 
question of time." 

Despite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamei had 
a sense of realities, and recognized that, for the moment 
at least, British power could not be forcibly overthrown. 
He did not, therefore, attempt any open violence which 
he knew would merely ruin himself and his followers. 
Early in 1908 he died, only thirty-four years of age. 
His mantle fell upon his leading disciple, Mohammed 
Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal caliber, 
tried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence 
by the violence of his invective. The difference between 
the two leaders can be gauged by the editorial columns 
of El Lewa. Here is an editorial of September, 1909: 
"This land was polluted by the English, putrefied with 
their atrocities as they suppressed our beloved dustour 
[constitution], tied our tongues, burned our people alive 
and hanged our innocent relatives, and perpetrated 
other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble, 
the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let 
us take a new step. Let our fives be cheap while we 
seek our independence. Death is far better than life 
for you if you remain in your present condition." 

Mohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposi- 
tion led him into tactical blunders like alienating the 
native Christian Copts, whom Mustapha Kamel had been 
careful to conciliate. The following diatribe (which, 



NATIONALISM 



181 



by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and 
Eastern ideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the 
increasing violence of his propaganda: "The Copts 
should be kicked to death. They still have faces and 
bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which 
is a proof that they hide poisonous spirits within then- 
souls. The fact that they exist in the world confirms 
Darwin's theory that human beings are generated from 
monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You de- 
scendants of the bearers of trays ! You tails of camels 
with your monkey faces! You bones of bodies!" 

In this more violent attitude the nationalists were 
encouraged by several reasons. For one thing, Lord 
Cromer had laid down his proconsulate in 1907 and had 
been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The new ruler 
represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in 
power, which wished to appease Egyptian unrest by con- 
ciliation instead of by Lord Cromer's autocratic indiffer- 
ence. In the second place, the Young-Turk revolution 
of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry 
for constitutional self-government. Lastly, France's 
growing intimacy with England dashed the nationalists' 
cherished hope that Britain would be forced by outside 
pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges and evacuate 
the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely 
more on their own exertions. 

Given this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt 
was foredoomed to failure. For, however conciliatory 
Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details, he could not prom- 
ise the one thing which the nationalists supremely de- 
sired — independence. This demand England refused 
even to consider. Practically all Englishmen had be- 



182 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



come convinced that Egypt with the Suez Canal was a 
vital link between the eastern and western halves of the 
British Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt 
was thus an absolute necessity. There was thus a fun- 
damental deadlock between British imperial and Egyp- 
tian national convictions. Accordingly, the British 
Liberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even 
Sir Eldon Gorst admitted in his official reports that con- 
cessions were simply regarded as signs of weakness. 

Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence 
grew to such proportions that the British Government 
became convinced that only strong measures would 
save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir Eldon Gorst 
was replaced by Lord Kitchener — a patent warning to 
the nationalists that sedition would be given short shrift 
by the iron hand which had crushed the Khalifa and 
his Dervish hordes at Omdurman. Kitchener arrived 
in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order, and 
this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The 
Egyptians were told plainly that England neither in- 
tended to evacuate the Nile valley nor considered its in- 
habitants fit for self-government within any discernible 
future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts 
from politics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture, 
at which they were so good. As for seditious propaganda, 
new legislation enabled Lord Kitchener to deal with it 
in summary fashion. Practically all the nationalist 
papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders 
were imprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the Brit- 
ish Government did its best to distract attention every- 
where from Egypt, the British press co-operating loyally 
by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was that 



NATIONALISM 



183 



Egypt became quieter than it had been for a gener- 
ation. 

However, it was only a surface calm. Driven under- 
ground, Egyptian unrest even attained new virulence 
which alarmed close observers. In 1913 the well-known 
English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investiga- 
tion of the Egyptian situation, wrote: "We are not 
popular in Egypt. Feared we may be by some; re- 
spected I doubt not by many others; but really liked, 
I am sure, by very few/' 1 Still more outspoken was 
an article significantly entitled "The Darkness over 
Egypt," which appeared on the eve of the Great War. 2 
Its publication in a semiscientific periodical for special- 
ists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy of serious 
attention. "The long-continued absence of practically 
all discussion or even mention of Egyptian internal 
affairs from the British press," asserted this article, 
"is not indicative of a healthy condition. In Egypt 
the superficial quiet is that of suppressed discontent — 
of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government 
of the Occupation. Certain recent happenings have 
strengthened in Egyptian minds the conviction that the 
Government is making preparations for the complete 
annexation of the country. . . . We are not concerned 
to question how far the motives attributed to the Gov- 
ernment are true. The essential fact is that the Govern- 
ment of the Occupation has not yet succeeded in endear- 
ing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian peo- 
ple, but is, on the contrary, an object of suspicion, an 
occasion of enmity." The article expresses grave doubt 

1 Low, Egypt in Transition, p. 260 (London, 1914). 

2 The Asiatic Review, April, 1914. 



184 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



whether Lord Kitchener's repressive measures have 
done more than drive discontent underground, and 
shows "how strong is the Nationalist feeling in Egypt 
to-day in spite of the determined attempts to stamp out 
all freedom of political opinion. As might be expected, 
this wholesale muzzling of the press has not only re- 
duced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of in- 
ternal ferment, but has seriously alienated the hitherto 
loyal Copts. It may be that the Government can dis- 
cover no better means of recommending itself to the 
confidence and good- will of the Egyptian people; it may 
be that only by the instant repression of every outward 
sign of discontent can it feel secure in its occupation; 
but if such be the case, it is an admission of extreme 
weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure." The 
article concludes with the following warning as to the 
problem's wider implications: "Egypt, though a sub- 
ject of profound indifference to the English voter, is 
being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans, 
and by the whole of our West and Central African sub- 
jects — themselves strongly Moslem in sympathy, and 
at the present time jealously suspicious of the political 
activities of Christian Imperialism.' ' 

Such being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the 
outbreak of the Great War was bound to produce inten- 
sified unrest. England's position in Egypt was, in truth, 
very difficult. Although in fact England exercised com- 
plete control, in law Egypt was still a dependency of 
the Ottoman Empire, Britain merely exercising a tem- 
porary occupation. Now it soon became evident that 
Turkey was going to join England's enemies, the Teu- 
tonic empires, while it was equally evident that the 



NATIONALISM 



185 



Egyptians sympathized with the Turks, even the Khe- 
dive Abbas Hilmi making no secret of his pro-Turkish 
views. During the first months of the European War ? 
while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian 
native press, despite the British censorship, was full of 
veiled seditious statements, while the unruly attitude of 
the Egyptian populace and the stirrings among the 
Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to how the 
wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed. 
Accordingly, when Turkey entered the war in November, 
1914, England took the decisive plunge, deposed Abbas 
Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel " Sultan," 
and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire. 

This stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like 
formal rebellion was rendered impossible by the heavy 
masses of British and Colonial troops which had been 
poured into the country. Nevertheless, there was a 
good deal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a 
stern application of the " State of Siege." A French 
observer thus vividly describes these critical days: "The 
Jehadd is rousing the anti-Christian fanaticism which 
always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since 
the end of October one could read in the eyes of the low- 
class Mohammedan natives their hope — the massacre of 
the Christians. In the streets of Cairo they stared 
insolently at the European passers-by. Some even 
danced for joy on learning that the Sultan had declared 
the Holy War. Denounced to the police for this, they 
were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearest police- 
station. The same state of mind reigned at El-Azhar, 
and I am told that Europeans who visit the celebrated 
Mohammedan University have their ears filled with the 



186 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



strongest epithets of the Arab repertory — that best 
furnished language in the world/ 7 1 

The nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad 
what their fellows could not say at home. Their leader, 
Mohammed Farid Bey, issued from Geneva an official 
protest against "the new illegal regime proclaimed by 
England the 18th of last December. England, which 
pretends to make war on Germany to defend Belgium, 
ought not to trample under foot the rights of Egypt, 
nor consider the treaties relative thereto as ' scraps of 
paper.' " 2 These exiles threw themselves vehemently 
into the arms of Germany, as may be gauged from the 
following remarks of Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, secretary of 
the Nationalist party, in a German periodical: "There 
is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England 
may be beaten and her Empire fall in ruins. During 
the early days of the war, while I was still in Egypt, 
I was a witness of this popular feeling. In cities and 
villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced 
in the Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its 
caliph ; and they are hoping and praying for Germany's 
victory." 3 

Of course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison 
in Egypt, such pronouncements were as idle as the wind. 
The hoped-for Turkish attacks were beaten back from 
the Suez Canal, the "State of Siege" functioned with 
stern efficiency and Egypt, flooded with British troops, 

1 "L'figypte et les Debuts du Protectorat," Revue des Sciences Poli- 
tique8, 15 June, 1915. 

2 Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'figypte et la Guerre," Revue Politique 
Internationale, May, 1915. 

3 Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die agyptische Frage," Asien, November, 
1916. 



NATIONALISM 



187 



lapsed into sullen silence, not to be broken until the end 
of the war. 

Turning back at this point to consider nationalist 
developments in the rest of North Africa, we do not, as 
in Egypt, find a well-marked territorial patriotism. 
Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, but such " pa- 
triotic" sentiments as exist belong rather to those more 
diffused types of nationalist feeling known as a Pan- 
Arabism" and " Pan-Islamic Nationalism," which we 
shall presently discuss. 

The basic reason for this North African lack of na- 
tional feeling, in its restricted sense, is that nowhere 
outside of Egypt is there a land which ever has been, 
or which shows distinct signs of becoming, a true "na- 
tion." The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast 
band of territory between the Mediterranean Sea and 
the Sahara desert are " Berbers" — an ancient stock, 
racially European rather than Asiatic or negroid, and 
closely akin to the " Latin" peoples across the Mediter- 
ranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albani- 
ans: they are extremely tenacious of their language and 
customs, and they have an instinctive racial feeling; 
but they are inveterate particularists, having always 
been split up into many tribes, sometimes combining 
into partial confederations but never developing true 
national patriotism. 1 

Alongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying 
proportion of Arabs. The Arabs have colonized North 
Africa ever since the Moslem conquest twelve centuries 
ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arab 

1 A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, Les Blancs 
d'Afrique (Paris, 1910). 



188 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



culture, but they never made North Africa part of the 
Arab world as they did Syria and Mesopotamia, and in 
somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The two races have 
never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years 
of Arab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains 
distinct. They have largely kept their language, and 
there has been comparatively little intermarriage. Pure- 
blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups, but 
they are still, in a way, foreigners. 1 

With such elements of discord, North Africa's political 
life has always been troubled. The most stable re- 
gion has been Morocco, though even there the Sultan's 
authority has never really extended to the mountain 
tribes. As for the so-called "Barbary States" (Algiers, 
Tunis, and Tripoli), they were little more than port- 
cities along the coast, the hinterland enjoying practi- 
cally complete tribal independence. Over this confused 
turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning 
with Algiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day. 2 
France brought peace, order, and material prosperity, 
but here, as in other Eastern lands, these very benefits 
*Df European tutelage created a new sort of unity among 
the natives in their common dislike of the European 
conqueror and their common aspiration toward inde- 
pendence. Accordingly, the past generation has wit- 
nessed the appearance of " Young Algerian" and "Young 
Tunisian" political groups, led by French-educated men 
who have imbibed Western ideas of " self-government " ' 

1 For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de 
Saint-Aymour, Arabes et Kabyles (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, Coup d'CEil sur 
VI slam en Berberie (Paris, 1917). 

2 For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European 
Reconquest of North Africa," American Historical Review, July, 1912. 



NATIONALISM 



189 



and "liberty." 1 However, as we have already re- 
marked, their goal is not so much the erection of distinct 
Algerian and Tunisian "Nations" as it is creation of a 
larger North African, perhaps Pan-Islamic, unity. It 
must not be forgotten that they are in close touch with 
the Sennussi and kindred influences which we have 
already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism. 

So much for "first-stage" nationalist developments 
in the Arab or Arabized lands. There is, however, one 
more important centre of nationalist sentiment in the 
Moslem world to be considered — Persia. Persia is, in 
fact, the land where a genuine nationalist movement 
would have been most logically expected, because the 
Persians have for ages possessed a stronger feeling of 
"country" than any other Near Eastern people. 

In the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such 
deep decrepitude that its patent weakness excited the 
imperialistic appetites of Czarist Russia and, in some- 
what lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadence and 
external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking 
Persians, and a series of reformist agitations took place, 
beginning with the religious movement of the Bab early 
in the nineteenth century and culminating with the 
revolution of 1908. 2 That revolution was largely pre- 
cipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by 

1 For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Ser- 
vier, he Nationalisme musulman (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie, 
Les Civilisations tunisiennes (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les Jeunes-Alg6- 
riens," Revue de Paris, 1 November, 1913. 

2 A good analysis of the prerevolutionary reformist movements is 
found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse," Revue du Monde 
musulman, June, 1914. See also Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern 
Lands; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia," 
Proceedings of the Central. Asian Society, 13 March,. 1907. 



I<JQ THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



which England and Russia virtually partitioned Persia; 
the country being divided into a Russian " sphere of 
influence" in the north and a British " sphere of influ- 
ence " in the south, with a " neutral zone " between. The 
revolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of 
the Persian patriots to set their house in order and avert, 
at the eleventh hour, the shadow of European domina- 
tion which was creeping over the land. But the revolu- 
tion was not merely a protest against European aggres- 
sion. It was also aimed at the alien Khadjar dynasty 
which had so long misruled Persia. These Khadjar 
sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had never 
become really Persianized, as shown by the fact that 
the intimate court language was Turki, not Persian. 
They occupied a position somewhat analogous to that of 
the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. The Per- 
sian revolution was thus basically an Iranian patriotic 
outburst against all alien influences, whether from East 
or West. 

We have already seen how this patriotic movement 
was crushed by the forcible intervention of European 
imperialism. 1 By 1912 Russia and England were in 
full control of the situation, the patriots were proscribed 
and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence. 
As a British writer then remarked: "For such broken 
spirit and shattered hopes, as for the 1 anarchy' now 
existing in Persia, Russia and Great Britain are directly 
responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will one day be 
held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement 

1 See W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York, 1912). 
Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, The Revolu- 
tion in Persia (London, 1910). 



NATIONALISM 



191 



in the situation, when the only Government in Persia 
consists of a Cabinet which does not command the con- 
fidence of the people, terrorized by Russia, financially 
starved by both Russia and England, allowed only mis- 
erable doles of money on usurious terms, and forbidden 
to emplo}^ honest and efficient foreign experts like Mr. 
Sinister; when the King is a boy, the Regent an absentee, 
the Parliament permanently suspended, and the best, 
bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driven 
into exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession- 
hunters and land-grabbers presses ever harder on the 
exhausted victim, whose struggles grow fainter and 
fainter. Little less than a miracle can now save Persia." 1 
So ends our survey of the main "first-stage" nation- 
alist movements in the Moslem world. We should of 
course remember that a nationalist movement was 
developing concurrently in India, albeit following an 
eccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember 
that, in addition to the main movements just discussed, 
there were minor nationalist stirrings among other 
Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, the Chinese 
Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch 
Indies. Lastly, we should remember that these nation- 
alist movements were more or less interwoven with the 
non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and with those 
" second-stage," "racial" nationalist movements which 
we shall now consider. 

1 ~E>. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia," Contemporary 
Review, November, 1912. 



192 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



II 

Earlier in this chapter we have already remarked that 
the opening years of the twentieth century witnessed 
the appearance in Asia of nationalism's second or racial 
stage, especially among the Turkish and Arab peoples. 
This wider stage of nationalism has attained its highest 
development among the Turks; where, indeed, it has 
gone through two distinct phases, describable respec- 
tively by the terms "Pan-Turkism" and "Pan-Turan- 
ism." We have described the primary phase of Turkish 
nationalism in its restricted " Ottoman " sense down to 
the close of the Balkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that 
time that the secondary or "racial" aspects of Turkish 
nationalism first come prominently to the fore. 

By this time the Ottoman Turks had begun to realize 
that they did not stand alone in the world; that they 
were, in fact, the westernmost branch of a vast band 
of peoples extending right across eastern Europe and 
Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Medi- 
terranean to the Arctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists 
have assigned the name of "Uralo-Altaic race," but who 
are more generally termed " Turanians." This group 
embraces the most widely scattered folk — the Ottoman 
Turks of Constantinople and Anatolia, the Turkomans 
of Persia and Central Asia, the Tartars of South Russia 
and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary, the Finns 
of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes 
of Siberia, and even the distant Mongols, and Manphus. 
Diverse though they are in culture, tradition, and even 
personal appearance, these people nevertheless possess 
certain well-marked traits in common. Their languages 



NATIONALISM 



193 



are all similar, while their physical and mental make-up 
displays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for 
great physical vitality combined with unusual toughness 
of nerve-fibre. Though somewhat deficient in imagina- 
tion and creative artistic sense, they are richly endowed 
with patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all, 
they have usually displayed extraordinary military ca- 
pacity, together with a no less remarkable aptitude for 
the masterful handling of subject peoples. The Tura- 
nians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that 
the world has ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad 
and his Magyars, Isperich and his Bulgars, Alp Arslan 
and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans, Jenghiz 
Khan and Tamerlane with their "inflexible" Mongol 
hordes, Baber in India, even Kubilai Khan and Nur- 
hachu in far-off Cathay : the type is ever the same. The 
hoof-print of the Turanian "man on horseback" is 
stamped deep all over the palimpsest of history. 

Glorious or sinister according to the point of view, 
Turan's is certainly a stirring past. Of course one may 
query whether these diverse peoples actually do form 
one genuine race. But, as we have already seen, so far 
as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Pos- 
sessed of kindred tongues and temperaments, and dow- 
ered with such a wealth of soul-stirring tradition, it 
would suffice for them to think themselves racially one 
to form a nationalist dynamic of truly appalling potency. 

Until about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of 
such a movement were visible. Not only were distant 
stocks like Finns and Manchus quite unaware of any 
common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred like 
Ottoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded 



194 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



one another with indifference or contempt. Certainly 
the Ottoman Turks were almost as devoid of racial as 
they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambery tells 
how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, "the 
word Turkluk (i. e., 'Turk') was considered an oppro- 
brious synonym of grossness and savagery, and when 
I used to call people's attention to the racial importance 
of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianople to the 
Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing 
us with Kirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary.' 
. . . With a few exceptions, I found no one in Con- 
stantinople who was seriously interested in the ques- 
tions of Turkish nationality or language." 1 

It was, in fact, the labors of Western ethnologists like 
the Hungarian Vambery and the Frenchman Leon Ca- 
hun that first cleared away the mists which enshrouded 
Turan. These labors disclosed the unexpected vastness 
of the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a 
most unacademic significance. The writings of Vambery 
and his colleagues spread far and wide through Turan 
and were there devoured by receptive minds already 
stirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The 
normality of the Turanian movement is shown by its 
simultaneous appearance at such widely sundered points 
as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres along 
the Russian Volga. Indeed, if an}i;hing, the leaven 
began its working on the Volga sooner than on the Bos- 
phorus. This Tartar revival, though little known, is 
one of the most extraordinary phenomena in ail nation- 
alist history. The Tartars, once masters of Russia, 
though long since fallen from their high estate, have 

1 Vambery 7 , La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Arts, pp. 11-12. 



NATIONALISM 



195 



never vanished in the Slav ocean. Although many of 
them have been for four centuries under Russian rule, 
they have stubbornly maintained their religious, racial, 
and cultural identity. Clustered thickly along the 
Volga, especially at Kazan and Astrakhan, retaining 
much of the Crimea, and forming a considerable mi- 
nority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct 
" enclaves" in the Slav empire, widely scattered but 
indomitable. 

The first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness 
among the Russian Tartars appeared as far back as 
1895, and from then on the movement grew with aston- 
ishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restric- 
tions at the time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was 
followed by a regular literary florescence. Streams of 
books and pamphlets, numerous newspapers, and a 
solid periodical press, all attested the vigor and fecun- 
dity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of 
the Russian Tartars assured the material sinews of war. 
The Tartar oil millionaires of Baku here played a con- 
spicuous role, freely opening their capacious purses for 
the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showed 
distinct political ability and soon gained the confidence 
of their Turkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia, 
who were also stirring to the breath of nationalism. 
The first Russian Duma contained a large Mohammedan 
group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led that 
Russian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and 
encouraged the government to diminish Tartar influence 
in Russian parliamentary life by summary curtailments 
of Mohammedan representation. 1 

1 For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia," 
The Moslem World, January, 1911; Fevret, "Les Tatars de Crimee," 



196 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Of course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to 
proclaim their political loyalty to the Russian Empire. 
Nevertheless, many earnest spirits revealed their secret 
aspirations by seeking a freer and more fruitful field of 
labor in Turkish Stambul, where the Russian Tartars 
played a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan- 
Turanian movements within the Ottoman Empire. In 
fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, 
who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian so- 
ciety at Constantinople, and his well-known book, 
Three Political Systems, became the text on which most 
subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have been based. 1 

Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan- 
Turanism was somewhat under a cloud at Stambul. 
Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was a Pan- 
Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist 
movements. Accordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not 
actually persecuted, were never in the Sultan's favor. 
With the advent of Young-Turk nationalism to power, 
however, all was changed. The " Ottomanizing " leaders 
of the new government listened eagerly to Pan-Turanian 
preaching and most of them became affiliated with the 
movement. It is interesting to note that Russian Tar- 
tars continued to play a prominent part. The chief Pan- 
Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed 

Revue du Monde musulman, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musul- 
mans russes," Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1906; Fr. von 
Mackay, "Die Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Volkerschaften," Deutsche 
Rundschau, March, 1918; Arminius Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern 
Lands; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans," Russian Review, 
February, 1914; "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme," Revue 
du Monde musulman, March, 1913. 

*For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed 
JEmin, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press (New 
York, 1914). 



NATIONALISM 



197 



Bey Agayeff, a Volga Tartar. His well-edited organ, 
Turk Yurdu (Turkish Home), penetrated to every corner 
of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised great influence 
on the development of its public opinion. 

Although leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly 
visualized the entire Turanian world from Finland to 
Manchuria as a potential whole, and were thus full- 
fledged "Pan-Turanians/' their practical efforts were at 
first confined to the closely related Turko-Tartar seg- 
ment; that is, to the Ottomans of Turkey, the Tartars 
of Russia, and the Turkomans of Central Asia and Per- 
sia. Since all these peoples were also Mohammedans, 
it follows that this propaganda had a religious as well as 
a racial complexion, trending in many respects toward 
Pan-Islamism. Indeed, even disregarding the religious 
factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanian in theory, 
the movement was at that time in practice little more 
than "Pan-Turkism." 

It was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really pre- 
cipitated full-fledged Pan-Turanism. Those wars not 
merely expelled the Turks from the Balkans and turned 
their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused 
such hatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of 
Hungarians and Bulgarians that both these peoples 
proclaimed their "Turanian" origins and toyed with 
ideas of "Pan-Turanian" solidarity against the menace 
of Serbo-Pussian " Pan-Slavism.' M The Pan-Turanian 
thinkers were assuredly evolving a body of doctrine 
grandiose enough to satisfy the most ambitious hopes. 

1 For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my 
article "Pan-Turanism," American Political Science Review, February, 
1917. 



198 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Emphasizing the great virility and nerve-force every- 
where patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers 
saw in Turan the dominant race of the morrow. Zeal- 
ous students of Western evolutionism and ethnology, 
they were evolving their own special theory of race 
grandeur and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian 
teaching, the historic peoples of southern Asia — Arabs, 
Persians, and Hindus — are hopelessly degenerate. As 
for the Europeans, they have recently passed their 
apogee, and, exhausted by the consuming fires of modern 
industrialism, are already entering upon their decline. 
It is the Turanians, with their inherent virility and 
steady nerves unspoiled by the wear and tear of Western 
civilization, who must be the great dynamic of the fu- 
ture. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far 
as to proclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race 
to revitalize a whole senescent, worn-out world by the 
saving infusion of regenerative Turanian blood. 1 

Of course the Pan-Turanians recognized that any- 
thing like a realization of their ambitious dreams was 
dependent upon the virtual destruction of the Russian 
Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Turkomans, 
Kirghiz, Finns, and numerous kindred tribes, was in 
Pan-Turanian eyes merely a Slav alluvium laid with 
varying thickness over a Turanian subsoil. This turn- 
ing of Russia into a vast "Turania irredenta" was cer- 
tainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan- 
Turanians counted on powerful Western backing. They 
realized that Germany and Austria-Hungary were fast 

1 See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants 
politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine," Retme du Monde musulman, 
December, 1912. 



NATIONALISM 



199 



drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such 
a cataclysm ; however perilous, would also offer most 
glorious possibilities. 

These Pan-Turanian aspirations undoubtedly had a 
great deal to do with driving Turkey into the Great 
War on the - side of the Central Empires. Certainly, 
Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the gov- 
erning group had long been more or less affiliated with 
the Pan-Turanian movement. Of course the Turkish 
Government had more than one string to its bow. It 
tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in double 
harness, using the "Holy War" agitation for pious 
Moslems everywhere, while it redoubled Pan-Turanian 
propaganda among the Turko-Tartar peoples. A good 
statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early years 
of the war is that of the publicist Tekin Alp in his 
book, The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, published 
in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: "With the crushing of Rus- 
sian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and 
Turkish armies, 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 Turanians will 
receive their independence. With the 10,000,000 Otto- 
man Turks, this will form a nation of 50,000,000, ad- 
vancing toward a great civilization which may perhaps 
be compared with that of Germany, in that it will have 
the strength and energy to rise even higher. In some 
ways it will be superior to the degenerate French and 
English civilizations." 

With the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revo- 
lution at the end of 1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no 
bounds. So certain were they of triumph that they 
began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing 
that hatred of all Europeans which had always lurked 



200 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

at the back of their minds. A German staff-officer thus 
describes the table-talk of Halil Pasha ; the Turkish com- 
mander of the Mesopotamian front and uncle of En- 
ver: "First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother- 
tongue must be forged into a single nation. The na- 
tional principle was supreme; so it was the design to 
conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power and 
glory. That was the first task. From that base con- 
nections must be established with the Yakutes of Si- 
beria; who were considered; on account of their lin- 
guistic kinship; the remotest outposts of the Turkish 
blood to the eastward. The closely related Tartar 
tribes of the Caucasus must naturally join this union. 
Armenians and Georgians, who form minority nation- 
alities in that territory, must either submit voluntarily 
or be subjugated. . . . Such a great compact Turkish 
Empire, exercising hegemony over all the Islamic world, 
would exert a powerful attraction upon Afghanistan and 
Persia. ... In December, 1917, when the Turkish 
front in Mesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha 
said to me, half vexed, half jokingly: ' Supposing we let 
the English have this cursed desert hole and go to 
Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little 
boy.' He had named his youngest son after the great 
conqueror and destroyer, Jenghiz Khan." 1 

1 Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the Berliner 
Tageblatt, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist activities and atti- 
tudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199 — A Manual on the Tura- 
nians and Pun-Turanianism. Compiled by the Geographical Section of the 
Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty (London, 1919); E. F. 
Benson, Crescent and Iron Cross (London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, The 
Turks of Central Asia : An Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem (Oxford, 
1918); H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1918); 
Dr. Harry Sturmer, Two War-Years in Constantinople (New York, 1917); 
A. Mandelstam, "The Turkish Spirit," New Europe, April 22, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



201 



As a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcau- 
casia and northern Persia overrun by Turkish armies 
headed for Central Asia. Then came the German col- 
lapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently 
dooming Turkey to destruction. For the moment the 
Pan-Turanians were stunned. Nevertheless, their hopes 
were soon destined to revive, as we shall presently see. 

Before describing the course of events in the Near 
East since 1918, which need to be treated as a unit, let 
us go back to consider the earlier developments of the 
other "second-stage'' nationalist movements in the 
Moslem world. We have already seen how, concur- 
rently with Turkish nationalism, Arab nationalism was 
likewise evolving into the " racial" stage, the ideal being 
a great " Pan-Arab" empire, embracing not merely the 
ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Meso- 
potamia, but also the Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli, 
French North Africa, and the Sudan. 

Pan-Arabism has not been as intellectually developed 
as Pan-Turanism, though its general trend is so similar 
that its doctrines need not be discussed in detail. One 
important difference between the two movements is 
that Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan- 
Islamic in character, the Arabs regarding themselves 
as "The Chosen People" divinely predestined to domi- 
nate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacks 
Pan-Turanism 's unity of direction. There have been 
two distinct intellectual centres — Syria and Egypt. In 
fact, it is in Egypt that Pan-Arab schemes have been 
most concretely elaborated, the Egyptian programme 
looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands un- 
der the Khedive — perhaps at first subject to British tute- 



202 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



lage ; though ultimately throwing off British control by 
concerted Pan-Arab action. The late Khedive Abbas 
Hilmi, deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to 
have encouraged this movement. 1 

The Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism, 
especially by its creation of an independent Arab king- 
dom in the Hedjaz with claims on Syria and Mesopo- 
tamia. However, the various Arab peoples are so en- 
grossed with local independence agitations looking 
toward the elimination of British, French, and Italian 
control from specific regions like Egypt, Syria, Meso- 
potamia, and Tripoli, that the larger concept of Pan- 
Arabism, while undoubtedly an underlying factor, is 
not to-day in the foreground of Arab nationalist pro- 
grammes. 

Furthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism 
is interwoven with the non-racial concepts of Pan- 
Islamism and " Pan-Islamic Nationalism." This latter 
concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of 
terms. So it may be to us Westerners. But it is not 
necessarily so to Eastern minds. However eagerly the 
East may have seized upon our ideas of nationality and 
patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full 
of concepts like Islamic solidarity and the brotherhood 
of all True Believers. The result has been a subtle col- 
oration of the new by the old, so that even when Mos- 
lems use our exact words, "nationality," "race," etc., 
their conception of what those words mean is distinctly 
different from ours. These differences in fact extend 

1 For Pan- Arab developments, see A. Musil, Zur Zeitgeschichte von 
Arabien (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the Present 
Crisis," Asiatic Review, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, Le Nationalisme 
musulman; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauiach, "Das Machtgebiet der arabi- 
schen Sprache," Preussische Jahrbucher, September, 1916. 



NATIONALISM 



203 



to all political concepts. Take the word " State," for 
example. The typical Mohammedan state is not, like 
the typical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with 
fixed boundaries and full sovereignty exercised every- 
where within its frontiers. It is more or less an amor- 
phous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of an au- 
thority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic inde- 
pendence. Of course, in the past half-century, most 
Mohammedan states have tried to remodel themselves 
on Western lines, but the traditional tendency is typi- 
fied by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian 
northwest frontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy 
practical independence and have frequently conducted 
private wars of their own against the British which the 
Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not 
held him responsible. 

Similarly with the term "Nationality." In Moslem 
eyes, a man need not be born or formally naturalized 
to be a member of a certain Moslem "Nationality." 
Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part of 
Islam, so a man may just happen into a particular coun- 
try and thereby become at once, if he wishes, a national 
in good standing. For example: "Egypt for the Egyp- 
tians" does not mean precisely what we think. Let a 
Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo. 
Nothing prevents him from acting, and being considered 
as, an "Egyptian Nationalist" in the full sense of the 
term. This is because Islam has always had a distinct 
idea of territorial as well as spiritual unity. All pre- 
dominantly Mohammedan lands are believed by Mos- 
lems to constitute "Dar-ul-Islam," 1 which is in a sense 

literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively 
known as " Dar-ul-Harb " or " House of War." 



204 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



the joint possession of all Moslems and which all Mos- 
lems are jointly obligated to defend. That is the reason 
why alien encroachments on any Moslem land are in- 
stantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end of the 
Moslem world, who could have no possible material 
interest in the matter. 

We are now better able to understand how many 
Moslem thinkers, combining the Western concept of 
nationality with the traditional idea of Dar-ul-Islam, 
have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by 
the term "Pan-Islamic Nationalism. " This trend of 
thought is well set forth by an Indian Moslem, who 
writes: "In the West, the whole science of government 
rests on the axiom that the essential divisions of hu- 
manity are determined by considerations of race and 
geography; but for Orientals these ideas are very far 
from being axioms. For them, humanity divides ac- 
cording to religious beliefs. The unity is no longer the 
nation or the State, but the 'Millah.' 1 Europeans see 
in this a counterpart to their Middle Ages — a stage 
which Islam should pass through on its way to mo- 
dernity in the Western sense. How badly they under- 
stand how religion looks to a Mohammedan! They 
forget that Islam is not only a religion, but also a social 
organization, a form of culture, and a nationality. . . . 
The principle of Islamic fraternity — of Pan-Islamism, 
if you prefer the word — is analogous to patriotism, but 
with this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though re- 
sulting in identity of laws and customs, has not (like 
Western Nationality) been brought about by community 



1 /. e., the organized group of followers of a particular religion. 



NATIONALISM 



205 



of race, country, or history, but has been received, as 
we believe, directly from God." 1 

Pan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phe- 
nomenon and has not been doctrinally worked out. 
Nevertheless it is visible throughout the Moslem world 
and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions like 
North Africa and India, where strong territorial patri- 
otism has, for one reason or another, not developed. 
As a French writer remarks: "Mohammedan Nation- 
alism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It is a 
broad tide, which is flowing over the whole Islamic 
world of Asia, India, and Africa. Nationalism is a new 
form of the Mohammedan faith, which, far from being 
undermined by contact with European civilization 
seems to have discovered a surplus of religious fervor, 
and which, in its desire for expansion and proselytism, 
tends to realize its unity by rousing the fanaticism of 
the masses, by directing the political tendencies of the 
elites, and by sowing everywhere the seeds of a danger- 
ous agitation." 2 Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus, 
in the future, become a major factor which will have 
to be seriously reckoned with. 3 

1 Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans Tlnde," Revue 
Politique Internationale, January, 1914. He headed the so-called "Khila- 
fat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to pro- 
test against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace treaties. 

2 A. Servier, Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 181. 

3 For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, 
quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, Ulslam au dix-neuvi&me Siecle (Paris, 
1888); same author, "Politique musulmane," Revue du Monde Musulman, 
September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam," Nineteenth Cen- 
tury and After, July, 1919; G. Demorgny, La Question Persane, pp. 23-31 
(Paris, 1916); W. E. D, Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," Quar- 
terly Review, October, 1920. 



206 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



III 

So ends our survey of nationalist movements in the 
Moslem world. Given such a tangled complex of as- 
pirations, enormously stimulated by Armageddon, it was 
only natural that the close of the Great War should 
have left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Ob- 
viously, anything like a constructive settlement could 
have been effected only by the exercise of true states- 
manship of the highest order. Unfortunately, the Ver- 
sailles peace conference was devoid of true statesman- 
ship, and the resulting " settlement " not only failed to 
give peace to Europe but disclosed an attitude toward 
the East inspired by the pre-war spirit of predatory 
imperialism and cynical Realpolitik. Apparently ob- 
livious of the mighty psychological changes which the 
war had wrought, and of the consequent changes of 
attitude and policy required, the victorious Allies pro- 
ceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were 
a skirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a century ago. 

In fact, disregarding both the general pronounce- 
ments of liberal principles and the specific promises of 
seh-determination for Near Eastern peoples which they 
had made during the war, the Allies now paraded a se- 
ries of secret treaties (negotiated between themselves 
during those same war-years when they had been so 
unctuously orating), and these secret treaties clearly 
divided up the Ottoman Empire among the victors, in 
absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants. 
The purposes of the Allies were further revealed by the 
way in which the Versailles conference refused to receive 
the representatives of Persia (theoretically still inde- 



NATIONALISM 



207 



pendent), but kept them cooling their heels in Paris 
while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's 
government to enter into an " agreement" that made 
Persia a virtual protectorate of the British Empire. As 
for the Egyptians, who had always protested against 
the protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its 
own initiative in 1914, the conference refused to pay 
any attention to their delegates, and they were given to 
understand that the conference regarded the British 
protectorate over Egypt as a fait accompli. The upshot 
was that, as a result of the war, European domination 
over the Near and Middle East was riveted rather than 
relaxed. 

But the strangest feature of this strange business 
remains to be told. One might imagine that the Allied 
leaders would have realized that they were playing a 
dangerous game, which could succeed only by close 
team-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the 
very reverse was the case. After showing their hand, 
and thereby filling the East with disillusionment, de- 
spair, and fury, the Allies proceeded to quarrel over the 
spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France, 
and Italy were able to come to an even superficial agree- 
ment as to the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and 
meanwhile they had been bickering and intriguing 
against each other all over the Near East. This was 
sheer madness. The destined victims were thereby in- 
formed that European domination rested not only on 
disregard of the moral " imponderables" but on diplo- 
matic bankruptcy as well. The obvious reflection was 
that a domination resting on such rotten foundations 
might well be overthrown. 



208 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



That, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals 
read the situation, and their rebellious feelings were 
stimulated not merely by consciousness of their own 
strength and Western disunion, but also by the active 
encouragement of a new ally — Bolshevik Russia. Rus- 
sian Bolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to West- 
ern civilization, and in the desperate struggle which was 
now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw with terrible glee the 
golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. The 
details of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be con- 
sidered in the chapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to 
remember here that Bolshevik propaganda is an im- 
portant element in that profound ferment which ex- 
tends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment 
which has reduced some regions to the verge of chaos 
and which threatens to increase rather than diminish 
in the immediate future. 

To relate all the details of contemporary Eastern un- 
rest would fill a book in itself. Let us here content 
ourselves with considering the chief centres of this un- 
rest, remembering always that it exists throughout 
the Moslem world from French North Africa to Central 
Asia and the Dutch Indies. The centres to be here sur- 
veyed will be Egypt, Persia, and the Turkish and Arab 
regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth main 
centre of unrest — India — will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 

The gathering storm first broke in Egypt. During 
the war Egypt, flooded with British troops and sub- 
jected to the most stringent martial law, had remained 
quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of pas- 
sivity. We have seen how, with the opening years of 



NATIONALISM 



209 



the twentieth century, virtually all educated Egyptians 
had become more or less impregnated with nationalist 
ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed in evo- 
lutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief 
hope of the moderates had been the provisional char- 
acter of English rule. So long as England declared 
herself merely in "temporary occupation" of Egypt, 
anything was possible. But the proclamation of the 
protectorate in 1914, which declared Egypt part of the 
British Empire, entirely changed the situation. Even 
the most moderate nationalists felt that the future was 
definitely prejudged against them and that the door had 
been irrevocably closed upon their ultimate aspirations. 
The result was that the moderates were driven over to 
the extremists and were ready to join the latter in vio- 
lent action as soon as opportunity might offer. 

The extreme nationalists had of course protested 
bitterly against the protectorate from the first, and the 
close of the war saw a delegation composed of both na- 
tionalist wings proceed to Paris to lay their claims be- 
fore the Versailles conference. Rebuffed by the confer- 
ence, which recognized the British protectorate over 
Egypt as part of the peace settlement, the Egyptian 
delegation issued a formal protest warning of trouble. 
This protest read: 

"We have knocked at door after door, but have re- 
ceived no answer. In spite of the definite pledges given 
by the statesmen at the head of the nations which won 
the war, to the effect that their victory would mean the 
triumph of Right over Might and the establishment of 
the principle of self-determination for small nations, the 
British protectorate over Egypt was written into the 



210 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain without the peo- 
ple of Egypt being consulted as to their political status. 

"This crime against our nation, a breach of good 
faith on the part of the Powers who have declared that 
they are fonning in the same Treaty a Society of Na- 
tions; will not be consummated without a solemn warn- 
ing that the people of Egypt consider the decision taken 
at Paris null and void. ... If our voice is not heard, 
it will be only because the blood already shed has not 
been enough to overthrow the old world-order and give 
birth to a new world-order." 1 

Before these lines had appeared in type, trouble in 
Egypt had begun. Simultaneously with the arrival of the 
Egyptian delegation at Paris, the nationalists in Egypt 
laid their demands before the British authorities. The 
nationalist programme demanded complete self-govern- 
ment for Egypt, leaving Eugland only a right of super- 
vision over the public debt and the Suez Canal. The 
nationalists' strength was shown by the fact that these 
proposals were indorsed by the Egyptian cabinet re- 
cently appointed by the Khedive at British suggestion. 
In fact, the Egyptian Premier, Roushdi Pasha, asked 
to be allowed to go to London with some of his col- 
leagues for a hearing. This placed the British authori- 
ties in Egypt in a distinctly tiying position. However, 
they determined to stand firm, and accordingly an- 
swered that England could not abandon its responsi- 
bility for the continuance of order and good govern- 
ment in Egypt, now a British protectorate and an inte- 
gral part of the empire, and that no useful purpose 

1 Egyptian White Book : Collection of Official Correspondence of the 
Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919). 



NATIONALISM 



211 



would be served by allowing the Egyptian leaders to 
go to London and there advance immoderate demands 
which could not possibly be entertained. 

The English attitude was firm. The Egyptian atti- 
tude was no less firm. The cabinet at once resigned, 
no new cabinet could be formed; and the British High 
Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assume 
unveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced 
that they were going to hold a plebiscite to determine 
the attitude of the Egyptian people. Forbidden by 
the British authorities, the plebiscite was , nevertheless 
illegally held, and resulted, according to the nationalists, 
in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their de- 
mands. This defiant attitude determined the British 
on strong action. Accordingly, in the spring of 1919, 
most of the nationalist leaders were seized and deported 
to Malta. 

Egypt's answer was an explosion. From one end of 
the country to the other, Egypt flamed into rebellion. 
Everywhere it was the same story. Railways and tele- 
graph lines were systematically cut. Trains were stalled 
and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers were 
murdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were 
sacked by the mob. Soon the danger was rendered 
more acute by the irruption out of the desert of swarms 
of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days 
Egypt trembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British 
Government admitted in Parliament that all Egypt 
was in a state of insurrection. 

The British authorities met the crisis with vigor and 
determination. The number of British troops in Egypt 
was large, trusty black regiments were hurried up from 



212 THE N E W WORLD OF ISLAM 



the Sudan, and the well-disciplined Egyptian native 
police generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of 
sharp righting and heavy loss of life, Egypt was again 
gotten under control. 

Order was restored, but the outlook was ominous in 
the extreme. Only the presence of massed British and 
Sudanese troops enabled order to be maintained. Even 
the application of stern martial law could not prevent 
continuous nationalist demonstrations, sometimes end- 
ing in riots, fighting, and heavy loss of life. The most 
serious aspect of the situation was that not only were 
the upper classes solidly nationalist, but they had be- 
hind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. The 
war-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military 
exigencies had compelled Britain to conscript fully a 
million of them for forced labor in the Near East and 
even in Europe, while there had also been wholesale 
requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supplies. These 
things had caused profound discontent and had roused 
among the fellaheen not merely passive dislike but 
active hatred of British rule. Authoritative English 
experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortly after 
the riots Sir William Willcocks, the noted engineer, 
said in a public statement: "The keystone of the British 
occupation of Egypt was the fact that the fellaheen 
were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governing classes, 
and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, 
but nothing counted for much while the millions of 
fellaheen were solid for the occupation. The British 
have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendship and confi- 
dence of the fellaheen." And Sir Valentine Chirol 
stated in the London Times: "We are now admittedly 



NATIONALISM 



213 



face to face with the ominous fact that for the first time 
since the British occupation large numbers of the Egyp- 
tian fellaheen, who owe far more to us than does any 
other class of Egyptians, have been worked up into a 
fever of bitter discontent and hatred. Very few people 
at home, even in responsible quarters, have, I think, 
the slightest conception of the very dangerous degree 
of tension which has now been reached out here." 

All foreign observers were impressed by the national- 
ist feeling which united all creeds and classes. Re- 
garding the monster demonstrations held during the 
summer of 1919, an Italian publicist wrote: "For the 
first time in history, the banners flown showed the Cres- 
cent interwoven with the Cross. Until a short time ago 
the two elements were as distinct from each other as 
each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as 
has happened in India among the Mussulmans and 
the Hindus, every trace of religious division has de- 
parted. All Egyptians are enrolled under a single ban- 
ner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning 
with the same faith, and confident that his cause will 
ultimately triumph." 1 And a Frenchwoman, a lifelong 
resident of Egypt, wrote: a We have seen surprising 
things in this country, so often divided by party and 
religious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques; 
ulemas preaching in Christian churches; Syrian, Mar- 
onite, or Mohammedan students; women, whether of 
Turkish or Egyptian blood, united in the same fervor, 
the same ardent desire to see break over their ancient 
land the radiant dawn of independence. For those who, 
like myself, have known the Egypt of Tewfik, the atti- 

1 G. Civimini, in the Corriere delta Sera, December 30, 1919. 



214 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tude of the women these last few years is the most sur- 
prising transformation that has happened in the val- 
ley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant 
life, the almost complete indifference to anything savor- 
ing of politics, to appreciate the enormous steps taken 
in the last few months. For example; last summer a 
procession of women demonstrators was surrounded 
by British soldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the 
women, threatened by a soldier, turned on him, baring 
her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so that there may 
be another Miss CavehV " * 

Faced by this unprecedented nationalist fervor, 
Englishmen on the spot were of two opinions. Some, 
like Sir William Willcocks and Sir Valentine Chirol, 
stated that extensive concessions must be made. 2 Other 
qualified observers asserted that concessions would be 
weakness and would spell disaster. Said Sir M. Mc- 
Ilwraith: "Five years of a Nationalist regime would 
lead to hopeless chaos and disorder. ... If Egypt 
is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and 
anarchy from which we rescued her in 1882, with the 
still greater horrors of Bolshevism, of which there are 
already sinister indications, superadded, Britain must 
not loosen her control/' 3 In England the Egyptian 
situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer 

1 Madame Jehan dTvray, "En Egypte," Revue de Paris, September 15, 
1920. Madame d'lvraj' - cites other picturesque incidents of a like charac- 
ter. See also Annexes to Egyptian White Book, previously quoted. 
These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by pho- 
tographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops. 

2 Contained in the press statements previously mentioned. 

3 Sir M. Mcllwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism," Edinburgh Review, 
July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt," 
New Europe, November 6, 1919. 



NATIONALISM 



215 



of 1919 the British Government announced the ap- 
pointment of a commission of inquiry headed by Lord 
Milner to investigate fully into Egyptian affairs. 

The appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was 
one of the ablest figures in British political life, a man 
of long experience with imperial problems, including 
that of Egypt, and possessed of a temperament equally 
remote from the doctrinaire liberal or the hidebound 
conservative. In short, Lord Milner was a realist } in 
the true sense of the word, as his action soon proved. 
Arriving in Egypt at the beginning of 1920, Lord Mil- 
ner and his colleagues found themselves confronted 
with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had 
gone forth to boycott the commission, and not merely 
nationalist politicians but also religious leaders like the 
Grand Mufti refused even to discuss matters unless the 
commissioners would first agree to Egyptian indepen- 
dence. This looked like a deadlock. Nevertheless, by 
infinite tact and patience, Lord Milner finally got into 
free and frank discussion with Zagloul Pasha and the 
other responsible nationalist leaders. 

His efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain de- 
velopments within Egypt itself. In Egypt, as else- 
where in the East, there were appearing symptoms not 
merely of political but also of social unrest. New types 
of agitators were springing up, preaching to the popu- 
lace the most extreme revolutionary doctrines. These 
youthful agitators disquieted the regular nationalist 
leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party 
chiefs and as men of social standing and property. The 
upshot was that, by the autumn of 1920, Lord Milner 
and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basis of what 



216 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



looked like a genuine compromise. According to the 
intimations then given out to the press, and later con- 
firmed by the nature of Lord Milner's official report, 
the lines of the tentative agreement ran as follows: 
England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to 
declare Egypt independent. This independence was 
qualified to about the same extent that Cuba's is to- 
ward the United States. Egypt was to have complete 
self-government, both the British garrison and British 
civilian officials being withdrawn. Egypt was, how- 
ever, to make a perpetual treaty of alliance with Great 
Britain, was to agree not to make treaties with other 
powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant 
Britain a military and naval station for the protection 
of the Suez Canal and of Egypt itself in case of sudden 
attack by foreign enemies. The vexed question of the 
Sudan was left temporarily open. 

These proposals bore the earmarks of genuinely con- 
structive compromise. Unfortunately, they were not 
at once acted upon. 1 Both in England and in Egypt 
they roused strong opposition. In England adverse 
official influences held up the commission's report till 
February, 1921. In Egypt the extreme nationalists de- 
nounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, though moderate 
opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commis- 
sion's report, as finally published, declared that the 
grant of self-government to Egypt could not be safely 
postponed; that the nationalist spirit could not be ex- 
tinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the 
teeth of a hostile people would be "a difficult and dis- 

1 For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Con- 
flicting Policies in the East," New Europe, July 1, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



217 



graceful task"; and that it would be a great misfortune 
if the present opportunity for a settlement were lost. 
However, the report was not indorsed by the British 
Government in its entirety, and Lord Milner forthwith 
resigned. As for Zagloul Pasha, he still maintains his 
position as nationalist leader, but his authority has 
been gravely shaken. Such is the situation of Egypt 
at this present writing: a situation frankly not so en- 
couraging as it was last year. 

Meanwhile the storm which had begun in Egypt had 
long since spread to other parts of the Near East. In 
fact, by the opening months of 1920, the storm-centre 
had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Al- 
lies themselves were largely to blame. Of course a 
constructive settlement of these troubled regions would 
have been very difficult. Still, it might not have proved 
impossible if Allied policy had been fair and above- 
board. The close of the war found the various peoples 
of the Ottoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war- 
aims professed by the Allied spokesmen would be re- 
deemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful, be- 
cause they had been given a whole series of Allied prom- 
ises (shortly to be repudiated, as we shall presently see), 
while even the beaten Turks were not entirely bereft 
of hope in the future. Besides the general pronounce- 
ments of liberal treatment as formulated in the " Four- 
teen Points" programme of President Wilson and indorsed 
by the Allies, the Turks had pledges of a more specific 
character, notably by Premier Lloyd George, who, on 
January 5, 1918, had said: "Nor are we fighting to de- 
prive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned 
lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predomi- 



218 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



nantly Turkish in race." In other words, the Turks 
were given unequivocally to understand that, while 
their rule over non-Turkish regions like the Arab prov- 
inces must cease, the Turkish regions of the empire 
were not to pass under alien rule, but were to form a 
Turkish national state. The Turks did not know 
about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, be- 
gun in 1915, which partitioned practically the whole 
of Asia Minor between the Allied Powers. These were 
to come out a little later. For the moment the Turks 
might hope. 

In the case of the Arabs there were far brighter 
grounds for nationalist hopes — and far darker depths 
of Allied duplicity. We have already mentioned the 
Arab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in the Hedjaz 
under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently 
spread through all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire and contributed so largely to the collapse of 
Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however, not a 
sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully 
planned, and was due largely to Allied backing — and 
Allied promises. From the very beginning of the war 
Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch with 
the British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly 
welcomed and encouraged in their separatist schemes, 
because an Arab rebellion would obviously be of inval- 
uable assistance to the British in safeguarding Egypt 
and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into 
Turkish territory. 

The Arabs, however, asked not merely material aid 
but also definite promises that their rebellion should 
be rewarded by the formation of an Arab state embrac- 



NATIONALISM 



219 



ing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Un- 
fortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British 
and French Governments had their own ideas as to the 
future of Turkey's Arab provinces. Both England 
and France had long possessed "spheres of influence" 
in those regions. The English sphere was in southern 
Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The 
French sphere was the Lebanon, a mountainous district 
in northern Syria just inland from the Mediterranean 
coast, where the population, known as Maronites, were 
Roman Catholics, over whom France had long extended 
her diplomatic protection. Of course both these dis- 
tricts were legally Turkish territory. Also, both were 
small in area. But "spheres of influence" are elastic 
things. Under favorable circumstances they are capa- 
ble of sudden expansion to an extraordinary degree. 
Such a circumstance was the Great War. Accordingly, 
the British and French foreign offices put their heads 
together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments 
signed a secret treaty by the terms of which France 
was given a "predominant position" in Syria and Brit- 
ain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. No defi- 
nite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was 
to stake out claims which would partition Turkey's 
Arab provinces between England and France. 

Naturally the existence of this secret treaty was an 
embarrassment to the British officials in Egypt in their 
negotiations with the Arabs. However, an Arab re- 
bellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and the Brit- 
ish negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied 
the Arab leaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of 
Mecca's representative at Cairo was given a document 



220 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



by the Governor-General of Egypt, Sir Henry Mc- 
Mahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional 
upon an Arab revolt, to recognize the independence of 
the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire except in southern 
Mesopotamia, where British interests required special 
measures of administrative control, and also except 
areas where Great Britain was "not free to act without 
detriment to the interests of France." This last clause 
was of course a " joker." However, it achieved its 
purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret 
treaty, supposed it referred merely to the restricted 
district of the Lebanon. They went home jubilant, 
to prepare the revolt which broke out next year. 

The revolt began in November, 1916. It might not 
have begun at all had the Arabs known what had hap- 
pened the preceding May. In that month England and 
France signed another secret treaty, the celebrated 
Sykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely par- 
titioned Turkey's Arab provinces along the lines sug- 
gested in the initial secret treaty of the year before. 
By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia 
was to be definitely British, while the Syrian coast from 
Tyre to Alexandretta was to be definitely French, to- 
gether with extensive Armenian and Asia Minor regions 
to the northward. Palestine was to be "international," 
albeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and 
the implication was that Palestine fell within the English 
sphere. As to the great hinterland lying between Meso- 
potamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be "indepen- 
dent Arab under two spheres of influence," British and 
French; the French sphere embracing all the rest of 
Syria from Aleppo to Damascus, the English sphere 



NATIONALISM 



221 



embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia — the region about 
Mosul. In other words, the independence promised 
the Arabs by Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into 
thin air. 

This little shift behind the scenes was of course not 
communicated to the Arabs. On the contrary, the 
British did everything possible to stimulate Arab na- 
tionalist hopes — this being the best way to extract their 
fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Govern- 
ment sent the Arabs a number of picked intelligence 
officers, notably a certain Colonel Lawrence, an extraor- 
dinary young man who soon gained unbounded in- 
fluence over the Arab chiefs and became known as "The 
Soul of the Arabian Revolution.' ' 1 These men, chosen 
for their knowledge of, and sympathy for, the Arabs, 
were not informed about the secret treaties, so that 
their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred 
by any lack of sincerity. Similarly, the British generals 
were prodigal of promises in their proclamations. 2 The 
climax of this blessed comedy occurred at the very close 
of the war, when the British and French Governments 
issued the following joint declaration which was posted 
throughout the Arab provinces: "The aim which France 
and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East 
the war let loose upon the world by German ambition, 
is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all 
those peoples, so long oppressed by Turks, and to es- 
tablish national governments and administrations which 

1 For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of articles 
by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution," Asia, 
April, May, June, July, 1920. 

2 A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the Meso- 
potamian Arabs in March, 1917. 



222 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



shall derive their authority from the initiative and free 
will of the people themselves." 

This climax was, however, followed by a swift de- 
nouement. The war was over, the enemy was beaten, 
the comedy was ended, the curtain was rung down, 
and on that curtain the Arabs read — the inner truth of 
things. French troops appeared to occupy the Syrian 
coast, the secret treaties came out, and the Arabs learned 
how they had been tricked. Black and bitter was their 
wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once 
had it not been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially 
Prince Feisal, the son of the Shereef of Mecca, who 
had proved himself a real leader of men during the war 
and who had now attained a position of unquestioned 
authority. Feisal knew the Allies 7 military strength 
and realized how hazardous war would be, especially 
at that time. Feeling the moral strength of the Arab 
position, he besought his countrymen to let him plead 
Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference, 
and he had his way. During the year 1919 the Arab 
lands were quiet, though it was the quiet of suspense. 

Prince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace con- 
ference with eloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed. 
The covenant of the League of Nations might contain 
the benevolent statement that "certain communities 
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached 
a stage of development where their existence as inde- 
pendent nations can be provisionally recognized subject 
to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance 
by a mandatory until such time as they are able to 
stand alone." 1 The Arabs knew what " mandatories" 

1 Article xxii. 



NATIONALISM 



223 



meant. Lloyd George might utter felicitous phrases 
such as "Arab forces have redeemed the pledges given 
to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges." 1 
The Arabs had read the secret treaties. "In vain is 
the net spread in the sight of any bird." The game no 
longer worked. The Arabs knew that they must rely 
on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war. 

Feisal still counselled peace. He was probably in- 
fluenced to this not merely by the risks of armed resis- 
tance but also by the fact that the Allies were now quar- 
relling among themselves. These quarrels of course 
extended all over the Near East, but there was none 
more bitter than the quarrel which had broken out 
between England and France over the division of the 
Arab spoils. This dispute originated in French dissat- 
isfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the 
Sykes-Picot Agreement been published than large and 
influential sections of French opinion began shouting 
that they had been duped. For generations French 
imperialists had had their eye on Syria,? and since the 
beginning of the war the imperialist press had been con- 
ducting an ardent propaganda for wholesale annexa- 
tions in the Near East. "La Syrie integrate!" "All 
Syria!" was the cry. And this "all" included not 
merely the coast-strip assigned France by the Sykes- 

1 From a speech delivered September 19, 1919. 

2 For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. Poignant, 
"Les Interets francais en Syrie," Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, 
March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author cites 
Premier Poincar6's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December 
21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria particu- 
larly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make them re- 
spected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question sy- 
rienne," Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur, 
Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d' Orient (Paris, 1914). 



224 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and the vast Aleppo- 
Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields 
of Mosul. To this entire region, often termed in French 
expansionist circles "La France du Levant/' the impe- 
rialists asserted that France had " imprescriptible his- 
toric rights running back to the Crusades and even to 
Charlemagne." Syria was a "second Alsace," which 
held out its arms to France and would not be denied. 
It was also the indispensable fulcrum of French world- 
policy. These imperialist aspirations had powerful 
backing in French Government circles. For example, 
early in 1915, M. Leygues had said in the Chamber of 
Deputies: "The axis of French policy is in the Medi- 
terranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers, 
Tunis, and Morocco. The other must lie in the East, 
with Syria, Lebanon, Palestine." 1 

After such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement on French imperialists can be imagined. 
Their anger turned naturally upon the English, who 
were roundly denounced and blamed for everything 
that was happening in the East, Arab nationalist aspi- 
rations being stigmatized as nothing but British propa- 
ganda. Cried one French writer: "Some psychiatrist 
ought to write a study of these British colonial officials, 
implacable imperialists, megalomaniacs, who, night and 
day, work for their country without even asking counsel 
from London, and whose constant care is to annihilate 

1 Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie 
et en Palestine," Revue Hebdomadaire, June 5, 1915. For other examples 
of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim, 
La Question du Liban (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La Syrie: Champ de 
Bataille politique," La Revue Mondiale, February 1-15, 1920; Comte 
Cressaty, La Syrie frangaise (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La France du 
Levant," Revue Hebdomadaire, March 1, 1919. 



NATIONALISM 225 

in Syria, as they once annihilated in Egypt, the su- 
premacy of France." 1 In answer to such fulminations, 
English writers scored French "greed" and " folly" 
which was compromising England's prestige and threat- 
ening to set the whole East on fire. 2 In fine, there was 
a very pretty row on between people who, less than a 
year before, had been pledging their " sacred union" 
for all eternity. The Arabs were certainly much edi- 
fied, and the other Eastern peoples as well. 

Largely owing to these bickerings, Allied action in 
the Near East was delayed through 1919. But by the 
spring of 1920 the Allies came to a measure of agree- 
ment. The meeting of the Allied Premiers at San 
Remo elaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed 
on Turkey, dividing Asia Minor into spheres of influ- 
ence and exploitation, while the Arab provinces were 
assigned England and France according to the terms of 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement — properly camouflaged, of 
course, as " mandates" of the League of Nations. Eng- 
land, France, and their satellite, Greece, prepared for 
action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopo- 
tamia and Palestine; French reinforcements were sent 
to Syria; an Anglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to oc- 
cupy Constantinople, and Premier Yenizelos promised 
a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The one 
rift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brew- 

1 Baudouin, supra. For other violent anti-British comment, see Lau- 
det, supra. 

2 For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see Beckles 
Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," National Review, September, 
1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause," Balkan Review, September, 1920. 
Both of these writers were officers in the British forces in the Arab area. 
See also strong articles by "Taira" in the Balkan Review, August and 
October, 1920. 



226 THE 



NEW 



WORLD 



OF ISLAM 



ing and determined not to be directly involved. Said 
Premier Nitti to an English journalist after the San 
Remo conference: "You will have war in Asia Minor, 
and Italy will not send a single soldier nor pay a single 
lira. You have taken from the Turks their sacred city 
of Adrianople; you have placed their capital city under 
foreign control; you have taken from them every port 
and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turk- 
ish delegates whom you will select will sign a treaty 
which will not have the sanction of the Turkish people 
or the Turkish Parliament." 

Premier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past 
the Turkish nationalists, knowing what was in store 
for them, had been building up a centre of resistance 
in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the former 
nationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since 
fled to distant havens like Transcaucasia or Bolshevik 
Russia, but new leaders appeared, notably a young 
officer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal 
Pasha. With great energy Mustapha Kemal built up 
a really creditable army, and from his "capital," the 
city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, he now defied 
the Allies, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the 
French garrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia 
Minor just north of Syria), inflicting heavy losses. 

The Arabs also were preparing for action. In March 
a "Pan-Syrian Congress" met at Damascus, unani- 
mously declared the independence of Syria, and elected 
Feisal king. This announcement electrified all the 
Arab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone 
riots broke out against the French; in Palestine there 
were "pogroms" against the Jews, whom the Arabs, 



NATIONALISM 



227 



both Moslem and Christian, hated for their " Zionist" 
plans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic up- 
risings of tribesmen. 

Faced by this ominous situation, the " mandatories" 
took military counter-measures. The French took espe- 
cially vigorous action. France now had nearly 100,000 
men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud, a 
veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in "strong- 
arm" methods. On July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an 
ultimatum requiring complete submission. Feisal, dip- 
lomatic to the last, actually accepted the ultimatum, 
but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality 
and struck for Damascus with 60,000 men. Feisal at- 
tempted no real resistance, fighting only a rear-guard 
action and withdrawing into the desert. On July 25 
the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital, deposed 
Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Oppo- 
sition was punished with the greatest severity. Da- 
mascus was mulcted of a war-contribution of 10,000,000 
francs, after the German fashion in Belgium, many 
nationalist leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gou- 
raud announced that the death of "one French subject 
or one Christian" would be followed by wholesale "most 
terrible reprisals" by bombing aeroplanes. 1 

Before this Napoleonic "thunder-stroke" Syria bent 
for the moment, apparently terrorized. In Mesopo- 
tamia, however, the British were not so fortunate. For 
some months trouble had patently been brewing, and 
in March the British commander had expressed him- 
self as "much struck with the volcanic possibilities of 
the country." In July all Mesopotamia flamed into 

1 For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted. 



228 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



insurrection ; and though Britain had fully 100,000 
troops in the province, they were hard put to it to stem 
the rebellion. 

Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, 
to force acceptance of the draft treaty of peace. Nat- 
urally, there was no resistance, Constantinople being 
entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But the si- 
lence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incom- 
ing troops rilled some Allied observers with disquietude. 
A French journalist wrote: "The silence of the multi- 
tude was more impressive than boisterous protests. 
Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through 
this throng of mute, prostrated, hopeless people circu- 
lated watchful and sinuous emissaries, who were to 
carry word of this misfortune to the remotest confines 
of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. 
A couple of days later the news would have spread to 
Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In a brief space of time it 
would be heralded throughout the regions of Bolshevist 
influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In 
a few weeks all these centres of agitation will be prepar- 
ing their counter-attack. Asia and xAfrica will again 
cement their union of faith. Intelligent agents will 
record in the retentive minds of people who do not 
read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries 
of insurrection and fanaticism come from every race 
and class of societv. Educated and refined men dis- 
guise themselves as beggars and outcasts, in order to 
spread the news apace and to prepare for bitter ven- 
geance." 1 

Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the 

1 B. G. Gaulis in U Opinion, April 24, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



229 



Italian Premier Nitti had foretold. The Allied masters 
of Constantinople compelled the Sultan to appoint a 
" friendly" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha 
Kemal and his "rebels," and sent a hand-picked delega- 
tion to Sevres, France, where they dutifully "signed on 
the dotted line" the treaty that the Allies had pre- 
pared. The Allies had thus "imposed their will" — on 
paper. For every sensible man knew that the whole 
business was a roaring farce; knew that the "friendly" 
government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, was as na- 
tionalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the 
real Turkish capital was not Constantinople but Angora, 
and that the Allies' power was measured by the range 
of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, his comment 
on the Sevres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of 
the world." 

The Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing 
situation, especially since "The Allies" now meant only 
England and France. Italy was out of the game. As 
Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a 
single soldier nor pay a single lira." With 200,000 
soldiers holding down the Arabs, and plenty of trouble 
elsewhere, neither France nor Britain had the troops to 
crush Mustapha Kemal — a job which the French staff 
estimated would take 300,000 men. One weapon, how- 
ever, they still possessed — Greece. In return for large 
territorial concessions, Premier Venizelos offered to bring 
the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted, and 100,- 
000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek 
campaign was not a success. Even 100,000 men soon 
wore thin when spread out over the vast Asia Minor 
plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle, 



230 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was 
harassing the French in Cilicia at the other end of the 
line. The Greeks "dug in," and a deadlock ensued 
which threatened to continue indefinitely. This soon 
caused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing 
to "carry on" as the Allies' submandatory, but the 
Greek people were not. Kept virtually on a war-footing 
since 1912 ; the Greeks kicked over the traces. In the 
November elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote 
of 990,000 to 10,000, and recalled King Constantine ; who 
had been deposed by the Allies three years before. This 
meant that Greece, like Italy, was out of the game. To 
be sure, King Const an tine presently started hostilities 
with the Turks on his own account. This was, however, 
something very different from Greece's attitude under 
the Venizelist regime-. The Allies' weapon had thus 
broken in their hands. 

Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consoli- 
dating his authority in Asia Minor but was gaining 
allies of his own. In the first place, he was establish- 
ing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear 
strange to find such bitter foes become friends; never- 
theless, Franco-British policy had achieved even this 
seeming miracle. The reason was clearly explained by no 
less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the Arab 
Revolution") who had returned to civil life and was 
thus free to speak his mind on the Eastern situation, 
which he did in no imcertain fashion. In one of sev- 
eral statements given to the British press, Lawrence 
said: "The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the 
war, not because the Turkish Government was notably 
bad, but because they wanted independence. They 



NATIONALISM 



231 



did not risk their lives in battle to change masters, to 
become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a 
State of their own." The matter was put even more 
pointedly by an Arab nationalist leader in the columns 
of a French radical paper opposed to the Syrian adven- 
ture. Said this leader: "Both the French and the Eng- 
lish should know once for all that the Arabs are joined 
by a common religion with the Turks, and have been/ 
politically identified with them for centuries, and there- 
fore do not wish to separate themselves from their fel- 
low believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to 
the domination of a European nation, no matter what 
form the latter's suzerainty may assume. ... It is no 
use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thought 
of trespassing in any respect upon the independence 
of these people/ No one is deceived by such state- 
ments as that. The armistice was signed in accordance 
with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as 
soon as Germany and its allies were helpless, the prom- 
ises of the armistice were trodden under foot, as well 
as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation of the prom- 
ises of complete independence, so prodigally made to 
the Arabs on so many occasions, has resulted in reunit- 
ing closer than ever the Arabs and the Turks. It has 
taken but a few months to restore that intimacy. . . . 
It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of 
150,000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, 
will be able to subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will 
not finish the task. The interior of that country borders 
upon other lands inhabited by Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, 
and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with 
4,000,000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 



232 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



15,000,000 Arabs in the Levant, most of whom are 
armed tribes, without including the other Mohammedan 
peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity and or- 
ganization under the blows that are being dealt them 
by the Entente. If you believe I am exaggerating, all 
you have to do is to investigate the facts yourself. But 
what good will it do to confirm the truth too late, and 
after floods of blood have flowed?" 1 

In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became 
everywhere apparent. To be sure, this co-operation 
was not openly avowed either by Mustapha Kemal or 
by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, con- 
tinued his diplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought 
beside Turks against the French in Cilicia; Turks and 
Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in their continual local 
risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in 
the rebellion against the British in Mesopotamia. 

This Arab entente was not the whole of Mustapha 
Kemal's foreign policy. He was also reaching out 
northeastward to the Tartars of Transcaucasia and the 
Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus was 
by this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle 
between Moslem Tartars and Turkomans, Christian 
Armenians and Georgians, and various Russian fac- 
tions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to 
chaos. Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened 
by Pan-Turanian propaganda, Mustapha Kemal found 
enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts were supported 
by a third ally — Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, 
which, as we have already stated, was seeking to stir 
up trouble against the Western Powers throughout the 

1 Le Populaire, February 16, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



233 



East, had watched Kemal's rise with great satisfaction. 
At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for the Turk- 
ish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, 
but the collapse of Wrangel's "White" army in Novem- 
ber, 1920, and the consequent overrunning of all south 
! Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct line from 
Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth 
Mustapha Kemal was supplied with money, arms, and a 
few men. 

Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were start- 
ing trouble in Persia. That country was in a most de- 
plorable condition. During the war Persia, despite her 
technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between 
the Anglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco- 
Germans on the other. Russia's collapse in 1917 had 
led to her military withdrawal from Persia, and Eng- 
land, profiting by the situation, had made herself su- 
preme, legalizing her position by the famous " Agree- 
ment" "negotiated" with the Shah's government in 
August, 1919. 1 This treaty, though signed and sealed 
in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persian peo- 
ple. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshe- 
vik propaganda. Accordingly, the Bolshevik govern- 
ment renounced all rights in Persia acquired by the 
Czarist regime and proclaimed themselves the friends 
of the Persian people against Western imperialism. 
Naturally, the game worked, and Persia soon became 
honeycombed with militant unrest. In the early sum- 
mer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the 
Caspian Sea and landed on the Persian shore. They 

1 For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in The Cen- 
tury, January, 1920. 



234 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



did not penetrate far into the country. They did not 
need to ; for the country simply effervesced in a way 
which made the British position increasingly untenable. 
For many months a confused situation ensued. In 
fact ; at this writing the situation is still obscure. But 
there can be no doubt that Britain's hold on Persia is 
gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled to 
evacuate the country, with the possible exception of 
the extreme south. 

Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of 
England and France in the Near East had become far 
from bright. Deserted by Italy and Greece, defied by 
the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by the Egyp- 
tians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the 
subtle workings of Bolshevism, the situation was not a 
happy one. The burden of empire was proving heavy. 
In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100,000,000 
sterling, with no relief in sight. 

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
in both England and France Near Eastern policies 
were subjected to a growing flood of criticism. In Eng- 
land especially the tide ran veiy strong. The Meso- 
potamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and 
a blunder. For example, Colonel Lawrence stated: 
"We are to-day not far from disaster. Our govern- 
ment is worse than the old Turkish system. They 
kept 14,000 local conscripts in the ranks and killed 
yearly an average of 200 Arabs in mamtaining peace. 
We keep 90,000 men, with aeroplanes, armored cars, 
gunboats, and armored trains. We have killed about 
10,000 Arabs in the rising this summer." 1 Influenced 

1 Statement given to the press in August, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



235 



by such criticisms and by the general trend of events, 
the British Government modified its attitude, sending 
out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. Sir 
Percy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm 
grip on realities and an intimate experience with Eastern 
affairs. Authorized to discuss large concessions, he met 
the nationalist leaders frankly and made a good impres- 
sion upon them. At this writing matters have not 
been definitely settled, but it looks as though England 
was planning to limit her direct control to the extreme 
south of Mesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf — 
practically her old sphere of influence before 1914. 

Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded 
in maintaining relative order by strong-arm methods. 
But the situation is highly unstable. All classes of the 
population have been alienated. Even the Catholic 
Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitat- 
ing. General Gouraud promptly squelched the agita- 
tion by deporting the leaders to Corsica; nevertheless, 
the fact remains that France's only real friends in Syria 
are dissatisfied. Up to the present these things have 
not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex- 
Premier Leygues remarked of Syria, " France will oc- 
cupy all of it, and always"; while still more recently 
General Gouraud stated: " France must remain in Syria, 
both for political and economic reasons. The political 
consequences of our abandonment of the country would 
be disastrous. Our prestige and influence in the Levant 
and the Mediterranean would be doomed. The eco- 
nomic interests of France also compel us to remain 
there. When fully developed, Syria and Glicia will 
have an economic value fully equal to that of Egypt." 



236 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



However, despite the French Government's firmness, 
there is an increasing public criticism of the " Syrian 
adventure," not merely from radical anti-imperialist 
quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative circles 
as well. The editor of one of the most conservative 
French political periodicals has stated: " Jealous of its 
autonomy, the Arab people, liberated from the Otto- 
man yoke, do not desire a new foreign domination. 
To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria 
wishes to be entirely independent." 1 And recently 
Senator Victor Berard, one of France's recognized au- 
thorities on Eastern affairs, made a speech in the French 
Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian 
policy from the very start and declaring that a "free 
Syria" was "a question of both interest and honor." 

Certainly, the French Government, still so unyield- 
ing toward the Arabs, has reversed its attitude toward 
the Turks. Sidestepping the Sevres Treaty, it has 
lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish 
nationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In 
fact, both France and England know that the Sevres 
Treaty is unworkable and that Turkish possession of 
virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be rec- 
ognized. 

In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France un- 
doubtedly hopes to get him to throw over the Arabs. 
But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend of 
events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near 
Eastern peoples against Western political control. A 

1 Henri de Chambon, editor of La Revue Parlementaire. Quoted by 
Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure," National Review, 
September, 1920. 



NATIONALISM 



237 



most remarkable portent in this direction is the Pan- 
Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. This 
conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effec- 
tive Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended 
not merely by the high orthodox Moslem dignitaries 
and political leaders, but also by heterodox chiefs like 
the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the 
Zaidite Emir of Yemen — leaders of heretical sects be- 
tween whom and the orthodox Sunnis co-operation had 
previously been impossible. Most notable of all, the 
press reports state that the conference was presided 
over by no less a personage than El Sennussi. This 
may well be so, for we have already seen how the Sen- 
nussi have always worked for a close union of all Islam 
against Western domination. 

Such is the situation in the Near East — a situation 
very grave and full of trouble. The most hopeful por- 
tent is the apparent awakening of the British Govern- 
ment to the growing perils of the hour, and its conse- 
quent modifications of attitude. The labors of men 
like Lord Milner and Sir Percy Cox, however hampered 
by purblind influences, can scarcely be wholly barren 
of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants 
of Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great 
political tradition which has steered the British Empire 
safely through crises that appeared hopeless. 

On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near 
East is the continued intransigeance of France. Steeped 
in its old traditions, French policy apparently refuses 
to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it 
must unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark 
day, thirty or forty French battalions are caught in a 



238 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



simoom of Arab fury blowing out of the desert and are 
annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict of 
many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French 
policy has deserved it." 

Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical 
juncture to the inscrutable solution of the future, let us 
now turn to the great political problem of the Middle 
East — the nationalist movement in India. 



CHAPTER VI 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 

India is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental 
geographical unity, India has never known real political 
union save that recently imposed externally by the 
British "Raj." Full of warlike stocks, India has never 
been able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races, 
these races have never really fused, but have remained 
distinct and mutually hostile, sundered by barriers of 
blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India, large 
and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like 
China, evolved a generalized national unity; nor, like 
Europe, has developed a specialized national diversity; 
but has remained an amorphous, unstable indetermi- 
nate, with tendencies in both directions which were 
never carried to their logical conclusion. 

India's history has been influenced mainly by three 
great invasions: the Aryan invasion, commencing about 
1500 B. C; the Mohammedan invasion, extending 
roughly from 1000 to 1700 A. D., and the English inva- 
sion, beginning about 1750 A. D. and culminating a 
century later in a complete conquest which has lasted 
to the present day. 

The Aryans were a fair-skinned people, unquestion- 
ably of the same general stock as ourselves. Press- 
ing down from Central Asia through those northwestern 
passes where alone land-access is possible to India, else- 

239 



240 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



where impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of 
the Himalayas; the Aryans subdued the dark-skinned 
Bra vidian aborigines and settled down as masters. 
This conquest was, however, superficial and partial. 
The bulk of the Aryans remained in the northwest, 
the more adventurous spirits scattering thinly over the 
rest of the vast peninsula. Even in the north large 
areas of hill-country and jungle remained in the exclu- 
sive possession of the aborigines, while very few Aryans 
ever penetrated the south. Over most of India, there- 
fore, the Aryans were merely a small ruling class super- 
imposed upon a much more numerous subject popula- 
tion. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian 
ocean, the Aryans attempted to preserve their politi- 
cal ascendancy and racial purity by the institution of 
"caste," which has ever since remained the basis of 
Indian social life. Caste was originally a "color line." 
But it was enforced not so much by civil law as by re- 
ligion. Society was divided into three castes: Brah- 
mins, or priests; Kshatriyas, or warriors; and Sudras, 
or workers. The Aryans monopolized the two upper 
castes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject popula- 
tion. These castes were kept apart by a rigorous series 
of religious taboos. Intermarriage, partaking of food 
and drink, even physical propinquity, entailed cere- 
monial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience 
to these taboos was punished with the terrible penalty 
of "outcasting," whereby the offender did not merely 
fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy but sank even 
below the Sudra and became a "Pariah," or man of no- 
caste, condemned to the most menial and revolting oc- 
cupations, and with no rights which even the Sudra was 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 241 



bound to respect. Thus Indian society was governed, 
not by civil, but by ceremonially religious law; while, 
conversely, the nascent Indian religion ("Brahminism") 
became not ethical but social in character. 

These things produced the most momentous conse- 
quences. As a " color line," caste worked very imper- 
fectly. Despite its prohibitions, even the Brahmins 
became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood. 1 
But as a social system caste continued to function in 
ways peculiar to itself. The three original castes gradu- 
ally subdivided into hundreds and even thousands of 
sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing of 
the original racial significance. But they were all just 
as exclusive as the primal trio, and the outcome was a 
shattering of Indian society into a chaos of rigid social 
atoms, between which co-operation or even understand- 
ing was impossible. The results upon Indian history are 
obvious. Says a British authority: "The effect of this 
permanent maintenance of human types is that the popu- 
lation is heterogeneous to the last degree. It is no ques- 
tion of rich and poor, of town and country, of employer 
and employed : the differences He far deeper. The popu- 
lation of a district or a town is a collection of different 
nationalities — almost different species — of mankind that 
will not eat or drink or intermarry with one another, and 
that are governed in the more important affairs of life by 
committees of their own. It is hardly too much to say 

1 According to some historians, this race-mixture occurred almost at 
once. The theory is that the Aryan conquerors, who outside the north- 
western region had very few of their own women with them, took Dra- 
vidian women as wives or concubines, and legitimatized their half-breed 
children, the offspring of the conquerors, both pure-bloods and mixed- 
bloods, coalescing into a closed caste. Further infiltration of Dravidian 
blood was thus prevented, but Aryan race-purity had been destroyed. 



242 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are 
differentiated into over two thousand species, which, in 
the intimate physical relations of life, have as little in 
common as the inmates of a zoological garden." 1 

Obviously, a land socially atomized and politically 
split into many principalities was destined to fall before 
the first strong invader. This invader was Islam. The 
Mohammedans attacked India soon after their con- 
quest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere bor- 
der raids without lasting significance. The first real 
Mohammedan invasion was that of Mahmud of Ghazni, 
an Afghan prince, in the year 1001 A. D. Following 
the road taken by the Aryans ages before, Mahmud 
conquered northwestern India, the region known as 
the Punjab. Islam had thus obtained a firm foothold 
in India, and subsequent Moslem leaders spread grad- 
ually eastward until most of northern India was under 
Moslem rule. The invaders had two notable advan- 
tages: they were fanatically united against the despised 
"Idolaters," and they drew many converts from the 
native population. The very antithesis of Brahmanism, 
Islam, with its doctrine that all Believers are brothers, 
could not fail to attract multitudes of low-castes and 
out-castes, who by conversion might rise to the status 
of the conquerors. This is the main reason why the 
Mohammedans in India to-day number more than 

1 Sir Bampfylde Fuller, Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment, p. 40 
(London, 1910). For other discussions of caste and its effects, see W. 
Archer, India and the Future (London, 1918); Sir V. Chirol, Indian Un- 
rest (London, 1910); Rev. J. Morrison, New Ideas in India: A Study of 
Social, Political, and Religious Developments (Edinburgh, 1906); Sir H. 
Risley, The People of India (London, 1908) ; also writings of the "Namasu- 
dra" leader, Dr. Nair, previously quoted, and S. Nihal Singh, "India's 
Untouchables," Contemporary Review, March, 1913. 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 243 



70,000,000 — over one-fifth of the total population. 
These Indian Moslems are descended, not merely from 
Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even 
more from the millions of Hindu converts who embraced 
Islam. 

For many generations the Moslem, hold on India was 
confined to the north. Then, early in the sixteenth 
century, the great Turko-Mongol leader Baber entered 
India and founded the " Mogul" Empire. Baber and 
his successors overran even the south and united India 
politically as it had never been united before. But 
even this conquest was superficial. The Brahmins, 
threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival; 
the Mogul dynasty petered out; and at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century the Mogul Empire collapsed, 
leaving India a welter of warring principalities, Mo- 
hammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for religion, 
for politics, or for sheer lust of plunder. 

Out of this anarchy the British rose to power. The 
British were at first merely one of several other Euro- 
pean elements — Portuguese, Dutch, and French — who 
established small settlements along the Indian coasts. 
The Europeans never dreamed of conquering India 
while the Mogul power endured. In fact, the British 
connection with India began as a purely trading ven- 
ture — the East India Company. But when India col- 
lapsed into anarchy the Europeans were first obliged to 
acquire local authority to protect their "factories," 
and later were lured into more ambitious schemes by 
the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British 
ousted their European rivals and established a solid 
political foothold in India. The one stable element 



244 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



in a seething chaos, the British inevitably extended 
their authority. At first the}' did so reluctantly. The 
East India Company long remained primarily a trad- 
ing venture, aiming at dividends rather than dominion. 
However, it later evolved into a real government with 
an ambitious policy of annexation. This in turn awak- 
ened the fears of many Indians and brought on the 
"Mutiny" of 1857. The mutiny was quelled, the East 
India Company abolished, and India came directly 
under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later 
proclaimed Empress of India. These events in turn 
resulted not only in a strengthening of British political 
authority but also in an increased penetration of West- 
ern influences of every description. Roads, railways, 
and canals opened up and unified India as never before; 
the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez facilitated commimi- 
cation with Europe; while education on European lines 
spread Western ideas. 

Over this rapidly changing India stood the British 
"Raj" — a system of government unique in the world's 
history. It was the government of a few hundred 
highly skilled administrative experts backed by a small 
professional arm}', ruling a vast agglomeration of sub- 
ject peoples. It was frankly an absolute paternalism, 
governing as it saw fit, with no more responsibility to 
the governed than the native despots whom it had dis- 
placed. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty, 
and sense of duty, the government of India is probably 
the best example of benevolent absolutism that the 
world has ever seen. It gave India profound peace. 
It played no favorites, holding the scales even between 
rival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 245 



a real political entity — something which India had never 
been before. For the first time in its history, India 
was firmly united under one rule — the rule of the Pax 
Britannica. 

Yet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of 
future trouble. Generations grew up, peacefully united 
in unprecedented acquaintanceship, forgetful of past 
ills, seeing only European shortcomings, and, above all, 
familiar with Western ideas of self-government, liberty, 
and nationality. In India, as elsewhere in the East, 
there was bound to arise a growing movement of dis- 
content against Western rule — a discontent varying 
from moderate demands for increasing autonomy to 
radical demands for immediate independence. 

Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
organized political agitation against the British "Raj" 
was virtually unknown. Here and there isolated in- 
dividuals uttered half-audible protests, but these voices 
found no popular echo. The Indian masses, preoccu- 
pied with the ever-present problem of getting a living, 
accepted passively a government no more absolute, 
and infinitely more efficient, than its predecessors. Of 
anything like self-conscious Indian " Nationalism" there 
was virtually no trace. 

The first symptom of organized discontent was the 
formation of the "Indian National Congress" in the 
year 1885. The very name showed that the British 
Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India's 
diverse elements a certain common point of view and 
aspiration. However, the early congresses were very 
far from representing Indian public opinion, in the 
general sense of the term. On the contrary, these con- 



246 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



gresses represented merely a small class of professional 
men, journalists, and politicians, all of them trained 
in Western ideas. The European methods of educa- 
tion which the British had introduced had turned out 
an Indian intelligentsia, conversant with the English 
language and saturated with Westernism. 

This new intelligentsia, convinced as it was of the 
value of Western ideals and achievements, could not 
fail to be dissatisfied with many aspects of Indian life. 
In fact, its first efforts were directed, not so much to 
politics, as to social and economic reforms like the sup- 
pression of child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, 
and wider education. But, as time passed, matters of 
political reform came steadily to the fore. Saturated 
with English history and political philosophy as they 
were, the Indian intellectuals felt more and more keenly 
their total lack of self-government, and aspired to en- 
dow India with those blessings of liberty so highly prized 
by their English rulers. Soon a vigorous native press 
developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the in- 
tellectuals into a self-conscious unity, and moulding a 
genuine public opinion. By the close of the nineteenth 
century the Indian intelligentsia was frankly agitating 
for sweeping political innovations like representative 
councils, increasing control over taxation and the execu- 
tive, and the opening of the public services to Indians 
all the way up the scale. 

Down to the closing years of the nineteenth century 
Indian discontent was, as already said, confined to a 
small class of more or less Europeanized intellectuals 
who, despite their assumption of the title, could hardly 
be termed " Nationalists " in the ordinary sense of the 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



247 



word. With a few exceptions; their goal was neither 
independence nor the elimination of effective British 
oversight, but rather the reforming of Indian life along 
Western lines, including a growing degree of self-gov- 
ernment under British paramount authority. 

But by the close of the nineteenth century there 
came a change in the situation. India, like the rest of 
the Orient, was stirring to a new spirit of political and 
racial self-consciousness. True nationalist symptoms be- 
gan to appear. Indian scholars delved into their musty 
chronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories 
of India's historic past. Reformed Hindu sects like 
the Arya Somaj lent religious sanctions. The little 
band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined by other 
elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms 
on Western models, but of a new India, rejuvenated 
from its own vital forces, and free to work out its own 
destiny in its own way. From the nationalist ranks 
now arose the challenging slogan: "Bandemataram !" 

("Hail, Motherland!") 1 

The outstanding feature about this early Indian na- 
tionalism was that it was a distinctively Hindu move- 
ment. The Mohammedans regarded it with suspicion 
or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The 

1 For the nationalist movement, see Archer, Chirol, and Morrison, 
supra. Also Sir H. J. S. Cotton, India in Transition (London, 1904); 
J. N. Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, 1915) ; 
Sir W. W. Hunter, The India of the Queen and Other Essays (London, 
1903) ; W. S. Lilly, India and Its Problems (London, 1902) ; Sir V. Lovett, 
A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement (London, 1920) ; J. Ramsay 
Macdonald, The Government of India (London, 1920); Sir T. Morison, 
Imperial Rule in India (London, 1899) ; J. D. Rees, The Real India (Lon- 
don, 1908) ; Sir J. Strachey, India : Its Administration and Progress (Fourth 
Edition — London, 1911); K. Vyasa Rao, The Future Government of India 
(London, 1918). 



248 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ideal of the new nationalists was Aryan India ; the India 
of the "Golden Age/' "Back to the Vedas!" was a 
nationalist watchword; and this implied a veneration 
for the past ; including a revival of aggressive Brahmin- 
ism. An extraordinary change came over the intelli- 
gentsia. Men who, a few years before, had proclaimed 
the superiority of Western ideas and had openly flouted 
"superstitions" like idol-worship, now denounced every- 
thing Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu 
gods. The "sacred soil" of India must be purged of the 
foreigner. 1 But the "foreigner," as these nationalists 
conceived him, was not merely the Englishman; he was 
the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the 
past with a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu- 
Mohammedan division had run like a chasm athwart 
India. It had never been closed, but it had been some- 
what veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British 
Raj. Now the veil was torn aside, and the Moham- 
medans saw themselves menaced by a recrudescence of 
militant Hinduism like that which had shattered the 
Mogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb 
two hundred years before. The Mohammedans were not 
merely alarmed; they were infuriated as well. Remem- 
bering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hin- 
dus did the glories of Aryan India, they considered them- 
selves the rightful lords of the land, and had no mind 
to fall under the sway of despised "Idolaters." The 

1 I have already discussed this "Golden Age" tendency in Chapter III. 
For more or less Extremist Indian view-points, see A. Coomaraswamy, 
The Dance of Siva (New York, 1918) ; H. Maitra, Hinduism : The World- 
Ideal (London, 1916); Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Un- 
rest in India," Contemporary Review, February 7 , 1910; also various writ- 
ings of Lajpat Rai, especially The Arya Samaj (London, 1915) and Young 
India (New York, 1916). 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 249 



Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they 
hated the Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a 
bulwark against the potential menace of hereditary 
enemies who outnumbered them nearly five to one. 
Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationalism 
and proclaimed their loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the 
Indian Moslems were also affected by the general spirit 
of unrest which was sweeping over the East. They too 
felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, being 
a minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of 
territorial "patriotism," but of those more diffused senti- 
ments, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Islamic nationalism, which 
we have already discussed. 1 

Early Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in 
character; it was distinctly "Brariminical" as well. 
More and more the Brahmins became the driving power 
of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy 
in the India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in 
the India of the past. But this aroused apprehension 
in certain sections of Hindu society. Many low-castes 
and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or even 
autonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brah- 
min oligarchy which would deny them the benefits they 
now enjoyed under British rule. 2 Also, many of the 
Hindu princes disliked the thought of a theocratic re- 

1 For Indian Mohammedan points of view, mostly anti-Hindu, see 
H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition (London, 1918); S. Khuda 
Bukhsh, Essays: Indian and Islamic (London, 1912); Sir Syed Ahmed, 
The Present State of Indian Politics (AJlahabad, 1888); Syed Sirdar Ali 
Khan, The Unrest in India (Bombay, 1907); also his India of Today 
(Bombay, 1908). 

2 This attitude of the "Depressed Classes," especially as revealed in 
the "Namasudra Association," has already been discussed in Chapter 
III, and will be further touched upon later in this present chapter. 



250 



THE NEW WORLD OF 



ISLAM 



gime which might reduce them to shadows. 1 Thus the 
nationalist movement stood out as an alliance between 
the Brahmins and the Western-educated intelligentsia, 
who had pooled their ambitions in a programme for 
jointly riuing India. 

Quickened by this ambition and fired by religious 
zeal, the nationalist movement rapidly acquired a fanat- 
ical temper characterized by a mystical abhorrence, of 
even-thing Western and a ferocious hatred of all Euro- 
peans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this 
spirit, and the very next year (1905) an act of the In- 
dian Government precipitated the gathering storm. 
This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. The par- 
tition was a mere admmistrative measure, with no po- 
litical intent. But the nationalists made it a "vital 
issue,'"' and about this grievance they started an intense 
propaganda that soon filled India with seditious unrest. 
The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak, who has been called "the father of Indian un- 
rest." Tilak typified the nationalist movement. A 
Brahmin with an excellent Western education, he was 
the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization. 
An able propagandist, his speeches roused his hearers 
to frenzy, while his newspaper, the Yugantar, of Cal- 
cutta, preached a campaign of hate, assassination, and 
rebellion. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangible 
results, numerous riots, "dacoities," and murders of 
Englishmen taking place. And of course the Yugantar 

1 Regarding the Indian native princes, see Archer and Chirol, supra. 
Also J. Pollen, "Native States and Indian Home Rule," Asiatic Review, 
January 1, 1917; The Maharajah of Bobbili, Advice to the Indian Aris- 
tocracy (Madras, 1905) ; articles by Sir D. Barr and Sir F. Younghusband 
in The Empire and the Century (London, 1905). 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



251 



was merely one of a large number of nationalist organs ; 
some printed in the vernacular and others in English, 
which vied with one another in seditious invective. 

The violence of the nationalist press may be judged 
by a few quotations. " Revolution/' asserted the Yu- 
gantar, "is the only way in which a slavish society can 
save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man in life, 
play the man in death. Foreigners have come and de- 
cided how you are to live. But how you are to die de- 
pends entirely upon yourself." "Let preparations be 
made for a general revolution in every household ! The 
handful of police and soldiers will never be able to with- 
stand this ocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may 
be made prisoners and may die, but thousands of others 
will spring into their places. Do not be afraid! With 
the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile. 
Do not be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes. 
There is no dearth of money; glory awaits you! A sin- 
gle frown (a few bombs) from your eyes has struck 
terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic 
has filled the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the 
ocean of bloodshed!" The assassination note was ve- 
hemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma in The In- 
dian Sociologist: "Political assassination is not murder, 
and the rightful employment of physical force connotes 
' force used defensively against force used aggressively/" 
"The only subscription required," stated the Yugantar, 
"is that every reader shall bring the head of a Euro- 
pean." Not even women and children were spared. 
Commenting on the murder of an English lady and her 
daughter, the YuganUxr exclaimed exultantly: "Many 
a female demon must be killed in course of time, in 



252 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



order to extirpate the race of Asuras from the breast 
of the earth." The fanaticism of the men (usually 
very young men) who committed these assassinations 
may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a 
high English official; Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly 
before his execution: "I believe that a nation held down 
by foreign bayonets is in a perpetual state of war. Since 
open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed race, 
I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I 
drew my pistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong 
to my country is an insult to the gods. Her cause is 
the cause of Shri Ram; her service is the service of Shri 
Krishna. Poor in wealth and intellect; a son like my- 
self has nothing else to offer the Mother but his own 
blood; and so I have sacrificed the same on Her altar. 
The only lesson required in India at present is to learn 
how to die ; and the only way to teach it is to die our- 
selves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom. 
This war will continue between England and India so 
long as the Hindee and English races last, if the present 
unnatural relation does not cease." 1 

The government's answer to this campaign of sedi- 
tion and assassination was of course stern repression. 
The native press was muzzled; the agitators imprisoned or 
executed; and the hands of the authorities were strength- 
ened by punitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was 
the European community by the murders and outrages 
committed by the nationalists that many Englishmen 

1 A good symposium of extremist comment is contained in Chirol, 
supra. Also see J. D. Rees, The Real India (London, 1908); series of 
extremist articles in The Open Court, March, 1917. A good sample of 
extremist literature is the fairly well-known pamphlet India's "Loyalty" 
to England (1915). 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



253 



urged the withdrawal of such political privileges as did 
exist, the limiting of Western education, and the estab- 
lishment of extreme autocratic rule. These angry 
counsels were at once caught up by the nationalists, 
resulted in fresh outrages, and were answered by more 
punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists on 
both sides lashed each other to hotter fury and worsened 
the situation. For several years India seethed with an 
unrest which jailings, hangings, and deportations did 
little to allay. 

Presently, however, things took at least a temporary 
turn for the better. The extremists were, after all, a 
small minority, and cool heads, both British and Indian, 
were seeking a way out of the impasse. Conservative 
Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism 
and besought their countrymen to seek the realization 
of their aspirations by peaceful means. On the other 
hand, liberal-minded Englishmen, while refusing to be 
stampeded, sought a programme of conciliation. Indian 
affairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal 
statesman John Morley, and the fruit of his labors was 
the Indian Councils Act of 1909. The act was a dis- 
tinct departure from the hitherto almost unlimited 
absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indian 
opposition greatly increased opportunities for advice, 
criticism, and debate, and it initiated a restricted scheme 
of elections to the legislative bodies which it established. 
The salutary effect of these concessions was soon ap- 
parent. The moderate nationalist elements, while not 
wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of sub- 
sequent concessions and as a proof of British good-will. 
The terrorism and seditious plottings of the extremists, 



254 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



while not stamped out, were held in check and driven 
underground. King George's visit to India in 1911 
evoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the 
peninsula and augured well for the future. 

The year 1911 was the high- water mark of this era 
of appeasement following the storms of 1905-9. The 
years after 1911 witnessed a gradual recrudescence of 
discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act wore 
off and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened the 
appetite for more. In fact, during these years, Indian 
nationalism was steadily broadening its base. In one 
sense this made for stability, for the nationalist move- 
ment ceased to be a small minority of extremists and 
came more under the influence of moderate leaders like 
Mr. Gokhale, who were content to work for distant 
goals by evolutionary methods. It did, however, mean 
an increasing pressure on the government for fresh devo- 
lutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom 
of nationalist growth was the rallying of a certain sec- 
tion of Mohammedan opinion to the nationalist cause. 
The Mohammedans had by this time formed their own 
organization, the " All-India Moslem League." The 
league was the reverse of nationalist in complexion, 
having been formed primarily to protect Moslem inter- 
ests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless, 
as time passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the 
friendly attitude and promises of the Hindu moderates, 
abandoned the league's anti-Hindu attitude and joined 
the moderate nationalists, though refraining from sedi- 
tious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split 
into two distinct groups, moderates and extremists. The 
extremists, condemned by their fellows, kept up a desul- 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



255 



tory campaign of violence, largely directed by exiled 
leaders who from the shelter of foreign countries incited 
their followers at home to seditious agitation and violent 
action. 

Such was the situation in India on the outbreak of 
the Great War; a situation by no means free from diffi- 
culty, yet far less troubled than it had been a few years 
before. Of course, the war produced an increase of un- 
rest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as 
a whole, remained quiet. Throughout the war India 
contributed men and money unstintedly to the imperial 
cause, and Indian troops figured notably on European, 
Asiatic, and African battle-fields. 

However, though the war-years passed without any 
serious outbreak of revolutionary violence, it must not 
be thought that the far more wide-spread movement for 
increasing self-government had been either quenched or 
stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement 
fresh impetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for 
not merely good government but government accepta- 
ble to Indian patriots because responsible to them. 
The very fact that India had proved her loyalty to the 
Empire and had given generously of her blood and trea- 
sure were so many fresh arguments adduced for the 
grant of a larger measure of self -direction. Numerous 
were the memoranda presented to the British authori- 
ties by various sections of Indian public opinion. These 
memoranda were an accurate reflection of the different 
shades of Indian nationalism. The ultimate goal of all 
was emancipation from British tutelage, but they dif- 
fered widely among themselves as to how and when this 
emancipation was to be attained. The most conserva- 



256 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tive contented themselves with asking for modified self- 
government under British guidance, while the more 
ambitious asked for the full status of a dominion of 
the British Empire like Australia and Canada. The 
revolutionary element naturally held aloof, recognizing 
that only violence could serve their aim — immediate 
and unqualified independence. 

Of course even the more moderate nationalist de- 
mands implied great changes in the existing govern- 
mental system and a diminution of British control such 
as the Government of India was not prepared at present 
to concede. Nevertheless, the Government met these 
demands by a conciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh 
concessions in the near future. In 1916 the Viceroy, 
Lord Harding, said: "I do not for a moment wish to 
discountenance self-government for India as a national 
ideal. It is a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the 
sympathy of all moderate men, but in the present posi- 
tion of India it is not idealism that is needed but practi- 
cal politics. We should do our utmost to grapple with 
realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes and en- 
courage unrealizable demands can only tend to delay 
and will not accelerate political progress. I know this 
is the sentiment of wise and thoughtful Indians. No- 
body is more anxious than I am to see the early realiza- 
tion of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am 
equally desirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from 
the birth of institutions which experience might prove 
to be premature." 

As a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr. 
Montagu, Secretary of State for India, came out from 
England with the object of thoroughly canvassing In- 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



257 



dian public opinion on the question of constitutional 
reform. For months the problem was carefully weighed, 
conferences being held with the representatives of all 
races, classes, and creeds. The result of these researches 
was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montagu and 
by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and published in * 
July, 1918. 

The report recommended concessions far beyond any 
which Great Britain had hitherto made. It frankly 
envisaged the gift of home rule for India "as soon as 
possible," and went on to state that the gift was to be 
conferred not because of Indian agitation, but because 
of "the faith that is in us." There followed these mem- 
orable words: "We believe profoundly that the time 
has come when the sheltered existence which we have 
given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her 
national life; that we have a richer gift for her people 
than any that we have yet bestowed on them; that na- 
tionhood within the Empire represents something bet- 
ter than anything India has hitherto attained; that the 
placid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the 
soil on which such Indian nationhood will grow, and 
that in deliberately disturbing it we are working for her 
highest good." 

The essence of the report was its recommendation of 
the principle of "diarchy," or division of governmental 
responsibility between councillors nominated by the 
British executive and ministers chosen from elective 
legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both 
the central and provincial governments. The legisla- 
tures were to be elected by a much more extensive fran- 
chise than had previously prevailed and were to have 



258 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been 
little more than advisory bodies; now they were to be- 
come "legislatures" in the Western sense, though their 
powers were still limited, many powers, particularly 
that of the purse, being still "reserved" to the execu- 
tive. The British executive thus retained ultimate con- 
trol and had the last word; thus no true "balance of 
power" was to exist, the scales being frankly weighted 
in favor of the British Raj. But the report went on to 
state that this scheme of government was not intended 
to be permanent; that it was frankly a transitional 
measure, a school in which the Indian people was to 
serve its apprenticeship, and that when these first les- 
sons in self-government had been learned, India would 
be given a thoroughly representative government which 
would not only initiate and legislate, but which would 
also control the executive officials. 

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively 
discussed both in India and in England, and from these 
frank discussions an excellent idea of the Indian prob- 
lem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained. 
The nationalists split sharply on the issue, the moder- 
ates welcoming the report and agreeing to give the pro- 
posed scheme of government their loyal co-operation, 
the extremists condemning the proposals as a snare and 
a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a mani- 
festo signed by their leaders, headed by the eminent 
Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha, which stated: 
"The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure 
capable of improvement in some particulars, especially 
at the top, but is nevertheless a progressive measure. 
The reforms are calculated to make the provinces of 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 259 



India reach the goal of complete responsible govern- 
ment. On the whole, the proposals are evolved with 
great foresight and conceived in a spirit of genuine sym- 
pathy with Indian political aspirations, for which the 
distinguished authors are entitled to the country's 
gratitude." The condemnation of the radicals was 
voiced by leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged "standing 
fast by the Indian National Congress ideal/ 7 and Mr. 
Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: "It is my deliberate 
opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Government 
will be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to- 
day." 

Extremely interesting was the protest of the anti- 
nationalist groups, particularly the Mohammedans and 
the low-caste Hindus. For it is a fact significant of 
the complexity of the Indian problem that many mil- 
lions of Indians fear the nationalist movement and 
look upon the autocracy of the British Raj as a shield 
against nationalist oppression and discrimination. The 
Mohammedans of India are, on the question of self- 
government for India, sharply divided among them- 
selves. The majority still dislike and fear the nation- 
alist movement, owing to its "Hindu", character. A 
minority, however, as already stated, have rallied to 
the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in 
numbers during the war-years, their increased friendli- 
ness being due not merely to desire for self-government 
but also to anger at the Allies' policy of dismemberment 
of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the 
Near and Middle East. 1 The Hindu nationalists were 
quick to sympathize with the Mohammedans on these 

1 Discussed in the preceding chapter. 



260 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



external matters, and the result was a cordiality be- 
tween the two elements never known before. 

The predominance of high-caste Brarimins in the na- 
tionalist movement explains the opposition of many low- 
caste Hindus to Indian home rule. So great is the low- 
caste fear of losing their present protection under the 
British Raj and of being subjected to the domination 
of a high-caste Brahmin oligarchy that in recent years 
they have formed an association known as the "Namasu- 
dra," led by well-known persons like Doctor Nair. 1 
The Namasudra points out what might happen by 
citing the Brahminic pressure which occurs even in such 
political activity as already exists. For example: in 
many elections the Brahmins have terrorized low-caste 
voters by threatening to " out-caste " all who should not 
vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them "Pariahs" 
— untouchables, with no rights in Hindu society. 

Such protests against home rule from large sections 
of the Indian population gave pause even to many Eng- 
lish students of the problem who had become convinced 
of home rule's theoretical desirability. And of course 
they greatly strengthened the arguments of those nu- 
merous Englishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who as- 
serted that India was as yet unfit for self-government. 
Said one of these objectors in The Round Table: "The 
masses care not one whit for politics; Home Rule they 
do not understand. They prefer the English District 
Magistrate. They only ask to remain in eternal and 
bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in the Eng- 
lishman because he has always shown himself the 1 Pro- 
tector of the Poor/ and because he is neither Hindu 

1 Quoted in Chapter IV. 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



261 



nor Mussulman, and has a reputation for honesty." 
And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism of the Mon- 
tagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: "There are many 
defects in our system of government in India. Re- 
forms are needed; but they must be based solely upon 
considerations of the welfare of the masses of India as 
a whole. If the policy of i deliberately 7 disturbing their 
• contentment ' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of 
State have announced is carried out; if, through the 
'whispering galleries of the East/ the word is passed 
that the only authority that can maintain law and order 
and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian na- 
tion is weakening; if, as is proposed, the great public 
services are emasculated; then the fierce old animosi- 
ties will break out afresh, and, assisted by a recrudes- 
cence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism, they will 
within a few years bring to nought the noblest work 
which the British race has ever accomplished.' 1 1 

Yet, other English authorities on Indian affairs as- 
serted that the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals were 
sound and must be enacted into law if the gravest perils 
were to be averted. Such were the opinions of men 
like Lionel Curtis 2 and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated: 
"It is of the utmost importance that there should be 
no unnecessary delay. We have had object-lessons 
enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in In- 
dia as elsewhere time is on the side of the trouble-mak- 

1 Lord Sydenham, "India," Contemporary Review, November, 1918. 
For similar criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, see G. M. 
Chesney, India under Experiment (London, 1918); "The First Stage 
towards Indian Anarchy," Spectator, December 20, 1919. 

2 Lionel Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government, 
already quoted at the end of Chapter IV. 



262 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ers. . . . We cannot hope to reconcile Indian Extrem- 
ism. What we can hope to do is to free from its insidi- 
ous influence all that is best in Indian public life by- 
opening up a larger field of useful activity." 1 

As a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report 
was accepted as the basis of discussion by the British 
Parliament, and at the close of the year 1919 its recom- 
mendations were formally embodied in law. Unfortu- 
nately, during the eighteen months which elapsed be- 
tween the publication of the report and its legal enact- 
ment, the situation in India had darkened. Militant 
unrest had again raised its head, and India was more 
disturbed than it had been since 1909. 

For this there were several reasons. In the first 
place, all those nationalist elements who were dissatis- 
fied with the report began coquetting with the revolu- 
tionary irreconcilables and encouraging them to fresh 
terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the British 
Parliament into wider concessions than the report had 
contemplated. But there were other causes of a more 
general nature. The year 1918 was a black one for In- 
dia. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit India par- 
ticularly hard, nearly 7,000,000 persons being carried 
off by the grim plague. Furthermore, India was cursed 
with drought, the crops failed, and the spectre of famine 
stalked through the land. The year 1919 saw an even 
worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By 
the late summer it was estimated that 32,000,000 per- 
sons had died of hunger, with 150,000,000 more on the 
verge of starvation. And on top of all came an Afghan 
war, throwing the northwest border into tumult and 

1 Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," Edinburgh Review, July, 1918. 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 263 



further unsettling the already restless Mohammedan 
element. 

The upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in 
an epidemic of riots, terrorism, and seditious activity 
which gave the British authorities serious concern. So 
critical appeared the situation that a special commission 
was appointed to investigate conditions, and the report 
handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a 
depressing picture of the strength of revolutionary un- 
rest. The report stated that not only had a considera- 
ble number of young men of the educated upper classes 
become involved in the promotion of anarchical move- 
ments, but that the ranks were filled with men belonging 
to other social orders, including the military, and that 
there was clear evidence of successful tampering with 
the loyalty of the native troops. To combat this grow- 
ing disaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended 
fresh repressive legislation. 

Impressed with the gravity of the committee's report, 
the Government of India formulated a project of law 
officially known as the Anarchical and Revolutionary 
Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt 
Bill. By its provisions the authorities were endowed 
with greatly increased powers, such as the right to 
search premises and arrest persons on mere suspicion 
of seditious activity, without definite evidence of the 
same. 

The Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist 
opposition. Not merely extremists, but many moder- 
ates, condemned it as a backward step and as a provoker 
of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate in 
the Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative 



264 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Council; all the native members save one opposed it, 
and the bill was finally passed on strictly racial lines by 
the votes of the appointed English majority. However, 
the government considered the bill an absolute pre- 
requisite to the successful maintenance of order, and it 
was passed into law in the spring of 1919. 

This brought matters to a head. The nationalists, 
stigmatizing the Rowlatt law as the " Black Cobra Act," 
were unmeasured in their condemnation. The extrem- 
ists engineered a campaign of militant protest and de- 
creed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as 
a national " Humiliation Day." On that day monster 
mass-meetings were held, at which nationalist orators 
made seditious speeches and inflamed the passions of 
the multitude. " Humiliation Day" was in fact the 
beginning of the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny. 
For the next three months a veritable epidemic of riot- 
ing and terrorism swept India, particularly the northern 
provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civilians 
were murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of 
property. At some moments it looked as though India 
were on the verge of revolution and anarchy. 

However, the government stood firm. Violence was 
countered with stern repression. Riotous mobs were 
mowed down wholesale by rifle and machine-gun fire 
or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flying 
aeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was 
the so-called "Amritsar Massacre," where British troops 
fired into a seditious mass-meeting, killing 500 and 
wounding 1,500 persons. In the end the government 
mastered the situation. Order was restored, the sedi- 
tious leaders were swept into custody, and the revolu- 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 



265 



tionary agitation was once more driven underground. 
The enactment of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform bill 
by the British Parliament toward the close of the year 
did much to relax the tension and assuage discontent, 
though the situation of India was still far from normal. 
The deplorable events of the earlier part of 1919 had 
roused animosities which were by no means allayed. 
The revolutionary elements, though driven underground, 
were more bitter and uncompromising than ever, while 
opponents of home rule were confirmed in their convic- 
tion that India could not be trusted and that any re- 
laxation of autocracy must spell anarchy. 

This was obviously not the best mental atmosphere 
in which to apply the compromises of the Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremists were de- 
termined that they should not be given a fair trial, re- 
garding the reforms as a snare which must be avoided 
at all costs. Recognizing that armed rebellion was still 
impossible, at least for the present, the extremists evolved 
the idea known as "non-co-operation." This was, in 
fact, a gigantic boycott of eveiything British. Not 
merely were the new voters urged to stay away from the 
polls and thus elect no members to the proposed legis- 
lative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid 
the courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen 
to go on strike, shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell 
British-made goods, and even pupils to leave the schools 
and colleges. This wholesale " out-casting " of every- 
thing British would make the English in India a new 
sort of Pariah — " untouchables"; the British Govern- 
ment and the British community in India would be 
left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, rendered unworka- 



266 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ble, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands 
for complete self-government. 

Such was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea 
soon found an able exponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi, 
who had long possessed a reputation for personal sanc- 
tity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with that pe- 
culiar religious fervor which certain types of Indian 
ascetics have always known how to arouse. Gandhi's 
propaganda can be judged by the following extract from 
one of his speeches: "It is as amazing as it is humiliat- 
ing that less than 100,000 white men should be able to 
rule 315,000,000 Indians. They do so somewhat, un- 
doubtedly, by force, but more by securing our co-opera- 
tion in a thousand ways and making us more and more 
helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward. 
Let us not mistake reformed councils (legislatures), 
more law-courts, and even governorships for real freedom 
or power. They are but subtler methods of emascu- 
lation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And 
so they resort to all means, honorable and dishonorable, 
in order to retain their hold on India. They want In- 
dia's bilHons and they want India's man-power for their 
imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply them with 
men and money, we achieve our goal: namely, Swaraj, 1 
equality, manliness." 

The extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement 
have not been realized. The Montagu-Chelmsford re- 
forms have been put in operation, and the first elections 
under them were held at the beginning of 1921. But 
the outlook is far from bright. The very light vote 
cast at the elections revealed the effect of the non-co- 

1 /. e., self-government, in the extremist sense — practically independence. 



NATIONALISM IN INDIA 267 



operation movement; which showed itself in countless 
other ways, from strikes in factories to strikes of school- 
children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. And 
this unrest is not merely political; it is social as well. 
The vast economic changes which have been going on in 
India for the past half-century have profoundly dis- 
organized Indian society. These changes will be dis- 
cussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted 
is that the extremist leaders are capitalizing social dis- 
content and are unquestionably in touch with Bolshevik 
Russia. Meanwhile the older factors of disturbance 
are by no means eliminated. The recent atrocious 
massacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh 
fanatics, and the three-cornered riots between Hindus, 
Mohammedans, and native Christians which broke out 
about the same time in southern India, reveal the hid- 
den fires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder 
beneath the surface of Indian life. 

The truth of the matter is that India is to-day a bat- 
tle-ground between the forces of evolutionary and revolu- 
tionary change. It is an anxious and a troubled time. 
The old order is obviously passing, and the new order 
is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possi- 
bilities of both good and evil, and no one can confidently 
predict the outcome. 



CHAPTER VII 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 

One of the most interesting phenomena of modern 
world-history is the twofold conquest of the East by 
the West. The word "conquest" is usually employed 
in a political sense, and calls up visions of embattled 
armies subduing foreign lands and lording it over distant 
peoples. Such political conquests in the Orient did of 
course occur, and we have already seen how, during the 
past century, the decrepit states of the Near and Middle 
East fell an easy prey to the armed might of the Euro- 
pean Powers. 

But what is not so generally realized is the fact that 
this political conquest was paralleled by an economic 
conquest perhaps even more complete and probably 
destined to produce changes of an even more profound 
and enduring character. 

The root-cause of this economic conquest was the 
Industrial Revolution. Just as the voyages of Colum- 
bus and Da Gama gave Europe the strategic mastery 
of the ocean and thereby the political mastery of the 
world, so the technical inventions of the later eighteenth 
century which inaugurated the Industrial Revolution 
gave Europe the economic mastery of the world. These 
inventions in fact heralded a new Age of Discovery, this 
time into the realms of science. The results were, if 
possible, more momentous even than those of the age 
of geographical discovery three centuries before. They 

268 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



269 



gave our race such increased mastery over the resources 
of nature that the ensuing transformation of economic 
life swiftly and utterly transformed the face of things. 

This transformation was, indeed, unprecedented in 
the world's history. Hitherto man's material progress 
had been a gradual evolution. With the exception of 
gunpowder, he had tapped no new sources of material 
energy since very ancient times. The horse-drawn mail- 
coach of our great-grandfathers was merely a logical 
elaboration of the horse-drawn Egyptian chariot; the 
wind-driven clipper-ship traced its line unbroken to 
Ulysses's lateen bark before Troy; while industry still 
relied on the brawn of man and beast or upon the sim- 
ple action of wind and waterfall. Suddenly all was 
changed. Steam, electricity, petrol, the Hertzian wave, 
harnessed nature's hidden powers, conquered distance, 
and shrunk the terrestrial globe to the measure of hu- 
man hands. Man entered a new material world, differ- 
ing not merely in degree but in kind from that of pre- 
vious generations. 

When I say "Man," I mean, so far as the nineteenth 
century was concerned, the white man of Europe and 
its racial settlements overseas. It was the white man's 
brain which had conceived all this, and it was the white 
man alone who at first reaped the benefits. The two 
outstanding features of the new order were the rise of 
machine-industry with its incalculable acceleration of 
mass-production, and the correlative development of 
cheap and rapid transportation. Both these factors 
favored a prodigious increase in economic power and 
wealth in Europe, since Europe became the workshop 
of the world. In fact, during the nineteenth century, 



270 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Europe was transformed from a seniirural continent into 
a swarming hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital, 
and men, pouring forth its wares to the remotest corners 
of the earth, and drawing thence fresh stores of raw 
material for new fabrication and exchange. 

Such was the industrially revolutionized West which 
confronted an East as backward and stagnant in eco- 
nomics as it was in politics and the art of war. In fact, 
the East was virtually devoid of either industry or busi- 
ness, as we understand these terms to-day. Economi- 
cally, the East was on an agricultural basis, the eco- 
nomic unit being the self-supporting, semi-isolated 
village. Oriental " industries " were handicrafts, car- 
ried on by relatively small numbers of artisans, usually 
working by and for themselves. Their products, while 
often exquisite in quality, were largely luxuries, and were 
always produced by such slow, antiquated methods 
that their quantity was limited and their market price 
relatively high. Despite very low wages, therefore, 
Asiatic products not only could not compete in the 
world-market with European and American machine- 
made, mass-produced articles, but were hard hit in their 
home-markets as well. 

This Oriental inability to compete with Western in- 
dustry arose not merely from methods of production 
but also from other factors such as the mentality of the 
workers and the scarcity of capital. Throughout the 
Near and Middle East economic life rested on the princi- 
ple of status. The Western economic principles of con- 
tract and competition were virtually unknown. Agri- 
culturists and artisans followed blindly in the footsteps 
of their fathers. There was no competition, no stimu- 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



271 



lus for improvement, no change in customary wages, 
no desire for a better and more comfortable living. The 
industries were stereotyped; the apprentice merely imi- 
tated his master, and rarely thought of introducing new 
implements or new methods of manufacture. Instead 
of working for profit and advancement, men followed 
an hereditary "calling," usually hallowed by religious 
sanctions, handed down from father to son through 
many generations, each calling possessing its own un- 
changing ideals, its zealously guarded craft-secrets. 

The few bolder, more enterprising spirits who might 
have ventured to break the iron bands of custom and 
tradition were estopped by lack of capital. Fluid "in- 
vestment" capital, easily mobilized and ready to pour 
into an enterprise of demonstrable utility and profit, 
simply did not exist. To the Oriental, whether prince 
or peasant, money was regarded, not as a source of profit 
or a medium of exchange, but as a store of value, to be 
hoarded intact against a "rainy day." The East has 
been known for ages as a "sink of the precious metals." 
In India alone the value of the gold, silver, and jewels 
hidden in strong-boxes, buried in the earth, or hanging 
about the necks of women must run into billions. Says 
a recent writer on India: "I had the privilege of being 
taken through the treasure-vaults of one of the wealth- 
iest Maharajahs. I could have plunged my arm to the 
shoulder in great silver caskets filled with diamonds, 
pearls, emeralds, rubies. The walls were studded with 
hooks and on each pair of hooks rested gold bars three 
to four feet long and two inches across. I stood by a 
great cask of diamonds, and picking up a handful let them 
drop slowly from between my fingers, sparkling and glis- 



272 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tening like drops of water in sunlight. There are some 
seven hundred native states, and the rulers of every one 
has his treasure-vaults on a more or less elaborate scale. 
Besides these, every zamindar and every Indian of high 
or low degree who can save anything, wants to have it 
by him in actual metal; he distrusts this new-fangled 
paper currency that they try to pass off on him. Some- 
times he beats his coins into bangles for his wives, and 
sometimes he hides money behind a loose brick or under 
a flat stone in the bottom of the oven, or he goes out 
and digs a little hole and buries it." 1 

Remember that this description is of present-day 
India, after more than a century of British rule and not- 
withstanding a permeation of Western ideas which, as 
we shall presently see, has produced momentous modi- 
fications in the native point of view. Remember also 
that this hoarding propensity is not peculiar to India 
but is shared by the entire Orient. We can then realize 
the utter lack of capital for investment purposes in the 
East of a hundred years ago, especially when we remem- 
ber that political insecurity and religious prohibitions 
of the lending of money at interest stood in the way of 
such far-sighted individuals as might have been inclined 
to employ their hoarded wealth for productive pur- 
poses. There was, indeed, one outlet for financial ac- 
tivity — usury, and therein virtually all the scant fluid 
capital of the old Orient was employed. But such cap- 
ital, lent not for productive enterprise but for luxury, 
profligacy, or incompetence, was a destructive rather 
than a creative force and merely intensified the preju- 
dice against capital of any kind. 

1 F. B. Fisher, India's Silent Revolution, p. 53 (New York, 1920). 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



273 



Such was the economic life of the Orient a hundred 
years ago. It is obvious that this archaic order was 
utterly unable to face the tremendous competition of 
the industrialized West. Everywhere the flood of cheap 
Western machine-made, mass-produced goods began 
invading Eastern lands, driving the native wares be- 
fore them. The way in which an ancient Oriental 
handicraft like the Indian textiles was literally annihi- 
lated by the destructive competition of Lancashire cot- 
tons is only one of many similar instances. To be sure, 
some Oriental writers contend that this triumph of 
Western manufactures was due to political rather than 
economic reasons, and Indian nationalists cite British 
governmental activity in favor of the Lancashire cot- 
tons above mentioned as the sole cause for the destruc- 
tion of the Indian textile handicrafts. But such argu- 
ments appear to be fallacious. British official action 
may have hastened the triumph of British industry in 
India, but that triumph was inevitable in the long run. 
The best proof is the way in which the textile crafts of 
independent Oriental countries like Turkey and Persia 
were similarly ruined by Western competition. 

A further proof is the undoubted fact that Oriental 
peoples, taken as a whole, have bought Western-manu- 
factured products in preference to their own hand-made 
wares. To many Westerners this has been a mystery. 
Such persons cannot understand how the Orientals 
could buy the cheap, shoddy products of the West, 
manufactured especially for the Eastern market, in 
preference to their native wares of better quality and 
vastly greater beauty. The answer, however, is that 
the average Oriental is not an art connoisseur but a 



274 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

poor man living perilously close to the margin of star- 
vation. He not only wants but must buy things cheap, 
and the wide price-margin is the deciding factor. Of 
course there is also the element of novelty. Besides 
goods which merely replace articles he has always used, 
the West has introduced many new articles whose utility 
or charm are irresistible. I have already mentioned 
the way in which the sewing-machine and the kerosene- 
lamp have swept the Orient from end to end, and there 
are many other instances of a similar nature. The 
permeation of Western industry has, in fact, profoundly 
modified every phase of Oriental economic life. New 
economic wants have been created; standards of living 
have been raised; canons of taste have been altered. 
Says a lifelong American student of the Orient: "The 
knowledge of modern inventions and of other foods and 
articles has created new wants. The Chinese peasant 
is no longer content to burn bean-oil; he wants kerosene. 
The desire of the Asiatic to possess foreign lamps is 
equalled only by his passion for foreign clocks. The 
ambitious Syrian scorns the mud roof of his ancestors, 
and will be satisfied only with the bright red tiles im- 
ported from France. Everywhere articles of foreign 
manufacture are in demand. . . . Knowledge increases 
wants, and the Oriental is acquiring knowledge. He 
demands a hundred things to-day that his grandfather 
never heard of." 1 

Everywhere it is the same story. An Indian eco- 
nomic writer, though a bitter enemy of Western indus- 
trialism, bemoans the fact that "the artisans are losing 

1 Rev. A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," The Century, March, 
1904. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



275 



their occupations and are turning to agricultuie. The 
cheap kerosene-oil from Baku or New York threatens 
the oilman's 1 existence. Brass and copper which have 
been used for vessels from time immemorial are threat- 
ened by cheap enamelled ironware imported from Eu- 
rope. . . . There is also, pari passu, a transformation 
of the tastes of the consumers. They abandon gur for 
crystal sugar. Home-woven cloths are now replaced 
by manufactured cloths for being too coarse. All local 
industries are attacked and many have been destroyed. 
Villages that for centuries followed customary practices 
are brought into contact with the world's markets all 
on a sudden. For steamships and railways which have 
established the connection have been built in so short 
an interval as hardly to allow breathing-time to the 
village which slumbered so long under the dominion of 
custom. Thus the sudden introduction of competition 
into an economic unit which had from time immemorial 
followed custom has wrought a mighty change." 2 

This " mighty change" was due not merely to the in- 
flux of Western goods but also to an equally momentous 
influx of Western capital. The opportunities for profita- 
ble investment were so numerous that Western capital 
soon poured in streams into Eastern lands. Virtually 
devoid of fluid capital of its own, the Orient was bound 
to have recourse to Western capital for the initiation 
of all economic activity in the modern sense. Rail- 
ways, mines, large-scale agriculture of the "plantation" 
type, and many other undertakings thus came into be- 
ing. Most notable of all was the founding of numerous 

1 1. e. y the purveyor of the native vegetable-oils. 

2 R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Economics, p. 5 (London, 1916). 



276 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



manufacturing establishments from North Africa to 
China and the consequent growth of genuine "factory- 
towns" where the whir of machinery and the smoke of 
tall chimneys proclaimed that the East was adopting 
the industrial life of the West. 

The momentous social consequences of this industriali- 
zation of the Orient will be treated in subsequent chap- 
ters. In the present chapter we will confine ourselves 
to a consideration of its economic side. Furthermore, 
this book, limited as it is to the Near and Middle East, 
cannot deal with industrial developments in China and 
Japan. The reader should, however, always bear in 
mind Far Eastern developments, which, in the main, 
run parallel to those which we shall here discuss. 

These industrial innovations were at first pure West- 
ern transplantings set in Eastern soil. Initiated by 
Western capital, they were wholly controlled and man- 
aged by Western brains. Western capital could not 
venture to intrust itself to Orientals, with their lack of 
the modern industrial spirit, their habits of " squeeze" 
and nepotism, their lust for quick returns, and their 
incapacity for sustained business team-play. As time 
passed, however, the success of Western undertakings 
so impressed Orientals that the more forward-looking 
among them were ready to risk their money and to ac- 
quire the technic necessary for success. At the close 
of Chapter II, I described the development of modern 
business types in the Moslem world, and the same is 
true of the non-Moslem populations of India. In India 
there were several elements such as the Parsis and the 
Hindu "banyas," or money-lenders, whose previous 
activities in commerce or usury predisposed them to 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



277 



financial and industrial activity in the modern sense. 
From their ranks have chiefly sprung the present-day 
native business communities of India, exemplified by 
the jute and textile factories of Calcutta and Bombay, 
and the great Tata iron-works of Bengal — undertakings 
financed by native capital and wholly under native con- 
trol. Of course, beside these successes there have been 
many lamentable failures. Nevertheless, there seems 
to be no doubt that Western industrialism is ceasing to 
be an exotic and is rooting itself firmly in Eastern soil. 1 
The combined result of Western and Eastern enter- 
prise has been, as already stated, the rise of important 
industrial centres at various points in the Orient. In 
Egypt a French writer remarks: "Both banks of the 
Nile are lined with factories, sugar-refineries and cotton- 
mills, whose belching chimneys tower above the mud 
huts of the fellahs.' ' 2 And Sir Theodore Morison says 
of India: "In the city of Bombay the industrial revolu- 
tion has already been accomplished. Bombay is a 
modern manufacturing city, where both the dark and 
the bright side of modern industrialism strike the eye. 
Bombay has insanitary slums where overcrowding is as 
great an evil as in any European city; she has a prole- 
tariat which works long hours amid the din and whir of 
machinery; she also has her millionaires, whose princely 
charities have adorned her streets with beautiful build- 
ings. Signs of lavish wealth and, let me add, culture and 

these points, see Fisher, op. cit. ; Sir T. Morison, The Economic 
Transition in India (London, 1911); Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest 
(London, 1910); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Eco- 
nomic Journal, December, 1910; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in 
India," Journal of Race Development, July, 1910. 
*L. Bertrand, he Mirage oriental, pp. 20-21 (Paris, 1910). 



278 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



taste in Bombay astonish the visitor from the inland 
districts. The brown villages and never-ending fields 
with which he has hitherto been familiar are the India 
which is passing away; Bombay is the presage of the 
future." 1 

The juxtaposition of vast natural resources and a 
limitless supply of cheap labor has encouraged the most 
ambitious hopes in Oriental minds. Some Orientals 
look to a combination of Western money and Eastern 
man-power, expressed by an Indian economic writer in 
the formula: " English money and Indian labor are the 
two cheapest things in the world." 2 Others more am- 
bitiously dream of industrializing the East entirely by 
native effort, to the exclusion and even to the detriment 
of the West. This view was well set forth some years 
ago by a Hindu, who wrote in a leading Indian periodi- 
cal: 3 "In one sense the Orient is really menacing the 
West, and so earnest and open-minded is Asia that no 
pretense or apology whatever is made about it. The 
Easterner has thrown down the industrial gauntlet, and 
from now on Asia is destined to witness a progressively 
intense trade warfare, the Occidental scrambling to re- 
tain his hold on the markets of the East, and the Ori- 
ental endeavoring to beat him in a battle in which here- 
tofore he has been an easy victor. ... In competing 
with the Occidental commercialists, the Oriental has 
awakened to a dynamic realization of the futility of 
pitting unimproved machinery and methods against 
modern methods and appliances. Casting aside his 

1 Sir T. Morison, The Economic Transition in India, p. 181. 

2 Quoted by Jones, supra. 

3 The Indian Review (Madras), 1910. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



279 



former sense of self-complacency, he is studying the sci- 
ences and arts that have given the West its material 
prosperity. He is putting the results of his investiga- 
tions to practical use, as a rule, recasting the Occidental 
methods to suit his peculiar needs, and in some instances 
improving upon them." 

This statement of the spirit of the Orient's industrial 
awakening is confirmed by many white observers. At 
the very moment when the above article was penned, 
an American economic writer was making a study tour 
of the Orient, of which he reported: "The real cause of 
Asia's poverty lies in just two things: the failure of Asi- 
atic governments to educate their people, and the failure 
of the people to increase their productive capacity by 
the use of machinery. Ignorance and lack of machinery 
are responsible for Asia's poverty; knowledge and mod- 
ern tools are responsible for America's prosperity." 
But, continues this writer, we must watch out. Asia 
now realizes these facts and is doing much to remedy 
the situation. Hence, "we must face in ever-increas- 
ing degree the rivalry of awakening peoples who are 
strong with the strength that comes from struggle with 
poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to 
master and apply all our secrets in the coming world- 
struggle for industrial supremacy and for racial read- 
justment." 1 Another American observer of Asiatic 
economic conditions reports: "All Asia is being per- 
meated with modern industry and present-day mechani- 
cal progress." 2 And Sir Theodore M orison concludes 

1 Clarence Poe, "What the Orient can Teach Us," World's Work, July, 
1911. 

" 2r C. S. Cooper, The Modernising of the Orient, p. 5 (New York, 1914). 



280 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



regarding India's economic future: " India's industrial 
transformation is near at hand; the obstacles which have 
hitherto prevented the adoption of modern methods of 
manufacture have been removed; means of transport 
have been spread over the face of the whole count ry, 
capital for the purchase of machinery and erection of 
factories may now be borrowed on easy terms; me- 
chanics; engineers; and business managers may be hired 
from Europe to train the future captains of Indian in- 
dustry; in English a common language has been found 
in which to transact business with all the provinces of 
India and with a great part of the Western world; se- 
curity from foreign invasion and internal commotion 
justifies the inception of large enterprises. All the 
conditions are favorable for a great reorganization of 
industry which ; when successfully accomplished; will 
bring about an increase hitherto undreamed of in In- 
dia's annual output of wealth." 1 

The factor usually relied upon to overcome the Ori- 
ent's handicaps of inexperience and inexpertness in in- 
dustrialism is its cheap labor. To Western observers 
the low wages and long hours of Eastern industry are 
literally astounding. Take Egypt and India as exam- 
ples of industrial conditions in the Near and Middle 
East. Writing of Egypt in 1908 ; the English economist 
H. N. Brailsford says: "There was then no Factory Act 
in Egypt. There are all over the country girniing-mills, 
which employ casual labor to prepare raw cotton for 
export; during four or five months of the year. The 
wages were low, from 7^d. to lOd. (15 to 20 cents) a 
day for an adult, and 6d. (12 cents) for a child. Chil- 

1 M orison, op. cit., p. 242. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



281 



dren and adults alike worked sometimes for twelve, 
usually for fifteen, and on occasion even for sixteen or 
eighteen hours a day. In the height of the season even 
the children were put on night shifts of twelve hours." 1 

In India conditions are about the same. The first 
thorough investigation of Indian industry was made in 
1907 by a factory labor commission, and the follow- 
ing are some of the data published in its report: In the 
cotton-mills of Bombay the hours regularly worked ran 
from 13 to 14 hours. In the jute-mills of Calcutta the 
operatives usually worked 15 hours. Cotton-ginning 
factories required their employees to work 17 and 18 
hours a day, rice and flour mills 20 to 22 hours, and an 
extreme case was found in a printing works where the 
men had to work 22 hours a day for seven consecutive 
days. As to wages, an adult male operative, working 
from 13 to 15 hours a day, received from 15 to 20 rupees 
a month ($5 to $6.35). Child labor was very prevalent, 
children six and seven years old working "half-time" — 
in many cases 8 hours a day. As a result of this report 
legislation was passed by the Indian Government better- 
ing working conditions somewhat, especially for women 
and children. But in 1914 the French economist Albert 
Metin, after a careful study, reported factory conditions 
not greatly changed, the Factory Acts systematically 
evaded, hours very long, and wages extremely low. In 
Bombay men were earning from 10 cents to 20 cents per 
day, the highest wages being 30 cents. For women and 
children the maximum was 10 cents per day. 2 

With such extraordinarily low wages and long hours 

l H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, p. 114 (London, 1915). 
s A. M6tin, Vlnde d'aujourd'hutf: fitude sociale, p. 336 (Paris, 1918). 



282 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



of labor it might at first sight seem as though, given 
adequate capital and up-to-date machinery, the Orient 
could not only drive Occidental products from Eastern 
markets but might invade Western markets as well. 
This, indeed, has been the fear of many Western writ- 
ers. Nearly three-quarters of a century ago Gobineau 
prophesied an industrial invasion of Europe from Asia, 1 
and of late years economists like H. N. Brailsford have 
warned against an emigration of Western capital to the 
tempting lure of factory conditions in Eastern lands. 2 
Nevertheless, so far as the Near and Middle East is 
concerned, nothing like this has as yet materialized. 
China, to be sure, may yet have unpleasant surprises 
in store for the West, 3 but neither the Moslem world nor 
India have developed factory labor with the skill, stam- 
ina, and assiduity sufficient to undercut the industrial 
workers of Europe and America. In India, for exam- 
ple, despite a swarming and poverty-stricken popula- 
tion, the factories are unable to recruit an adequate or 
dependable labor-supply. Says M. Metin: "With such 
long hours and low wages it might be thought that In- 
dian industry would be a formidable competitor of the 
West. This is not so. The reason is the bad quality 
of the work. The poorly paid coolies are so badly fed 
and so weak that it takes at least three of them to do the 
work of one European. Also, the Indian workers lack 
not only strength but also skill, attention, and liking 
for their work. . . . An Indian of the people will do 

1 In his book, Trois Am en Perse (Paris, 1858). 

2 Brailsford, op. cit., pp. 83, 114r-115. 

3 Regarding conditions in China, especially the extraordinary disci- 
pline and working ability of the Chinaman, see my Rising Tide of Color 
against White V/orld-Supremacy, pp. 28-30, 243-251. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



283 



anything else in preference to becoming a factory opera- 
tive. The factories thus get only the dregs of the work- 
ing class. The workers come to the factories and mines 
as a last resort; they leave as soon as they can return 
to their prior occupations or find a more remunerative 
employment. Thus the factories can never count on 
a regular labor-supply. Would higher wages remedy 
this? Many employers say no — as soon as the workers 
got a little ahead they would quit, either temporarily 
till their money was spent, or permanently for some 
more congenial calling.' ' 1 These statements are fully 
confirmed by an Indian economic writer, who says: 
"One of the greatest drawbacks to the establishment of 
large industries in India is the scarcity and inefficiency 
of labor. Cheap labor, where there is no physical stam- 
ina, mental discipline, and skill behind it, tends to be 
costly in the end. The Indian laborer is mostly unedu- 
cated. He is not in touch with his employers or with 
his work. The laboring population of the towns is a 
flitting, dilettante population." 2 

Thus Indian industry, despite its very considerable 
growth, has not come up to early expectations. As the 
official Year-Book very frankly states: " India, in short, 
is a country rich in raw materials and in industrial pos- 
sibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishments." 3 
In fact, to some observers, India's industrial future 
seems far from bright. As a competent English student 
of Indian conditions recently wrote: "Some years ago 
it seemed possible that India might, by a rapid assimila- 



1 M6tin, op. tit, p. 337. 

2 A. Yusuf Ali, Life and Labor in India, p. 183 (London, 1907). 

8 "India in the Years 1917-1918" (official publication— Calcutta). 



284 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tion of Western knowledge and technical skill, adapt 
for her own conditions the methods of modern industry, 
and so reach an approximate economic level. Some 
even now threaten the Western world with a vision of 
the vast populations of China and India rising up with 
skilled organization, vast resources, and comparatively 
cheap labor to impoverish the West. To the present 
writer this is a mere bogey. The peril is of a very dif- 
ferent kind. Instead of a growing approximation, he 
sees a growing disparity. For every step India takes 
toward mechanical efficiency, the West takes two. 
When India is beginning to use bicycles and motor-cars 
(not to make them), the West is perfecting the aero- 
plane. That is merely symbolic. The war, as we know, 
has speeded up mechanical invention and produced a 
population of mechanics; but India has stood compara- 
tively still. It is, up to now, overwhelmingly mediaeval, 
a country of domestic industry and handicrafts. Me- 
chanical power, even of the simplest, has not yet been 
applied to its chief industry — agriculture. Yet the 
period of age-long isolation is over, and India can never 
go back to it; nevertheless, the gap between East and 
West is widening. What is to be the outcome for her 
300 millions? We are in danger in the East of seeing 
the worst evils of commercialism developed on an enor- 
mous scale, with the vast population of India the vic- 
tims — of seeing the East become a world slum." 1 

Whether or not this pessimistic outlook is justified, 
certain it is that not merely India but the entire Orient 
is in a stage of profound transition; and transition pe- 
riods are always painful times. We have been consider- 

1 Young & Ferrers, India in Conflict, pp. 15-17 (London, 1920). 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



285 



ing the new industrial proletariat of the towns. But 
the older social classes are affected in very similar fash- 
ion. The old-type handicraftsman and small merchant 
are obviously menaced by modern industrial and busi- 
ness methods, and the peasant masses are in little better 
shape. It is not merely a change in technic but a 
fundamental difference in outlook on life that is in- 
volved. The life of the old Orient, while there was 
much want and hardship, was an easy-going life, with 
virtually no thought of such matters as time, efficiency, 
output, and " turnover." The merchant sat cross- 
legged in his little booth amid his small stock of wares, 
passively waiting for trade, chaffering interminably with 
his customers, annoyed rather than pleased if brisk 
business came his way. The artisan usually worked 
by and for himself, keeping his own hours and knock- 
ing off whenever he chose. The peasant arose with the 
dawn, but around noon he and his animals lay down for 
a long nap and slept until, in the cool of afternoon, they 
awoke, stretched themselves, and, comfortably and cas- 
ually, went to work again. 

To such people the speed, system, and discipline of 
our economic life are painfully repugnant, and adaptar 
tion can at best be effected only very slowly and under 
the compulsion of the direst necessity. Meanwhile 
they suffer from the competition of those better equipped 
in the economic battle. Sir William Ramsay paints a 
striking picture of the way in which the Turkish popu- 
lation of Asia Minor, from landlords and merchants to 
simple peasants, have been going down-hill for the last 
half-century under the economic pressure not merely 
of Westerners but of the native Christian elements, 



286 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



Armenians and Greeks, who had partially assimilated 
Western business ideas and methods. Under the old 
state of things, he says, there was in Asia Minor "no 
economic progress and no mercantile development; 
things went on in the old fashion, year after year. Such 
simple business as was carried on was inconsistent with 
the highly developed Western business system and West- 
ern civilization; but it was not oppressive to the people. 
There were no large fortunes; there was no opportunity 
for making a great fortune; it was impossible for one 
man to force into his service the minds and the work 
of a large number of people, and so to create a great 
organization out of which he might make big profits. 
There was a very large number of small men doing busi- 
ness on a small scale." 1 Sir William Ramsay then goes 
on to describe the shattering of this archaic economic 
life by modern business methods, to the consequent 
impoverishment of all classes of the unadaptable Turkish 
population. 

How the agricultural classes, peasants and landlords 
alike, are suffering from changing economic conditions 
is well exemplified by the recent history of India. Says 
the French writer Chailley, an authoritative student 
of Indian problems: "For the last half-century large 
fractions of the agricultural classes are being entirely 
despoiled of their lands or reduced to onerous tenancies. 
On the other hand, new classes are rising and taking 
their place. . . . Both ryots and zamindars 2 are in- 
volved. The old-type nobility has not advanced with 

^ir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," Quarterly 
Review, January, 1918. 

2 1, e., peasants and landlords. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



287 



the times. It remains idle and prodigal, while the 
peasant proprietors, burdened by the traditions of many 
centuries, are likewise improvident and ignorant. On 
the other hand, the economic conditions of British In- 
dia are producing capitalists who seek employment for 
their wealth. A conflict between them and the old 
landholders was predestined, and the result was inevita- 
ble. Wealth goes to the cleverest, and the land must 
pass into the hands of new masters, to the great indig- 
nation of the agricultural classes, a portion of whom will 
be reduced to the position of farm-laborers." 1 

The Hindu economist Mukerjee thus depicts the dis- 
integration and decay of the Indian village: "New eco- 
nomic ideas have now begun to influence the minds of 
the villagers. Some are compelled to leave their occu- 
pations on account of foreign competition, but more 
are leaving their hereditary occupations of their own 
accord. The Brahmins go to the cities to seek govern- 
ment posts or professional careers. The middle classes 
also leave their villages and get scattered all over the 
country to earn a living. The peasants also leave their 
ancestral acres and form a class of landless agricultural 
laborers. The villages, drained of their best blood, 
stagnate and decay. The movement from the village 
to the city is in fact not only working a complete revolu- 
tion in the habits and ideals of our people, but its eco- 
nomic consequences are far more serious than are ordi- 
narily supposed. It has made our middle classes help- 
lessly subservient to employment and service, and has 
also killed the independence of our peasant proprietors. 

1 J. Chailley, Adrmmsirative Problems of British India, p. 339 (London, 
1910 — English translation). 



288 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



It has jeopardized our food-supply, and is fraught with 
the gravest peril not only to our handicrafts but also to 
our national industry — agriculture." 1 

Happily there are signs that, in Indian agriculture 
at least, the transition period is working itself out and 
that conditions may soon be on the mend. Both the 
British Government and the native princes have vied 
with one another in spreading Western agricultural ideas 
and methods, and since the Indian peasant has proved 
much more receptive than has the Indian artisan, a more 
intelligent type of farmer is developing, better able to 
keep step with the times. A good instance is the growth 
of rural co-operative credit societies. First introduced 
by the British Government in 1904, there were in 1915 
more than 17,000 such associations, with a total of 825,- 
000 members and a working capital of nearly $30,000,- 
000. These agricultural societies make loans for the 
purchase of stock, fodder, seed, manure, sinking of wells, 
purchase of Western agricultural machinery, and, in 
emergencies, personal maintenance. In the districts 
where they have established themselves they have 
greatly diminished the plague of usury practised by the 
"banyas/' or village money-lenders, lowering the rate of 
interest from its former crushing range of 20 to 75 per 
cent to a range averaging from 9 to 18 per cent. Of 
course such phenomena are as yet merely exceptions to 
a very dreary rule. Nevertheless, they all point toward 
a brighter morrow. 2 

1 Mukerjee, op. cit., p. 9. 

2 On the co-operative movement in India, see Fisher, India's Silent 
Revolution, pp. 54-58; R. B. Ewebank, "The Co-operative Movement in 
India," Quarterly Review, April, 1916. India's economic problems, both 
agricultural and industrial, have been carefully studied by a large number 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



289 



But this brighter agricultural morrow is obviously 
far off, and in industry it seems to be farther still. Mean- 
while the changing Orient is full of suffering and dis- 
content. What wonder that many Orientals ascribe 
their troubles, not to the process of economic transition, 
but to the political control of European governments 
and the economic exploitation of Western capital. 
The result is agitation for emancipation from Western 
economic as well as Western political control. At the 
end of Chapter II we examined the movement among 
the Mohammedan peoples known as " Economic Pan- 
Islamism." A similar movement has arisen among the 
Hindus of India — the so-called " Swadeshi " movement. 
The Swadeshists declare that India's economic ills are 
almost entirely due to the " drain" of India's wealth to 
England and other Western lands. They therefore 
advocate a boycott of English goods until Britain grants 
India self-government, whereupon they propose to erect 
protective tariffs for Indian products, curb the activi- 
ties of British capital, replace high-salaried English 
officials by natives, and thereby keep India's wealth 
at home. 1 

of Indian economists, some of whose writings are extremely interesting. 
Some of the most noteworthy books, besides those of Mukeriee and Yusuf 
Ali, already quoted, are: Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule 
in India (London, 1901); Romesh Dutt, The Economic History of India 
in the Victorian Age (London, 1906); H. H. Gosh, The Advancement of 
Industry (Calcutta, 1910) ; P. C. Ray, The Poverty Problem in India (Cal- 
cutta, 1895); M. G. Ranade, Essays on Indian Economics (Madras, 1920); 
Jadunath Sarkar, Economics of British India (Calcutta, 1911). - 

1 The best compendium of Swadeshist opinion is the volume contain- 
ing pronouncements from all the Swadeshi leaders, entitled, The Swa- 
deshi Movement : A Symposium (Madras, 1910). See also writings of the 
economists Gosh, Mukerjee, Ray, and Sarkar, above quoted, as well as the 
various writings of the nationalist agitator La j pat Rai. A good summary 
interpretation is found in M. Glotz, "Le Mouvement 'Swadeshi' dans 
l'lnde," Revue du Mois, July, 1913. 



290 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



An analysis of these Swadeshist arguments, however, 
reveals them as inadequate to account for India's ills, 
which are due far more to the general economic trend of 
the times than to any specific defects of the British con- 
nection. British governance and British capital do cost 
money, but their undoubted efficiency in producing 
peace, order, security, and development must be con- 
sidered as offsets to the higher costs which native rule 
and native capital would impose. As Sir Theodore 
Morison well says: "The advantages which the British 
Navy and British credit confer on India are a liberal 
offset to her expenditure on pensions and gratuities to 
her English servants. . . . India derives a pecuniary 
advantage from her connection with the British Empire. 
The answer, then, which I give to the question 'What 
economic equivalent does India get for foreign pay- 
ments?' is this: India gets the equipment of modern 
industry, and she gets an administration favorable to 
economic evolution cheaper than she could provide it 
herself." 1 A comparison with Japan's much more 
costly defense budgets, inferior credit, and higher in- 
terest charges on both public and private loans is en- 
Hghtening on this point. 

In fact, some Indians themselves admit the fallacy of 
Swadeshist arguments. As one of them remarks: "The 
so-called economic ' drain' is nonsense. Most of the 
misery of late years is due to the rising cost of living — a 
world-wide phenomenon." And in proof of this he cites 
conditions in other Oriental countries, especially Japan. 2 

1 Sir T. Morison, The Economic Transition in India, pp. 240-241. Also 
see Sir Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest, pp. 255-279; William Archer, 
India and the Future, pp. 131^157. 

2 Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, India of Today, p. 19 (Bombay, 1908). 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 291 



As warm a friend of the Indian people as the British 
labor leader, Ramsay Macdonald, states: "One thing 
is quite evident: a tariff will not re-establish the old 
hand-industry of India nor help to revive village handi- 
crafts. Factory and machine production, native to 
India itself, will throttle them as effectively as that of 
Lancashire and Birmingham has done in the past." 1 

Even more trenchant are the criticisms formulated by 
the Hindu writer Pramatha Nath Bose. 2 The "drain," 
says Mr. Bose, is ruining India. But would the Home 
Rule programme, as envisaged by most Swadeshists, 
cure India's economic ills? Under Home Rule these 
people would do the following things: (1) Substitute 
Englishmen for Indians in the Administration; (2) levy 
protective duties on Indian products; (3) grant state 
encouragement to Indian industries; (4) disseminate 
technical education. Now, how would these matters 
work out? The substitution of Indian for British offi- 
cials would not lessen the "drain " as much as most 
Home Rulers think. The high-placed Indian officials 
who already exist have acquired European standards 
of living, so the new official corps would cost almost 
as much as the old. Also, "the influence of the ex- 
ample set by the well-to-do Indian officials would per- 
meate Indian society more largely than at present, and 
the demand for Western articles would rise in propor- 
tion. So commercial exploitation by foreigners would 
not only continue almost as if they were Europeans, but 
might even increase." As to a protective tariff, it would 
attract European capital to India which would exploit 

1 J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government cjf India, p. 133 (London, 1920). 

2 In The Hindustan Review (Calcutta), 1917. 



292 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



labor and skim the profits. India has shown relatively 
little capacity for indigenous industrial development. Of 
course, even at low wages, many Indians might benefit, 
yet such persons would form only a tithe of the millions 
now starving — besides the fact that this industrialization 
would bring in many new social evils. As to state en- 
couragement of industries, this would bring in Western 
capital even more than a protective tariff, with the re- 
sults already stated. As for technical education, it is a 
worthy project, but, says Mr. Bose, "I am afraid the 
movement is too late, now. Within the last thirty years 
the Westerners and the Japanese have gone so far ahead 
of us industrially that it has been yearly becoming 
more said more difficult to compete with them." 

In fact, Mr. Bose goes on to criticise the whole system 
of Western education, as applied to India. Neither 
higher nor lower education have proven panaceas. 
"Higher education has led to the material prosperity of 
a small section of our community, comprising a few 
thousands of well-to-do lawyers, doctors, and State 
servants. But their occupations being of a more or 
less unproductive or parasitic character, their well- 
being does not solve the problem of the improvement 
of India as a whole. On the contrary, as their taste 
for imported articles develops in proportion to their 
prosperity, they help to swell rather than diminish the 
economic drain from the country which is one of the 
chief causes of our impoverishment." Neither has ele- 
mentary education "on the whole furthered the well- 
being of the multitude. It has not enabled the cultir 
vators to 'grow two blades where one grew before/ 
On the contrary, it has distinctly diminished their effi- 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 



293 



ciency by inculcating in the literate proletariat, who 
constitute the cream of their class, a strong distaste for 
their hereditary mode of living and their hereditary call- 
ings, and an equally strong taste for shoddy superflui- 
ties and brummagem fineries, and for occupations of a 
more or less parasitic character. They have, directly 
or indirectly, accelerated rather than retarded the de- 
cadence of indigenous industries, and have thus helped 
to aggravate their own economic difficulties and those 
of the entire community. What they want is more 
food — and New India vies with the Government in giv- 
ing them what is called ' education' that does not in- 
crease their food-earning capacity, but on the contrary 
fosters in them tastes and habits which make them de- 
spise indigenous products and render them fit subjects 
for the exploitation of scheming capitalists, mostly 
foreign. Political and economic causes could not have 
led to the extinction of indigenous industry if they had 
not been aided by change of taste fostered by the West- 
ern environment of which the so-called 1 education 9 is 
a powerful factor." 

From all this Mr. Bose concludes that none of the 
reforms advocated by the Home Rulers would cure 
India's ills. "In fact, the chances are, she would be 
more inextricably entangled in the toils of Western civi- 
lization, without any adequate compensating advantage, 
and the grip of the West would close on her to crush 
her more effectively." Therefore, according to Mr. 
Bose, the only thing for India to do is to turn her back 
on everything Western and plunge resolutely into the 
traditional past. As he expresses it: "India's salvation 
lies, not in the region of politics, but outside it; not in 



294 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



aspiring to be one of the ' great' nations of the present 
day, but in retiring to her humble position — a position, 
to my mind, of solitary grandeur and glory; not in going 
forward on the path of Western civilization, but in going 
back from it so far as practicable; not in getting more 
and more entangled in the silken meshes of its finely 
knit, wide-spread net, but in escaping from it as far as 
possible." 

Such are the drastic conclusions of Mr. Bose; conclu- 
sions shared to a certain extent by other Indian idealists 
like Rabindranath Tagore. But surely such projects, 
however idealistic, are the vainest fantasies. Whole 
peoples cannot arbitrarily cut themselves off from the 
rest of the world, like isolated individuals forswearing 
society and setting up as anchorites in the jungle. The 
time for "hermit nations" has passed, especially for a 
vast country like India, set at the crossroads of the 
East, open to the sea, and already profoundly penetrated 
by Western ideas. 

Nevertheless, such criticisms, appealing as they do to 
the strong strain of asceticism latent in the Indian na- 
ture, have affected many Indians who, while unable to 
concur in the conclusions, still try to evolve a "middle 
term/' retaining everything congenial in the old system 
and grafting on a select set of Western innovations. 
Accordingly, these persons have elaborated programmes 
for a "new order" built on a blend of Hindu mysticism, 
caste, Western industry, and socialism. 1 

Now these schemes are highly ingenious. But they 
are not convincing. Their authors should remember 



1 Good examples are found in the writings of Mukerjee and Lajpat Rai, 
already quoted. 



ECONOMIC CHANGE 295 

the old adage that you cannot eat your cake and have it 
too. When we realize the abysmal antithesis between 
the economic systems of the old East and the modern 
West, any attempt to combine the most congenial points 
of both while eschewing their defects seems an attempt 
to reconcile irreconcilables and about as profitable as 
trying to square the circle. As Lowes Dickinson wisely 
observes: "Civilization is a whole. Its art, its religion, 
its way of life, all hang together with its economic and 
technical development. I doubt whether a nation can 
pick and choose; whether, for instance, the East can 
say, 'We will take from the West its battle-ships, its 
factories, its medical science; we will not take its social 
confusion, its hurry and fatigue, its ugliness, its over- 
emphasis on activity/ ... So I expect the East to 
follow us, whether it like it or no, into all these excesses, 
and to go right through, not round, all that we have 
been through on its way to a higher phase of civiliza- 
tion." 1 

This seems to be substantially true. Judged by the 
overwhelming body of evidence, the East, in its contem- 
porary process of transformation, will follow the West — 
avoiding some of our more patent mistakes, perhaps, 
but, in the main, proceeding along similar lines. And, 
as already stated, this transformation is modifying 
every phase of Eastern life. We have already examined 
the process at work in the religious, political, and eco- 
nomic phases. To the social phase let us now turn. 

1 G. Lowes Dickinson, An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China, 
and Japan, pp. 84-85 (London, 1914). 



CHAPTER VIII 



SOCIAL CHANGE 

The momentous nature of the contemporary trans- 
formation of the Orient is nowhere better attested than 
by the changes effected in the lives of its peoples. That 
dynamic influence of the West which is modifying gov- 
ernmental forms, political concepts, religious beliefs, and 
economic processes is proving equally potent in the range 
of social phenomena. In the third chapter of this vol- 
ume we attempted a general survey of Western influence 
along all the above lines. In the present chapter we 
shall attempt a detailed consideration of the social 
changes which are to-day taking place. 

These social changes are very great, albeit many of 
them may not be so apparent as the changes in other 
fields. So firm is the hold of custom and tradition on 
individual, family, and group life in the Orient that 
superficial observers of the East are prone to assert 
that these matters are still substantially unaltered, how- 
ever pronounced may have been the changes on the ex- 
ternal, material side. Yet such is not the opinion of 
the closest students of the Orient, and it is most em- 
phatically not the opinion of Orientals themselves. 
These generally stress the profound social changes which 
are going on. 

And it is their judgments which seem to be tne more 
correct. To say that the East is advancing "materi- 

296 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



297 



ally" but standing still " socially" is to ignore the ele- 
mental truth that social systems are altered quite as 
much by material things as by abstract ideas. Who 
that looks below the surface can deny the social, moral, 
and civilizing power of railroads, post-offices, and tele- 
graph lines? Does it mean nothing socially as well as 
materially that the East is adopting from the West a 
myriad innovations, weighty and trivial, important 
and frivolous, useful and baneful? Does it mean noth- 
ing socially as well as materially that the Prophet's 
tomb at Medina is lit by electricity and that picture 
post-cards are sold outside the Holy Kaaba at Mecca? 
It may seem mere grotesque piquancy that the muezzin 
should ride to the mosque in a tram-car, or that the 
Moslem business man should emerge from his harem, 
read his morning paper, motor to an office equipped with 
a prayer-rug, and turn from his devotions to dictaphone 
and telephone. Yet why assume that his life is moulded 
by mosque, harem, and prayer-rug, and yet deny the 
things of the West a commensurate share in the shaping 
of his social existence ? Now add to these tangible inno- 
vations intangible novelties like scientific education, 
Occidental amusements, and the partial emancipation 
of women, and we begin to get some idea of the depth 
and scope of the social transformation which is going 
on. 

In those parts of the Orient most open to Western 
influences this social transformation has attained nota- 
ble proportions for more than a generation. When the 
Hungarian Orientalist Vambery returned to Constanti- 
nople in 1896 after forty years' absenoe, he stood amazed 
at the changes which had taken place, albeit Constan- 



298 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tinople was then subjected to the worst repression of 
the Hamidian regime. "I had/' he writes, "continually 
to ask myself this question: Is it possible that these are 
my Turks of 1856; and how can all these transformations 
have taken place? I was astonished at the aspect of 
the city; at the stone buildings which had replaced the 
old wooden ones; at the animation of the streets, in 
which carriages and tram-cars abounded, whereas forty 
years before only saddle-animals were used; and when 
the strident shriek of the locomotive mingled with the 
melancholy calls from the minarets, all that I saw and 
heard seemed to me a living protest against the old 
adage: 'la bidaat fil Islam' — 'there is nothing to reform 
in Islam.' My astonishment became still greater when 
I entered the houses and was able to appreciate the 
people, not only by their exteriors but still more by their 
manner of thought. The effendi class 1 of Constanti- 
nople seemed to me completely transformed in its con- 
duct, outlook, and attitude toward foreigners." 2 

Vambery stresses the inward as well as outward evolu- 
tion of the Turkish educated classes, for he says: "Not 
only in his outward aspect, but also in his home-life, 
the present-day Turk shows a strong inclination to the 
manners and habits of the West, in such varied matters 
as furniture, table-manners, sex-relations, and so forth. 
This is of the very greatest significance. For a people 
may, to be sure, assimilate foreign influences in the 
intellectual field, if it be persuaded of their utility and 
advantage; but it gives up with more difficulty customs 
and habits which are in the blood. One cannot over- 

1 /. e., the educated upper class. 

8 Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'ccvant Quarante Ans, p. 15. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



299 



estimate the numerous sacrifices which ; despite every- 
thing, the Turks have made in this fine. I find all Turk- 
ish society, even the Mollahs, 1 penetrated with the 
necessity of a union with Western civilization. Opin- 
ions may differ as to the method of assimilation: some 
wish to impress on the foreign civilization a national 
character; others, on the contrary, are partisans of our 
intellectual culture, such as it is, and reprobate any kind 
of modification." 2 

Most significant of all, Vambery found even the se- 
cluded women of the harems, "those bulwarks of obscur- 
antism," notably changed. "Yes, I repeat, the life of 
women in Turkey seems to me to have been radically 
transformed in the last forty years, and it cannot be de- 
nied that this transformation has been produced by in- 
ternal conviction as much as by external pressure." 
Noting the spread of female education, and the in- 
creasing share of women in reform movements, Vambery 
remarks: "This is of vital importance, for when women 
shall begin to act in the family as a factor of modern 
progress, real reforms, in society as well as in the state, 
cannot fail to appear." 3 

In India a similar permeation of social life by West- 
ernism is depicted by the Moslem liberal, S. Khuda 
Bukhsh, albeit Mr. Bukhsh, being an insider, lays greater 
emphasis upon the painful aspects of the inevitable 
transition process from old to new. He is not unduly 
pessimistic, for he recognizes that "the age of transition 
is necessarily to a certain extent an age of laxity of mor- 
al^ indifference to religion, superficial culture, and gos- 
r'ping levity. These are passing ills which time itself 

1 /. e., the priestly class. 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 Ibid., p. 51. 



300 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



will cure." Nevertheless, he does not minimize the 
critical aspects of the present situation, which implies 
nothing less than the breakdown of the old social sys- 
tem. "The clearest result of this breakdown of our 
old system of domestic life and social customs under 
the assault of European ideas/' he says, "is to be found 
in two directions — in our religious beliefs and in our so- 
cial life. The old system, with all its faults, had many 
redeeming virtues. " To-day this old system, narrow- 
minded but God-fearing, has been replaced by a "strange 
independence of thought and action. Reverence for 
age, respect for our elders, deference to the opinions of 
others, are fast disappearing. . . . Under the older 
system the head of the family was the sole guide and 
friend of its members. His word had the force of law. 
He was, so to speak, the custodian of the honor and 
prestige of the family. From this exalted position he 
is now dislodged, and the most junior member now 
claims equality with him." 1 

Mr. Bukhsh deplores the current wave of extrava- 
gance, due to the wholesale adoption of European cus- 
toms and modes of living. "What," he asks, "has 
happened here in India? We have adopted European 
costume, European ways of living, even the European 
vices of drinking and gambling, but none of their vir- 
tues. This must be remedied. We must learn at the 
feet of Europe, but not at the sacrifice of our Eastern 
individuality. But this is precisely what we have not 
done. We have dabbled a little in English and Euro- 
pean history, and we have commenced to despise our 
religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. We 

1 Bukhsh, Essays : Indian and Islamic, pp. 221-226. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



301 



have unlearned the lessons of our history and our civili- 
zation, and in their place we have secured nothing solid 
and substantial to hold society fast in the midst of end- 
less changes. " In fine: " Destruction has done its work, 
but the work of construction has not yet begun." 1 

Like Vambery, Bukhsh lays strong emphasis on the 
increasing emancipation of women. No longer regarded 
as mere "child-bearing machines/ ' the Mohammedan 
women of India "are getting educated day by day, and 
now assert their rights. Though the purdah system 2 
still prevails, it is no longer that severe, stringent, and 
unreasonable seclusion of women which existed fifty 
years ago. It is gradually relaxing, and women are 
getting, step by step, rights and liberties which must in 
course of time end in the complete emancipation of 
Eastern womanhood. Forty years ago women meekly 
submitted to neglect, indifference, and even harsh treat- 
ment from their husbands, but such is the case no 
longer." 3 

These two descriptions of social conditions in the Near 
and Middle East respectively enable one to get a fair 
idea of the process of change which is going on. Of 
course it must not be forgotten that both writers deal 
primarily with the educated upper classes of the large 
towns. Nevertheless, the leaven is working steadily 
downward, and with every decade is affecting wider 
strata of the native populations. 

The spread of Western education in the East during 
the past few decades has been truly astonishing, because 

1 Ibid., p. 240. 

2 The purdah is the curtain separating the women's apartments from 
the rest of the house. 

* Ibid., pp. 254-255. 



302 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



it is the exact antithesis of the Oriental educational sys- 
tem. The traditional " education" of the entire Orient, 
from Morocco to China, was a mere memorizing of sa- 
cred texts combined with exercises of religious devotion. 
The Mohammedan or Hindu student spent long years 
reciting to his master (a "holy man") interminable 
passages from books which, being written in classic 
Arabic or Sanskrit, were unintelligible to him, so that 
he usually did not understand a word of what he was 
saying. No more deadening system for the intellect 
could possibly have been devised. Every part of the 
brain except the memory atrophied, and the wonder is 
that any intellectual initiative or original thinking ever 
appeared. 

Even to-day the old system persists, and millions of 
young Orientals are still wasting their time at this mind- 
petrifying nonsense. But alongside the old there has 
arisen a new system, running the whole educational 
gamut from kindergartens to universities, where Orien- 
tal youth is being educated along Western lines. These 
new-type educational establishments are of every kind. 
Besides schools and universities giving a liberal educa- 
tion and fitting students for government service or the 
professions, there are numerous technical schools turn- 
ing out skilled agriculturists or engineers* while good 
normal schools assure a supply of teachers qualified to 
instruct coming student-generations. Both public and 
private effort furthers Western education in the East. 
All the European governments have favored Western 
education in the lands under their control, particularly 
the British in India and Egypt, while various Christian 
missionary bodies have covered the East with a net- 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



303 



work of schools and colleges. Also many Oriental gov- 
ernments like Turkey and the native states of India 
have made sincere efforts to spread Western education 
among their peoples. 1 

Of course, as in any new development, the results so 
far obtained are far from ideal. The vicious traditions 
of the past handicap or partially pervert the efforts of 
the present. Eastern students are prone to use their 
memories rather than their intellects, and seek to cram 
their way quickly through examinations to coveted posts 
rather than acquire knowledge and thus really fit them- 
selves for their careers. The result is that many fail, 
and these unfortunates, half-educated and spoiled for 
any sort of useful occupation, vegetate miserably, come 
to hate that Westernism which they do not understand, 
and give themselves up to anarchistic revolutionary 
agitation. Sir Alfred Lyall well describes the dark side 
of Western education in the East when he says of India: 
"Ignorance is unquestionably the root of many evils; 
and it was natural that in the last century certain phi- 
losophers should have assumed education to be a certain 
cure for human delusions; and that statesmen like Ma- 
caul ay should have declared education to be the best and 
surest remedy for political discontent and for law-break- 
ing. In any case, it was the clear and imperative duty 
of the British Government to attempt the intellectual 
emancipation of India as the best justification of British 
rule. We have since discovered by experience, that, 
although education is a sovereign remedy for many ills — 

1 For progress in Western education in the Orient, under both European 
and native auspices, see L. Bertrand, he Mirage oriental, pp. 291- -392; 
C. S. Cooper, The Modernizing of the Orient, pp. 3-13; 24-64. 



304 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



is indeed indispensable to healthy progress — yet an in- 
discriminate or superficial administration of this potent 
medicine may engender other disorders. It acts upon 
the frame of an antique society as a powerful dissolvent, 
heating weak brains, stimulating rash ambitions, rais- 
ing inordinate expectations of which the disappointment 
is bitterly resented." 1 

Indeed, some Western observers of the Orient, particu- 
larly colonial officials, have been so much impressed by 
the political and social dangers arising from the existence 
of this "literate proletariat" of semieducated failures 
that they are tempted to condemn the whole venture 
of Western education in the East as a mistake. Lord 
Cromer, for example, was decidedly sceptical of the 
worth of the Western-educated Egyptian, 2 while a 
prominent Anglo-Indian official names as the chief 
cause of Indian unrest, "the system of education, which 
we ourselves introduced — advisedly so far as the limited 
vision went of those responsible; blindly in view of the 
inevitable consequences." 3 

Yet these pessimistic judgments do not seem to make 
due allowance for the inescapable evils attendant on 
any transition stage. Other observers of the Orient 
have made due allowance for this factor. Vambery, 
for instance, notes the high percentage of honest and 
capable native officials in the British Indian and French 
North African civil service (the bulk of these officials, of 
course, Western-educated men), and concludes: "Strictly 
conservative Orientals, and also fanatically inclined 

1 In his Introduction to Sir Valentine Chirol's Indian Unrest, p. xii. 

2 Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. II, pp. 228-243. 

3 J. D. Rees, The Real India, p. 162 (London, 1908). 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



305 



Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture 
the primitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed, 
and that the uncivilized Oriental was more faithful, 
more honest, and more reliable than the Asiatic edu- 
cated on European principles. This is a gross error. It 
may be true of the half-educated, but not of the Asiatic 
in whose case the intellectual evolution is founded on 
the solid basis of a thorough, systematic education." 1 

And, whatever may be the ills attendant upon West- 
ern education in the East, is it not the only practicable 
course to pursue? The impact of Westernism upon the 
Orient is too ubiquitous to be confined to books. Grant- 
ing, therefore, for the sake of argument, that colonial 
governments could have prevented Western education 
in the formal sense, would not the Oriental have learned 
in other ways? Surely it is better that he should learn 
through good texts under the supervision of qualified 
teachers, rather than tortuously in perverted — and more 
dangerous — f ashion . 

The importance of Western education in the East is 
nowhere better illustrated than in the effects it is pro- 
ducing in ameliorating the status of women. The de- 
pressed condition of women throughout the Orient is 
too well known to need elaboration. Bad enough in 
Mohammedan countries, it is perhaps at its worst among 
the Hindus of India, with child-marriage, the virtual 
enslavement of widows (burned alive till prohibited by 
English law), and a seclusion more strict even than that 
of the " harem" of Moslem lands. As an English writer 
well puts it: Ladies first/ we say in the West; in the 
East it is 'ladies last/ That sums up succinctly the dif- 

1 Vambery, Western Culture in Eastern Lands, pp. 203-204. 



306 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



ference in the domestic ideas of the two civilizations." 1 
Under these circumstances it might seem as though 
no breath of the West could yet have reached these jeal- 
ously secluded creatures. Yet, as a matter of fact, 
Western influences have already profoundly affected 
the women of the upper classes, and female education, 
while far behind that of the males, has attained con- 
siderable proportions. In the more advanced parts of 
the Orient like Constantinople, Cairo, and the cities 
of India, distinctly "modern" types of women have 
appeared, the self-supporting, self-respecting — and re- 
spected — woman school-teacher being especially in evi- 
dence. 

The social consequences of this rising status of women, 
not only to women themselves but also to the com- 
munity at large, are very important. In the East the 
harem is, as Yambery well says, the "bulwark of ob- 
scurantism." 2 Ignorant and fanatical herself, the ha- 
rem woman implants her ignorance and fanaticism in 
her sons as well as in her daughters. What could be a 
worse handicap for the Eastern "intellectual" than his 
boyhood years spent "behind the veil"? No wonder 
that enlightened Oriental fathers have been in the 
habit of sending their boys to school at the earliest pos- 
sible age in order to get them as soon as possible out of 
the stultifying atmosphere of harem life. Yet even this 
has proved merely a palliative. Childhood impressions 
are ever the most lasting, and so long as one-half of the 
Orient remained untouched by progressive influences, 

1 H. E. Compton, Indian Life in Town and Country, p. 98 (London, 
1904). 

2 Vambery, La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quaranie Ans, p. 32. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



307 



Oriental progress had to be begun again de novo with 
every succeeding generation. 

The increasing number of enlightened Oriental women 
is remedying this fatal defect. As a Western writer 
well says: "Give the mothers education and the whole 
situation is transformed. Girls who are learning other 
things than the unintelligible phrases of the Koran are 
certain to impart such knowledge, as daughters, sisters, 
and mothers, to their respective households. Women 
who learn housewifery, methods of modern cooking, 
sewing, and sanitation in the domestic-economy schools, 
are bound to cast about the home upon their return the 
atmosphere of a civilized community. The old-time 
picture of the Oriental woman spending her hours upon 
divans, eating sweetmeats, and indulging in petty and 
degrading gossip with the servants or with women as 
ignorant as herself, will be changed. The new woman 
will be a companion rather than a slave or a toy of her 
husband. Marriage will advance from the stage of a 
paltry trade in bodies to something like a real union, 
involving respect toward the woman by both sons and 
fathers, while in a new pride of relationship the woman 
herself will be discovered." 1 

These men and women of the newer Orient reflect 
their changing ideas in their changing standards of liv- 
ing. Although this is most evident among the wealthier 
elements of the towns, it is perceptible in all classes of 
the population. Rich and poor, urban and rural, the 
Orientals are altering their living standards toward those 
of the West. And this involves social changes of the 
most far-reaching character, because few antitheses 

1 Cooper, op. tit., pp. 48-49. 



308 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



could be sharper than the living conditions prevailing 
respectively in the traditional East and in the modern 
Western world. This basic difference lies, not in wealth 
(the East, like the West, knows great riches as well as 
great poverty), but rather in comfort — using the word in 
its broad sense. The wealthy Oriental of the old school 
spends most of his money on Oriental luxuries, like fine 
raiment, jewels, women, horses, and a great retinue of 
attendants, and then hoards the rest. But of "comfort," 
in the Western sense, he knows virtually nothing, and 
it is safe to say that he lives under domestic conditions 
which a Western artisan would despise. 1 

To-day, however, the Oriental is discovering "com- 
fort." And, high or low, he likes it very well. All the 
myriad things which make our lives easier and more 
agreeable — lamps, electric lights, sewing-machines, clocks, 
whiskey, umbrellas, sanitary plumbing, and a thousand 
others; all these things, which to us are more or less 
matters of course, are to the Oriental so many delightful 
discoveries, of irresistible appeal. He wants them, and 
he gets them in ever-increasing quantities. But this 
produces some rather serious complications. His pri- 
vate economy is more or less thrown out of gear. This 
opening of a whole vista of new wants means a porten- 
tous rise in his standard of living. And wiiere is he 
going to find the money to pay for it? If he be poor, 
he has to skimp on his bare necessities. If he be rich, 
he hates to forego his traditional luxuries. The upshot 
is a universal growth of extravagance. And, in this 

x On this point of comfort vs. luxury, see especially Sir Bampfylde 
Fuller, "East and West: A Study of Differences," Nineteenth Century and 
After, November, 1911. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



309 



connection; it is well to bear in mind that the peoples of 
the Near and Middle East, taken as a whole, have never 
been really thrifty. Poor the masses may have been, 
and thus obliged to live frugally, but they have always 
proved themselves "good spenders" when opportunity 
offers. The way in which a Turkish peasant or a Hindu 
ryot will squander his savings and run into debt over 
festivals, marriages, funerals, and other social events is 
astounding to Western observers. 1 Now add to all 
this the fact that in the Orient, as in the rest of the 
world, the cost of the basic necessaries of life — food, 
clothing, fuel, and shelter, has risen greatly during the 
past two decades, and we can realize the gravity of the 
problem which higher Oriental living-standards involves. 2 
Certain it is that the struggle for existence is grow- 
ing keener and that the pressure of poverty is getting 
more severe. With the basic necessaries rising in price, 
and with many things considered necessities which were 
considered luxuries or entirely unheard of a generation 
ago, the Oriental peasant or town working man is finding 
it harder and harder to make both ends meet. As one 
writer well phrases it: "These altered economic condi- 
tions have not as yet brought the ability to meet them. 
The cost of living has increased faster than the resources 
of the people." 3 

1 L. Bertrand, op. cit., 145-147; J. Chailley, Administrative Problems of 
British India, pp. 138-139. For increased expenditure on Western prod- 
ucts, see A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia," The Century, March, 
1904; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India," Journal of Race 
Development, July, 1910; R. Mukerjee, The Foundations of Indian Eco- 
nomics, p. 5. 

2 For higher cost of living in the East, see Chirol, Indian Unrest, pp. 2-3; 
Fisher, India's Silent Revolution, pp. 46-60; Jones, op. cit.; T. T. Williams, 
"Inquiry into the Rise of Prices in India," Economic Journal, December, 
1915. 

8 Brown, op. cit. 



310 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



One of the main (though not sufficiently recognized) 
causes of the economico-social crisis through which the 
Orient is to-day passing is overpopulation. The quick 
breeding tendencies of Oriental peoples have always 
been proverbial, and have been due not merely to strong 
sexual appetites but also to economic reasons like the 
harsh exploitation of women and children, and perhaps 
even more to religious doctrines enjoining early marriage 
and the begetting of numerous sons. As a result, Ori- 
ental populations have always pressed close upon the 
limits of subsistence. In the past, however, this pres- 
sure was automatically lightened by factors like war, 
misgovernment, pestilence, and famine, which swept 
off such multitudes of people that, despite high birth- 
rates, populations remained at substantially a fixed level. 
But here, as in every other phase of Eastern life, West- 
ern influences have radically altered the situation. The 
extension of European political control over Eastern 
lands has meant the putting down of internal strife, 
the diminution of governmental abuses, the decrease of 
disease, and the lessening of the blight of famine. In 
other words, those "natural" checks which previously 
kept down the population have been diminished or abol- 
ished, and in response to the life-saving activities of the 
West, the enormous death-rate which in the past has 
kept Oriental populations from excessive multiplication 
is falling to proportions comparable with the low death- 
rate of Western nations. But to lower the Orient's 
prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. As a 
matter of fact, that birth-rate keeps up with undimin- 
ished vigor, and the consequence has been a portentous 
increase of population in nearly every portion of the 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



311 



Orient under Western political control. In fact, even 
those Oriental countries which have maintained their 
independence have more or less adopted Western life- 
conserving methods, and have experienced in greater or 
less degree an accelerated increase of population. 

The phenomena of overpopulation are best seen in 
India. Most of India has been under British control 
for the greater part of a century. Even a century ago, 
India was densely populated, yet in the intervening 
hundred years the population has increased between 
two and three fold. 1 Of course, factors like improved 
agriculture, irrigation, railways, and the introduction 
of modern industry enable India to support a much 
larger population than it could have done at the time of 
the British conquest. Nevertheless, the evidence is 
clear that excessive multiplication has taken place. 
Nearly all qualified students of the problem concur on 
this point. Forty years ago the Duke of Argyll stated: 
" Where there is no store, no accumulation, no wealth; 
where the people live from hand to mouth from season 
to season on a low diet; and where, nevertheless, they 
breed and multiply at such a rate; there we can at least 
see that this power and force of multiplication is no 
evidence even of safety, far less of comfort." Toward 
the close of the last century, Sir William Hunter termed 
population India's " fundamental problem," and con- 
tinued: "The result of civilized rule in India has been 
to produce a strain on the food-producing powers of the 
country such as it had never before to bear. It has be- 

1 At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of India 
is roughly estimated to have been about 100,000,000. According to the 
census of 1911 the population was 315,000,000. 



312 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



come a truism of Indian statistics that the removal of 
the old cruel checks on population in an Asiatic country- 
is by no means an unmixed blessing to an Asiatic peo- 
ple." 1 Lord Cromer remarks of India's poverty: "Not 
only cannot it be remedied by mere philanthropy; but 
it is absolutely certain — cruel and paradoxical though it 
may appear to say so — that philanthropy enhances the 
evil. In the days of Akhbar or Shah Jehan, cholera, 
famine, and internal strife kept down the population. 
Only the fittest survived. Now internal strife is forbid- 
den, and philanthropy steps in and says that no single 
life shall be sacrificed if science and Western energy or 
skill can save it. Hence the growth of a highly con- 
gested population, vast numbers of whom are living on a 
bare margin of subsistence. The fact that one of the 
greatest difficulties of governing the teeming masses of 
the East is caused by good and humane government 
should be recognized. It is too often ignored." 2 

William Archer well states the matter when, in answer 
to the query why improved external conditions have not 
brought India prosperity, he says: "The reason, in my 
view, is simple: namely, that the benefit of good govern- 
ment is, in part at any rate, nullified, when the people 
take advantage of it, not to save and raise their stand- 
ard of living, but to breed to the very margin of sub- 
sistence. Henry George used to point out that every 
mouth that came into the world brought two hands 
along with it; but though the physiological fact is unde- 
niable, the economic deduction suggested will not hold 

1 Sir W. W. Hunter, The India of the Queen and Other Essays, p. 42 (Lon- 
don, 1903). 

2 Cromer, "Some Problems of Government in Europe and Asia," Nine- 
teenth Century and After, May, 1913. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



313 



good except in conditions that permit of the profitable 
employment of the two hands. ... If mouths increase 
in a greater ratio than food, the tendency must be to- 
ward greater poverty." 1 

It is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the situa- 
tion that very few Oriental thinkers yet realize that 
overpopulation is a prime cause of Oriental poverty. 
Almost without exception they lay the blame to politi- 
cal factors, especially to Western political control. In 
fact, the only case that I know of where an Eastern 
thinker has boldly faced the problem and has coura- 
geously advocated birth-control is in the book published 
five years ago by P. K. Wattal, a native official of the 
Indian Finance Department, entitled, The Population 
Problem of India. 2 This pioneer volume is written with 
such ability and is of such apparent significance as an 
indication of the awakening of Orientals to a more ra- 
tional attitude, that it merits special attention. 

Mr. Wattal begins his book by a plea to his fellow 
countrymen to look at the problem rationally and with- 
out prejudice. "This essay," he says, "should not be 
construed into an attack on the spiritual civilization of 
our country, or even indirectly into a glorification of 
the materialism of the West. The object in view is 
that we should take a somewhat more matter-of-fact 
view of the main problem of life, viz., how to live in this 
world. We are a poor people; the fact is indisputable. 
Our poverty is, perhaps, due to a great many causes. 
But I put it to every one of us whether he has not at 

Archer, India and the Future, pp. 157, 162 (London, 1918). 
2 P. K. Wattal, of the Indian Finance I)epartment, Assistant Account- 
ant-General. The book was published at BQmba^, 1916. 



314 



THE NEW 



WORLD 



OF ISLAM 



some of the most momentous periods of his life been 
handicapped by having to support a large family, and 
whether this encumbrance has not seriously affected 
the chances of advancement warranted by early promise 
and exceptional endowment. This question should be 
viewed by itself. It is a physical fact, and has nothing 
to do with political environment or religious obligation. 
If we have suffered from the consequences of that mis- 
take, is it not a duty that we owe to ourselves and to 
our progeny that its evil effects shall be mitigated as 
far as possible? There is no greater curse than pov- 
erty — I say this with due respect to our spiritualism. 
It is not in a spirit of reproach that restraint in married 
life is urged in these pages. It is solely from a vivid 
realization of the hardships caused by large families and 
a profound sympathy with the difficulties under which 
large numbers of respectable persons struggle through 
life in this country that I have made bold to speak in 
plain terms what comes to every young man, but which 
he does not care to give utterance to in a manner that 
w r ould prevent the recurrence of the evil." 1 

After this appeal to reason in his readers, Mr. Wattal 
develops his thesis. The first prime cause of over- 
population in India, he asserts, is early marriage. Con- 
trary to Western lands, where population is kept down 
by prudential marriages and by birth-control, "for the 
Hindus marriage is a sacrament which must be per- 
formed, regardless of the fitness of the parties to bear 
the responsibilities of a mated existence. A Hindu male 
must marry and beget children — sons, if you please — to 
perform his funeral rites lest his spirit wander uneasily 

1 Wattal, pp. i-iii. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



315 



in the waste places of the earth. The very name of son, 
'putra/ means one who saves his father's soul from the 
hell called Puta. A Hindu maiden unmarried at puberty 
is a source of social obloquy to her family and of damna- 
tion to her ancestors. Among the Mohammedans, who 
are not handicapped by such penalties, the married 
state is equally common, partly owing to Hindu example 
and partly to the general conditions of primitive society, 
where a wife is almost a necessity both as a domestic 
drudge and as a helpmate in field work." 1 The worst 
of the matter is that, despite the efforts of social re- 
formers, child-marriage seems to be increasing. The 
census of 1911 showed that during the decade 1901-10 
the numbers of married females per 1,000 of ages 
0-5 years rose from 13 to 14; of ages 5-10 from 102 to 
105; of 10-15 from 423 to 430, and of 15-20 from 770 
to 800. In other words, in the year 1911, out of every 
1,000 Indian girls, over one-tenth were married before 
they were 10 years old, nearly one-half before they were 
15, and four-fifths before they were 20. 2 

The result of all this is a tremendous birth-rate, but 
this is "no matter for congratulation. We have heard 
so often of our high death-rate and the means for com- 
bating it, but can it be seriously believed that with a 
birth-rate of 30 per 1,000 it is possible to go on as we are 
doing with the death-rate brought down to the level of 
England or Scotland? Is there room enough in the 
country for the population to increase so fast as 20 per 
1,000 every year? We are paying the inevitable penalty 
of bringing into this world more persons than can be 
properly cared for, and therefore if we wish fewer deaths 

1 Ibid., p. 3. 2 Ibid., p. 12. 



316 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



to occur in this country the births must be reduced to 
the level of the countries where the death-rate is low. 
It is, therefore, our high birth-rate that is the social 
danger; the high death-rate, however regrettable, is 
merely an incident of our high birth-rate." 1 

Mr. Wattal then describes the cruel items in India's 
death-rate: the tremendous female mortality, due largely 
to too early childbirth, and the equally terrible infant 
mortality, nearly 50 per cent of infant deaths being due 
to premature birth or debility at birth. These are the 
inevitable penalties of early and universal marriage. 
For, in India, "everybody marries, fit or unfit, and is a 
parent at the earliest possible age permitted by nature." 
This process is highly disgenic; it is plainly lowering 
the quality and sapping the vigor of the race. It is the 
lower elements of the population, the negroid aboriginal 
tribes and the Pariahs or Outcastes, who are gaining the 
fastest. Also the vitality of the whole population seems 
to be lowering. The census figures show that the num- 
ber of elderly persons is decreasing, and that the average 
statistical expectation of life is falling. "The coming 
generation is severely handicapped at start in life. And 
the chances of living to a good old age are considerably 
smaller than they were, say thirty or forty years ago. 
Have we ever paused to consider what it means to us in 
the life of the nation as a whole? It means that the 
people who alone by weight of experience and wisdom 
are fitted for the posts of command in the various pub- 
lic activities of the country are snatched away by death; 
and that the guidance and leadership which belongs to 
age and mature judgment in the countries of the West 

1 Ibid., p. 14. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



317 



fall in India to younger and consequently to less trust- 
worthy persons." 1 

After warning his fellow countrymen that neither 
improved methods of agriculture, the growth of indus- 
try, nor emigration can afford any real relief to the 
growing pressure of population on means of subsistence, 
he notes a few hopeful signs that, despite the hold of 
religion and custom, the people are beginning to realize 
the situation and that in certain parts of India there are 
foreshado wings of birth-control. For example, he quotes 
from the census report for 1901 this official explanation 
of a slight drop in the birth-rate of Bengal: "The post- 
ponement of the age of marriage cannot wholly account 
for the diminished rate of reproduction. The deliber- 
ate avoidance of child-bearing must also be partly re- 
sponsible. ... It is a matter of common belief that 
among the tea-garden coolies of Assam means are fre- 
quently taken to prevent conception, or to procure 
abortion." And the report of the Sanitary Commis- 
sioner of Assam for 1913 states: "An important factor 
in producing the defective birth-rate appears to be due 
to voluntary limitation of births." 2 

However, these beginnings of birth-control are too 
local and partial to afford any immediate relief to In- 
dia's growing overpopulation. Wider appreciation of 
the situation and prompt action are needed. "The 
conclusion is irresistible. We can no longer afford to 
shut our eyes to the social canker in our midst. In the 
land of the bullock-cart, the motor has come to stay. 
The competition is now with the more advanced races of 
the West, and we cannot tell them what Diogenes said 

1 Ibid., pp. 19-21. 2 Ibid., p. 28. 



318 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



to Alexander — 1 Stand out of my sunshine.' After the 
close of this gigantic World War theories of population 
will perhaps be revised and a reversion in favor of early 
marriage and larger families may be counted upon. 
But, (1) that will be no solution to our own population 
problem, and (2) this reaction will be only for a time. . . . 
The law of population may be arrested in its operation, 
but there is no way of escaping it." 1 

So concludes this striking little book. Furthermore, 
we must remember that, although India may be the 
acutest sufferer from overpopulation, conditions in the 
entire Orient are basically the same, prudential checks 
and rational birth-control being everywhere virtually 
absent. 2 Remembering also that, besides overpopula- 
tion, there are other economic and social evils previously 
discussed, we cannot be surprised to find in all Eastern 
lands much acute poverty and social degradation. 

Both the rural and urban masses usually live on the 
bare margin of subsistence. The English economist 
Brailsford thus describes the condition of the Egyptian 
peasantry: "The villages exhibited a poverty such as I 
have never seen even in the mountains of anarchical 
Macedonia or among the bogs of Donegal. . . . The 
villages are crowded slums of mud hovels, without a 
tree, a flower, or a garden. The huts, often without a 
window or a levelled floor, are minute dungeons of baked 
mud, usually of two small rooms neither whitewashed 
nor carpeted. Those which I entered were bare of any 
visible property, save a few cooking utensils, a mat to 
serve as a bed, and a jar which held the staple food of 

1 IUd., p. 82. 

2 For conditions in the Near East, see Bertrand, pp. 110; 124; 125-128. 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



319 



maize." 1 As for the poorer Indian peasants, a British 
sanitary official thus depicts their mode of life: "One 
has actually to see the interior of the houses, in which 
each family is often compelled to live in a single small 
cell, made of mud walls and with a mud floor; contain- 
ing small yards littered with rubbish, often crowded 
with cattle; possessing wells permeated by rain soaking 
through this filthy surface; and frequently jumbled to- 
gether in inchoate masses called towns and cities." 2 

In the cities, indeed, conditions are even worse than 
in the country, the slums of the Orient surpassing the 
slums of the West. The French publicist Louis Ber- 
trand paints positively nauseating pictures of the poorer 
quarters of the great Levantine towns like Cairo, Con- 
stantinople, and Jerusalem. Omitting his more poign- 
ant details, here is his description of a Cairo tenement: 
"In Cairo, as elsewhere in Egypt, the wretchedness and 
grossness of the poorer-class dwellings are perhaps even 
more shocking than in the other Eastern lands. Two 
or three dark, airless rooms usually open on a hallway 
not less obscure. The plaster, peeling off from the 
ceilings and the worm-eaten laths of the walls, falls con- 
stantly to the filthy floors. The straw mats and bed- 
ding are infested by innumerable vermin." 3 

In India it is the same story. Says Fisher: "Even 
before the growth of her industries had begun, the cities 
of India presented a baffling housing problem. Into the 

1 H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold, pp. 112-113. See also 
T. Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin, pp. 298-300 (London, 1910), Sir W. W. 
Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia," Quarterly Review, January, 
1918. 

2 Dr. D. Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," The Survey, 
February 18, 1911. 

3 Bertrand, op. cit., pp. 111-112. 



320 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



welter of crooked streets and unsanitary habits of an 
Oriental city these great industrial plants are wedging 
their thousands of employees. Working from before 
dawn until after dark, men and women are too exhausted 
to go far from the plant to sleep, if they can help it. 
When near-by houses are jammed to suffocation, they 
live and sleep in the streets. In Calcutta, twenty years 
ago, 1 land had reached $200,000 an acre in the over- 
crowded tenement districts." 2 Of Calcutta, a Western 
writer remarks: " Calcutta is a shame even in the East. 
In its slums, mill hands and dock coolies do not live; 
they pig. Houses choke with unwholesome breath; 
drains and compounds fester in filth. Wheels com- 
press decaying refuse in the roads; cows drink from 
wells soaked with sewage, and the floors of bakeries 
are washed in the same pollution." 3 In the other in- 
dustrial centres of India, conditions are practically the 
same. A Bombay native sanitary official stated in a 
report on the state of the tenement district, drawn up 
in 1904: "In such houses — the breeders of germs and 
bacilli, the centres of disease and poverty, vice, and 
crime — have people of all kinds, the diseased, the disso- 
lute, the drunken, the improvident, been indiscrimi- 
nately herded and tightly packed in vast hordes to dwell 
in close association with each other." 4 

Furthermore, urban conditions seem to be getting 
worse rather than better. The problem of congestion, 
in particular, is assuming ever graver proportions. Al- 
ready in the opening years of the present century the 

1 /. e., in 1900. 2 Fisher, India's Silent Revolution, p. 51. 

3 G. W. Stevens, In India. Quoted by Fisher, p. 51. 

4 Dr. Bhalchandra Krishna. Quoted by A. Yusuf Ali, Life and Labor 
in India, p. 35 (London, 1907). 



SOCIAL CHANGE 



321 



congestion in the great industrial centres of India like 
Calcutta, Bombay, and Lucknow averaged three or four 
times the congestion of London. And the late war has 
rendered the housing crisis even more acute. In the 
East, as in the West, the war caused a rapid drift of 
population to the cities and at the same time stopped 
building owing to the prohibitive cost of construction. 
Hence, a prodigious rise in rents and a plague of land- 
lord profiteering. Says Fisher: "Rents were raised as 
much as 300 per cent, enforced by eviction. Mass-meet- 
ings of protest in Bombay resulted in government ac- 
tion,, fixing maximum rents for some of the tenements 
occupied by artisans and laborers. Setting maximum 
rental does not, however, make more room." 1 

And, of course, it must not be forgotten that higher 
rents are only one phase in a general rise in the cost of 
living that has been going on in the East for a genera- 
tion and which has been particularly pronounced since 
1914. More than a decade ago Bertrand wrote of the 
Near East: "From one end of the Levant to the other, 
at Constantinople as at Smyrna, Damascus, Beyrout, 
and Cairo, I heard the same complaints about the in- 
creasing cost of living; and these complaints were uttered 
by Europeans as well as by the natives." 2 To-day the 
situation is even more difficult. Says Sir Valentine 
Chirol of conditions in Egypt since the war: "The rise 
in wages, considerable as it has been, has ceased to keep 
pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very neces- 
sities of life. This is particularly the case in the urban 
centres, where the lower classes — workmen, carters, cab- 
drivers, shopkeepers, and a host of minor employees — 

1 Fisher, pp. 51-52. 2 Bertrand, p. 141. 



322 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



are hard put to it nowadays to make both ends meet." 1 
As a result of all these hard conditions various phe- 
nomena of social degradation such as alcoholism, vice, 
and crime, are becoming increasingly common. 2 Last — ■ 
but not least — there are growing symptoms of social 
unrest and revolutionary agitation, which we will ex- 
amine in the next chapter. 

1 Sir V. Chirol, "England's Peril in Egypt," from the London Times, 
1919. 

2 See Bertrand and Fisher, supra. 



CHAPTER IX 

SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM 

Unrest is the natural concomitant of change — particu- 
larly of sudden change. Every break with past ; how- 
ever normal and inevitable, implies a necessity for read- 
justment to altered conditions which causes a temporary 
sense of restless disharmony until the required adjust- 
ment has been made. Unrest is not an exceptional 
phenomenon; it is always latent in every human society 
which has not fallen into complete stagnation, and a 
slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of 
healthy growth rather than a symptom of disease. In 
fact, the minimum degrees of unrest are usually not 
called by that name, but are considered mere incidents 
of normal development. Under normal circumstances, 
indeed, the social organism functions like the human 
organism: it is being incessantly destroyed and as in- 
cessantly renewed in conformity with the changing con- 
ditions of life. These changes are sometimes very con- 
siderable, but they are so gradual that they are effected 
almost without being perceived. A healthy organism 
well attuned to its environment is always plastic. It 
instinctively senses environmental changes and adapts 
itself so rapidly that it escapes the injurious conse- 
quences of disharmony. 

Far different is the character of unrest's acuter mani- 
festations. These are infallible symptoms of sweeping 
changes, sudden breaks with the past, and profound 
maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified. 

328 



324 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



In other words, acute unrest denotes social ill health 
and portends the possibility of one of those violent 
crises known as "revolutions." 

The history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the 
above generalizations. The formative period of Sara- 
cenic civilization was characterized by rapid change and 
an intense idealistic ferment. The great "Motazelite" 
movement embraced many shades of thought, its radi- 
cal wing professing religious, political, and social doc- 
trines of a violent, revolutionary nature. But this 
changeful period was superficial and brief. Arab vigor 
and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently to 
leaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the 
old traditions reasserted themselves — somewhat modi- 
fied, to be sure, yet basically the same. Saracenic civi- 
lization became stereotyped, ossified, and with this ossi- 
fication changeful unrest died away. Here and there 
the radical tradition was preserved and secretly handed 
down by a few obscure sects like the Kharidjites of Inner 
Arabia and the Bektashi dervishes; but these were mere 
cryptic episodes, of no general significance. 

With the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, however, symptoms of social 
unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimed not 
merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a 
general protest against the contemporary decadence of 
Moslem society. In many cases it took the form of a 
popular revolt against established governments. The 
same was true of the correlative Babbist movement in 
Persia, which took place about the same time. 1 

1 For these early forms of unrest, see A. Le Chatelier, L'team au diss- 

neumbme SMe, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888). 



SOCIAL UNREST 



325 



And of course these nascent stirrings were greatly 
stimulated by the flood of Western ideas and methods 
which, as the nineteenth century wore on, increasingly 
permeated the East. What, indeed, could be more pro- 
vocative of unrest of every description than the result- 
ing transformation of the Orient — a transformation so 
sudden, so intense, and necessitating so concentrated a 
process of adaptation that it was basically revolutionary 
rather than evolutionary in its nature? The details of 
these profound changes — political, religious, economic, 
social — we have already studied, together with the 
equally profound disturbance, bewilderment, and suffer- 
ing afflicting all classes in this eminently transition 
period. 

The essentially revolutionary nature of this transition 
period, as exemplified by India, is well described by 
a British economist. 1 What, he asks, could be more 
anachronistic than the contrast between rural and urban 
India? "Rural India is primitive or mediaeval; city 
India is modern.' ' In city India you will find every 
symbol of Western life, from banks and factories down 
to the very "sandwichmen that you left in the London 
gutters." Now all this coexists beside rural India. 
"And it is surely a fact unique in economic history that 
they should thus exist side by side. The present condi- 
tion of India does not correspond with any period of 
European economic history." Imagine the effect in 
Europe of setting down modern and mediaeval men to- 
gether, with utterly disparate ideas. That has not hap- 
pened in Europe because "European progress in the 

1 D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India," Economic Journal, 
December, 1910, 



326 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



economic world has been evolutionary a process spread 
over centuries. In India, on the other hand, this eco- 
nomic transformation has been " revolutionary " in 

character. 

How unevolutionary is India's economic transforma- 
tion is seen by the condition of rural India. 

"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive 
usage, has been invaded by ideas that are intensely hos- 
tile to the old state of things. It is primitive, but not con- 
sistently primitive. Competitive wages are paid side by 
side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed 
by custom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes. 
From the midst of a population deeply rooted in the 
soil, men are being carried away by the desire of better 
wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly and 
partially intruded themselves in the realm of primitive 
morality. And, if we turn to city India, we see a simi- 
lar, though inverted, state of things. ... In neither 
case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusion 
complete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated, 
too far apart, to coalesce with ease. . . . 

"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution 
throughout all the classes of an enormous and complex so- 
ciet} r . The only period in which Europe offered even faint 
analogies to modern India was the Industrial Revolution, 
from which even now we have not settled down into 
comparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortunate 
circumstance for Europe that the intellectual movement 
which culminated in the French Revolution did not coin- 
cide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had, it is 
possible that European society might have been hope- 
lessly wrecked. But, as it was, even when the French 



SOCIAL UNREST 



327 



Revolution had spent its force in the conquests of Na- 
poleon; the Industrial Revolution stirred up enough so- 
cial and political discontent. When whole classes of 
people are obliged by economic revolution to change 
their mode of life, it is inevitable that man} 7 should suf- 
fer. Discontent is roused. Political and destructive 
movements are certain to ensue. Not only the revolu- 
tions of '48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party 
sprang from the Industrial Revolution. 

"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as 
that which is now in operation in India. The inven- 
tion of machinery and steam-power was, in Europe, but 
the crowning event of a long series of years in which 
commerce and industry had been constantly expanding, 
in which capital had been largely accumulated, in which 
economic principles had been gradually spreading. . . . 
No, the Indian economic revolution is vastly greater 
and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolu- 
tion, great as that was. Railways have been built 
through districts where travel was almost impossible, 
and even roads are unknown. Factories have been 
built, and filled by men unused to industrial labor. 
Capital has been poured into the country, which was 
unprepared for any such development. And what are 
Ihe consequences? India's social organization is being 
dissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The 
iyot is no longer bound to the soil. The banya is no 
longer the sole purveyor of capital. The hand-weaver 
is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker can 
no longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which 
this sudden change has brought about, of the many who 
can no longer follow their ancestral vocations, of the 



328 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



commotion which a less profound change produced in 
Europe, and you will understand what is the chief mo- 
tive-power of the political unrest. It is small w r onder. 
The wonder is that the unrest has been no greater than 
it is. Had India not been an Asiatic country, she would 
have been in fierce revolution long ago." 

The above lines were of course written in the opening 
years of the twentieth century, before the world had 
been shattered by Armageddon and aggressive social 
revolution had established itself in semi-Asiatic Russia. 
But even during those pre-war years, other students of 
the Orient were predicting social disturbances of increas- 
ing gravity. Said the Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin 
Chandra Pal: "This so-called unrest is not really politi- 
cal. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritual up- 
heaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with 
a new organon and a new philosophy of life behind it." 1 
And the French publicist Chailley w T rote of India: " There 
will be a series of economic revolutions, which must 
necessarily produce suffering and struggle." 2 

During this pre-war period the increased difficulty of 
living conditions, together with the adoption of West- 
ern ideas of comfort and kindred higher standards, 
seem to have been engendering friction between the dif- 
ferent strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a 
British sanitary expert assigned "wretchedness" as the 
root-cause of India's political unrest. After describing 
the deplorable living conditions of the Indian masses, 
he wrote: "It will of course be said at once that these 

1 Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Unrest in India," Con- 
temporary Review, February, 1910. 

2 J. Chailley, Administrative Problems of British India, p. 339 (London, 
1910 — English translation) . 



SOCIAL UNREST 



329 



conditions have existed in India from time immemorial, 
and are no more likely to cause unrest now than pre- 
viously; but in my opinion unrest has always existed 
there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in the old 
days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison 
between their own condition and that of more fortunate 
people; now they can compare their own slums and 
terrible 1 native quarters' with the much better ordered 
cantonments, stations, and houses of the British offi- 
cials and even of their own wealthier brethren. So far 
as I can see, such misery is always the fundamental 
cause of all popular unrest. . . . Seditious meetings, 
political chatter, and ' aspirations' of babus and dema- 
gogues are only the superficial manifestations of the 
deeper disturbance." 1 

This growing social friction was indubitably height- 
ened by the lack of interest of Orientals in the suffer- 
ings of all persons not bound to them by family, caste, 
or customary ties. Throughout the East, "social ser- 
vice," in the Western sense, is practically unknown. 
This fact is noted by a few Orientals themselves. Says 
an Indian writer, speaking of Indian town life: "There 
is no common measure of social conduct. . . . Hith- 
erto, social reform in India has taken account only of 
individual or family life. As applied to mankind in the 
mass, and especially to those soulless agglomerations of 
seething humanity which we call cities, it is a gospel 
yet to be preached." 2 As an American sociologist re- 
marked of the growing slum evil throughout the indus- 

1 Dr. Ronald Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest," The 
Survey, 18 February, 1911. 

2 A. Yusuf Ali, Life and Labor in India, pp. 3, 32 (London, 1907). 



330 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



trialized Orient: "The greatest danger is due to the fact 
that Orientals do not have the high Western sense of 
the value of the life of the individual, and are, compara- 
tively speaking, without any restraining influence simi- 
lar to our own enlightened public opinion, which has 
been roused by the struggles of a century of industrial 
strife. Unless these elements can be supplied, there is 
danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any the 
West has known." 1 

All this diffused social unrest was centring about 
two recently emerged elements: the Western-educated 
intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat of the fac- 
tory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the in- 
telligentsia, particularly of its half-educated failures, 
have been already noted, and these latter have undoubt- 
edly played a leading part in all the revolutionary dis- 
turbances of the modern Orient, from North Africa 
to China. 2 Regarding the industrial proletariat, some 
writers think that there is little immediate likelihood 
of their becoming a major revolutionary factor, be- 
cause of their traditionalism, ignorance, and apathy, 
and also because there is no real connection between 
them and the intelligentsia, the other centre of social 
discontent. 

The French economist M£tin states this view-point 
very well. Speaking primarily of India, he writes: 
" The Nationalist movement rises from the middle classes 
and manifests no systematic hostility toward the capi- 

*E. W. Capen, "A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence in the 
Orient," American Journal of Sociology, May, 1911. 

2 P. Khorat, "Psychologie de la Revolution chinoise," Revue des Deux 
Mondes, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, Le Mirage orientale, pp. 164r-166; 
J. D. Rees, The Real India, pp. 162-163. 



SOCIAL UNREST 331 



talists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is 
on their side." 1 As for the proletariat: "The coolies 
do not imagine that their lot can be bettered. Like the 
i-yots and the agricultural laborers, they do not show 
the least sign of revolt. To whom should they turn? 
The ranks of traditional society are closed to them. 
People without caste, the coolies are despised even by 
the old-style artisan, proud of his caste-status, humble 
though that be. To fall to the job of a coolie is, for the 
Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workers 
are not yet numerous enough to form a compact and 
powerful proletariat, able to exert pressure on the old 
society. Even if they do occasionally strike, they are 
as far from the modern trade-union as they are from the 
traditional working-caste. Neither can they look for 
leadership to the ' intellectual proletariat ' ; for the Na- 
tionalist movement has not emerged from the 'bour- 
geois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists. . . . 

"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages. 
In truth, the material evolution which translates itself 
by the construction of factories, and the social evolu- 
tion which creates a proletariat, have only begun to 
emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arise 
the programmes of social demands has not even begun.' ' 2 

Other observers of Indian industrial conditions, how- 
ever, do not share M. Metin's opinion. Says the British 
labor leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald: "To imagine the 
backward Indian laborers becoming a conscious regiment 
in the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams 
in which a Western mind can indulge. But I some- 

1 Albert M6tin, Ulnde tfaujourd'hui: ftiu&e soczale, p. 276 (Paris, 1918). 
s J6td., pp. 339-345. 



332 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



times wonder if it be so very vain after all. In the first 
place, the development of factory industry in India has 
created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched 
by the same economic ckri in any other capitalist com- 
munity; and to imagine that this class is to be kept 
out, or can be kept out, of Indian politics is far more 
vain than to dream of its developing a politics on West- 
ern lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have 
shown a willingness to respond to Trades-Union meth- 
ods; they are forming industrial associations and have 
engaged in strikes; some of the social reform movements 
conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try to es- 
tablish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us 
in connection with Trades-Union propaganda. A capi- 
talist fiscal policy will not only give this movement a 
great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India will not be 
able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan, 
by legislation. As yet, the true proletarian wage-earner, 
uprooted from his native village and broken away from 
the organization of Indian society, is but insignificant. 
It is growing, however, and I believe that it will organ- 
ize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian 
classes of other capitalist countries. So soon as it be- 
comes politically conscious, there are no other lines upon 
which it can organize itself/' 1 

Turning to the Near East — more than a decade ago 
a French Socialist writer, observing the hard living con- 
ditions of the Egyptian masses, noted signs of social 
unrest and predicted grave disturbances. "A genuine 
proletariat, " he wrote, "has been created by the multi- 

1 J. Ramsay Macdonald, The Government of India, pp. 133-134 (London, 
1920). 



SOCIAL UNREST 



333 



plication of industries and the sudden, almost abrupt, 
progress which has followed. The cost of living has 
risen to a scale hitherto unknown in Egypt, while wages 
have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound. 
Some day suffering will provoke the people to com- 
plaints, perhaps to angry outbursts, throughout this 
apparently prosperous Delta. It is true that the influx 
of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when 
the city or country laborer of Egyptian race comes 
clearly to perceive the wrongs that are being done to 
him. He may miss the educational influence of Social- 
ism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than 
people expect. It is not only among the successful and 
prosperous Egyptians that intelligence is to be found. 
Those whose wages are growing gradually smaller and 
smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it has 
become a real question as to the hour when for the first 
time in the land of Islam the flame of Mohammedan 
Socialism shall burst forth." 1 In Algeria, likewise, a 
Belgian traveller noted the dawning of a proletarian 
consciousness among the town working men just before 
the Great War. Speaking of the rapid spread of West- 
ern ideas, he wrote: " Islam tears asunder like rotten 
cloth on the quays of Algiers: the dockers, coal-passers, 
and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong, leave 
their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality, 
that of the proletarians of Europe, and they make com- 
mon cause with their European colleagues on the basis 
of a strictly economic struggle. If there were many big 
factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soon disap- 

1 Georges Foucart. Quoted in The Literary Digest, 17 August, 1907, 
pp. 225-226. 



334 THE 



NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



pear there, as old-fashioned Catholicism has disappeared 
with us under the shock of great industry." 1 

Whatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emer- 
gence of organized labor movements in the Orient, one 
thing seems certain: the unrest which afflicted so many 
parts of the East in the years preceding the Great War. 
though mainly political, had also its social side. To- 
ward the end of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal 
remarked pessimistically: "We have already gone so 
far on the downward path that leads to destruction that 
there are districts in what were once regarded as the 
most settled parts of India which are being abandoned 
by the rich because their property is not safe. So great 
is the contempt for the law that it is employed by the 
unscrupulous as a means of offense against the innocent. 
Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost unbelie\able 
in their daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation 
spreads in regard to topics quite outside the business 
of orderly people. There is no matter of domestic or 
foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible people 
do not want to have their passionate way. Great griev- 
ances are made of little, far-off things. What ought to 
be the ordered, spacious life of the District Officer is 
intruded upon and disturbed by a hundred distracting 
influences due to the want of discipline of the people. 
In the subordinate ranks of the great services them- 
selves, trades-unions have been formed. Military and 
police officers have to regret that the new class of re- 
cruits is less subordinate than the old, harder to dis- 
cipline, more full of complaints." 2 

1 A. Van Gennep, En Algerie, p. 182 (Paris, 1914). 

2 The Englishman (Calcutta). Quoted in The Literary Digest, Febru- 
ary 21, 1914, p. 369. 



SOCIAL UNREST 



335 



The Great War of course enormously aggravated 
Oriental unrest. In many parts of the Near East, 
especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions, and furi- 
ous hates combined to reduce society to the verge of 
chaos. Into this ominous turmoil there now came the 
sinister influence of Russian Bolshevism, marshalling all 
this diffused unrest by systematic methods for definite 
ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolu- 
tion and the destruction of Western civilization. To 
attain this objective the Bolshevist leaders not only 
launched direct assaults on the West, but also planned 
flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that 
if the East could be set on fire, not only would Russian 
Bolshevism gain vast additional strength but also the 
economic repercussion on the West, already shaken by 
the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapse 
would ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolu- 
tion. 

Bolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short 
of universal, both in area and in scope. No part of the 
world was free from the plottings of its agents; no possi- 
ble source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly "Red" 
doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were 
very far from being the only weapons in Bolshevism's 
armory. Since what was first wanted was the over- 
throw of the existing world-order, any kind of opposition 
to that order, no matter how remote doctrinally from 
Bolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accord- 
ingly, in every quarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa, 
Australia, and the Americas, as in Europe, Bolshevik 
agitators whispered in the ears of the discontented their 
gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspira- 



336 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



tion, every political grievance, every social injustice, 
every racial discrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's 
incitement to violence and war. 1 

Particularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity 
were the Near and Middle East. Besides being a prey 
to profound disturbances of every description, those 
regions, as traditional objectives of the old Czarist im- 
perialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian 
agents who had evolved a technic of " pacific penetra- 
tion" that might be easily adjusted to Bolshevist ends. 
To stir up political, religious, and racial passions in Tur- 
key, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially against 
England, required no original planning by Trotzky or 
Lenine. Czarism had already done these things for 
generations, and full information lay both in the Petro- 
grad archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist 
agents ready to turn their hands as easily to the new 
work as the old. 

In all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda 
which to-day enmeshes the East we must discrirninate 
between Bolshevism's two objectives: one immediate — 
the destruction of Western political and economic su- 
premacy; the other ultimate — the Bolshevizing of the 
Oriental masses and the consequent extirpation of the 
native upper and middle classes, precisely as has been 
done in Russia and as is planned for the countries of the 
West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready to 
respect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Orien- 

1 For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see Paul 
Miliukov, Bolshevism: An International Danger (London, 1920); also, 
my Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy, pp. 218-221, 
and my article, "Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man," The 
Century, June, 1919. 



SOCIAL UNREST 



337 



tal nationalist movements. In the second stage, re- 
ligions like Islam and nationalists like Mustapha Kemal 
are to be branded as "bourgeois" and relentlessly de- 
stroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavors to work 
these two schemes in double harness, we shall presently 
see. 

Russian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated 
soon after its accession to power at the close of 1917. 
The year 1918 was a time of busy preparation. An 
elaborate propaganda organization was built up from 
various sources. A number of old Czarist agents and 
diplomats versed in Eastern affairs were cajoled or con- 
scripted into the service. The Russian Mohammedan 
populations such as the Tartars of South Russia and 
the Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits. 
Even more valuable were the exiles who flocked to Rus- 
sia from Turkey, Persia, India, and elsewhere at the 
close of the Great War. Practically all the leaders of the 
Turkish war-government — Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and 
many more, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance 
of the victorious Entente Powers. The same was true of 
the Hindu terrorist leaders who had been in German 
pay during the war and who now sought service under 
Lenine. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental 
propaganda department was well organized, divided 
into three bureaux, for the Islamic countries, India, 
and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's 
Far Eastern activities this book is not concerned, though 
the reader should bear them in mind and should remem- 
ber the important part played by the Chinese in recent 
Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indian bu- 
reaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bol- 



338 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



shevik literature into the various Oriental languages, 
training numerous secret agents and propagandists for 
"field-work," and getting in touch with all disaffected 
or revolutionary elements. 

With the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity 
throughout the Near and Middle East became increas- 
ingly apparent. The wave of rage and despair caused 
by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalist 
aspirations 1 played splendidly into the Bolshevists' 
hands, and we have already seen how Moscow sup- 
ported Mustapha Kemal and other nationalist leaders 
in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In the Mid- 
dle East, also, Bolshevism gained important successes. 
Not merely was Moscow's hand visible in the epidemic 
of rioting and seditious violence which swept northern 
India in the spring of 1919, 2 but an even shrewder blow 
was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land of 
turbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual 
thunder-cloud on India's northwest frontier, had kept 
quiet during the Great War, mainly owing to the Anglo- 
phile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer Habibullah Khan. 
But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. Whether 
the Bolsheviki had a hand in the matter is not known, 
but they certainly reaped the benefit, for power passed 
to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan, who was 
an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings 
with Turco-German agents during the late war. Ama- 
nullah at once got in touch with Moscow, and a little 
later, just when the Punjab was seething with unrest, 
he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen, 
pouring across the border, set the northwest frontier 

1 See Chapter V. 2 See Chapter VI. 



SOCIAL UNREST 



339 



on fire. After some hard fighting the British succeeded 
in repelling the Afghan invasion, and Amanullah was 
constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously 
dared not press Amanullah too hard, for in the peace 
treaty the Ameer was released from his previous obliga- 
tion not to maintain diplomatic relations with other 
nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired 
his independence by maintaining ostentatious relations 
with Moscow. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki had 
by this time established an important propagandist 
subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Af- 
ghan border, and this bureau's activities of course en- 
visaged not merely Afghanistan but the wider field of 
India as well. 1 

During 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more 
pronounced throughout the Near and Middle East. 
We have already seen how powerfully Bolshevik Russia 
supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist move- 

1 For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich, 
"The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan," New Europe, December 4, 
1919; Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Fall of Bokhara," The Near East, October 28, 
1920, and his "The Central Asian Tangle," Asiatic Review, October, 
1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally, 
see Miliukov, op. cit., pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir George 
Aston, "Bolshevik Propaganda in the East," Fortnightly Review, August, 
1920; W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present," Quarterly Re- 
view, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in the 
Near East," New Europe, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, "Awakening 
Asia," The Living Age, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French); 
Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, "Moslems and the Tangle in the 
Middle East," National Review, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Russia 
at Peace," The Nation (New York), January 26> 1921; H. von Hoff, "Die 
nationale Erhebung in der Tiirkei," Deutsche Revue, December, 1919; 
R. G. Hunter, "Entente— Oil— Islam," New Europe, August 26, 1920; 
"Taira," "The Story of the Arab Revolt," Balkan Review, August, 
1920; "Voyageur," "Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam," New Europe, 
June 10, 1920; Hans Wendt, "Ex Oriente Lux," Nord und Sud, May, 
1920; George Young, "Russian Foreign Policy," New Europe, July 1, 
1920. 



340 THE 



NEW 



WORLD 



OF ISLAM 



ments. In fact, the reckless short-sightedness of Entente 
policy was driving into Lenine's arms multitudes of na- 
tionalists to whom the internationalist theories of Mos- 
cow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head 
of the Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed 
his reasons for friendship with Soviet Russia, in an inter- 
view printed by the official Soviet organ, Izvestia: a I am 
neither Communist nor Socialist, but my political pro- 
gramme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia, 
I am an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism 
in Asia, the chief representatives of which are the Eng- 
lish. On this point I coincide with the Communists, 
and in this respect we are your natural allies. . . . 
Afghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist 
state, and it is very unlikely that even a parliament ary 
regime will take deep root in these countries. It is so 
far difficult to say how subsequent events will develop. 
I only know that the renowned address of the Soviet 
Government to all nations, with its appeal to them to 
combat capitalists (and for us a capitalist is synonymous 
with the word foreigner, or, to be more exact, an English- 
man), had an enormous effect on us. A still greater 
effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the 
secret treaties enforced by the imperialistic governments, 
and by the proclaiming of the right of all nations, no 
matter how small, to determine their own destiny. This 
act rallied around Soviet Russia all the exploited nation- 
alities of Asia, and all parties, even those very remote 
from Socialism." Of course, knowing what we do of 
Bolshevik propagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that 
the Afghan diplomat ever said the things which the Iz- 
vestia relates. But, even if the interview be a fake, 



SOCIAL UNREST 



341 



the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vast 
numbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bol- 
shevik propagandist successes in Eastern lands. 

So successful; indeed, had been the progress of Bol- 
shevik propaganda that the Soviet leaders now began 
to work openly for their ultimate ends. At first Moscow 
had posed as the champion of Oriental " peoples" against 
Western "imperialism"; its appeals had been to " peo- 
ples/ ' irrespective of class; and it had promised " self- 
determination/' with full respect for native ideas and 
institutions. For instance: a Bolshevist manifesto to 
the Turks signed by Lenine and issued toward the close 
of 1919 read: "Mussulmans of the world, victims of the 
capitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's 
pernicious policy toward you and offers to help you over- 
throw English tyranny. She will allow you freedom of 
religion and self-government. The frontiers existing 
before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory 
will be given Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will re- 
main yours, and Constantinople will remain the capital 
of the Mussulman world. The Mussulmans in Russia 
will be given self-government. All we ask in exchange 
is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would 
exploit your country and make it a colony." Even 
when addressing its own people, the Soviet Government 
maintained the same general tone. An "Order of the 
Day" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders 
of India stated: "Comrades of the Pamir division, you 
have been given a responsible task. The Soviet Repub- 
lic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on the 
frontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and 
India. The Pamir table-land divides revolutionary Rus- 



342 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



sia from India, which, with its 300,000,000 inhabitants, 
is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On this table- 
land the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag 
of the army of liberation. May the peoples of India, 
who fight against their English oppressors, soon know 
that friendly help is not far off. Make yourselves at 
home with the Hberty-lo\dng tribes of northern India, 
promote by word and deed their revolutionary progress, 
refute the mass of calumnies spread about Soviet Russia 
by agents of the British princes, lords, and bankers. 
Long live the alliance of the revolutionary peoples of 
Europe and Asia!" 

Such was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propa- 
ganda, Presently, however, propaganda of quite a 
different character began to appear. This second-stage 
propaganda of course continued to assail Western " capi- 
talist imperialism." But alongside, or rather inter- 
mingled with, these anti-Western fulminations, there 
now appeared special appeals to the Oriental masses, 
inciting them against all "capitalists" and "bourgeois," 
native as well as foreign, and promising the " proleta- 
rians" remedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist 
manifesto to the Turkish masses, published in the sum- 
mer of 1920. It is very different from the manifestoes 
of a year before. "The men of toil," says this interest- 
ing document, "are now struggling everywhere against 
the rich people. These people, with the assistance of 
the aristocracy and their hirelings, are now trying to, 
hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It is the rich peo- 
ple of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey. 
Comrades, let us make common cause with the world's 
toilers. If we do not do so we shall never rise again. 



SOCIAL UNREST 



343 



Let the heroes of Turkey's revolution join Bolshevism. 
Long live the Third International ! Praise be to Allah !" 

And in these new efforts Moscow was not content 
with words; it was passing to deeds as well. The first 
application of Bolshevism to an Eastern people was in 
Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first came to 
power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan 
full " self-determination/ ' and the inhabitants had ac- 
claimed their native princes and re-established their old 
state-units, subject to a loose federative tie with Russia. 
Early in 1920, however, the Soviet Government con- 
sidered Turkestan ripe for the "Social Revolution." 
Accordingly, the native princes were deposed, all politi- 
cal power was transferred to local Soviets (controlled 
by Russians), the native upper and middle classes were 
despoiled of their property, and sporadic resistance was 
crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiar 
forms of Bolshevist terrorism. 1 In the Caucasus, also, 
the social revolution had begun with the Sovietization 
of Azerbaidjan. The Tartar republic of Azerbaidjan was 
one of the fragments of the former Russian province 
of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence 
on the collapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located 
in eastern Transcaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azer- 
baidjan's capital was the city of Baku, famous for its oil- 
fields. Oil had transformed Baku into an industrial 
centre on Western fines, with a large working popula- 
tion of mixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon 
the nascent class-consciousness of this urban proletariat, 
the Bolshevik agents made a coup oVetat in the spring of 
1920, overthrew the nationalist government, and, with 

1 Ikbal Ali Shah, op. ait. 



344 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaidjan a Soviet 
republic. The usual accompaniments of the social rev- 
olution followed: despoiling and massacring of the 
upper and middle classes, confiscation of property in 
favor of the town proletarians and agricultural laborers, 
and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of 
1920, Bolshevism was thus in actual operation in both 
the Near and Middle East. 1 

Having acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bol- 
shevism now felt strong enough to throw off the mask. 
In the autumn of 1920, the Soviet Government of Rus- 
sia held a "Congress of Eastern Peoples" at Baku, the 
aim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient 
from Western control but its Bolshevizing as well. 
No attempt at concealment of this larger objective was 
made, and so striking was the language employed that 
it may well merit our close attention. 

In the first place, the call to the congress, issued by 
the Third (Moscow) International, was addressed to 
the "peasants and workers" of the East. The summons 
read: 

"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran 
Government of the Khadjars and its retinue of provin- 
cial Khans have plundered and exploited you through 
many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws 
of the Sheriat, was your common property, has been 
taken possession of more and more by the lackeys of 

1 For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, " Transcaucasia, Past 
and Present," Quarterly Review, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer, "The 
Situation in the Transcaucasus," New Europe, September 2, 1920; "D. 
Z. T.," "L' Azerbaidjan: La Premiere Republique musulmane," Revue du 
Monde musulman, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Exit Georgia," The Nation 
(New York), March 30, 1921. 



I 

SOCIAL UNREST 345 

the Teheran Government; they trade it away at their 
pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you; 
and when, through their mismanagement, they got the 
country into such a condition that they were unable to 
squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, they sold 
Persia last year to English capitalists for 2,000,000 
pounds, so that the latter will organize an army in Per- 
sia that will oppress you still more than formerly, and 
so the latter can collect taxes for the Khans and the 
Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in 
South Persia and thus helped plunder the country. 

"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have de- 
clared your country to be independent; but 80,000 Eng- 
lish soldiers are stationed in your country, are robbing 
and plundering, are killing you and are violating your 
women. 

"Peasants of Anatolia! The English, French, and 
Italian Governments hold Constantinople under the 
mouths of their cannon. They have made the Sultan 
their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to the 
dismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory, 
they are forcing him to turn the country's finances over 
to foreign capitalists in order to make it possible for 
them better to exploit the Turkish people, already re- 
duced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They 
have occupied the coal-mines of Heraclea, they are hold- 
ing your ports, they are sending their troops into your 
country and are trampling down your fields. 

"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago 
you became the victims of the intrigues of foreign capi- 
tal, which launched heavy verbal attacks against the 
massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited 



346 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



3^011 to fight against the Sultan in order to obtain through 
your blood new concessions and fresh profits daily from 
the bloody Sultan. During the war they not only prom- 
ised you independence, but they incited your merchants, 
your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of 
the Turkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal con- 
flict between the Armenian and Turkish peoples, so that 
they could eternally derive profits out of this conflict, 
for as long as strife prevails between you and the Turks, 
just so long will the English, French, and American 
capitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the 
menace of an Armenian uprising and to use the Arme- 
nians as cannon-fodder through the menace of a pogrom 
by Kurds. 

"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was 
promised to you by the English and the French, and 
now they hold your country occupied by their armies, 
now the English and the French dictate your laws, 
and you, who have freed yourselves from the Turkish 
Sultan, from the Constantinople Government, are now 
slaves of the Paris and London Governments, which 
merely differ from the Sultan's Government in being 
stronger and better able to exploit you. 

"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian 
peasants and workers have risen against their traitorous 
Teheran Government. The peasants in Mesopotamia 
are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants 
in Anatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha 
in order to fight against the foreign invasion, but at the 
same time we hear that you are trying to organize your 
own party, a genuine peasants' party that will be willing 
to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with 



SOCIAL UNREST 



347 



the Entente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you, 
Armenian peasants, whom the Entente, despite its 
promises, allows to die from hunger in order to keep you 
under better control, you are understanding more and 
more that it is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente 
capitalists. Even your bourgeois Government of the 
Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, is compelled 
to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of 
Russia with an appeal for peace and help. 

" Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you 
organize yourselves, if you form your own Workers' 
and Peasants' Government, if you arm yourselves, if 
you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants' 
Army, then you will be able to defy the English, French, 
and American capitalists, then you will settle accounts 
with your own native exploiters, then you will find it 
possible, in a free alliance with the workers' republics 
of the world, to look after your own interests; then you 
will know how to exploit the resources of your country 
in your own interest and in the interest of the working 
people of the whole world, that will honestly exchange 
the products of their labor and mutually help each other. 

"We want to talk over all these questions with you at 
the Congress in Baku. Spare no effort to appear in 
Baku on September 1 in as large numbers as possible. 
You march, year in and year out, through the deserts 
to the holy places where you show your respect for your 
past and for your God — now march through deserts, 
over mountains, and across rivers in order to come to- 
gether to discuss how you can escape from the bonds of 
slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as 
men, free and equal." 



f 

348 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

From this summons the nature of the Baku congress 
can be imagined. It was, in fact, a social revolution- 
ist far more than a nationalist assembly. Of its 1,900 
delegates, nearly 1,300 were professed communists. 
Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries 
sent the largest delegations, though there were also 
delegations from Arabia, India, and even the Far East. 
The Russian Soviet Government was of course in con- 
trol and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The 
character of these proceedings was well summarized by 
the address of the noted Bolshevik leader Zinoviev, presi- 
dent of the Executive Committee of the Third (Moscow) 
International, who presided. 

Zinoviev said: 

"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest 
events in history, for it proves not only that the pro- 
gressive workers and working peasants of Europe and 
America are awakened, but that we have at last seen the 
day of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thou- 
sands, of hundreds of thousands, of millions of the labor- 
ing class of the peoples of the East. These peoples form 
the majority of the world's w T hole population, and they 
alone, therefore, are able to bring the war between 
capital and labor to a conclusive decision. . . . 

"The Communist International said from the very 
first day of its existence: ' There are four times as many 
people living in Asia as live in Europe. We will free all 
peoples, all who labor.' . . . We know that the labor- 
ing masses of the East are in part retrograde, though 
not by their own fault; they cannot read or write, are 
ignorant, are bound in superstition, believe in the evil 
spirit, are unable to read any newspapers, do not know 



SOCIAL UNREST 



349 



what is happening in the world, have not the slight- 
est idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Com- 
rades, our Moscow International discussed the ques- 
tion whether a socialist revolution could take place in 
the countries of the East before those countries had 
passed through the capitalist stage. You know that 
the view which long prevailed was that every country 
must first go through the period of capitalism . . . be- 
fore socialism could become a live question. We now 
believe that this is no longer true. Russia has done 
this, and from that moment we are able to say that 
China, India, Turkey, Persia, Armenia also can, and 
must, make a direct fight to get the Soviet System. 
These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to 
be Soviet republics. 

"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons 
who do not believe in our ideas, who are even opposed 
to us on some points. In this way, the Soviet Govern- 
ment supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one mo- 
ment do we forget that the movement headed by Kemal 
is not a communist movement. We know it. I have 
here extracts from the verbatim reports of the first ses- 
sion of the Turkish people's Government at Angora. 
Kemal himself says that 'the Caliph's person is sacred 
and inviolable.' The movement headed by Kemal 
wants to rescue the Caliph's ' sacred' person from the 
hands of the foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's 
point of view. But is it a communist point of view? 
No. We respect the religious convictions of the masses ; 
we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the 
work of years. 

"We use great caution in approaching the religious 



350 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



convictions of the laboring masses in the East and else- 
where. But at this Congress we are bound to tell you 
that you must not do what the Kemal Government is 
doing in Turkey; you must not support the power of 
the Sultan, not even if religious considerations urge you 
to do so. You must press on, and must not allow your- 
selves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan's hour 
has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic 
power to continue; you must destroy, you must annihi- 
late, faith in the Sultan; you must struggle to obtain 
real Soviet organizations. The Russian peasants also 
were strong believers in the Czar; but when a true peo- 
ple's revolution broke out there was practically nothing 
left of this faith in the Czar. The same thing will hap- 
pen in Turkey and all over the East as soon as a true 
peasants' revolution shall burst forth over the surface 
of the black earth. The people will very soon lose faith 
in their Sultan and in their masters. We say once more, 
the policy pursued by the present people's Government 
in Turkey is not the policy of the Communist Inter- 
national, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declare 
that we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight 
against the English Government. 

"Yes, we array ourselves against the English bour- 
geoisie; we seize the English imperialist by the throat 
and tread him under foot. It is against English capi- 
talism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt. 
That is so. But at the same time we must educate the 
laboring masses of the East to hatred, to the will to fight 
the whole of the rich classes indifferently, whoever they 
be. The great significance of the revolution now start- 
ing in the East does not consist in begging the English 



SOCIAL UNREST 



351 



imperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose 
of then permitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet 
on it all the more comfortably; no, we will very politely 
ask all the rich to remove their dirty feet from the table, 
so that there may be no luxuriousness among us, no 
boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but 
that the world may be ruled by the worker's horny 
hand." 

The Baku Congress was the opening gun in Bolshe- 
vism's avowed campaign for the immediate Bolshevizing 
of the East. It was followed by increased Soviet ac- 
tivity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially 
in the Caucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were 
Bolshevized in the spring of 1921. 

These very successes, however, awakened growing 
uneasiness among Soviet Russia's nationalist proteges. 
The various Oriental nationalist parties, which had at 
first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against 
the Entente Powers, now began to realize that Russian 
Bolshevism might prove as great a peril as Western 
imperialism to their patriotic aspirations. Of course 
the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's 
ultimate goal, but hitherto they had felt themselves 
strong enough to control the situation and to take Rus- 
sian aid without paying Moscow's price. Now they 
no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious 
"proletarians" in the East might be very small. The 
communist philosophy might be virtually unintelligible 
to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless, the very exist- 
ence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disre- 
garded. In Russia an infinitesimal communist minority, 
numbering, by its own admission, not much over 600,- 



352 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 



000, was maintaining an unlimited despotism over 
170,000,000 people. Western countries might rely on 
their popular education and their stanch traditions of 
ordered liberty; the East possessed no such bulwarks 
against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact, much like 
Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the 
masses; the same absence of a large and powerful mid- 
dle class; the same tradition of despotism; the same 
popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthless minorities. 
Finally, there were the ominous examples of Sovietized 
Turkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nation- 
alists bethought them of the old adage that he who sups 
with the devil needs a long spoon. 

Everywhere it has been the same story. In Asia 
Minor, Mustapha Kemal has arrested Bolshevist propa- 
ganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troops have 
more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus fron- 
tiers. In Egypt we have already seen how an amicable 
arrangement between Lord Milner and the Egyptian 
nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear 
of the social revolutionary agitators who were inflam- 
ing the fellaheen. In India, Sir Valentine Chirol noted 
as far back as the spring of 1918 how Russia's collapse 
into Bolshevism had had a " sobering effect'' on Indian 
public opinion. "The more thoughtful Indians," he 
wrote, "now see how helpless even the Russian intel- 
ligentsia (relatively far more numerous and matured 
than the Indian intelligentsia) has proved to control the 
great ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of 
government has been hastily shattered." 1 In Afghani- 

1 Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail," Edinburgh Review, July, 1918. 
Also see H. H. The Aga Khan, India in Transition, p. 17 (London, 1918). 



SOCIAL UNREST 



353 



stan, likewise, the Ameer was losing his love for his Bol- 
shevist allies. The streams of refugees from Sovietized 
Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection, 
headed by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made 
Amanullah Khan do some hard thinking, intensified by 
a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on the Russian bor- 
der, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers' 
Councils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist 
agents might tempt him by the loot of India, but the 
Ameer could also see that that would do him little good 
if he himself were to be looted and killed by his own 
rebellious subjects. 1 Thus, as time went on, Oriental 
nationalists and conservatives generally tended to close 
ranks in dislike and apprehension of Bolshevism. Had 
there been no other issue involved, there can be little 
doubt that Moscow's advances would have been repelled 
and Bolshevist agents given short shrift. 

Unfortunately, the Eastern nationalists feel them- 
selves between the Bolshevist devil and the Western 
imperialist deep sea. The upshot has been that they 
have been trying to play off the one against the other — 
driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression; 
driven toward the West by every Soviet coup of Lenine. 
Western statesmen should realize this, and should re- 
member that Bolshevism's best propagandist agent is, 
not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud, 
with his Senegalese battalions and "strong-arm" meth- 
ods in Syria and the Arab hinterland. 

Certainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the 
East would be a terrible misfortune both for the Orient 
and for the world at large. If the triumph of Bolshe- 

1 Ikbal Ali Shah, op, eU % 



354 THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM 

vism would mean barbarism in the West ; in the East it 
would spell downright savagery. The sudden release 
of the ignorant, brutal Oriental masses from their tra- 
ditional restraints of religion and custom, and the sub- 
mergence of the relatively small upper and middle 
classes by the flood of social revolution would mean the 
destruction of all Oriental civilization and culture, and 
a plunge into an abyss of anarchy from which the East 
could emerge only after generations, perhaps centuries. 



CONCLUSION 



Oub survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end. 
What is the outstanding feature of that survey? It is: 
Change. The "Immovable East" has been moved at 
last — moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-day 
in full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and pro- 
found than any it has hitherto known. The world of 
Islam, mentally and spiritually quiescent for almost a 
thousand years, is once more astir, once more on the 
march. 

Whither? We do not know. Who would be bold 
enough to prophesy the outcome of this vast ferment — 
political, economic, social, religious, and much more 
besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe, 
describe, and analyze the various elements in the great 
transition. 

Yet surely this is much. To view, however empiri- 
cally, the mighty transformation at work; to group its 
multitudinous aspects in some sort of relativity; to fol- 
low the red threads of tendency running through the 
tangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge 
and acquire capacity to grasp the significance of future 
developments as they shall successively arise. 

"To know is to understand" — and to hope: to hope 
that this present travail, vast and ill understood, may 
be but the birth-pangs of a truly renascent East taking 
its place in a renascent world. 



855 




THE WORLD OF 



I: 



INDEX 



Aali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 65 
Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro-Turkish 

views of, 185; deposition of, 185; 

Pan-Arabianism supported by, 202 
Abd-el-Kader, French resisted by, 49 
Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism 

of, 186 

Abd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival 
begun by, 26, 48; birth of, 26; early 
life of, 27 ff.; influence of, 28; death 
of, 28 

Abdul Hamid, despotism of, 39; as 
caliph, 48; Senussi's opposition to, 
48, 56; Djemal-ed-Din protected by, 
63 ff.; Pan-Islam policy of, 65 ff.; 
character of, 65 ff.; government of, 
66; deposition of, 67, 142; tyrannical 
policy of, 138; nationalism opposed 
by, 166, 196; Arabs conciliated by, 
169 ff. 

Abu Bekr, 28; policy of, 135 ff. 
Abyssinian Church, Mohammedan 

threat against, 60 
Afghanistan, religious uprisings in, 50; 

nineteenth-century independence of, 

140; Bolshevism in, 338 ff.; rebellion 

of, 339 ff. 

Africa-Mohammedan missionary work 

in, 59 ff. See also North Africa 
Agadir crisis, 69 

Ahmed Bey Agayefl, Pan-Turanism 

aided by, 197 
Alexandria, massacre of Europeans in, 

177 

Algeria, French conquest of, 49, 188; 
Kabyle insurrection in, 50; compul- 
sory vaccination in, 113; liberal politi- 
cal aspirations in, 140 ff.; need for 
European government in, 145 

Allenby, General, Egypt in control of, 
211 

Amanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 338; 

war on England declared by, 339; 

present policy of, 353 
Anatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 345 
Anglo-Russian Agreement, terms of, 

189 ff. 

Arabi Pasha, Djemal-ed-Din's influ- 
ence on, 176; revolution in Egypt 
headed by, 176 

Arabia, description of natives of, 27; 
Turks fought by, 28; defeat of, 29; 
political freedom of, 135; democracy 
in, 151; nationalist spirit in, 167 ff.; 



Turkish rulers opposed by, 167 ff.; 
suppression of, 170; 1905 rebellion of, 
170; effect of Young-Turk revolu- 
tion on, 172 ff.; 1916 revolt of, 174; 
Pan-Arabism in, 172; religious char- 
acter of Pan- Arab movement in, 
201 ff. ; effect of Great War on, 202, 
218 ff. ; Allied encouragement of, 218; 
peace terms and, 219; English agree- 
ment with, 219 ff.; revolt against 
Turks of, 220; secret partition of, 
220 ff. ; Colonel Lawrence's influence 
in, 221; secret treaties revealed to, 
222; France and England in, 222 ff.; 
Mustapha Kemal aided by, 230 ff.; 
English negotiations with, 235; Bol- 
shevist manifesto to, 345 
Arabian National Committee, creation 
of, 170 

Archer, William, on overpopulation in 

India, 312 
Argyll, Duke of, overpopulation in 

India, 311 
Armenia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 345 
Arya Somaj, 247 
Atchin War, 50 

Azerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in, 
343 ff. 

Babbist movement in Persia, 324 
Baber, Mogul Empire founded by, 243 
Baku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at, 
344, 351 

Balkan War, 68; Mohammedans roused 
by, 70 

Barbary States, French conquest of, 188 
Berard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks 

and Arabs, 167 ff.; France's Syrian 

policy criticised by, 236 
Bertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling 

in Orient described by, 114 ff.; on 

social conditions in the Levant, 319, 

321 

Bevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of, 
149 JT. 

Bin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 86 
Bolshevism, effects on Orient of, 208; 
Mustapha Kemal aided by, 232 ff.; 
the East a field for, 335 ff.; propa- 
ganda of, 336 ff., 341 ff.; Oriental 
policy of, 337; in Afghanistan, 338 if.; 
manifesto to Mohammedans issued 
by, 341 ff.; manifesto to Turks issued 



358 



INDEX 



by, 842 ff.; "Congress of Eastern 
Peoples" held by, 344 ff. 
Bombay, English character of, 120; 

social conditions in, 320 ff. 
Bose, Pramatha Nath, on economic 

conditions in India, 291 ff. 
Brahminism, illiberalism of, 143 
Brailsford, H. N., on modern industry 
in Egypt, 280 ff. ; on social conditions 
in Egypt, 318 ff. 
British East India Company, 244 
Bukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of, 
38 ff.; nationalism in India opposed 
by, 148 ff. ; on Indian social condi- 
tions, 299 ff. 

Caetani, Leone, 76 
Cahan, Leon, Turanism and, 194 
Cairo, revolt in, 211; modern women in, 
306 

Calcutta, English character of, 120; 

social conditions in, 320 
Caliphate, Islam strengthened by, 46 

ff.; history of, 47; Turkey the head 

of, 47 ff. 

Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 257 ff. 

China, Mohammedan insurrection in, 
50, 61 ff.; Mohammedan missionary 
work in, 61; number of Moham- 
medans in, 62; Mohammedan agita- 
tion in, 73 

Chirol, Valentine, Western influence in 
Orient described by, 94 ff. ; on Egyp- 
tian situation, 212 ff.; Montagu- 
Chelmsford Report approved by, 
261; on Egyptian conditions since 
the war, 321 ff.; on Bolshevism in 
India, 352 

Congress of Eastern Peoples, 344 ff. 

Constantino, King, recalled, 230 

Constantinople, Allied occupation of, 
228 ff. ; changes since 1896 in, 297 ff. ; 
status of women in, 306 

Cox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian nego- 
tiations made by, 235; influence of, 
237 

Cromer, Lord, on Islam, 36, 39; West- 
ern influence in Orient described by, 
96; ethics of imperialism formulated 
by, 101, 122, 143 ff.; Egyptian ad- 
ministration of, 177; resignation of, 
181; on western-educated Egypt, 
304; on overpopulation in India, 312 

Curtis, Lionel, nationalism in India 
supported by, 154 ff.; Montagu- 
Chelmsford Report approved by, 261 

Curzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of, 
252 

Damascus, French in, 226 ff. 
Dar-ul-Islam, 203 ff. 
Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern eco- 
nomics, 295 



Djemal-ed-Din, birth of, 63; character 
of, 63; anti-European work of, 63; 
in India, 63; in Egypt, 63; Abdul 
Hamid's protection of, 63 ff.; death 
of, 64; teachings of, 64 ff.; national- 
ism taught by, 164; Egypt influenced 
by, 176; in Russia, 337 

Dutch East Indies, Mohammedan up- 
risings in, 50; Mohammedan mis- 
sionary work in, 62 

Egypt, nationalism in, 39, 140 ff.; 
Mahdist insurrection in, 50; 1914 
insurrection of, 73; exiled Arabs in, 
170; characteristics of people of, 174 
ff.; early European influences in, 175; 
nationalist agitation in, 176 ff. ; in- 
fluence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 176; 
1882 revolution in, 176 ff.; Lord 
Cromer's rule of, 177; France's in- 
fluence in, 178 ff. ; failure of English 
liberal policy in, 181 ff.; Lord Kitch- 
ener's rule in, 182 ff.; effect of out- 
break of World War on, 185 ff. ; made 
English protectorate, 185 ff.; Pan- 
Arabism in, 201; Versailles confer- 
ence's treatment of, 207; nationalist 
demands of, 210; Allenby in control 
of, 211; rebellion of, 211 ff.; martial 
law in, 212; situation after rebellion 
In, 213 ff; English commission of 
inquiry in, 215; English compromise 
with, 216; opposition to compromise 
in, 216 ff.; modern factories in, 277, 
280; industrial conditions in, 280 ff.; 
social conditions in, 319; social revo- 
lution in, 332 ff. 

El-Gharami, 36 

El Mahdi, 51 

England, Egypt's rebellion against, 
208 ff.; Commission of Inquiry into 
Egyptian affairs appointed by, 215; 
Egyptian compromise with, 216; 
opposition to compromise in, 216; 
Arabia and, 219 ff. ; in Mesopotamia, 
219 ff.; in Palestine, 220; French dis- 
agreement with, 223 ff. ; at San Remo 
conference, 225; Mesopotamian re- 
bellion against, 227 ff. ; Sevres Treaty 
and, 229; Greek agreement with, 229; 
Arabian negotiations with, 235; in 
India, 243 ff. 

Enver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 199; 
in Russia, 337 

Feisal, Prince, at peace conference, 
222 ff.; peace counsels of, 223; made 
king of Syria, 226 

Fisher, on social conditions in India, 
319 ff. 

France, Morocco seized by, 69; anti- 
British propaganda of, 178 ff.; Arabia 
and, 219; Syrian aspirations of, 219 



INDEX 



359 



ff.; at San Remo conference, 225; 
Syrian rebellion and, 226 ff.; Sevres 
Treaty and, 229; Greek agreement 
■with, 229; present Syrian situation 
of, 235 ff. 

Gandhi, M. K., boycott of England ad- 
vocated by, 266 

Gorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer suc- 
ceeded by, 181; failure of policy of, 
181 ff. 

Gouraud, General, Feisal subdued by, 
227; danger in methods of, 353 

Greece, anti-Turk campaign of, 229; 
Venizelos repudiated by, 230; Con- 
stantino supported by, 230 

Habibullah Khan, Ameer, England sup- 
ported by, 338; death of, 338 

Haifa, to be British, 220 

Hajj, Islam strengthened by, 46 ff. 

Halil Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 200 

Hanotaux, Gabriel, 69 

Harding, Lord, Indian nationalist 
movement supported by, 256 

Hedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 167 

Hindustan, Islam's appeal to, 72; anti- 
Western feeling in, 118 ff.', illiberal 
tradition of, 143 

Hunter, Sir William, on overpopulation 
in India, 311 ff. 

Hussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt, 
185 

Ikhwan, beginning of, 86; progress of, 
86 

Imam Yahya, 237 

India, reform of Islamism in, 37; Eng- 
lish mastery of, 49; Islam's mission- 
ary work in, 62; 1914 insurrection in, 
73; English towns and customs in, 
120; effect of Russo-Japanese War 
in, 126, 250 ff. ; liberal political aspira- 
tions in, 140 ff.', democracy intro- 
duced by England in, 146 ff. ; opposi- 
tion to nationalism in, 147 ff., 259 ff. ; 
support of nationalism in, 154 ff., 
162 ff.; history of. 239; Aryan inva- 
sion of, 239 ff.; beginning of caste 
system In, 240 ff. ; Mohammedan in- 
vasion of, 242 ff; Mogul Empire 
founded in, 243; British conquest of, 

244 ff.; beginning of discontent in, 

245 ff. ; Hindu nationalist movement 
in, 247 ff., 252 ff.; English liberal 
policy in, 253 ff. ; result of outbreak 
of war in, 255; Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report in, 257 ff. ; militant unrest in, 
262 ff.; effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 263 
ff.; English boycotted by, 265 ff.; 
present turmoil in, 267 ; industries in, 
276 ff.; industrial conditions in, 281 



ff. ; industrial future of, 283 ff. ; agri- 
culture in, 288 ff.; Swadeshi move- 
ment in, 289 ff.; social conditions in, 
299 ff.; status of women in, 301, 
305 ff.; education in, 302 ff.; over- 
population in, 311 ff.; condition of 
peasants in, 319; city and rural life 
in, 325 ff.; economic revolution in, 
327 ff. ; attitude of Bolshevists 
toward, 341 ff. 

Indian Councils Act, terms of, 253; 
effect of, 254 

Indian National Congress, 245 

Islam, eighteenth-century decadence of, 
25 ff; revival of, 26; Christian opin- 
ions of, 32 ff. ; present situation of, 33 
ff.; agnosticism in, 39 ff.; fanatics in, 
40 ff. ; solidarity of, 45 ff. ; Hajj an aid 
to, 46 ff. ; caliphate an aid to, 46 ff. ; 
Western successes against, 49 ; prose- 
lytism of, 58 ff. ; effect of Balkan War 
on, 70 ff.; effect of Russo-Japanese 
War on, 71, 126 ff; Western influ- 
ence on, 90 ff. ; anti-Western reaction 
of, 105 ff. ; race mixture in, 122 ff ; 
tyranny in, 132 ff. ; early equality in, 
135 ff. ; political reformation in, 137 
ff.; birth of nationalism in, 163 ff.; 
Bolshevist propaganda in, 336 ff. 
See also Pan-Islam 

Ismael Hamet, on scepticism among 
Moslems, 40 

Ismael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of, 
139; Egypt Europeanized by, 175 ff. 

Italy, Tripoli attacked by, 68; San 
Remo Treaty opposed by, 226, 229 

Japan, Mohammedan missionary work 

in, 71 ff. 
Jowf , Sennussi stronghold, 55 % 

Kabyle insurrection, 50 

Khadjar dynasty, Persian revolution 
against, 190 

Kharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved 
by, 324 

Khartum, capture of, 50 

Kheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate 
Tunis made by, 107 

Kitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection 
suppressed by, 50; antinationalist be- 
liefs of, 146; nationalism in Egypt 
suppressed by, 182 ff. 

Krishna varma, S., assassination com- 
mended by, 251 

Lawrence, Colonel, influence of, 221; 
Arab-Turk agreement views of, 
230 ff. ; Mesopotamia views of, 234 
Lebanon, France's control of, 219 
Lenine, manifesto to Mohammedans 
issued by, 341 ff. 



360 



INDEX 



Low, Sidney, modern imperialism de- 
scribed by, 103 ff. ; on Egyptian situa- 
tion, 183 

Lyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education 

in India, 303 ff. 
Lybyer, Professor A. H., democracy in 

Islam described by, 136, 151 

Macdonald, J. Ramsay, on economic 
conditions in India, 291; on social 
revolution in India, 331 ff. 

Mcllwraith, Sir M., on Egyptian situa- 
tion, 214 

MeMahon, Sir Henry, agreement with 

Arabs made by, 220 ff. 
Madras, English character of, 120 
Mahdism, definition of, 50 ff. 
Mahdist insurrection, 50 
Mahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of, 

137 

Mahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by, 
242 

Mecca, decadence of, 26; Abd-el- 
Wahab's pilgrimage to, 27; Saud's 
subjugation of, 28; Turkish recon- 
quest of, 29; aid to strength of Islam, 
46 ff. ; post-cards sold at, 297 

Medina, decadence of, 26; Abd-el- 
Wahab's studies at, 27; Saud's subju- 
gation of, 28 ; Turkish reconquest of, 
29; electricity at, 297 

Mehemet Ali, army of, 29; Turks aided 
by, 29; Wahabi defeated by, 29; 
liberal policy of, 137; Egypt Eu- 
ropeanized by, 175 

Mesopotamia, Turkish dominion of, 
167; England in, 219 ff.; rebellion 
against England of, 227 ff. ; denuncia- 
tion of English policy in, 234; Bol- 
shevists' manifesto issued to, 345 

MStin, Albert, on nationalist move- 
ment in India, 330 ff. 

Midhat Pasha, liberal movement aided 
by, 39 

Milner, Lord, Egyptian ina.uiry com- 
mission headed by, 215; character of, 
215; compromise agreed on by, 216 
ff.: resignation of, 217; influence of, 
237 

Mogul Empire, foundation of, 243 
Mohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal 

movement aided by, 39; Djemal-ed- 

Din's influence on, 176; conservative 

teachings of, 178 
Mohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of, 

56 

Mohammed Farid Bey, anti-English 
policy of, 180; mistakes of, 180 ff.; 
pro-German policy of, 186 

Mohammedan Revival. See Pan- 
Islam 

Mollahs, antiliberalisrn of, 37 
Montagu-Chelmsford Keport, 258 ff. 



Montagu, liberal policy of, 256 ff. 

Morison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem 
situation, 81, 84 ff. ; on modern indus- 
try in India, 277 ff; 290 

Morley, John, liberal policy of, 253 

Morocco, French seizure of, 69, 188; 
in nineteenth century, 140 

Motazelism, rediscovery of, 32; influ- 
ence of, 36 

Moulvie Cheragh Ali, reform work of, 
38 

Muhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia 

against, 142 

Muir, Ramsay, European imperialism 
described by, 100 

Mustapha Kemal, character of, 179; 
beliefs of, 179 ff.; death of, 180; 
Allies defied by, 226; Turkish de- 
nunciation of, 229; Greek campaign 
against, 229 ff.; Arab aid given to, 
230 ff.; policy of, 232; Bolshevists 
allied with, 232 ff.; French negotia- 
tions with, 236; Bolshevist support 
of, 338, 349 

Mutiny of 1857, 244 

Nair, Doctor T. Madavan, anti- 
nationalist opinions of, 148, 260 

Nakechabendiya fraternity, 50 

Xamasudra, antinationalist organiza- 
tion, 147, 260 

Nejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab in, 26 ff.; 
description of, 26 ff. ; return of Abd- 
el-Wahab to, 27; conversion of, 28; 
consolidation of, 28 

Xitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty op- 
posed by, 225 ff. 

North Africa, "Holy Men" insurrec- 
tion in, 50; lack of nationalism in, 
187 ff. ; races in, 187 ff. 

Nyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 59 ff. 

Orient. See Islam 

Pal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu- 
Chelmsford Report, 259; on social 
revolution in India, 328 

Palestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and, 
220; England in, 220 

Pan-islam, fanatics' schemes for, 40 ff. ; 
definition of, 45 ff.; Hajj an aid to, 
46 ff. ; caliphate an aid to, 47 ff.; 
anti-Western character of, 49 ff.; 
fraternities in, 52 ff.; Abdul Hamid's 
support of, 65 ff. ; Young-Turk inter- 
ruption of, 68; renewal of, 68 ff.', 
effect of Balkan War on, 70 ff. ; Great 
War and, 73 ff.; Versailles Treaty 
and, 74 ff.; press strength of, 80; 
propaganda of, 80; menacing temper 
of, 84 ff. ; economic evolution in, 86 ff. 

Pan-Syrian Congress, 226 

Pan-Turanism. See Turanians 



INDEX 



361 



Pan-Turkism. See Turkey, rise of 
nationalism in 

Persia, 1914 insurrection in, 73; an 
English protectorate, 75; tyranny in, 
139; independence of, 140; liberal 
movement in, 140; 1908 revolution 
in, 142, 189 ff.; need for European 
government in, 145; nineteenth-cen- 
tury conditions in, 189; Versailles 
conference's treatment of, 206 ff. ; war 
conditions in, 233; Bolshevism in, 
233 ff., 339 ff.; Bolshevist manifesto 
issued to, 344 

Population Problem of India, The, 313 

Ramsay, Sir William, on economic 
conditions in Asia Minor, 285 ff. 

Bealpolitik, treatment of Orient.by, 103, 
127 

Reshid Pasha, liberal movement aided 
by, 39 

Roushdi Pasha, nationalist demands 
of, 210 ff. 

Rowlatt Bill, nationalist opposition to, 
263 ff. 

Russia, Turanian antagonism for, 198 
ff. See also Bolshevism and Soviet 
Russia 

Russo-Japanese War, Islam roused by, 
71, 126 

Salafl, rise and growth of, 86; spirit of, 
86 

San Remo, conference at, 225 ff. 

Saud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 28; 
power and character of, 28; govern- 
ment of, 28, 49; holy cities subdued 
by, 28; death of, 28 

Saud, clan of, converted, 29 

Schweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian na- 
tionalism described by, 177 ff. 

Sennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by, 
54; power of, 54 

Sennussiya, foundation of, 52 ff. ; lead- 
ership of, 54 ; present power of, 54 ff. ; 
government of, 55; policy of, 55 ff.; 
proselytism of, 58 ff. 

Sevres Treaty, 229, 236 

Seyid Ahmed, state in India founded 
by, 30; conquest of, 30 

Seyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 37 

Seyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 38 

Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in 
Mecca, 30, 47; Abdul Hamid opposed 
by, 48, 53; birth of, 53; education of, 
53; "Zawias" built by, 53; power of, 
53 ff. 

Shamyi, Russia opposed by, 49 
Shiah Emir, 237 

Shuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political 
capacity described by, 152 ff. 

South Africa, Mohammedan threat 
against, 60 



Soviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with, 
340 ff.; Kemal supported by, 349; 
success of, 351 ff. 

Sun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 73 

Sydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford 
Report criticised by, 261 

Swadeshi movement, 289 ff. 

Sykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 220 
ff.; French opposition to, 225 ff.; 
fulfilment of, 225 

Syria, Turkish dominion of, 167; na- 
tionalist agitation in, 169 ff. ; France 
in, 219 ff.; declaration of indepen- 
dence of, 226; French suppression of, 
227; present situation in, 235 ff.; 
Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 346 

Tagore, Rabindranath, on economic 
conditions in India, 294 

Talaat, in Russia, 337 

Tartars, liberal movement among, 39; 
Mohammedan missionary work 
among, 60 ff. ; nationalist revival of, 
194 ff.; Bolshevism among, 337 

Tekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 199 

Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 177 

Tewfik Pasha, anti-English feeling of, 
110 

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist 
work of, 250, 259 

Townsend, Meredith, anti-Western feel- 
ing in Orient explained by, 122, 125 

Transcaucasia, Russian conquest of, 
49; after-the-war situation in, 232; 
Mustapha Kemal supported by, 232 

Tripoli, Italy's raid on, 68; Moham- 
medan resistance in, 69; 1914 insur- 
rection in, 73 

Tunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 106 ff. 

Turanians, peoples composing, 192 ff.; 
nationalist movement among, 193 ff. ; 
effect of Young-Turk Revolution on, 
196 ; effect of Balkan Wars on, 197 ff. ; 
effect of Great War on, 199 ff. 

Turkestan, Bolshevism in, 339; social 
revolution in, 343 

Turkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in, 
61; revolt of, 62 

Turkey, Islam conquered by, 28; 
Arabs war against, 28 ff.; Mehemet 
Ali's aid of, 29 ; liberal movement in, 
38 ff.; 1908 revolution in, 39, 142; 
Balkan attack on, 68 ff. ; anti-Western 
feeling in, 108 ff; effect of Russo- 
Japanese War in, 126; independence 
of, 140; liberal movement in, 140; 
democracy in, 151; birth of national- 
ism in, 164; language of, 165; Pan- 
Turanism in, 166 ff., 192 ff., 217 ff.; 
Arabian rebellion against, 168 ff.; 
Allied treaty with, 229; Arab aid 
given to, 230 ff. ; Western educational 



362 



INDEX 



methods in, 303; status of women in, 
306; Bolshevists' manifesto to, 342 ff. 
Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, The, 
199 

Yambery, Arminius, warning against 
Mohammedans uttered by, 78 ff., 
127; Moslem politics described by, 
136, 150; Young-Turk party de- 
scribed by, 140; Turanism and, 194; 
on changes at Constantinople, 297 ff. ; 
on native officials in East, 304 ff. ; on 
status of woman in East, 306 

Venizelos, Allied agreement with, 229; 
Greek repudiation of, 230 

Versailles Peace, Islam affected by, 
128 ff., 206; secret treaties revealed 
by, 206 ff. 

Victoria, Queen, made Empress of 
India, 244 



Wacha; Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu- 
Chelmsford Report, 258 ff. 

Wahabi, formation of state of, 28, 48; 
government of, 28, 49; successful 
fighting of, 28; defeat of, 29; end of 
political power of, 29; spiritual power 
of, 29; in India, 30; English conquest 



of in India, 30; influence of, 30; 

characteristics of, 31 ff. 
"Wattal, P. K., on overpopulation in 

India, 313 ff. 
Willcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian 

situation, 212 

Yahya Siddyk, on pre-war Moham- 
medan situation, 81 ff. 

Yakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led 
by, 62 

Young Arabia, 171 ff. 

Young-Turk party, rise of, 139 ff. ; na- 
tionalist policy of, 166; Arabian 
nationalism and, 172 ff. 

Young-Turk revolution, 68, 142 

Yugantar, anti-English organ, 250 ff. 

Yunnan, Mohammedan insurrection 
in, 50, 61 ff. i Chinese Mohammedans 
in, 61 

Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Tura- 
nian society founded by, 196 

Zagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions 
with, 215; Milner's compromise with, 
216; opposition to, 216 ff. 

Zaidite Emir, 237 

Zawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 53 
Zinoviev, on Third International, 348 ff. 



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